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Prologue 
 
 
Chinese puzzle1:  
(1) A very difficult wooden puzzle, especially one that consists of a series of 
boxes which fit one inside the next 
(2) Any highly complicated puzzle or problem 
 
The latter is true for sourcing. Firms engage in productive activity in order to achieve their 
goals. Selling goods and services is the ultimate core business of a firm. In order to be able to 
sell products, they need human inputs, physical inputs, and information flows. All of these 
inputs originate from some source. Thus we speak of sourcing inputs. In management and 
organisation studies, sourcing is a highly relevant issue. To provide a first, broad definition 
sourcing is the pro c e s s  o f  f i nd ing  a  s our c e  f o r  th e  inpu t s  f o r  p roduc t i on  and  
subs equen t l y  manag ing  tha t  s our c e . Therefore, a study of sourcing is not so much 
concerned with throughput or output, unless insofar as it affects the choice and management 
of inputs given the ultimate goal of production of goods and services. 
 Sourcing is by no means a new topic. In fact, all organisations need to source. 
However, over the development of modern economies, o r gan i sa t i on s  hav e  b e c ome  mor e  
c omp l ex  and  produc t i on  cha in s  hav e  b e c ome  l ong e r , which changes the nature and extent 
of sourcing. To provide an example: in the old days a farmer directly provided milk to a 
consumer. Thus most sourcing could be done internally, given that no external labour was 
used and that the farmer breaded the cows. In fact, if the consumer would bring her own 
bucket to fetch the milk, no other sourcing was needed. Looking at the common pattern in 
modern societies, the production and distribution process has become much more complex, 
requiring different sourcing. Although farmers often still breed their cows themselves, they do 
not milk the cows by hand anymore. The machines that are used to milk the cow are so 
complex that the farmer can not build them. Therefore it is seen as normal that another firm 
provides these machines. Furthermore the electricity that is necessary to run the machines can 
much more efficiently be produced by yet another company. These are only two examples 
connected to the production process. However, the distribution of milk has also changed 
tremendously. The consumer no longer gets the milk from the farmer, but from the 
supermarket. This implies a number of extra steps. First of all physical transport of the milk is 
needed. At the same time the milk has to be cooled. The transport devices used are fairly 
complicated, and thus externally produced and maintained, and the labour and capital input is 
usually from an external transport firm. The milk is then bottled in a plant and distributed to 
the supermarket. The bottling machines, the packaging materials and the storage are other 
activities that have been added to the production chain and are performed by others than the 
farmer. The scale of the operations has also increased multiple times.  
This example is not the exception but the rule. Production chains have become more 
complex and longer. Production chains involve more players now who produce goods 
together. Furthermore many of these produc t i on  cha in s  hav e  ex t ended  g e o g raph i ca l l y . 
                                                           
1 Chambe r s  21 s t  Cen tu r y  Di c t i o na r y :  Th e  L i v i n g  Langua g e , Chambers, Edinburgh, 1996. 
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This has been facilitated by the rapidly decreasing per unit costs of transportation over the last 
200 years, combined with a much higher speed of transportation. More recently new 
Information Technology has caused severe drops in the costs of communication, which 
further induced the trend towards larger distances. This geographic extension has led to an 
increased ability of firms to produce, sell, and purchase across borders. Kotabe (1992: 6) states 
that global sourcing strategy is: 
 
“Management of the interfaces among R&D, manufacturing and marketing on a 
global basis and of logistics identifying which production units will serve which 
particular markets and how components will be supplied for production, such that 
the firm can exploit both its own advantages and the comparative advantages of 
various countries”. 
 
In this study a slightly different definition of global sourcing strategy will be used. When firms 
s ta r t  f ind ing  and  manag ing  s our c e s  f o r  p roduc t i on  o f  f i na l  p roduc t s  on  a  wor ld -w id e  
bas i s , we use the term g l oba l  s our c ing . First of all, the element of g l oba l  stands out when 
compared to i n t e rna t i ona l . As will be discussed in detail later, what distinguishes global from 
national is simultaneous international economic transfer and managerial integration across 
borders. Second, although the management of the interfaces among R&D, manufacturing, 
marketing and logistics is one of the ways in which a firm’s global sourcing strategy can be 
optimised, it is not the goal of global sourcing strategy. The goal of global sourcing strategy is 
to optimise the supply chain in order to help create advantages for the firm vis-à-vis 
competitors. Thus, global sourcing strategy is an element of firm strategy, which is in strategic 
management generally defined as the way in which a firm creates sustainable competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991). Furthermore the definition of sourcing in this dissertation is really 
how firms find sources to compose their final products both inside and outside of the firm. 
This does not involve the decision which production unit will supply a particular market, 
which is essentially a marketing decision, even though it has an impact on sourcing decisions 
and vice versa. The focus of this study is much more closely linked to outsourcing and 
supplier relations than to production – marketing decisions, which leads to a somewhat 
different definition: 
 
“Globa l  s our c ing  s t ra t e g y  i s  th e  d e c i s i on -making  p ro c e s s  th rough  wh i ch  
f i rms  f ind  and  manage  inpu t s  f o r  f ina l  p roduc t i on  in  an  in t e g ra t ed ,  
in t e rna t i ona l  c on t ex t  in  o rd e r  t o  c on t r ibu t e  t o  th e  c r ea t i on  o f  su s ta inab l e  
c ompe t i t i v e  advan tag e  by  th e  f i rm” .  
 
The r e s ea r ch  que s t i on  this study attempts to answer is closely related to this definition. This 
study is rooted in the academic field of strategic management of the firm. The overarching 
goal of this field of study is to explain performance differentials between firms. Hence the 
main research question in this study is: 
 
HOW DO FIRMS OBTAIN COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE ON 
THE INPUT SIDE? 
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Competitive advantage of a firm is determined by looking at a firm’s performance relative to 
that of competitors. Three possible strategies to obtain competitive advantage on the input 
side will be distinguished in this study. These three strategies are outsourcing, managing 
supplier relations and internationalising the supply base. Therefore three underlying questions 
emerge: 
 
1.  Doe s  ou t s our c ing  l ead  t o  improv ed  f i rm pe r f o rmanc e?  
2 .  Do c o - op e ra t i v e  supp l i e r  r e l a t i on s  l ead  t o  improv ed  f i rm pe r f o rmanc e?  
3.  Does  in t e rna t i ona l i sa t i on  o f  th e  supp l y  bas e  l ead  t o  improv ed  f i rm 
pe r f o rmanc e?  
 
Questions 2 and 3 are treated as extensions of question 1. This implies that supplier relations 
and international sourcing will be studied with regards to outsourced items. There are various 
reasons for this choice, which will be clarified at a later stage. Study ing  s our c ing  s t ra t e g y  
th en ,  i s  v e r y  much  l ike  s o l v ing  a  Chine s e  puzz l e : it involves complex issues and a 
problem with multiple layers (first deciding whether to outsource or not, then deciding on the 
relation type with as well as the location of the supplier). The aim of this study is to help solve 
this Chinese puzzle. To achieve that goal, this study will venture far beyond the borders of 
strategic management into the domains of organisation theory, international business, 
purchasing management and industrial marketing. 
 
The first chapter provides a broad overview of global sourcing strategy. It starts by reviewing 
several strands of previous research on the topic. Chapter 2 then defines some issues in 
sourcing research that have not been handled sufficiently. This helps to facilitate the 
construction of a research framework in the next chapter, which builds upon these gaps in 
existing literature. This framework in chapter 3 serves as the trigger for the empirical chapters 
of the dissertation. Chapter 4 deals with the methodology of the study, discussing both why 
certain methods are applied and how they will be applied. Chapter 5 is the first empirical 
chapter and discusses the relation between outsourcing and firm performance. Chapter 6 
focuses on the impact of buyer-supplier relations on the firm’s competitiveness. Chapter 7 
deals with international sourcing strategy and how this contributes to firm performance. 
Chapter 8 attempts to empirically integrate the various topics and presents a framework for 
understanding trade-offs and interactions between the three topics discussed in chapters 5 
through 7. The ninth and final chapter contains the conclusions of this study. 
 
This study is written in such a way as to shed light on issues that managers struggle with. Most 
likely few managers will be able to grasp all it has to say, including the many data analyses, 
even if they were willing to and would have the time. Such is the discrepancy between 
scientific method and managerial practice. However, I am convinced they will be able to 
identify with the topics and outcomes and see these outcomes as a platform for discussion. 
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Chapter 1: Global sourcing strategy 
 
 
In this chapter an initial overview is given of the topics of interest to this study. The literature 
is reviewed and classifications are provided to guide this review2. The need to review the 
existing literature on global sourcing strategy arises for a few different reasons. First, no full 
review has been given as yet, which may be caused by an underdeveloped body of knowledge. 
For example it is stated that (Swamidass & Kotabe, 1993: 82): 
 
“[T]he topic of international sourcing, which touches several disciplines 
including international trade, business strategy and manufacturing strategy, has 
not received the attention it deserves from researchers”3. 
 
In In t e rna t i ona l  Bus in e s s  studies some reviews have been given concerning topics that are 
intra-organisational in nature. Martinez and Jarillo (1989) discuss a vast number of studies on 
co-ordination mechanisms within MNCs. Birkinshaw (1994) focuses on the role of 
subsidiaries in MNC strategy making. Finally, Cheng and Bolton (1993) argue for greater 
interest in the topic of R&D and multinationals. However, inter-organisational topics have not 
been reviewed in an international context so far. Likewise there are a small number of authors 
that give an overview of sourcing or buyer-supplier relationships, but none of these explicitly 
addresses internationalisation. For example, Beije (1998) reviews publications on how the 
buyer-supplier relationship may facilitate innovation processes. Dyer and Singh (1998) discuss 
literature concerned with how buyer-supplier relations may lead to superior performance. 
Domberger (1998) deals with work on outsourcing. There is also a chapter in Nishiguchi’s 
book on industrial sourcing in Japan (Nishiguchi, 1994) that deals with theoretical approaches 
to sourcing, but this is not internationally comparative in nature either. So a  r e v i ew  tha t  
c ombine s  s our c ing  i s su e s  and  in t e rna t i ona l i sa t i on  i s  l a ck ing . 
 Second, r e s ea r ch  on  r e la t i on s  b e twe en  f i rms  i s  c l ea r l y  on  th e  in c r ea s e  in  th e  
o r gan i sa t i on  and  s t ra t e g y  f i e l d s  (Gulati, 1998) as firms are seen to increase their number of 
interorganisational relations. To some extent the increase in scholarly research can be traced 
back to an increased occurrence of networks of firms in practice and their larger impact on 
business (Ford, 1998; Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller, 1995). Given this increased academic 
interest in what is happening between firms, it would seem appropriate to expect a similar 
change in the international business area. Are international buyer-supplier relations emerging 
and what is their nature? A review of the state of the art in international sourcing strategy will 
lead to topics of future interest and may thus facilitate the development of knowledge on 
international sourcing. 
 Third, at a time when calls are being made to both increase the number of 
interdisciplinary studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Oliver, 1997), and to investigate whether theories 
                                                           
2 This chapter draws heavily upon a paper which was first presented at the 1998 EIBA conference (Mol, 
1998). 
3 One area of research that Swamidass and Kotabe do not explicitly mention is logistics. Other authors 
have picked up this point and stressed the urgency of good logistics in global sourcing (e.g. Levy, 1995; 
Murphy & Daley, 1994). 
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of management can be applied in different countries (Cheng, 1994; Shenkar & Von Glinow, 
1994), global sourcing seems an especially suitable test case. For one, global sourcing definitely 
crosses both functional and disciplinary borders (Kotabe, 1992): analysis of global sourcing 
involves such key economic concepts as ‘vertical integration’ (Joskow, 1985), sociological 
concepts like ‘trust’ (Gambetta, 1988) and political science concepts like ‘bargaining power’ 
(March, 1962). Kotabe (1992, 1998) rightly suggests that global sourcing is a topic on the 
intersection of various functional areas. He particularly mentions the importance of the 
interfaces between R & D, marketing and manufacturing. Sourcing strategy relates to all of 
these functions since important considerations are what technologies to source, for what 
markets to source and what items can be manufactured internally. Then there is the issue of 
differences between countries. Concerning the application of theoretical constructs in 
different countries the case is made (Cheng, 1994) that research should either be applicable 
anywhere in the world or should incorporate the peculiarities of the society and locality where 
it is being done. Given the fact that buyer-supplier relationships may partly be the outcome of 
social and historical developments (Nishiguchi, 1994), it seems worthwhile to explore 
international sourcing strategies in different research settings. This may allow for testing 
whether theories apply universally. Sourcing takes place everywhere, but presumably not in an 
identical way all over the globe. 
 
A review of the ProQuest database substantiates the notion that global sourcing is a topic of 
increasing interest to academics. The ProQuest database is widely used by academics in 
business studies and affiliated areas as a literature source. It provides search options for time 
periods, topics, authors and much more. This brief review looks at the number of peer 
reviewed articles appearing on sourcing and global sourcing every year. In figure 1 the yearly 
number of references containing the word ‘sourcing’ and the combination ‘global and 
sourcing’ is shown. The word ‘sourcing’ includes all forms of sourcing, including domestic 
and international sourcing. The combination with ‘global’ of course reduces the number of 
hits significantly. Over the entire 1970-1985 period only 29 articles feature the word 
‘sourcing’. Before 1986 not a single article containing ‘global’ and ‘sourcing’ appeared. After 
1985 interest in global sourcing rose rapidly, particularly after the seminal article by Kotabe 
and Omura (1989) so it seems. In the latest time period under review, from 1998 to 2000, the 
average yearly number of articles on sourcing rose to 35, while the average yearly number of 
articles on global and sourcing rose to 7. In conclusion figure 1 reveals that the interest in 
global sourcing has risen from none at all to reasonable levels over the last 15 years.  
This makes global sourcing an interesting topic to study for strategic management 
and international business scholars. Interestingly the pattern is little different for articles that 
are not peer reviewed (data not shown). This implies that practitioners have become equally 
interested in global sourcing in recent years. 
 
Figure 1.1: Average yearly number of hits in the ProQuest database on sourcing and global 
sourcing for 6 different time periods. The scale on the l e f t -hand  s id e  refers to hits (articles) 
on s our c ing . The scale on the r i gh t -hand  s id e  refers to hits on g l oba l  and  s our c ing . 
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1.1 Five dimensions of international sourcing strategy 
A survey of the literature resulted in a classification of international sourcing strategy along 
three areas of interest. The entire international sourcing strategy discussion has evolved in 
three areas that partly build upon each other but mostly develop independently. In the first 
area, make-or-buy decisions, authors are particularly concerned with the c on t en t  of sourcing 
strategy, e.g. what parts are outsourced and what parts are not? In the second area the 
emphasis is on the pro c e s s  through which firms source, e.g. what is the nature and extent of 
interaction with and among suppliers? Finally, the third area, international sourcing, is 
concerned with the c on t ex t  in which a firm sources from suppliers, e.g. does the firm source 
from the home base or from abroad? These three areas can be subdivided into five 
dimensions, three of which are not necessarily international in nature. 
Although other representations of the field are possible and viable, these five dimensions 
best characterise the decisions sourcing managers have to take with regard to their 
international sourcing strategy. They are key decisions with respect to the potential for 
improving performance of the firm and heavily dictate the daily activities sourcing managers 
have to undertake at later stages4. Furthermore it seems that all the core pieces in the existing 
literature on sourcing strategy fit well in one or two of these five dimensions. The five 
dimensions are: 
 
1.  Owner sh ip :  th e  d e g r e e  t o  wh i ch  th e  s our c e  i s  a  par t  o f  th e  s our c ing  c ompany ;  
2 .  Re la t i on :  th e  t yp e  o f  r e l a t i on  b e twe en  th e  s our c e  and  th e  s our c ing  c ompany ;  
3 .  Ne twork :  th e  na tur e  and  s t ru c tu r e  o f  th e  n e twork o f  supp l i e r s  o f  th e  s our c ing  
c ompany ;  
4 .  Supp l i e r  in t e rna t i ona l i sa t i on :  th e  d e g r e e  t o  wh i ch  th e  l o ca t i on  o f  th e  supp l i e r  
d i f f e r s  f r om tha t  o f  th e  buy e r ;  
                                                           
4 To substantiate this from a managerial point of view, please consider the scope of these decisions: they 
involve what source to use, how to use that source and the institutional context of sourcing. 
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5.  In t e rna t i ona l  supp l y  d e c i s i on s :  how de c i s i on s  c on c e rn ing  th e  supp l i e s  o f  th e  f i rm 
ar e  o r gan i s ed  b e twe en  c oun t r i e s .  
 
In order to briefly outline how these five dimensions together form international sourcing 
consider table 1 below. The table depicts a historical perspective of where the five dimensions 
first emerged and when they started to attract attention in the mainstream literature. These are 
the starting points of the literature discussion below, which is not to say that any of these 
discussions have faded since. The table is merely a rough overview that will be followed by 
more detailed qualifications later. 
 
Topic Triggered in particular 
by 
Academic literature Applied literature 
Make-o r -buy  
dec i s i ons  
• Ownership 
Vertical integration 
discussion, re-emerging 
with Williamson (1975) 
and later by core 
business considerations 
Developed particularly in the 
early 1980s with the work in 
Transaction Cost 
Economics, now also 
Resource Based View of the 
firm 
Developed particularly in 
the early 1990s with the 
work of Quinn (1992) and 
work on IT outsourcing 
Supp l i e r  
managemen t  
• Relation 
• Network 
The emergence of the 
successful and ‘different’ 
Japanese business 
system in the 1980s 
Developed particularly in the 
mid and late 1990s with the 
work on relational rent, 
network design and trust, the 
latter dating back to 
Granovetter (1985) 
Developed particularly in 
the mid and late 1980s 
with the work on 
Japanese supply chain 
management practices 
I n te rna t i ona l  
sou rc ing  
• Supplier 
internationalisation 
• International 
supply decisions 
The internationalisation 
of the world economy 
and increases in 
international buyer-
supplier relations in the 
late 1980s and 1990s 
Developed in the 1990s after 
the work of Kotabe and 
Omura (1989) 
Developing since the 
early 1990s with a range 
of articles in purchasing, 
logistics and supply chain 
publications 
Table 1.1: A brief historical overview of five dimensions of international sourcing. 
 
Although these five dimensions can not all be investigated over the course of this or any 
single study, they will all be reviewed in order to assess the current status of the literature. The 
remainder of this chapter is structured along the five dimensions and three areas of study. The 
first three dimensions are discussed in section 1.2. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 cover the international 
aspects of sourcing. As the first three dimensions have generally been discussed more and the 
last two are of particular relevance to a study of international sourcing, there is an uneven 
treatment of topics. The first three dimensions are not necessarily international in nature. 
They shall be discussed mainly by references to existing overviews. The international 
dimensions will be discussed in more detail. 
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1.2 Outsourcing, supplier relations and networks 
 
1.2.1 To make or to buy: is that the question?5 
Sourcing is about setting the boundaries of the organisation. Which inputs are to be produced 
by the organisation itself and which are preferably to be dealt with by other organisations or to 
be bought on a spot market? Whatever theoretical perspective one chooses to study firm 
behaviour, it is a s in e  qua  non  to include at least some element of sourcing. Any effort of a 
theory of the firm that does not specify the boundaries of the organisation and the way it 
obtains inputs to produce its products is doomed to fail. Consider two important frameworks 
that currently compete with each other in the theory of the firm debate, transaction costs 
economics (Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1975) and the resource based view of the firm (Penrose, 
1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). Based on the transaction costs approach many studies distinguish 
between the make  and buy  options (e.g. Walker, 1988; Walker & Weber, 1984). This equals a 
choice between internal and external sourcing, which will be used throughout this study. An 
explanation of whether a firm makes or buys something is found in the level of production 
and transaction costs. The transaction costs largely depend on the three variables as s e t  
sp e c i f i c i t y ,  f r equen c y  and unc e r ta in t y . Especially asset specificity is highly correlated to 
make or buy. The higher the asset specificity of a given transaction, the more likely a firm is to 
internalise the underlying activity (Walker & Weber, 1984). Based on the resource based view 
of the firm (see a/o Mahoney & Pandian, 1992), it has been proposed that firms ought to use 
their resource and competence base as a key to the sourcing decision (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994). 
Firms ought to make those items close to and within the core of their organisation’s 
competence base, whereas other items can be sourced from the best external provider 
available worldwide (Quinn, Baruch, & Zien, 1997; Quinn & Hilmer, 1994). 
 
So there is substantial academic debate on outsourcing. However, outside the walls of 
academia sourcing is also quite eminent. This may be considered from both a buye r ’ s  and a 
supp l i e r ’ s  point of view. Any organisation that wants to provide a product has to engage in 
sourcing decision making. That organisation may end up as either a buyer or an in-house 
producer of (parts of) the product. If it decides to buy certain items, we find a supplier or spot 
market on the other end, providing the product. In the real world many, if not most, of the 
organisations that we observe are in fact suppliers to other organisations (Simon, 1991). Final 
(consumer) products are still regarded as highly important, but no longer constitute a majority 
of the world’s economic activity as they once did, in the times of Adam Smith. In a sense 
many of the markets Smith (1976) and a string of economists after him discussed, where 
heaps of single suppliers fulfilled some aggregate demand, have been replaced by networks of 
firms that together produce some output. As the economist Richardson (1972: 883) frames it: 
 
“I was once in the habit of telling pupils that firms might be envisaged as islands 
of planned co-ordination in a sea of market relations. This now seems to me a 
highly misleading account of the way industry is in fact organised” 
and (Richardson, 1972: 892): 
                                                           
5 Reviews of literature related to this topic can be found in Cheon, Grover and Teng (1995) and 
Domberger (1998). 
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“Firms are not islands but are linked together in patterns of co-operation and 
affiliation. Planned co-ordination does not stop at the frontiers of the individual 
firm but can be effected through co-operation between firms. The dichotomy 
between firm and market, between directed and spontaneous co-ordination is 
misleading; it ignores the institutional fact of inter-firm co-operation and 
assumes away the distinct method of co-ordination this can provide”. 
 
While Smith (1976) is famed for his work on the internal division of labour, recall the example 
of the nail factory, we have now entered an era in which there is a much stronger external 
division of labour between firms. Products have become increasingly complex and are 
produced by a larger number of actors. This requires more co-ordination efforts on the one 
hand but allows for more efficient specialised production on the other hand. 
 
1.2.2 Different types of relations6 
Two different ways of managing (internal and external) suppliers exist: exit and voice (Helper, 
1991; based on Hirschman, 1970). Exit-based relations tend to focus on maximising the 
buyer’s short-term utility. As soon as a supplier does not fulfil expectations, buyers will switch 
under an exit-based approach. Voice-based relations on the other hand use buyer-supplier co-
operation to improve in the long run. Helper (1991: 785) defines the two as: 
 
“1) exit, where the buyer’s response to problems with a supplier is to find a new 
supplier, and 2) voice, where the buyer’s response is to work with the original 
supplier until the problem is corrected.”7 
 
Helper and Sako (1995) raise the question whether cultural or environmental conditions do or 
do not influence sourcing behaviour. Based upon the exit-voice distinction Japanese and US 
suppliers are compared (Helper & Sako, 1995). They appear to converge in their management 
of sourcing. Where there used to be major differences, these are now shrinking. However, 
other research (Dyer, Cho & Chu, 1998) actually suggests that the differences between 
Japanese, Korean and US firms are still substantial. 
Terms somewhat similar to exit and voice have been used for this distinction, 
including: non-co-operative and co-operative (Axelrod, 1984; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992); non-
embedded and embedded (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996); low and high trust (Gulati, 1995) 
and arms length and partnership relations (Matthyssens and Van den Bulte, 1994). All of these 
continuums carry slightly different meanings but share as a core element that the interaction 
intensity between the parties differs at the two ends of the continuum. In a voice relation the 
parties will exchange more information, communicate on a far more regular basis and 
exchange different kinds of information. Some important explanatory variables that have been 
                                                           
6 A well-developed review in this area of research is given by Ring and Van de Ven (1992) and Dyer & 
Singh (1998). For trust in particular see Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995). 
7 Note that a supplier to some extent faces the same choice when deciding whether or not to market a 
product to a certain buyer. For suppliers there is less leeway for voluntary decision-making though, since 
the need for turnover will largely determine the choice to engage in a relation with a buyer. In this study 
only the buyer’s perspective will be discussed because this study deals with the input side of the firm. 
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mentioned for this difference include trustworthiness of partners, loyalty, uncertainty and 
dependence between parties. 
Successful relations between buyer and suppliers are expected to involve at least 
some trust, especially in the longer run (Nooteboom, Berger and Noorderhaven 1997; Gulati, 
1995). A buyer-supplier relationship that is embedded in a network and societal structure, is 
likely to survive more frictions and is therefore potentially more successful in a dynamic 
setting (Uzzi, 1997). In embedded relations parties to the exchange are connected within the 
surroundings of a tightly knit network (Granovetter, 1985). In Granovetter’s terms the 
argument of embeddedness is (1985: 481-482): 
 
“the argument that the behavior and institutions to be analyzed are so 
constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent is 
a grievous misunderstanding”. 
 
The key variable in deciding upon exit or voice ties is uncertainty about future events (Gulati, 
1998; Luhmann, 1968): the higher the uncertainty, the more beneficial voice ties seem to be. 
Voice relations are used to absorb uncertainty about future events. Once a strong tie has been 
established, firms can try to use it to create sustainable competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 
1998). This is what Dyer and Singh (1998) refer to as relational rent, a term that intends to 
describe the potential synergy between buyer and supplier. From political science stems the 
idea that power and mutual dependence govern the relationship between buyers and suppliers 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Firms can be seen as coalitions of interest that seek resources from 
the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In that sense relations with suppliers should to 
some extent also be seen as struggles for power between buyers and suppliers. This is obvious 
from the fact that terms are always negotiated. Relational rent is partly a matter of win-win 
situations but to some extent also a struggle for appropriating rents by both parties. This 
implies it is not only necessary to co-operate with another party but also to be aware that there 
are conflicting demands between the parties. Both will seek to appropriate as much of the 
joint profits as they can, which requires governance mechanisms to balance interests. 
 
1.2.3 Supplier networks: structure and design8 
Finally, a limited amount of work has been undertaken in the area of design and structuring of 
supplier networks. More and more buyers organise their suppliers as a network (Lorenzoni & 
Baden-Fuller, 1995; Miles & Snow, 1992). Through tiering of suppliers, a practice in which the 
automobile industry is particularly advanced (Dyer, 1996), indirect steering of smaller suppliers 
is obtained. Tiering implies developing a hierarchy between 1st level, 2nd level and 3rd level 
suppliers. A key aspect of tiering is modularisation whereby a supplier of the 1st level is given 
full responsibility for a single module of a product (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995). This 
supplier organises the production of the module itself, such that the buyer is relieved from 
some supply chain co-ordination activities. This changes the nature of the supply network as it 
implies moving up responsibility in the chain towards large suppliers. 
In the research tradition of Burt (1992) and others, Uzzi (1996; 1997) has 
investigated the antecendents of embeddedness in supply networks and the consequences that 
                                                           
8 For a review of work on sourcing networks see Ford (1998). 
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embeddedness has for performance. Embeddedness consists of three key components: trust, 
fine-grained information and joint problem-solving mechanisms. In Uzzi’s terms (1997: 43-44) 
trust is based on heuristic-based processing instead of calculativeness and monitoring devices 
‘to catch a thief’ are absent. Fine-grained information is, unlike prices in markets, characterised 
by detailed and tacit understanding that has a holistic structure (Uzzi, 1997: 45). Uzzi states of 
joint problem-solving mechanisms that (1997: 47):  
 
“[E]mbedded ties entail problem-solving mechanisms that enable actors to 
coordinate functions and work out problems ‘on the fly’”. 
He further states that (1997: 47): 
“[j]oint problem solving mechanisms are mechanisms of voice. If a firm is able 
to design a supplier network to maximise the existence of these three 
mechanisms of trust, fine-grained information and joint problem-solving 
mechanisms, it can obtain the most benefits of them.” 
 
Dyer, Cho and Chu (1998) suggest that a network of suppliers is best segmented between 
durable arm’s length suppliers and strategic partners. Their data suggest that Japanese 
automobile manufacturers have been able to do so, while Korean car companies are locked 
into the partner model and US firms into the arm’s length model. Dyer et al (1998) state this 
accounts for the competitive advantage of Japanese firms in manufacturing. Partners are 
viewed as the firm’s preferred suppliers. Accordingly Kamath and Liker (1994) find that, 
unlike the common assumption, first tier suppliers in Japan are not always employed in the 
same manner. Different roles exist, namely partner, mature, child and contractual. Ruigrok 
and van Tulder (1995: 79) come up with six ideal types of supplier networks. In each of these 
networks the division of suppliers is different as well as the responsibilities given to those 
suppliers. In some cases first tier suppliers are actively involved in the management of lower 
tiers, in others they are not. Japanese firms usually keep up a more tightly structured network 
of suppliers (Dyer et al, 1998; Ruigrok & Van Tulder, 1995). A major trend in supplier 
network management is the reduction of the number of suppliers. Firms now tend towards 
single sourcing. Single, multiple and parallel sourcing (Richardson, 1993) are three ways of 
approaching suppliers. Single sourcing implies that one organisation supplies all the quantities 
of a product or service. Multiple sourcing is based on the fact that two or more firms 
continuously compete for orders of a given product or service in a market-like fashion. 
Parallel sourcing is another way of stimulating competition between suppliers. One supplier 
supplies all the orders for product A, whereas another supplier covers product B (Richardson, 
1993). These suppliers are expected to continuously improve their offers and compete with 
one another for new orders. 
 
 
1.3 Global sourcing as a firm strategy 
The internationalisation of firms has been a topic for academic research for over 40 years 
now. It has in fact grown into a whole new field of study, usually denoted as International 
Business (IB). International trade, as one of the predecessors of IB even goes back centuries, 
at least to Ricardo’s comparative advantage concept. From trade the focus has slowly shifted, 
first to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and over the last 15 or so years also to the firm’s 
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processes, strategies, and organisation9. This shift is the result of a conscious effort to open up 
the black box of the firm. 
 
Different forms of internationalisation 
Internationalisation takes various forms, a few of which are international sales, international 
licensing, international Research & Development (R & D), international Mergers & 
Acquisitions (M & A) activities, FDI and international sourcing. In fact firms can 
internationalise in all areas of management and there is neither a fixed sequence nor a fixed 
format for internationalisation10. International sales, through exports or local production, and 
advertising are forms of marketing across borders that serve to increase the potential market 
and size of a firm. International licensing and R & D are forms of international exploitation 
and accumulation of the knowledge base of the firm. International M & A is a form of 
expanding the firm’s scale or scope to either increase the market share or expand the number 
of markets in which a firm competes. FDI is a form of internationalisation of a firm’s primary 
processes, manufacturing or providing services, to increase the presence in foreign markets or 
to provide cheaper or better products and services for the home country. International 
sourcing is a form of internationalisation to optimise the supply base by either using internal 
or external suppliers that either possess innovative and unique capabilities or produce at a 
lower cost or both11. Much research has gone into explaining the motives for FDI flows and 
export patterns (Dunning, 1993). Far less is known about the reasons to source 
internationally. 
So, why would firms want to engage in international sourcing? In the literature 
different reasons are mentioned that mostly fall under the header of increased competitiveness 
(e.g. Kotabe, 1998). These reasons can roughly be divided into two categories. The first 
category is a well-known layman interpretation of international supplies and concerns the 
search for the lowest costs (Dunning, 1993), which leads North American, Japanese, and 
European firms to South East Asia and other areas of the world with low labour costs. In 
reality firms hardly ever choose the countries with the lowest labour costs, but instead those 
with the lowest integral costs per unit and a guaranteed minimum quality level. This includes 
costs of transportation and productivity differences. This explains why it are not the countries 
with the lowest per hour labour costs, like many African countries, that receive inward 
investment or international sourcing orders. At the other end, in the second category, we find 
                                                           
9 International trade and FDI are of course still on the agenda, but are rarely seen as the single dominant 
force in the future of IB, see for instance the 1998 special issue of the Journal of International Business 
Studies, volume 29: 1. 
10 Many modern firms counter the thesis of Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) that international 
sales is always the beginning of the internationalisation process. Internationalisation may also start with 
sourcing or finding international employees. To illustrate that there is no fixed format, consider global 
Internet start-ups or the firm from Antwerp that sells cookies in Belgium and then expands its 
geographical scope to include the Netherlands. Both follow very different internationalisation 
trajectories. 
11 Similar to Porter’s (1980; 1985) positioning argument, a good supplier is one that offers either a 
differentiated product or a product with a superior cost position. Adding unique characteristics can 
differentiate a product. Please note that the term characteristics should be interpreted in the broadest 
possible sense here to include for instance counter-trade obligations or new capabilities. A more efficient 
transformation process leads to lower costs than competitors. 
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the more specialised, quality and innovation seeking international sourcing, which is discussed 
far less in public space but more frequently in academia. Firms look for specific bases of 
knowledge, which fairly often are centred in clusters of economic activity (Porter, 1998). The 
inputs produced in such clusters are often, though not necessarily, more high tech and more 
innovation intensive.  
At the theoretical level this discussion of lowest cost versus highest value added has 
been captured by Zajac and Olsen (1993) who see this as two distinct research traditions. The 
cost minimising argument stems from Williamson’s Transaction Cost Economics (1981) and 
maintains that firms are out to minimise their combined costs of transacting and producing12. 
The opposite argument, transaction value maximisation, requires a process view of 
transactions (Zajac & Olsen, 1993). It poses that a low cost of transacting is not competitively 
advantageous per se, if another exchange leads to a higher value outcome. Looking at both 
sides of this coin provides a healthier look at the problem. After all, what firms seek from 
transacting is to create added value, which comes not from either minimising costs or 
maximising outcomes, but from a joint maximisation of outcomes minus costs. Synergy 
between transaction cost economics and resource-based explanations lies at this crossing. 
 
Global sourcing 
Global sourcing has been identified as a separate research topic in the late 1980s (Kotabe & 
Omura, 1989). The earliest academic reference to international sourcing appears to be Leff’s 
(1974) article in the Columbia Journal of World Business. Leff (1974) is concerned with 
production location decisions of U.S. firms that were seeking international expansion at the 
time. Leff seems to follow the argument of Aliber (1971) that plant location is essentially 
optimised by playing off currency fluctuations well. In the late 1970s more work emerged on 
the international sourcing pattern of firms (Buckley & Pearce, 1979; Lall, 1978). This was 
done under the header of intra-firm exports, with data obtained from trade statistics (Lall, 
1978), or under the header of sourcing for final markets (Buckley & Pearce, 1979). However, 
none of this earlier work is concerned with internal and external sourcing as competing modes 
implying their definitions do not match what is currently thought of as sourcing.  
Kotabe (1992), who made global sourcing into an IB topic in the first place, refers to 
global sourcing as involving sourcing for components as well as sourcing for final products. 
The sourcing part is thus rather straightforward: it simply involves all actions and transactions 
needed to obtain a marketable product (Kotabe, 1992). However, what makes it global often 
remains rather vague in most definitions. Consider the definition given by Murray, Kotabe, 
and Wildt (1995b): 
 
“Global sourcing involves setting up production operations in different 
countries to serve various markets, or buying and assembling components, 
parts or finished products world-wide”. 
 
                                                           
12 Obviously the absolute level of transaction and production costs that a firm can achieve is to a large 
extent determined by the institutional and business environment in which it operates featuring issues like 
currencies and business-government relations. Section 1.6 will deal with this issue in some more detail. 
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This definition suggests that all MNCs producing abroad, and even domestic firms which use 
inputs from a number of countries, engage in global sourcing. Or is there a hidden sub-
criterion in the definition? Other terms used besides global sourcing, include international 
sourcing (Levy & Dunning, 1993), multinational sourcing (Birou & Fawcett, 1993) and 
offshore sourcing (Frear, Metcalf & Alguire, 1992; Kotabe & Swann, 1994). International 
sourcing is defined as buying by a firm in one country from a firm in another country (Levy & 
Dunning, 1993). Multinational sourcing (Birou & Fawcett, 1993), though not formally defined, 
seems to have more or less the same connotation as international sourcing. Offshore sourcing 
(Frear et al, 1992; Kotabe & Swann, 1994) has only been applied to US firms that produce and 
purchase abroad and then export products to the United States. Thus, global sourcing appears 
to be the most comprehensive of the four terms and includes multinational, international and 
offshore sourcing. The term international sourcing will be used throughout most of this study 
since it is the most general term. 
 
Two dimensions seem to be underlying the notion that sourcing or any other activity can be 
global. The first is plainly that activities need to take place across borders. Sourcing 
domestically from one US firm to another can not rightfully be called global. The second 
dimension, that is needed to distinguish international activities from global ones is the 
functional integration of activities across borders (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Gereffi & 
Korzeniewicz, 1994). For example, it is stated that a commodity chain only becomes global 
when an attempt is made to organise and optimise an already international commodity chain 
by parties in different countries (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994). Thus we cannot speak of 
global sourcing unless there is an integration of the sourcing function across geographical 
borders. In order to classify the various international and domestic sourcing strategies 
available, a framework will now be presented13. It is a rather general framework that can be 
applied at both the level of a single transaction and the level of a sourcing relationship. The 
first dimension is quantitative and concerns the internationalisation of the actual sourcing 
pattern. The second dimension is qualitative and concerns the level and location of decision 
making on international sourcing.  
 
The first dimension of international sourcing is at the same time highly logical and not trivial. 
It indicates where the supplier to a certain transaction or the supplier in a relationship is 
located. Any statement on international sourcing strategy would at least seem to require some 
basic knowledge of the internationalisation pattern. For the sake of simplicity a dichotomy will 
be proposed between domestic and international sourcing. A much more refined 
categorisation is possible empirically, for example between different areas of the world. This 
categorisation will appear in section 1.4. Likewise, the measurement difficulties that may arise 
when suppliers themselves start locating across borders will be ignored for the time being. 
This first dimension is concerned with the content of a firm’s international sourcing strategy. 
 
The  d i s t in c t i on  b e twe en  domes t i c  s our c ing  and  in t e rna t i ona l  s our c ing  i s  th e  
f i r s t  d imens i on  o f  in t e rna t i ona l  s our c ing  s t ra t e g y .  
                                                           
13 Another useful classification is provided by Kotabe and Omura (1989). Their classification, however, 
does not deal with the extent of functional integration across borders. 
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The second dimension needs some more elaboration. In a seminal article, Perlmutter (1969) 
distinguished between three types of headquarters orientation. He also refers to these three as 
‘attitudes’ and ‘views of the world’. The three different types of headquarters orientation are 
ethnocentric, polycentric and geocentric. In ethnocentric organisations ‘home standards are 
applied for persons and performance’ (Perlmutter, 1969: 12). The headquarters of the 
organisation take the central role in ethnocentric organisations and subsidiaries are mainly 
replications of one another. In polycentric organisations standards are ‘determined locally’ 
(Perlmutter, 1969: 12). Here subsidiaries have a lot of initiative and they may actually be the 
decision making unit. Geocentric organisations try to find ‘standards which are universal and 
local’ (Perlmutter, 1969: 12). Geocentric organisations try to integrate the various subsidiaries 
and headquarters. Perlmutter refers to them as truly international companies that, at the same 
time, identify with national interests. Perlmutter’s types will not be used to distinguish 
between different attitudes, but the three types will instead be applied to the location of 
decision making. A decision taken at headquarters can be said to be ethnocentric, one in an 
independently operating subsidiary is polycentric and an integrated international decision is 
geocentric. Although many, more recent attempts exist to classify organisations along the 
same ‘attitude’ dimension, of which the integration-responsiveness (IR) grid (Prahalad & Doz, 
1987) is probably the most well-known, Perlmutter’s original threefold distinction14 will be 
maintained if only because it suffices for current purposes. This second dimension deals with 
the process through which a firm deals with international sourcing. 
 
The  d i s t in c t i on  b e twe en  e thno c en t r i c ,  po l y c en t r i c  and  g e o c en t r i c  
o r gan i sa t i ona l  d e c i s i on  making  i s  th e  s e c ond  d imens i on  o f  in t e rna t i ona l  
s our c ing  s t ra t e g y .  
 
Table 2 incorporates the two dimensions of internationalisation and decision making in a 3-
by-2 matrix15. For any given sourcing transaction or sourcing relationship there is a cell 
available. However, this matrix cannot incorporate the entire sourcing strategy of a given firm. 
It only addresses the question of internationalisation: where a decision is taken and whether it 
involves cross-border transhipment. Six different possibilities exist. Centralised sourcing [1] 
occurs when a sourcing decision (either a single transaction or a buyer-supplier relationship) is 
taken at headquarters level and the actual source is within the same country. For example, an 
                                                           
14 The integration-responsiveness grid (Prahalad & Doz, 1987) and the types of Perlmutter have a lot in 
common. The key to the integration-responsiveness grid is that firms at the same time try to optimise 
global integration and local responsiveness. Perlmutter’s ethnocentric organisation type fits the quadrant 
of high integration and low responsiveness. The polycentric organisation type fits the quadrant of low 
integration and high responsiveness. Finally, the geocentric organisation type fits the quadrant of high 
integration and high responsiveness. This geocentric type is very similar to Bartlett and Ghoshal’s 
transnational type that also seeks to combine high integration and high responsiveness. 
15 It is recognised that the table bears some resemblance to Porter’s framework of international co-
ordination (Porter, 1986b: 27). However, Porter only distinguishes between ‘low’ and ‘high’ co-
ordination without incorporating the notion that co-ordination may be achieved via different routes. 
‘High’ co-ordination occurs in different forms, through centralised decision making and through 
extensive information flows at a decentralised level. Of course Porter (1986b) in his framework is not 
particularly concerned with sourcing either. 
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automobile company may use in-house engines, constructed at the corporate headquarters. 
Best-in-world sourcing [4] uses the same principle of centralised decision-making, but instead 
decides upon a source outside of the home country. This may be done to obtain scale 
economies with a best-in-world supplier (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994), e.g. in the area of semi-
conductors. Local-for-local sourcing [2] on the contrary is both decentralised, with decisions 
being taken at the subsidiary level, and domestic. A standard example concerns the rental of 
storage capacity near a factory in the host country. Multinational sourcing [5] is decentralised 
and international. What actually occurs is that a unit that is independent from organisation 
units in other countries and therefore often locally oriented, sources internationally. This is 
essentially a replication of type 4 at the local level instead of the global level. Proximity-based 
sourcing [3] is domestic sourcing by an internationally interdependent organisation unit. For 
example, the subsidiaries or businesses of a firm together decide to opt for nearby delivery of 
electric power and consequently look for local suppliers. Finally, global sourcing [6] is both 
interdependent and international in scope. Consider the business unit of a chemicals firm, 
located outside the home country, which sources a catalyst from one supplier with a small 
number of production sites spread all over the world. 
 
Decision 
Place 
Ethnocentric 
(headquarters) 
Polycentric 
(subsidiaries) 
Geocentric 
(integrated) 
Domestic sourcing 1. Centralised sourcing 2. Local-for-local sourcing 3. Proximity-based 
sourcing 
International sourcing 
 
4. Best-in-world sourcing 5. Multinational sourcing 6. Global sourcing 
Table 1.216: Six different strategies for sourcing by place (internationalisation) and decision 
(internal organisation). Decision making dimension is based on Perlmutter (1969). 
 
 
1.4 Internationalisation of the supply base17 
What do we know empirically about international flows of goods between buyers and 
suppliers? There is a lot of anecdotal evidence to support the notion that many firms have 
partially and some have entirely international supply chains and that most firms have an 
increasing number of international suppliers. It is this latter phenomenon, internationalisation 
of the supply base, which will be the focus of this section. There is also some literature, 
although it is not very sizeable, that supports this notion. Two types of research strategy have 
been unleashed in the literature to determine the extent of internationalisation in sourcing. 
The first type uses secondary, statistical data at the macro level, most notably Wyckoff (1993). 
The second type uses primary, firm level data from questionnaires or interviews (e.g. Kotabe 
& Omura, 1989). 
 Wyckoff (1993) estimates internationalisation of sourcing based on input-output 
tables of national economies. Six countries are mentioned: the US, where 13% of sourcing is 
                                                           
16 The categorisation developed here in table 1.2, as well as the categorisation in table 1.6, mainly serve 
the purpose of assessing current literature. They are not intended as building blocks for the theoretical 
framework to be developed in chapter 3. However, particularly in chapter 7 reference will once again be 
made to these frameworks. 
17 A part of this section draws upon Mol and Koppius (forthcoming). 
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international; Japan, with 7% international sourcing; France, with 38%; Germany, with 34%; 
the UK, with 37% and Canada, with 50%. A methodological remark is that these data are 
based on fairly rough international trade statistics, which disguise for example ownership 
effects and re-imports. Given these limitations, it is still obvious that firms in smaller and 
geographically less isolated countries source more from abroad.  
For some 2,000 US firms with about 18,000 foreign affiliates Kotabe and Swan 
(1994) calculated an offshore sourcing ratio. This ratio is defined as the sum of US 
manufactured imports from foreign affiliates of US firms plus platform exports from these 
foreign affiliates to third countries, divided by parents’ total sales. This ratio is a measure of 
the importance of foreign production activity as a part of the firm’s total production (sales). 
This is not sourcing of components but sourcing of final products18. It was calculated for 
three points in time. In 1977 it stood at 6.2% and it subsequently increased to 7.8% in 1982 
and 10.3% in 1989.  
Buckley and Pearce (1979) similarly investigated sourcing for final markets, a 
measure of sourcing of final products. In a sample of 156 MNCs they found results similar to 
the Wyckoff study. For Japanese companies a ratio of overseas production to total sales was 
found of 2.4%. For French companies the ratio stood at 8.0%. For the Swiss (91.6%), 
Benelux (70.7%) and the ‘joint and other’ (69.7%) MNCs a much higher ratio was obtained. 
For other countries, such as the US, this ratio was not reported. From another ratio that 
Buckley and Pearce mentioned, overseas production as a percentage of overseas production 
plus the parent’s extra group exports, it becomes clear that US MNCs used overseas 
production far more than exports. For Japanese firms the opposite pattern was visible at that 
time. As mentioned in section 1.3 sourcing as it was defined in the 1970s is mostly a measure 
of a firm’s international manufacturing structure and did not include external sourcing. 
The Kotabe and Omura (1989) study provides data on 43 European and 28 Japanese 
MNCs in the United States. The major sourcing strategies of these MNCs are described in 
terms of components sourcing and assembly location. Sixteen of the European firms both 
assemble and source components in the home country and seventeen both assemble and 
source components in the US. Of the ten remaining European MNCs, four both assemble 
and source components from another developed country (which may be European). Three 
firms source components from the home country and then assemble these in the US One 
firm sources components from less developed countries and assembles in the US. One firm 
sources components from the home country and assembles in the US. The remaining firm 
sources components from the US and assembles in a less developed country. Of the 28 
Japanese firms in the sample 15 both assemble and source components in the home country 
as the major sourcing strategy. Five firms both assemble and source components in the US. 
Seven firms source components from the home country, which they subsequently assemble in 
the US. Only one firm relies on sourcing of components and assembly in a less developed 
country.  
Based upon the same survey of Japanese and European MNCs, Swamidass and 
Kotabe (1993) calculate average component sourcing. For manufacturing in the US, 64.3% is 
sourced within the US, 29.9% in the home country 1.8% in other developed countries and 4% 
                                                           
18 This measure, like the next one, has very little to do with the make-or-buy decision discussed in 
section 1.2. It relates more closely to location theories like Vernon’s (1979) product life cycle theory. 
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in less developed countries. For manufacturing in the home country with subsequent exports 
to the US, they find 6.5% sourcing in the US, 88.5% sourcing in the home country and 2.5% 
each in other developed countries and less developed countries. The latter data are the only 
data outside the US in the literature on component sourcing. However, no distinction is made 
here between Japan and Europe.  
In a later study Murray, Kotabe and Wildt (1995a) used a survey among US 
subsidiaries of Fortune 500 companies. This time 104 responses were obtained, 71% of which 
were European and 21% Japanese. On average these firms sourced 73.7% of their 
components from the US, 15.9% from the home country, 7.6% from other developed 
countries and 2.8% from less developed countries. In terms of assembly, 85.7% took place in 
the US, 7.9% in the home country, 3.5% in other developed countries and 2.9% in less 
developed countries.  
Other studies provide a less detailed view: Birou and Fawcett (1993) report 13% of 
sourcing to be international for a sample of 149 US firms in the US; Monczka and Trent 
(1991b), for a sample of US companies in the US, find 15% of sourcing to be international. 
Table 3 summarises these results. 
 
Author(s) Country Dom. Int. Home Host Other Devel. 
(Wyckoff, 1993) US 87% 13% - - - - 
(Wyckoff, 1993) Japan 93% 7% - - - - 
(Wyckoff, 1993) France 62% 38% - - - - 
(Wyckoff, 1993) Germany 66% 34% - - - - 
(Wyckoff, 1993) UK 63% 37% - - - - 
(Wyckoff, 1993) Canada 50% 50% - - - - 
(Kotabe & Swann, 1994) US (1977) 93.8% 6.2% - - - - 
(Kotabe & Swann, 1994) US (1982) 92.2% 7.8% - - - - 
(Kotabe & Swann, 1994) US (1989) 89.7% 10.3% - - - - 
(Buckley & Pearce, 1979) Japan - - 97.6% 2.4% - - 
(Buckley & Pearce, 1979) France - - 92.0% 8.0% - - 
(Buckley & Pearce, 1979) Switzerland - - 8.4% 91.6% - - 
(Buckley & Pearce, 1979) Benelux - - 29.3% 70.7% - - 
(Kotabe & Omura, 1989) US/ass.† - - 37.2% 48.8% 9.3% 4.7% 
(Kotabe & Omura, 1989) US/ass.‡ - - 53.6% 42.6% - 3.6% 
(Kotabe & Omura, 1989) US/comp.† - - 46.5% 41.9% 9.3% 2.3% 
(Kotabe & Omura, 1989) US/comp.‡ - - 78.6% 17.9% - 3.6% 
(Swamidass & Kotabe, 1993) US§ - - 29.9% 64.3% 1.8% 4% 
(Swamidass & Kotabe, 1993) Eur./Jap. 88.5% - - - 9% 2.5% 
(Murray et al, 1995a) US/ass.§ - - 7.9% 85.7% 3.5% 2.9% 
(Murray et al, 1995a) US/comp.§ - - 15.9% 73.7% 7.6% 2.7% 
(Birou & Fawcett, 1993) US 87% 13% - - - - 
(Monczka & Trent, 1991b) US 85% 15% - - - - 
Table 1.3: Summary of quantitative research findings: domestic, international, home country, 
host country, other developed country and developing country sourcing. All findings have 
been recalculated into percentages. Note: authors use very different ratios and methods (see 
text). Sometimes assembly (ass.) and components (comp.) are distinguished. 
† European MNCs in the United States 
‡ Japanese MNCs in the United States 
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§ A combination of European and Japanese MNCs in the United States 
 
Although marked differences exist between the aforementioned empirical studies, some 
similarities appear too: 
a. The degree of internationalisation in sourcing seems to be negatively related to the size of 
the focal country. This is entirely consistent with intuition. MNCs in smaller countries, such as 
Switzerland or Canada, use international sourcing more than Japanese or US MNCs do. 
b. Inside the parent’s home country MNCs do not make much use of international sourcing. 
Apparently these MNCs have over time built a large network of suppliers in their home 
country or even in their immediate proximity. This seems to be consistent with the idea of 
industrial districts (Marshall, 1919), such as Silicon Valley where firms lump together. 
c. MNCs outside their home countries have the most internationalised sourcing pattern. Their 
sourcing pattern appears to be mainly bi-national, divided between the home country and the 
host country. However, some firms demonstrate dissimilitudes and source from other 
developed countries or less developed countries. 
d. None of the studies addresses the effects of the formation of economic regions, such as the 
EU or NAFTA. Some studies were undertaken before these regional developments and 
others do not explicitly include these developments in their frameworks. It is reasonable to 
expect that the smaller countries mentioned before like Switzerland and Canada source much 
from within the economic areas in which they operate. Such regional sourcing is quite 
different from global sourcing. 
 
 
1.5 On the internal organisation of international sourcing 
Most of the research in the area of international sourcing focuses on the (dis)advantages of 
and sometimes the barriers to international sourcing (cf. Levy, 1995; Min et al, 1994; Monczka 
& Trent, 1991a; Murphy & Daley, 1994; Murray et al, 1995a). This area was largely discussed 
in the previous section. Only a smaller part is concerned with how the management of 
international sourcing takes place. Do firms centralise their sourcing decision-making or do 
they instead let their subsidiaries take these decisions (Faes, Matthyssens and Vandenbempt, 
2000)? This part will now be highlighted. 
 
The original Kotabe and Omura (1989: 113) study predicted a shift from a polycentric 
organisation to a more internationally co-ordinated, that is geocentric, organisation. This was 
based on the belief that strategy decision making became more global over the course of the 
1980s (Porter, 1986a). However, the sourcing data that Kotabe and Omura had at their 
disposal did not allow for testing of this proposition. In a later study (Kotabe & Swann, 1994) 
there is some indirect evidence that a shift in decision making has indeed occurred in the (late) 
1980s for US MNCs. R&D responsibilities are reported to be moved away from headquarters 
towards subsidiaries. Kotabe and Swan expect a related shift towards improved manufacturing 
capability of subsidiaries. Since their data do not shed any light on either the decision-making 
unit or the degree of interdependence between different subsidiaries, it is hard to achieve 
formal conclusions on this issue. Finally Murray, Kotabe and Wildt (1995a) report that the 
environment of the firm has a major impact on what is an effective way of sourcing. 
International sourcing strategy ought to be contingent upon the circumstances under which a 
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firm sources, it is maintained. Outside sourcing there is also evidence that that it can be 
effective to manage a firm by combining multiple centres of excellence (Doz, Asakawa, Santos 
and Williamson, 1997). 
 None of the studies described just now provides explicit data on the sourcing 
decision making unit. However, especially the last point made above seems an interesting 
starting point for analysis. If sourcing strategy is found to be contingent upon a number of 
conditions, then it seems reasonable to assume that organisation of sourcing may do so too. 
In fact, MNCs in Europe do indeed use different decision making units for their international 
sourcing activities. A sample of some 11 pilot interviews in Europe, that we held with some of 
the largest MNCs such as GE, Nissan, Royal Dutch / Shell and Unilever, pointed at different 
ways of internally organising sourcing strategy (Tecson, 1998) 19. Some of the firms opted for 
local or national decision making in sourcing. Others co-ordinated their sourcing mainly on a 
European scale. Several firms were in fact in the process of integrating various national 
operations into a European sourcing organisation. Finally, a third category used global 
product divisions or business units as the decision-making unit. Often, however, there was a 
mixture of the three different ways of decision making. This might for example amount to 
centralised purchases of commodities, local purchases of low value, non-critical items such as 
basic steel constructions, and global purchases of division-specific components. What 
appeared to be important predictors of how these firms organised themselves internationally 
were the industry  / product and the home country. Table 4 summarises some other empirical 
research that has been undertaken on the internal organisation of international sourcing. 
These findings are limited to the United States only. 
 
Authors Sample Findings on mode of sourcing 
(Guinipero & 
Monczka, 1990) 
Survey of 24 large MNCs 
from the United States 
All 24 operate some corporate purchasing staff 
Only 8 operate an international purchasing department 
Others operate on a more decentralised basis 
(Frear, Metcalf, 
& Alguire, 1992) 
Survey of 135 US 
purchasing managers 
66%: user organization (decentralised) 
35%: corporate purchasing (centralised) 
10%: company-owned trading operation 
11%: purchasing department of subsidiaries  
8%: purchasing department of JV partners 
(Min & Galle, 
1991) 
Survey of 141 US 
purchasing managers 
engaging in international 
sourcing 
38.1 %: assigned buyer in purchasing unit 
34.1%: manufacturer’s representative 
10.3%: foreign buying office 
10.3%: import broker 
7.9%: trading company 
7.1%: foreign subsidiary 
4.8%: import merchant 
0.8%: state trading agency 
(Handfield, 
1994) 
Survey of 97 US purchasing 
managers of which 56 used 
foreign sources 
49.1%: directly between buyer and supplier 
41.8%: supplier’s US representative 
5.5%: external trading company 
3.6%: international procurement office 
4.1%: face to face 
1.9%: automatic order system 
                                                           
19 The current author was the co-investigator on the EU-sponsered research project in the Netherlands 
carried out by Gwen Tecson of the University of the Phillipines in 1998. 
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Table 1.4: Empirical research assessing the degree to which firms have integrated their 
international sourcing function across borders. Where is the international sourcing function 
located? 
 
It appears that most firms treat their international sourcing operations as an extension of their 
existing domestic sourcing. In order to achieve functional integration across borders, a firm 
needs to construct some spatial organisation of sourcing. This could be achieved through a 
centralised international sourcing department, regional International Purchasing Offices 
(IPOs) or a globally integrated sourcing network. None of these three seems to be very 
prominent. Thus the integration across borders has not been well developed. Birou and 
Fawcett (1993: 37) conclude in their analysis of the extent to which there is such integration: 
 
“To date, relatively few firms have implemented truly global sourcing strategies; 
however, study results show that the international sourcing practices of some 
firms are directed at obtaining a systemwide competitive advantage”. 
 
With so little yet known, it seems that further fieldwork is needed. On the basis of a set of 
testable propositions the different ways of organising could be further investigated. There are 
three important issues to look into, (1 )  s ca l e  e c onomi e s ,  (2 )  home  c oun t r y  e f f e c t s ,  and  (3 )  
in t ra - indus t r y  e f f e c t s . First the nature of scale economies in the component or product 
influences sourcing decisions. Where large-scale economies exist with no need for local 
adaptation, centralisation seemed to persist in the interviews (Tecson, 1998). Similarly, in line 
with the general predictions of Prahalad and Doz (1987), with no scale economies present 
local subsidiaries take the main decisions. If scale economies do exist, but some form of 
adaptation is needed, flexible global contracts are often used.  
A second issue concerns the home country. On the basis of earlier studies (Bartlett 
& Ghoshal, 1989; Chandler, 1986; Johansson & Yip, 1994; Whitley, 1992a) Japanese firms are 
thought to have lower local adaptation. European firms adapt to local circumstance to a far 
larger extent, whereas American firms tend to maximise global scale. This ought to be 
reflected in their sourcing strategies.  
A third and final question is whether firms mimic one another (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983) and therefore replicate the sourcing organisation of direct competitors. Bandwagon 
effects may lead to synchronisation of decision making between firms (on IT outsourcing see 
Lacity & Hirschheim, 1995). Firms in an industry should show more or less the same pattern 
of organisation. 
When firms go abroad they need to adapt to their newly found environments. The 
adaptation pattern refers to how and how easily a firm adapts to local conditions if it 
internationalises sourcing operations. This involves such processes as co-developing new 
suppliers to attain the desired levels, like Toyota has done in Australia (Langfield-Smith & 
Greenwood, 1998), or bringing in transplant suppliers as Japanese electronics firms in the U.S. 
have done (Kenney & Florida, 1995). Empirically this is an underdeveloped area of study, but 
conceptually some good understanding has arisen. Kotova and Zaheer (1999) develop a 
framework that increases understanding of what happens when a firm enters a host 
environment. Firms operating abroad are faced with what is generally referred to as the 
‘liability of foreignness’. Kostova and Zaheer (1999: 68) suggest the extent of this liability is 
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strongly determined by “the host environment’s perception of and attitude toward foreign 
firms”. If these attitudes and perceptions are hostile, MNCs will often be pressed to engage in 
local co-operation or other symbolic acts.  
 
Limits to internationalisation 
Combining the overviews in sections 1.4 and 1.5 leads to the notion that much sourcing can 
be located in cells 1 and 2 of table 1.2. That is, there is very substantial domestic sourcing that 
is organised either ethnocentrically or geocentrically. In addition, there appears to be some 
international sourcing going on that best fits cells 3 and 4. The amount of sourcing that can be 
categorised in cells 5 and 6, what was referred to as proximity-based sourcing and global 
sourcing respectively, is rather limited. Thus it seems fair to say that previous literature 
indicates that global sourcing is not a common firm strategy. 
The results seem to point at a limited degree of internationalisation in sourcing until 
the mid 1990s, especially in the larger countries (U.S. and Japan). Where there is more 
international sourcing, this is often sourcing from the home country by foreign affiliates of 
MNCs. The studies discussed do not always allow for a comparison of internal and external 
sourcing in terms of their internationalisation. Generally speaking it appears that internal 
sourcing is more likely to be international than external sourcing. The functional integration, a 
second important trait of a global organisation, is not always achieved either. So far, there is 
no global sourcing across the board despite the contention that the lowest production costs 
are invariable found abroad. Apparently there still exist important inhibitors which offset 
these lower production costs and cause firms not to source globally.  
 
Some authors explicitly discuss these inhibitors. Min, LaTour, and Williams (1994: 371) 
mention the following: political stability; tariff barriers; cultural and communication obstacles; 
trade regulations and agreements; currency exchange rates; cultural differences; variations in 
ethical and quality standards. Scully and Fawcett (1994: 43) put forward some similar reasons, 
but also some different ones: cultural/language differences; duty/customs requirements; JIT 
sourcing requirements; logistics support for longer supply lines; finding qualified foreign 
sources; fluctuations in currency exchange rates; knowledge of foreign business practices; 
nationalistic attitudes and behaviour; understanding the political environment. 
A more general categorisation appears appropriate. There are three categories of cost 
drivers that exist solely in the international context, which together inhibit international 
sourcing, similar to Luostarinen’s (1989) geographic, cultural and economic distance. 
Geography is solely concerned with the question ‘from where to where’? The relational 
aspects are concerned with what happens in the buyer-supplier relation itself. Finally, the 
environmental aspects are concerned with what happens around the buyer and supplier, i.e. 
the context of the buyer-supplier relation. Distinct streams of social science research fit in 
with these issues. 
 
The first category is related to g e o g raphy  and how it differs between buyer and supplier 
(geographic distance in Luostarinen, 1989). Both people and goods are imperfectly mobile, so 
physical distribution costs are an obvious part of geography-related costs: they are more or 
less linearly related to distance. These include increasing difficulties in logistics and physical 
supply and the problems of just-in-time delivery under a global sourcing policy. The role of 
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physical distance in economic transactions is one of the key objects of analysis in economic 
geography. Early work in economic geography (Weber, 1909) focuses on production costs as 
related to location. In Weber (1909) there is a cost penalty connected to increasing the 
distance of a supply line. In new economic geography (Krugman, 1991) this assumption is still 
an important part of simulation models. The nature of these distance–related costs is not 
really described by Krugman. Distribution costs are an obvious part of distance-related costs. 
Other costs are to be included too though. In international sourcing, synchronisation of 
business processes can be a problem as Levy (1995) describes, long delivery time may cause a 
product to lose value or run out of fashion. Therefore co-ordination problems between the 
marketing and production or purchasing functions increase with distance. Another case in 
point is a difference in time zones, which restricts joint work in some cases. In general, the 
larger the physical distance, the higher the transportation and co-ordination costs the firm 
faces in international sourcing. 
A second category is in problems within the buye r - supp l i e r  r e l a t i on sh ip  itself 
(economic distance in Luostarinen, 1989). This includes lack of information concerning the 
product offerings of a supplier, variations in quality standards, different business practices and 
language- or culture-based difficulties in buyer-supplier communication. The reasons for these 
problems have been addressed extensively in the economics of information and economic 
behaviour theory (Arrow, 1974; Simon, 1998). Information theory focuses on the limits of 
individuals and organisations in perceiving, receiving, storing and communicating information. 
These differences cause known information to be incomplete. This is expressed in a lack of 
information concerning a supplier’s product offerings, variations in quality standards, different 
business practices and language- or culture-based difficulties in buyer-supplier communication 
(Min, LaTour & Williams, 1994; Scully & Fawcett, 1994). An example is that frequently, 
buyers will not have a good overview of all available suppliers world-wide. Similarly, 
insufficient knowledge of a particular culture may be an obstacle in international 
communication (Hofstede, 1980). Not being able to communicate with a partner efficiently 
makes the building of relationship harder. It is difficult for mutual trust to develop when 
partners do not know each other. This leads firms to stay within the confines of their existing 
social networks (Rangan, 2000). Thus in many cases firms will not even be exposed to 
international suppliers, and if they are, they are less likely to choose such a supplier over a 
local one. Of course, as the buying firm starts internationalising its manufacturing network 
through foreign direct investment, these problems may be tempered. Clearly, the more 
unfamiliar two firms are with one another, the more costly buyer-supplier differences are as 
time and investments are needed to get to know the other party in order to operate effectively. 
The third and final category consists of differences in the env i r onmen t s  of the buyer 
and supplier (cultural distance in Luostarinen, 1989). Having to get to know these different 
environments induces all kinds of deliberation costs and this phenomenon is generally 
referred to as the ‘liability of foreignness’ (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). The environment 
contains business elements and institutional elements. Participants in the market represent 
business elements. Non-market organisations make up the institutional environment. 
Regulatory and political difficulties, tariff barriers as well as different ethical standards are part 
of the institutional environment. Fluctuations in currency exchange rates are part of the 
business environment. Political instability, regulatory and political difficulties, nationalistic 
attitudes, tariff barriers, trade regulations as well as different ethical standards are elements of 
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the institutional environment that raise the need for local responsiveness (Min et al, 1994; 
Scully & Fawcett, 1994). Fluctuations in currency exchange rates are a part of the business 
environment that strongly influences sourcing decisions (Min et al, 1994). The entire set of 
systematic differences among firms of different nationalities is the focus of the business 
systems literature (Whitley, 1992a; Whitley, 1992b). National business systems are complex 
systems in which firms, governments and other institutions interact. These business systems 
are highly idiosyncratic and difficult to change. Firms that establish themselves abroad usually 
bring along the national business system of their home country (Whitley, 1992b). How a 
business system is constituted influences both the sourcing strategy of a firm and where the 
suppliers of the firm are located (for the case of Britain and Germany see Lane and 
Bachmann, 1996). For example, firms that are strongly rooted in the Dutch business system 
are less likely to establish relations with Polish suppliers. And as noted before U.S. firms are 
more likely to steer relations at arm’s length than are Japanese firms. 
In general, the larger the environmental differences the higher the transaction costs 
the firm faces in international sourcing. It is clear that these three types of barriers interact 
with one another. For example, as physical distance increases, the likelihood of a different 
language or of cultural differences does too. Therefore the classification is not to be seen in 
terms of three strictly separate categories. However, separate measurements of each category 
appear to be possible. Table 5 briefly recaptures the previous discussion. 
 
 Geography Buyer-supplier relation Environment 
Based on Products need to be 
physically relocated 
Buyer and supplier need to 
become familiar with each 
other 
Buyer and supplier must get 
to know a different 
environmental setting 
Examples • Logistical difficulties 
• Synchronisation 
becomes harder 
• No JIT delivery 
• Lack of information 
• Linguistic and cultural 
difficulties 
• Higher evaluation costs 
• Regulatory, political 
and ethical differences 
• Exchange rate shifts 
Table 1.5: three categories of inhibitors of international sourcing. 
 
 
1.6 Antecedents for cross-national differences20 
A key methodological consideration in the area of global sourcing strategy is what to do with 
differences between firms from different countries. Institutional effects can have a profound 
impact on firms’ sourcing strategies. The essence of comparative research is finding 
differences and similarities. Taking different nations as an independent variable in 
management research implies a quest for variables that express these differences and 
similarities in that particular context. Different classifications have been given of the type of 
variables needed. Cheng (1994) suggests that different contexts can be represented by 
political, legal, cultural and economic variables. According to Cheng, universality of 
knowledge could be obtained if cross-national variation can be explained by incorporating 
these context dependent variables into the research framework. 
                                                           
20 This section, as well as the next section on the role of information technology, does not discuss the 
content of global sourcing strategy but are included to provide an understanding of the background 
against which the field of global sourcing strategy is evolving. 
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Whitley gives a somewhat more detailed description of variables. He uses the concept 
of a business system (Whitley, 1992a; Whitley, 1992c), defined as (Whitley, 1992c: 6): 
 
“particular arrangements of hierarchy-market relations which become 
institutionalised and relatively successful in particular contexts.” 
 
Business systems can be seen to exist at different levels, for example at the national level. Any 
business system is characterised by (1) the nature of the firm, (2) market organisation and (3) 
authoritative co-ordination and control systems. Whitley (1992c) further describes 18 
variables, all related to these three characteristics, to describe variations between business 
systems. Of these 18 variables, six appeared to be of special interest in the context of sourcing 
strategy. These six are (Whitley, 1992c: 9): 
1. The degree to which private managerial hierarchies co-ordinate economic activities; 
2. Specialisation of managerial capabilities and activities within authority hierarchies; 
3. The extent to which risks are managed through mutual dependence with business 
partners and employees; 
4. The extent of long-term co-operative relations between firms within and between sectors; 
5. Stability, integration and scope of business groups; 
6. Dependence of co-operative relations on personal ties and trust. 
On the basis of these variables statements can be made concerning systematic (national) 
differences in the level of outsourcing, the nature of buyer-supplier relations and the scope of 
these relations.  
 
No such specific categorisation is needed here to further develop the argument. Four 
important dimensions of nationality were mentioned above (Cheng, 1994): legal, political, 
cultural / institutional and economic systems. If these four contextual dimensions are 
matched with the five dimensions of international sourcing strategy, a set of 20 independent 
variables is obtained. Table 6 identifies these 20 variables and their relations to both sourcing 
strategy and national context. The effects of these 20 independent variables on the five key 
elements of sourcing strategy will now be discussed. It is rather obvious that important 
relations exist between the independent variables, but these will not be discussed here in order 
not to complicate matters too much.  
 
 Legal Political Cultural / 
Institutional 
Economic 
Ownership Contract law Societal 
sensitivities 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
Market 
imperfections 
Relationship type Competition law Concept of 
control 
Societal trust  Extent of business 
cycle fluctuations 
Internationalisation Local content 
regulation 
Inclusion / 
exclusion 
Openness towards 
other countries 
Level of autarky 
Network design Competition law Bargaining 
rules 
Power distance Distribution of firm 
size 
Adaptation pattern Technical 
standards 
Receptivity of 
host country 
Cultural distance International trade 
patterns 
Table 1.6: Contextual variables that influence key elements of international sourcing strategy. 
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Which are the key contextual variables that determine national differences between the extent 
of outsourcing, i.e. ownership? The nature of buyer-supplier contracts, repeatedly brought up 
by Williamson (1979), is to a large extent determined by the national system for contract law. 
If this law does not offer the appropriate protection or guarantees for a buyer, this is likely to 
lower the extent of outsourcing. On the political side of things, societal sensitivities can cause 
firms to not even consider outsourcing activities. If outsourcing means the shedding of some 
jobs or a total loss of jobs to another country, in case of international outsourcing, this may 
undermine a firm’s legitimacy in its environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: chapter 3). The 
cultural context includes uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 1980), which is deeply rooted in 
outsourcing decisions. If there is uncertainty contracts with external suppliers will be 
incomplete. An uncertainty avoiding decision-maker wants to avoid risky contracts and will be 
more likely to outsource under such conditions. Finally a prominent economic explanation of 
internalisation is the imperfect functioning of markets (Coase, 1937). Firms can internalise 
activities if the market is a less than perfect instrument for production. Market imperfection 
clearly varies between countries, meaning that the pressure to internalise will differ between 
countries. Those countries with less market imperfection will generally have a lower extent of 
internal sourcing. 
 The comparative dimensions of supplier relations have only been researched to a 
limited extent so far. Comparisons have focused mainly on the United States and Japan, 
although not entirely. Helper and Sako (1995) discuss the possibility of convergence of 
sourcing relations in the U.S. and Japanese automobile industries. Dyer, Chun and Cho (1998) 
compare supplier relations in the U.S., Japanese and Korean automobile industries. Sako 
(1992) compares the functioning of trust in Japan and the U.K. Nishiguchi (1994) similarly 
compares relations in the British and Japanese electronics industries. A country’s competition 
law dictates whether a particular relation is deemed legal. In some countries quasi-integration 
of a supplier is not tolerated. This makes a true voice type of relation more difficult to achieve, 
since a voice relation often involves (cross) shareholdings. Second, the political context of the 
home country provides the MNC with a particular concept of control (Ruigrok & Van Tulder, 
1995). This concept of control determines to what extent and in which fashion a firm is 
willing to set up dependence relations with suppliers. Third, the level of trust has been shown 
to differ in societies and business systems, which has strong effects on supplier relations. As 
Sako (1992) argues high trust leads to a different type of relations than low trust. In Japan 
there is a large tendency towards these trust-based relations while in the U.K. there is a much 
smaller tendency (Sako, 1992). With high institutionalised trust it is easier to build voice 
relations than with low trust (Helper, 1991). Finally, Nishiguchi argues that business cycle 
fluctuations, a key element of a nation’s economy, cause changes in supplier relations 
(Nishiguchi, 1994). With large business cycle fluctuations it becomes more profitable to use 
suppliers as a buffer. If the business cycle is low, suppliers will be parted from and once it 
rises they will be rehired. Thus if business cycle fluctuations are abundant, meaning the 
economy is unstable, the exit type of relations can be expected to be more popular. 
 The degree to which a firm internationalises its supplier network is connected to its 
home and host country, which determine the extent to which international sourcing is viable. 
International sourcing is more complicated for those firms that face strong local content 
regulation in their respective host environments (Kenney & Florida, 1995). LCR forces a firm 
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to redesign its sourcing strategy to one that is economically less than optimal. At the political 
level pressures may arise to include or exclude suppliers. If many long-term, solid relations 
characterise a country its firms will have a stronger tendency to include particular suppliers 
while excluding suppliers from rivalling groups (Ruigrok & Van Tulder, 1995). In politically 
sensitive industries such as aircraft construction or shipbuilding this is a common practice. In 
case of government orders, national states interrupt the supplier search process by assigning 
suppliers. This mechanism can strongly alter the internationalisation pattern of the firm. 
Similarly particular suppliers may have to be excluded from the process because of political 
unwillingness to deal with them. A cultural factor that influences this process of 
internationalisation is the degree to which the home and host countries are open to exchange 
(see for example Servan-Schreiber, 1968). A firm from a home country that is not open to 
exchange will have little experience in interacting with other national cultures. This will hinder 
internationalisation of its supply chain. The economic variable that influences 
internationalisation is the degree to which a country is self-sufficient. Firms from smaller 
home countries need to go international in a much earlier stage as they face a need for all 
kinds of resources and for a larger market that the home country can not fulfil. 
 Firms design supply networks in many different ways, affecting the structure and 
management of these networks as well as the number of suppliers. Competition law again 
determines the legality of particular supply network constructions. If shareholdings in 
suppliers, large market shares of vertical chains or single sourcing are not enticed by 
competition law, a firm will not use these to the full extent. The bargaining rules that form 
supply networks vary by country, as some social environments are more inductive to 
particular bargaining strategies (Tinsley & Pillutla, 1998). In particular it is shown that 
negotiators in different countries bring different goals to the table. As these goals of the 
bargaining strategy grow more towards give-and-take it becomes easier to form and structure 
solid supply networks. Furthermore, if the power distance within hierarchies that is known to 
vary across countries (Hofstede, 1980) can be extended to the inter-firm level, this has 
consequences for sourcing strategy. In countries with a high power distance it will be more 
common to structure a supply network and make it more hierarchical. How the firm size in a 
country’s economy is distributed adds to these previous three variables. In a country with 
many small firms it is less common to find highly structured tiered supply networks. Roles 
change more frequently in such egalitarian networks. Buyers in one situation may be suppliers 
in another situation. However, if larger firms dominate the economy they may be able to 
dictate terms to their smaller counterparts, effectively introducing a tiered network. 
The adaptation pattern of the firm indicates its ability to adjust its supply base when 
moving into a host environment. One problem of a legal nature is the different legal standards 
that are prescribed when a firm moves into a host environment. Pending upon how different 
these standards are from what a firm is used to at home this may create adaptation problems. 
If the national home standards are particularly idiosyncratic, a firm is likely to encounter more 
problems (David, 1985). Complementary to the ‘distance between technical standards’, the 
receptivity of the host country to receive firms from a particular home country matters when 
adapting. It is widely known that some combinations of home and host countries do not fare 
so well as others when it comes to FDI patterns due to political or societal resistance 
(Dunning, 1993: part 3). Thirdly, there is a cultural distance between home and host countries 
(Kogut & Singh, 1988) that affects the ease with which home and host partners interact with 
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one another. How large the cultural distance is, will co-determine the adaptation pattern in the 
host environment. Finally, the history of previous economic interaction between the home 
and host country, as expressed by historical trade patterns, will be a factor in determining the 
ability to adapt to local conditions. If a long history of economic ties between two countries 
exists, this will generally make it easier to adapt. 
 
 
1.7 Introducing the role of IT in sourcing 
Recently it has been suggested that sourcing strategy is undergoing severe changes due to the 
rise of new technologies. Since the early 1990s multinational corporations have been actively 
restructuring their global supply bases. Information Technology (IT), in particular the internet, 
is providing new opportunities for supporting these restructuring efforts (Shapiro & Varian, 
1998). Although most public attention was originally focused on the role of electronic 
commerce for marketing consumer goods, firms are increasingly opting for electronic forms 
of purchasing. Business-to-business trading over the Internet is considered to have a much 
more promising future than business-to-consumer trading in the long run. Electronic sourcing, 
using electronic means to either initiate a transaction or a relationship with a supplier or to manage a 
relationship with a supplier, is the general term for this phenomenon. However, as yet not very 
much is known about which types of products or transactions are suitable for trading over the 
Internet. Neither do we have a clear idea as to the form this type of trading will take. Will we 
see more long-term co-operative relationships or should we expect an increased number of 
auctions for single transactions? This may have obvious implications for the dimensions of 
sourcing discussed earlier. 
In principle, IT allows for more market-oriented international sourcing strategies. For example, 
firms can conduct electronic auctions with their suppliers or set up Internet catalogues for 
selling and purchasing goods and services. Electronic auctions21 are already enormously 
popular on the Internet within the business-to-consumer and consumer-to-consumer 
segments on sites like eBay.com, which started operations in 1995. By 2000 it had an annual 
turnover of more than $5 Billion spread among 29.7 million users. Academic research on 
electronic auctions has, so far, been scarce. One of the reasons is that electronic auctions have 
only recently started to find widespread application in business-to-business practice. In the 
business-to-business context this involves procurement auctions, and to a lesser extent, sales 
auctions. Internet catalogues, like Amazon.com, are the most familiar and popular form of 
electronic commerce activity.  
However, there is not only a tendency towards improving the effectiveness of the 
market mechanism through IT. More idiosyncratic forms of IT have become available as well, 
like Intranet catalogues and dedicated electronic supplier networks. Their popularity would 
seem to run counter to the trend towards market-related forms of electronic trading. An 
example of more co-operative solutions is Cisco’s Connection Online (CCO), in which 
Cisco’s suppliers co-operate with each other to jointly produce the inputs that Cisco needs. 
                                                           
21 A typology of web-based auctions, based on the numbers of buyers and sellers is provided by van 
Heck and Vervest (1998). Appendix D will discuss the broader relation of electronic solutions to firm 
strategies. This section merely serves as an introduction and reflects the fact that the rise of new 
technologies is crucial to understanding changes in sourcing strategies. 
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Many large firms are implementing Intranet catalogues to gather and display supplier data for 
ordering purposes. Ariba and CommerceOne are just two of the firms active in selling these 
applications. So IT a l s o  suppor t s  c l o s e  c o - op e ra t i on  b e twe en  buy e r  and  supp l i e r  f o r  
exampl e  in  th e  f o rm o f  ex t rane t s . 
 
Electronic sourcing strategy combines two fields of interest, sourcing strategy and electronic 
markets, which are important for practical and academic reasons. A brief introduction of 
electronic market theory is therefore in place. Although some research has been done in this 
area, it has by no means been conclusive. Much theorising has already occurred as to what 
would be the effect of electronic markets on the choice between market and hierarchy, 
starting with Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987). Most of this work occurs in a transaction 
cost framework. Most of the Information Management scholars involved in this ‘markets vs. 
hierarchies’ debate have tended to suggest that outsourcing becomes more beneficial after the 
introduction of IT in the sourcing process. Malone et al (1987) proposed that a shift would 
occur from the hierarchical mode of sourcing towards the market mode of sourcing. Thus, 
not only would firms outsource more, but the transaction costs in the market would also 
decrease tremendously. In a later counter-proposition a ‘move to the middle’ was suggested 
(Clemons, Reddi, & Row, 1993) as the transaction costs of building up networks of firms 
using electronic means will also decrease with the introduction of IT. IT enables further 
construction of inter-firm networks. More recently the idea has come up that it could go any 
way, that is towards market, hierarchy or network, pending upon the circumstances under 
which a firm operates (Holland & Lockett, 1997). Holland and Lockett (1997) include the type 
of product and the competition in a firm’s markets as important predictors of the kind of 
swing that IT can induce in sourcing relations.  
This literature suffers from two weaknesses. First, it is extremely difficult to measure 
the ‘shifts’ that the literature predicts. Given the length of time over which such changes are 
suggested to occur, and the inability to control for all other changes over this time period 
hypothesis testing seems difficult if not impossible. Hence this literature largely remains 
conceptual in nature unless one is willing to move from a ‘shift’ to a ‘fit’ discussion22. Second, 
the focus of this literature has largely been on predicting the form of sourcing meaning 
management of the buyer-supplier process and the (international) context have largely been 
ignored. Far less theorising has been undertaken to determine what IT will do to 
internationalise a firm’s sourcing strategy or to analyse what IT does to trust in inter-firm 
relations. More research is needed to link new forms of IT to organisational strategies. 
 
Thus a key question is: what are the effects of new IT and E-commerce on firms’ sourcing 
strategies? Conceptually there are many different answers to this question. For buying 
companies electronic sourcing can potentially lower costs since many actions formerly 
performed by people can be automated. Furthermore other actions can become irrelevant 
altogether due to increased information availability. Electronic sourcing will certainly increase 
                                                           
22 In appendix D a f i t  framework is developed. If fit becomes the focus of analysis, the question is no 
longer what the consequences of IT are but how IT is best applied in supporting and improving existing 
sourcing relations given the characteristics of these relations. In the electronic markets area the work of 
Holland and Lockett (1997) probably comes closest to a fit perspective. Appendix D is best read right 
after chapter 6. 
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the range of potential suppliers as search costs will be substantially lower in international 
markets given the increased information availability and the use of automated search 
mechanisms like agents. Furthermore the transparency of markets will generally increase as a 
consequence of electronic sourcing since prices and other product attributes are only a click 
away. However, the costs of evaluating product offerings of suppliers will increase because 
there are more suppliers to evaluate and a possible information overload will occur. 
Evaluating distant and unknown suppliers will be more costly because firms can not rely on 
existing social networks (Rangan, 2000). Electronic sourcing also allows for the establishment 
of a far more integrated supply chain because linking different elements of the supply chain 
becomes easier. Using corporate information systems in sourcing (Clemons et al, 1993) can 
help overcome part of the friction between globalisation and localisation. These information 
systems can be both intra-organisational and inter-organisational in nature. One intra-
organisational example is a large European MNC, which uses a central database of preferred 
suppliers (Tecson, 1998). Local plants or national subsidiaries can pick suppliers from this 
database at will. An inter-organisational example is the electronic sourcing system that has 
been set up by a large company like GE. These are essentially networks where buyers and 
suppliers connect. 
 It remains unclear to what extent sourcing will become more global as a 
consequence of new information technologies. As suggested before, current sourcing is 
mainly regional or bi-regional. Using electronic sourcing will increase the range of suppliers 
and decrease the costs associated with physical distance. Communication between buyers and 
suppliers will become less costly too. However, electronic sourcing will not influence 
environmental barriers to global sourcing, and especially not the institutional barriers in the 
environment. As the degree of international sourcing increases, firms will actually have to face 
these barriers more often. It can generally be expected that internationalisation in sourcing will 
increase as a consequence of electronic sourcing, but not to what extent this will happen. 
Electronic sourcing may facilitate international buyer-supplier relations and remove some of 
the barriers to international sourcing. Research in this area will generate both managerially 
relevant information and much needed academic knowledge on inter-firm relationships in the 
network era (Castells, 1996). Later some evidence will be presented that deals with this issue. 
 
 
Chapter summary 
Chapter 1 provided an overview of literature on global sourcing strategy, which is a relatively 
new field of study. Global sourcing is a field of interest for both academics and practitioners. 
It allows academics to deal with multifaceted theoretical problems, hence the reference to 
‘global sourcing as a Chinese puzzle’. Sourcing practitioners are increasingly engaged in global 
sourcing activities and would benefit from more research on this topic. 
 
Three areas of global sourcing were distinguished: outsourcing, supplier management and 
international sourcing. Five dimensions within these three areas were discussed. Supplier 
management was subdivided in supplier relations and networks. International sourcing was 
subdivided in supplier internationalisation and international supply decisions. Then there was 
outsourcing. The review showed that there is an interesting and increasing literature on 
international sourcing strategy, in particular on the dimensions of outsourcing and supplier 
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management. The extent of supplier internationalisation is generally surprisingly limited. 
When firms do have international suppliers these are mostly located in the same economic 
region or in the home country of a host multinational. Internal sourcing is usually more 
international than external sourcing. Various categorisations of international sourcing 
strategies were produced. These categorisations served the purpose of ranking the literature. 
The chapter also addressed two key drivers of change in sourcing strategy, cross-national 
differences and new Information Technology to provide a background against which the field 
of global sourcing is evolving. 
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Chapter 2: The research agenda 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to identify important gaps in the sourcing literature and to propose 
how this study can contribute to this literature. The first section reviews the literature along 
the five dimensions proposed in chapter 1. Section 2 summarises the findings of this and the 
previous chapter and lists key points for future research. In section 3 the method through 
which this study attempts to contribute to the sourcing literature, replication with extension, is 
discussed in more detail. At the end of this chapter the necessary groundwork has been laid to 
start construction of a conceptual framework in chapter 3. 
 
 
2.1 Gaps in previous literature 
The five dimensions along which the literature was reviewed will now be revisited with the 
explicit aim of finding significant gaps in this literature. In section 1.1 these 5 dimensions were 
presented as: 
1.  Owner sh ip :  th e  d e g r e e  t o  wh i ch  th e  s our c e  i s  a  par t  o f  th e  s our c ing  c ompany ;  
2 .  Re la t i on :  th e  t yp e  o f  r e l a t i on  b e twe en  th e  s our c e  and  th e  s our c ing  c ompany ;  
3 .  Ne twork :  th e  na tur e  and  s t ru c tu r e  o f  th e  n e twork o f  supp l i e r s  o f  th e  s our c ing  
c ompany ;  
4 .  Supp l i e r  in t e rna t i ona l i sa t i on :  th e  d e g r e e  t o  wh i ch  th e  l o ca t i on  o f  th e  supp l i e r  
d i f f e r s  f r om tha t  o f  th e  buy e r ;  
5 .  In t e rna t i ona l  supp l y  d e c i s i on s :  in  wha t  par t s  o f  th e  f i rm de c i s i on s  c on c e rn ing  th e  
supp l i e s  o f  th e  f i rm ar e  made .  
This section addresses these five dimensions again, particularly in terms of strengths and 
weaknesses of the literature and concerning the relation between the five dimensions and the 
concept of performance. The aim of this section then, is to locate key weaknesses and 
strengths of the existing literature. Similar to the previous chapter this implies that certain 
topics will now be reviewed that will neither be part of the theoretical framework nor of the 
empirical analysis following that. 
 
1. Owner sh ip  
The ownership dimension is by far the most widely researched dimension of global sourcing 
strategy. Most academic attention on sourcing has gone to finding explanations for the make 
versus buy decision. For example we now know what the effects of asset specificity are on 
sourcing relations: high asset specificity decreases the likelihood that firms use a market mode 
of sourcing (Walker & Weber, 1984). Instead firms will opt for internal sourcing or for 
external sourcing with a strong co-operative (‘voice’) element. Likewise it is clear that 
uncertainty plays a major role in determining the type of sourcing. With high uncertainty firms 
will not outsource in the market mode of sourcing but opt for internal sourcing (Walker, 
1988).  
 
What has remained a highly controversial issue is the explanation of the relation between asset 
specificity and make-or-buy decisions. While transaction cost economics has maintained that 
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high asset specificity causes internalisation (Williamson, 1985), others have argued differently. 
Williamson (1985) and some of his colleagues (Heide & John, 1988; Masten, 1993) suggest 
that the need to provide safeguards against opportunism causes a firm to internalise activities. 
If these activities are sourced from an outside partner this partner might benefit from 
behaving opportunistically. Critics of TCE have addressed the role of opportunism and 
provided alternatives. They doubt that opportunism is such an omnipotent power because 
market parties are not anonymous actors (Granovetter, 1985). It is argued that the invisible 
hand of the market is itself the cap on opportunism (Hill, 1990). If a firm in the market 
behaves too opportunistically, its reputation among other firms will decrease and consequently 
its possibilities to acquire new business will drop. In that sense almost every transaction carries 
in it a ‘shadow of the future’ (Axelrod, 1984). The fact that an organisation knows it will deal 
with another party again at some point in the future strongly constrains opportunistic 
behaviour by that organisation. Others have argued that opportunism is not as dominant in 
the marketplace as Williamson suggested (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Ghoshal and Moran 
(1996) further point at the normative consequence of transaction cost economics: managers 
that are instructed that opportunism is the rule rather than the exception will adjust their own 
behaviour accordingly. This normative implication is seen as negative as it will encourage 
managers to behave opportunistically, thereby turning TCE’s opportunism into a ‘self-
fulfilling prophecy’ (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). More opportunism in the marketplace is seen 
as an undesirable state.  
The alternative explanation that has risen in the 1990s is usually referred to as the 
knowledge based view (Grant, 1996), which is seen as somewhat parallel to resource-based 
explanations. It claims that firms over time build capabilities and routines (Nelson & Winter, 
1982) that allow it to perform certain activities better than outside parties. Every firm has 
some kind of inherent advantage or core competence (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), which it is 
better able to exploit than other organisations are. This is where TCE and the resource and 
knowledge based approaches fundamentally differ. While TCE claims that internalisation of 
activities arises as a consequence of imperfections in the market primarily due to opportunism 
and bounded rationality, the other approaches see externalisation of activities as one 
appropriate route to follow in case a firm does not have internally available the needed 
resources and knowledge. 
However, these two views need not be different regarding their predictions on 
outsourcing. The knowledge-based view also predicts that high asset specificity, be it in the 
form of firm specific knowledge and capabilities, leads to internalisation (Grant, 1996). 
However, the explanation of knowledge based scholars is that asset specificity is a 
consequence of routines and capability building inside the firm whereas TCE is only 
marginally interested in the origins of asset specificity, and sees asset specificity as the 
outcome of a previous economising choice. 
  
The influence of the make-or-buy decision on a firm’s effectiveness is still not quite clear 
although recent research has addressed this topic. A meta-analysis of 15 vertical integration 
studies that tested a total of 104 relations found no conclusive results for the effects of vertical 
integration on financial performance (Capon, Farley, & Hoenig, 1990). Recent research has 
come up with some interesting statements. If there is high asset specificity it pays off not to 
outsource (Poppo & Zenger, 1998). However, this research was done on IT outsourcing, 
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which is a rather untypical form of outsourcing since it is very young and unstable (Lacity & 
Hirschheim, 1993; Lacity & Hirschheim, 1995). The work by Kotabe and collaborators 
mentioned before also finds a positive relation between internal sourcing and profitability. 
Similarly a positive relation between vertical integration (internal sourcing) and profitability is 
reported by D’Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994). Gilley and Rasheed (2000) do not find any direct 
relation between outsourcing and firm performance. Most of the research relating the make-
or-buy decision and effectiveness has been performed in the United States, with a small 
remainder coming from Japan and the United Kingdom. The research often presumes 
universal validity of the findings. How robust are these findings in different institutional 
contexts, such as China, continental Europe or India? Only by replicating earlier studies in 
those contexts, can this question be answered. 
What the effects of outsourcing decisions are on the long run performance of the 
organisation, on its industry or on third parties is largely unknown, e.g.: is outsourcing good or 
bad for the economy as a whole? Some authors have argued that outsourcing may cause a 
spiral of industrial decline (e.g. Bettis, Bradley, & Hamel, 1992) but little empirical 
substantiation of this claim has been provided. The spiral is supposed to emerge when a firm 
sources out activities that carry a large knowledge content (Bettis et al, 1992). Suppliers, 
particularly ones in developing or newly industrialising countries, learn to perform a new 
activity through a buyer and then start competing with the buyer directly. Since the buyer 
often also loses internal manufacturing capability (Kotabe, 1998) it is unable to compete with 
these forwardly integrating suppliers. This important point should be addressed more 
thoroughly in future academic research. 
 
An open question in the ownership and network dimensions, both conceptually and 
empirically, is whether inter-firm networks are an in-between mode of sourcing. That is, do 
they stand between markets and hierarchies as has been argued by some authors in the 
transaction cost economics tradition (Jarillo, 1988; Powell, 1990)? Networks are supposed to 
combine the positive traits of markets and hierarchies. This is a simplifying notion that is not 
empirically grounded. Hence we shall follow the line of some critics who have argued that: 
a. Sourcing networks do not occur solely in the middle between markets and hierarchies 
(Yeung, 1998). We find networks in a hierarchical setting, such as the Chinese family firm 
and in a market-like setting, such as the famous Italian garments district. 
b. Co-operation between firms does not occur along the same dimensions as hierarchies and 
markets. In inter-firm networks different processes occur, which are described by Dyer 
and Singh as ‘relational rent mechanisms’ (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
This leads to the conclusion that networks or inter-organisational relationships are really 
something different from markets and hierarchies and ought to be judged by different criteria. 
There is not one dimension between markets and hierarchies where networks occur 
somewhere in the middle. Since most empirical evidence can be found in the ‘swollen middle’ 
in between market and hierarchy (Hennart, 1993), it is better to judge relationships in terms of 
‘marketness’ and ‘hierarchyness’. These two terms are best seen as the degree to which a 
relationship is managed by price controls and the degree to which a relationship is managed by 
behavioural controls. Thus Hennart (1993) suggests it does not matter so much whether a 
supplier is internal or external. Instead he stresses the way the supplier is managed as key to 
understanding its effectiveness. This links closely to the next paragraph. 
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2.  Re la t i on  t yp e  
Many different categorisations of relation types have been introduced and tested. Particularly 
the role of ‘trust’ in interorganisational relations has been the topic of much conceptual and 
empirical work (Gambetta, 1988; Gulati, 1995; Lane and Bachmann, 1996; Sako, 1992). What 
is trust? What causes trust? What does trust cause? It is now obvious to most observers that 
dyadic relations can be described on a continuum. Whether that continuum runs from low to 
high trust, from low to high interaction or from exit to voice is partly a matter of semantics. 
High environmental uncertainty is a key factor in explaining why firms choose the high trust, 
voice type of relation (Gulati, 1998). Furthermore the degree to which trust is used varies with 
the product type (Sako, 1992). 
 
A particularly worrisome characteristic of most research on relation types is its inherent 
vagueness when it comes to describing these tight relations. Many authors have cited a trend 
towards partnership relations between buyers and suppliers over the last ten years (for 
example Das & Teng, 1998; Hamel, 1991; Klepper, 1995; Martinsons, 1993; McIvor, 
Humphreys, & McAleer, 1997; Nooteboom, 1999), but few have been able to characterise 
such relations in details. Unlike ‘hierarchies’ and ‘markets’, inter-organisational relations seem 
to take many shapes. This may have hampered academic research, but not business 
consultants, who proclaimed partnerships as a key route to competitive advantage over much 
of the 1990s. 
 
It has also been difficult to qualify and quantify the performance effects of partnership 
relations. Among the benefits that have been attributed to partnership relations are cost 
reductions through increased supply chain efficiency, lower transaction costs through trust, 
product and process innovation, learning, increases in firm competencies, improved product 
quality, reduced time to market and more generally competitiveness and cost positions (see 
amongst many others Burnes & New, 1997; Clark, 1989; Dyer, 1997; Hamel, 1991; Imrie & 
Morris, 1992; Smeltzer, 1997). A more formal relation between relation type and performance 
was not a topic of interest to the literature until fairly recently. In fact, much of the literature 
did not look at voice as causing both wanted effects (benefits) and unwanted effects (costs) 
and the balance between those two. Currently it seems that authors expect either a positive 
relationship between the voice type and performance (Helper & Sako, 1995) or a conditionally 
positive relationship (Sako, 1998). The measures of performance that Helper and Sako 
introduce, mainly ‘commitment’, are not very convincing. Which firm is judged on its mutual 
commitment with suppliers in the marketplace? This implies that better measures of 
relationship performance need to be found. Building upon Dyer and Singh (1998) it is 
interesting to describe what rent means in the context of inter-organisational relations. The 
next chapter will address that topic. 
 
3.  Network de s i gn  
The third topic, supplier networks, is of more recent origin. Networks have been a topic of 
serious management studies since the late 1980s and this is obvious when looking at the 
results so far. They seem to have been influenced by the period of initiation of research. Much 
is known about how Japanese automobile companies structure their networks of suppliers 
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(Nishiguchi, 1994; Richardson, 1993), but how about other industries and supplier networks 
in other countries, including developing countries? There often is little or no work available in 
these areas. Measurement problems lie at the heart of this gap in the literature. It is very 
difficult to find the boundaries of a network, if there are any. If one does not know what 
parties to include and exclude, measurement becomes difficult. Furthermore research that 
compares different networks is particularly scarce. This is somehow logical given that the 
difficult question ‘how do we compare two networks’ has not been answered sufficiently 
theoretically. More comparative research is needed to improve our knowledge of sourcing 
networks. Presumably we are only at the beginning of a large stream of research on buyer-
supplier networks. 
 
Research that looks at supply networks in terms of how international they are and whether 
this matters is very uncommon. It is even being suggested by some observers that 
‘internationalisation’ is a hollow term in a network perspective since any network is eventually 
bound to be international23. The European network literature in the IMP tradition24 largely 
disregards issues of effectiveness of network strategy. How can effectiveness be measured in a 
network context? Of course it is also questionable to whom effectiveness belongs in a 
network context as it is a jointly created outcome. Uzzi (1997) nonetheless differentiates 
between firm-level effects and network-level effects of embedded ties. Table 1 provides an 
overview of these effects. 
While embeddedness in relations brings advantages of the types mentioned above, 
relations can also be overembedded (Uzzi, 1997). In this case parties in the relation are no 
longer open to information outside the relation. A similar line of reasoning is employed by 
Ring (1999) who suggests that networks also incur costs upon the participants. This seems to 
suggest that firms need that firms that manage to find a balance between not being networked 
/ embbedded and being too networked / overembedded are best off, which would imply 
there is an optimal point somewhere in between. Thus there may be a curvilinear relation, an 
inverted U-shape, between the degree of embeddedness and network performance. It is 
important to consider that the work of Uzzi and Ring is clearly of a theory-building nature and 
does not involve much testing of these hypotheses. Testing the embeddedness – performance 
relation mentioned above could be a major step forward for network thinking. 
Generally speaking work that compares the effectiveness of networks vis-à-vis each 
other is quite rare. Most analysts would probably agree in that the complexity of most 
networks is too large to allow for a straightforward comparison of two distinctly different 
networks. There is a lot of anecdotal evidence based on single cases that points at either the 
successes or the failure of a network. Nike’s supply network is a well-known example that 
comes to mind (see also Mol, 2001a). Yet the network structure of Nike versus that of its 
competitors is seldomly seen as a separate topic of study.  
 
Table 2.1: adapted from (Uzzi, 1997). Expected positive firm-level and network-level 
consequences of embedded relations and negative consequences of ‘overembedded’ relations. 
                                                           
23 Personal communication with Professor David Ford of the University of Bath Management School. 
Bath, United Kingdom, February 2, 1999. 
24 The International Marketing and Purchasing group. 
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Components Firm-level effects in 
integrated network 
structure 
Accompanying network level 
effects in integrated network 
structure 
Overembedded 
network structure firm 
& network-level effects 
Trust • Less haggling and 
monitoring costs 
• Privileged access to 
resources 
• Exchange of difficult 
to price resources 
• Economies of time 
• Allocative efficiency 
• Investment 
• Complex adaptation 
• Pareto improvements 
• Feuding 
• Relief organisation 
Fine-grained 
information 
• Information –
processing speed and 
problem recognition 
• Knowledge of 
preferences and 
better forecasts 
• Economies of time 
• Allocative efficiency 
• Complex adaptation 
• Investment 
• Pareto improvements 
• Relief organisation 
• Less new & novel 
information from 
other networks 
Joint 
problem-
solving 
arrangements 
• Learning and 
performance 
feedback 
• Invention of new 
solutions 
• Economies of time 
• Allocative efficiency 
• Complex adaptation 
• Investment 
• Pareto improvements 
• Extinction effects 
 
4.  In t e rna t i ona l i sa t i on  
Research on the international dimension of sourcing has suffered from one conceptual and 
two empirical problems. Conceptually, there have not been any valid explanations as to why 
and in what cases international sourcing is superior to domestic sourcing. Although many ad 
hoc explanations have been given, we are therefore still stalled at the position of suspecting a 
positive impact of global sourcing on performance but being unable to explain it, unless with 
pragmatic arguments or the comparative costs argument. This latter argument, however, fails 
to account for the extra costs that are incurred through international sourcing due to physical 
distance, buyer-supplier distance and environmental distance (as discussed in chapter 1). 
Chapter 3 will address this topic of benefits of internationalisation in more detail. 
The first empirical problem is a lack of measurement between international sourcing 
and performance. The only piece addressing this issue directly is Scully and Fawcett (1994), 
which is not supported by any theoretical underpinnings.  They cite some perceived 
advantages of global sourcing (Scully & Fawcett, 1994). They also cite several challenges to 
successful global sourcing. Finally they measure the performance impact of global sourcing. 
The average performance impact they find for their different measures ranges from 3.11 to 
4.46 on a 7-point scale. This implies that on average, respondents neither agree nor disagree 
with the statement that international sourcing has improved their firm’s overall performance. 
What does this tell us? The way this impact is measured is essentially incorrect, since it carries 
bias. Consider the final question, the one delivering the highest averages: “Global sourcing has 
resulted in an above average improvement in your firm’s overall competitive position”. A 
respondent that answers no may feel that global sourcing has not impacted her or his firm, or 
alternatively that it has had a negative impact on the firm. No upward and downward margins 
of error are reported on the averages Scully and Fawcett calculate, which makes impossible an 
estimation of reliability of these findings. Furthermore the technique of calculating averages 
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based on direct questions and then to use them as evidence of a relationship is not accepted as 
a convincing method in top level academic research and journals. 
The second empirical problem is a lack of reliable data sources to investigate 
internationalisation of sourcing (Swamidass & Kotabe, 1993). Firms do not report their 
sourcing activities in the same way they report their sales data. Sometimes they do not even 
keep track of the internationalisation of their supply bases. On the aggregate, national level 
there are only trade data, which are typically not telling of firm behaviour. This has tended to 
constrain researchers in need of data on the extent of internationalisation in sourcing. 
 
Another aspect that is often not valued as it should be is the nationality of the supplier. 
Previously a lot of empirical work was discussed on the location of suppliers: domestic or 
international, developed or non-developed countries. However, only one article was discussed 
that explicitly recognised that supplier nationality matters (Kenney & Florida, 1995). For 
example, consider a multinational in a host country that uses a supplier from its home country 
that has also set up a local subsidiary in the host country. Is this a domestic, international or 
home-based supplier to the sourcing firm? Although the related issue of local content 
regulation has regularly been a topic of political debate, it has only rarely led to observations in 
the management literature. 
Although some work on barriers to international sourcing exists, these barriers have 
neither been related to actual patterns of international sourcing nor to the performance 
outcomes of international sourcing. However, perhaps the outcomes of previous research can 
partly be interpreted in the light of these barriers. Most international sourcing has clearly been 
in countries within the Triad or a region within the Triad. Such an interpretation would 
confirm the notion that these countries suffer from an underdeveloped business system and 
infrastructure. This could very well imply that the barriers to international sourcing are largest 
to those countries that are located outside of the Triad. 
 
Sourcing research in the third important economic area of the world, the European Union, 
has mainly been confined to descriptions of particular sourcing relations and networks 
(Dubois, 1998; Semlinger, 1993) and the structure and functioning of supplier networks (Ford, 
1998). In Europe trust and co-operation have been worked out in most detail, e.g. in the 
comparison of U.K and German firms (Lane & Bachmann, 1996), the networks of the third 
Italy and Baden-Würtemberg (Grabher, 1993). However, the last two focus on single 
industries within single regions. Thus evidence on sourcing strategies of other European 
countries than the U.K. is fairly limited at the time. While it is pretty obvious what a ‘sourcing 
profile’ of the U.S., Japan or the U.K. would look like, it is much harder to discern a profile 
for industry-rich countries like France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland or the 
Netherlands. Empirical evidence from these countries would add greatly to our understanding 
of the universality of certain sourcing concepts25. 
  
                                                           
25 This argument is developed further in a paper recently presented at the inaugural European Academy 
of Management conference (Mol, 2001b). 
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5.  In t e rna t i ona l  supp l y  d e c i s i on s  
The evidence that has been collected on how firms achieve a balance between local 
responsiveness and global integration with regards to sourcing has not been well developed. 
We do not know much about where sourcing decisions are taken within a firm. We know far 
more about where investment or marketing decisions are taken. The link to performance is 
not very obvious in this area. Under what precise circumstances would it be good for a firm to 
have local decision-making and when should it have global decision-making? 
 
A global decision making unit has final responsibility for all sourcing decisions world-wide. 
The classic example is the single country, single site, non-MNC. This firm always operates 
under a centralised regime. But this can also be a strategy of multinational corporations. As 
firms increase their number of operations and start internationalising they often stick to this 
centralised model of decision making, at least for some decisions. Major FDI decisions, for 
example, are always taken or approved by headquarters. Another form of global organisation 
is the division or business unit, which is delegated decision-making responsibility by 
headquarters. Finally, some firms use a global sourcing or global purchasing department to co-
ordinate world-wide sourcing or advise local and regional units. 
Following Prahalad and Doz (1987) the main reason to centralise decision-making is 
to obtain advantages from global integration. This can occur if large purchasing volumes exist, 
which allow buyers to drive down prices as fewer redundancies occur and the dependence of a 
supplier increases. Similar to the mechanism described by Prahalad and Doz large external 
supply volumes will most efficiently be handled globally. With economies of scale in 
production, firms tend to centralise production sites. However, international sourcing is unlike 
foreign production in the sense that multiple actors exist. With foreign production through 
FDI, firms choose single sites for production. In sourcing, suppliers are chosen that have 
specific location-bounded advantages. In other words international sourcing allows MNCs to 
consider a broader scope of suppliers. Only decision-making units with a global overview can 
fully exploit this scope as more decentralised units will run into information problems when 
searching outside their own geographical area. Obviously a condition that also stimulates 
global decision-making is the global presence of suppliers. Consider the numerous suppliers of 
carmakers that have internationalised in recent years. By being present in multiple markets 
they can offer carmakers a uniform product in all of these markets, reducing the need for 
costly design changes. 
Two major disadvantages seem to be connected to such a global mode of operations. 
The first disadvantage is obviously that globally organised MNCs have to sacrifice some 
responsiveness26. Locally embedded organisations will always have an advantage over global 
organisations when it comes to dealing with inconveniences in the buyer-supplier relation, as 
face-to-face communication is a preferable mode over any indirect form of communication. 
Furthermore firms that see the globe as their sourcing domain, instead of a large number of 
                                                           
26 Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) claim that this friction between integration and responsiveness may 
(partly) be overcome by adopting a ‘transnational’ model. However, little evidence exists that such a 
model has truly been implemented in many firms. None of the firms we spoke to (Tecson, 1998) 
explicitly admitted to a transnational model in sourcing. The effectiveness of the transnational model has 
also been cast in doubt in recent years after implementation failures at firms like Philips and ABB. It 
appears that both the complexity and the co-ordination costs of transnationals are high. 
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local or regional markets, are far more likely to run into search and deliberation costs (Rangan, 
2000). Acquiring information and certifying the reliability of that information are costly 
activities when venturing into new and far away markets. The abilities of organisations and 
individuals to access and evaluate new sources is limited by their social networks (Rangan, 
2000), which eventually leads to a limited search and incomplete evaluation. Once socially and 
physically nearby sources have been established, barriers are formed to look for unknown 
sources and buyers are somewhat locked-in to existing suppliers. 
 
A regional decision-making unit builds upon a world divided into subsets, e.g. Asia Pacific, 
Europe and North America. Each subset takes its’ own sourcing decisions. Many MNCs have 
given profit responsibilities to these regional organisations. A number of legitimate reasons 
exists to do so. First of all geographic proximity may cause firms to source regionally. Second, 
government regulation, such as EU directives, may force firms to source within the region as 
products need to be regionally adapted for the market. A third reason may be that a global 
organisation does not always provide the needed feeling for regional circumstances. Some 
MNCs, like Philips and Shell (Tecson, 1998), have in the past set up International Purchasing 
Offices (IPOs) to deal with this. IPOs are used to do all or part of the purchasing in the host 
country and often in a number of neighbouring countries. A regional sourcing department 
often fulfils the same role, the difference is that a regional sourcing department is a part of the 
regional headquarters. In some cases organising regionally is most appropriate. Especially 
when many of the relevant institutions and much of the regulation is at that level, as is the 
case for many products in Europe (Amin & Thrift, 1995). If there is a large economic and 
cultural similarity between the countries in the region, it seems particularly fitting to organise 
regionally. A regional organisation is mostly an attempt to combine the advantages of global 
and local organisation. 
 Among the problems related to a regional organisation of inter-firm relations is the 
possibility that a regional headquarter may start to operate as if it were a full headquarter in 
itself. In that case the distance to suppliers increases and the same problems of global 
organisation may erupt including communicating with and searching for suppliers. Conflicts 
of interest between regions on the other hand, may cause a sub-optimal result at the global 
level. The regional level may not be most appropriate given very high needs for integration or 
responsiveness. In such cases, firms sourcing regionally may be stuck in the middle. 
 
A local decision-making unit is a national subsidiary or even a single plant that carries its’ own 
responsibility for sourcing. Each locality takes independent sourcing decisions. Some products 
are still very costly to transport over larger distances. An example that immediately springs to 
mind is water, which is an important input to many production processes. Firms would not 
normally source water from the other end of the world. Local organisations will be better 
equipped to handle this type of sourcing than firm headquarters. Thus, a localised supplier 
base will often lead to a local organisation of sourcing. A second reason to organise sourcing 
locally is when strategic advantages can be obtained by deploying subsidiary level 
competencies, a phenomenon more commonly described as subsidiary initiative (Birkinshaw, 
Hood, & Jonsson, 1998). A subsidiary that engages in the development of new strategies, 
including those involving suppliers, may not only improve its own position within the 
corporation, but also induce product or process innovation (Birkinshaw et al, 1998). 
Chapter 2 
 42
However, for many sourced products, scale significantly alters cost patterns because scale 
economies get lost with small numbers. In a purely local transaction it is much harder to 
obtain significant scale than in a transaction involving multiple subsidiaries. Another problem 
related to local organisation is the limited scope of suppliers that a subsidiary will have. The 
range of international suppliers a subsidiary is likely to know is limited by its network size, 
which again is a result of its size and location (Gulati, 1998). With so few suppliers available to 
the subsidiary an optimal choice is less likely because other, global opportunities are foregone. 
Table 2 summarises points made in the previous section about the literature. 
 
 Key contributions Performance Agenda 
Ownership  
 
• High asset specificity 
causes internalisation 
• High uncertainty causes 
internalisation 
• Low frequency causes 
internalisation 
  
 
• Under high asset 
specificity  internalisation is 
positively related to 
performance 
• Under high uncertainty 
internalisation is positively 
related to performance 
• Conflicting findings on 
outsourcing – performance 
relation 
• Knowledge based 
and resource-based vs. 
transaction cost 
explanations? 
• Is there a critical point 
beyond which outsourcing 
is damaging? 
• Is there a continuum 
between ‘marketness’ and 
‘hierarchyness’? 
Relation 
type  
 
• Trust is necessary in 
building relations 
• Uncertainty causes need 
for trust and tight relations  
• Under high uncertainty 
tight relations are positively 
related to performance 
• Voice relations help in 
obtaining intangible benefits 
like learning and innovation 
Claim: 
• Voice relations lead to 
higher performance 
• Do voice relations 
improve performance? 
• How does trust 
develop? 
• Under what 
conditions are voice and 
trust not useful? 
Internatio-
nalisation  
 
• Degree of 
internationalisation varies with 
size of home country 
• Barriers to international 
sourcing  
Claim: 
• International sourcing 
leads to higher performance 
• Does international 
sourcing lead to higher 
performance? 
• What patterns of 
internationalisation are 
most effective? 
Network 
design 
 
 
• Firms have a portfolio of 
relations 
• Networks can be 
measured in terms of 
embeddedness 
• A balanced portfolio 
leads to higher performance 
• More embedded 
network nodes perform 
better under conditions of 
high uncertainty 
Claim: 
• Parallel sourcing leads 
to higher performance 
• What is the most 
effective network structure? 
• How are relations 
beyond the first tier best 
managed? 
• Is there a curvilinear 
embeddedness - 
performance relation? 
Internatio-
nal supply 
decisions 
 
• Home country influences 
the degree of local supplies 
• Local adaptation is 
needed to balance integration 
• Better adaptation leads 
to higher performance 
• Is a transnational 
model the best way of 
dealing with multiple 
demands? 
Table 2.2: A summary of the literature (see text). 
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2.2 Research agenda 
Although any generalisation of such a broad area of literature is doomed to be partly incorrect, 
some general remarks about the whole international sourcing literature hold true. These 
remarks define the agenda of sourcing research, a part of which will be unfolded in chapter 3. 
The remarks are based upon the discussions in chapters 1 and 2. They are listed below and 
their consequences for sourcing research are discussed. Broadly speaking these remarks can be 
divided into three topics. The first topic is the nature of the literature itself. The second topic 
concerns the research methods being applied. The third topic is related to the content of 
research questions. 
 
A. Natur e  o f  th e  l i t e ra tur e  
1. Fragmented literature: the literature is fragmented; 
2. Testing: some topics have been developed theoretically but have not been tested; 
3. Anglo-Saxon models: most of the literature is based on Anglo-Saxon models of thinking; 
 
B.  Res ear ch  me thods   
4. Statistical methods: among the statistical methods used, multiple regression is the most 
popular solution; 
5. Comparative cases: among the case studies few are done on multinationals from different 
countries. 
6. Continental Europe: there is little work that takes continental Europe as the empirical 
setting; 
 
C. Res ear ch  que s t i on s  
7. Combination: the decision to internalise and the particular type of relation are largely 
treated separately; 
8. Internationalisation of sourcing: the international dimension of sourcing is not fully 
understood or researched yet; 
9. Relation and performance: the type of relation has not often been related to the 
performance outcome of the relation;  
10. Network effectiveness: there is little understanding of what constitutes the effectiveness 
of a network; 
11. Internal decision making: little is known about internal decision making on external 
relations, in particular how it is organised across borders. 
12. Information technology: not much is known about how firms fit new IT into existing 
buyer-supplier relations. 
 
1.  Fragmen t ed  l i t e ra tur e  
Instead of seeing the various dimensions of sourcing as closely intertwined issues, most 
authors focus on one dimension and one theory27. From a practical point this is not very 
useful: a manager is interested in whether to outsource an item but at the same time requires 
information on how to source. It is unlikely that a single theory provide the desired level of 
                                                           
27 This is precisely the point Barringer and Harrison (2000) make when they discuss interorganisational 
relations, also see Mol (2001a). 
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understanding of such complicated issues. An integrated framework, describing various 
dimensions would be useful as a decision support tool. 
 
2.  Te s t ing  
There are a substantial number of interesting questions in the international sourcing literature, 
which await testing. With some issues we seem to have a clue but no evidence while others 
need some further theorising. For example it is surprising to notice what little evidence is 
available to support the notion that the internationalisation of the supply base has a positive 
influence on firm performance. This appears to be more of an assumption than a finding. And 
the fact that the literature on the effects of external sourcing or vertical integration is at best 
indecisive is not helpful either. 
 
3.  Ang lo -Saxon mode l s  
Although the Anglo-Saxon model of business largely dominates today’s international 
marketplace, it need not be our only theoretical lens to judge sourcing decision-making. In 
fact a more intricate understanding of the Dutch, Chinese or Brazilian business system, may 
serve to upgrade thinking about sourcing. The most important question to look at here is to 
what extent models and findings hold in other research settings. 
 
4.  S ta t i s t i ca l  me thods  
Multiple regression analysis is one of the more convenient and powerful statistical tools 
available to social science. Thus it is quite understandable that most researchers have so far 
relied on regression analysis. However, some of the issues to be solved could better be tackled 
by other methods like LISREL or panel data analysis. Since some of the theory in sourcing 
predicts indirect effects a path analysis method like LISREL could be helpful to reveal the 
various paths. For longitudinal research featuring relations over longer periods of time, panel 
data analysis is an appropriate technique. 
 
5.  Compara t i v e  ca s e s  
A substantial number of insightful case studies have been written on (international) sourcing 
strategy. An interesting addition from the perspective of discovering more about the influence 
of national systems on sourcing strategy would be cases comparing firms within the same 
industry but operating from different countries. This could generate new insights in the 
sourcing decision making process. 
 
6.  Cont in en ta l  Europe  
Clearly Europe provides a challenging and useful testing ground for the ideas in the outline 
above. On the one hand firms in Europe operate under a single economic regime. On the 
other hand, grave differences between people and between organisations still persist. 
Elements of culture come into play too and these are often very different between European 
countries like Portugal and Sweden. If a greater understanding is achieved of the differences 
and similarities between countries in the EU, as far as international sourcing strategy is 
concerned, this would be useful. 
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7.  Combina t i on  
It seems that different streams of literature exist, that largely disregards each other’s findings. 
Particularly, one would expect to see empirical combinations of the effects of ownership and 
relation type because choosing what source to use and how to use it are strongly intertwined 
questions. These combinations are nowhere to be found. This is bothersome from a practical 
point of view, since practising managers regularly confront themselves with this question: “Is 
it more important to decide whether I am going to outsource this item or how I am going to 
source it”? To what issue should most attention be devoted? It is perhaps, however, even 
more disturbing for academics as a failure to properly integrate two alternative explanations 
for essentially the same phenomenon, the effectiveness outcome of the sourcing arrangement, 
equals a failure to bridge domains of knowledge. Important new knowledge might be created 
precisely at this crossing. 
 
8.  In t e rna t i ona l i sa t i on  o f  s our c ing  
International sourcing is a very complex phenomenon because it can take on so many forms. 
The literature has as yet failed to deal with the entire complexity of the topic. Although some 
work in the area of international sourcing has been initiated it has so far been difficult to build 
explanations that go beyond extensions of domestic sourcing. Some mentioning of 
comparative advantage is made and Vernon’s product cycle theory is applied. However, an 
overarching framework of what differentiates global sourcing from domestic sourcing is 
missing.  
 
9.  Re la t i on  and  p e r f o rmanc e   
Partnership relations can potentially increase benefits for the parties involved or improve 
outcomes. What is more interesting is in what particular situation this goal is really obtained. 
Sometimes, relations can be overembedded: too many complexities are introduced in the 
buyer-supplier relation when seemingly simple conditions exist. So what is more important to 
know is under what conditions partnership relations are beneficial and for what types of 
performance. 
 
10.  Network e f f e c t i v en e s s  
Network propensities that have been the centre of attention include potential benefits and 
advantages. However, little has been made of measuring benefits and costs. Furthermore there 
is a serious appropriation problem in that we do not know whom to assign costs and benefits 
to. Finally it has proven to be very difficult to compare various networks. This makes much of 
the current work on the effectiveness of networks somewhat speculative in nature. 
 
11.  In t e rna l  d e c i s i on  making  
When it comes to the integration across borders, even less is known. The extension of 
previous research could take a number of directions. Which sourcing decisions are taken by 
headquarters (ethnocentric), by national subsidiaries (polycentric) or by business units and 
divisions (geocentric)? This is an interesting area for research that is currently undiscovered. 
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12.  In f o rmat i on  t e chno l o g y  
The focus of the original electronic markets literature was on how IT would change existing 
sourcing policies of firms. Since there no radical changes of sourcing strategies of large MNCs 
have occurred since the introduction of the Internet an equally if not more interesting 
question is how firms fit new IT into their set of existing supplier relations. Research on this 
topic would be helpful to increase the understanding of how sourcing strategies change over 
time. 
 
 
2.3 Replication with extension 
Obviously it is impossible to fill all these gaps in the literature within the limits of a single 
study. The discussion above was merely intended to highlight that multiple challenges are still 
unanswered. An important question is how these gaps can be filled through new research. The 
next  chap t e r  w i l l  sp e c i f y  wh i ch  o f  th e  gaps  can  and  hope fu l l y  w i l l  b e  f i l l ed  th rough  
th e  cu r r en t  s tudy . 
Two ways exist to improve and empirically validate the existing body of knowledge 
in any field: replication and extension of previous research. Replication does not occur very 
often (Hubbard, Vetter, & Little, 1998). Especially replications with extension are rare in the 
field of strategic management: only 22 out of 419 empirical studies in three top management 
journals over the 1976-1995 period are of this nature (Hubbard et al, 1998). Most other work 
is an extension of previous work but not a literal extension. The alternative to replication and 
extension would be to redefine a field and come up with new concepts, but no pressing 
reasons seem apparent to do so in the case of international sourcing strategy. There is 
sufficient theory and it is quite clear what the important dimensions of international sourcing 
are. What is lacking is application of this theory in some empirical settings and a link between 
the various dimensions. This study explicitly tries to build upon existing work through 
replicating it, but also through extending it into as yet uncharted territories. 
 One reason to exactly replicate earlier research is to validate results that might 
statistically not be entirely reliable. For example, Murray et al (1995a) explicitly call for 
replication of their own work on global sourcing, since the alpha coefficients on some of their 
measures are low. Furthermore, it cannot ex ante be shown that sourcing patterns do not 
change over time or across places, on the contrary: they seem to change continuously (Helper 
& Sako, 1995). A universal generalisation of research findings poses some extra preconditions 
(Rosenzweig, 1994): A conceptually equivalent definition of variables between countries, an 
equivalent operationalisation of variables, the same theorised relationship among focal 
variables, a closed system and data that are not affected by observer bias or respondent bias. It 
seems doubtful that all of these conditions have been met in previous research (just consider 
the closed system condition).  
Hence two forms of replication might be undertaken to test whether sourcing 
patterns change. First of all, the same  s e t  o f  f i rms  o r  a t  l ea s t  a  s imi la r  one  a s  u s ed  in  
one  o f  th e  ea r l i e r  s tud i e s  c ou ld  b e  sub j e c t  o f  r ep l i ca t i on . Using longitudinal analysis the 
consistence of results through a period of time could be checked and time-based deviations 
could be filtered out. The s e c ond  f o rm o f  r ep l i ca t i on  c ou ld  c on c e rn  th e  same  que s t i on s  
bu t  in  a  d i f f e r en t  e c onomi c ,  cu l tu ra l  and  s o c ia l  s e t t in g . It appears that most of the data 
presented, and especially those at the firm level, are from MNCs located in the United States. 
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Replicating the studies in another region, for example Japan or the European Union, might 
generate other findings. The differences in environmental variables might then be used to 
explain these findings (Cheng, 1994). The pilot study mentioned earlier (Tecson, 1998), 
revealed that the European environment indeed influences the sourcing policies of firms. One 
recurring factor in these interviews was that the local market and the regulatory environment 
often partly determine the location of suppliers. The European Union is a major player in the 
global economy with its own social and economic structures. A replication of earlier U.S.-
based research in the European context is thus desirable. 
 
 
Chapter summary 
Chapter 2 again discussed the literature on international sourcing, now with the explicit aim of 
finding omissions in this literature where further research is needed. Important strides have 
been made in the area of outsourcing and supplier relations where relatively solid theoretical 
models have been developed and tested. As a consequences much is known about why firms 
choose to outsource and good categorisations of different supplier relations exist. The 
literature on supplier networks is still in its formative stages but contributions have been made 
concerning the importance of networks in the modern economy. Concerning supplier 
internationalisation most research has focused on establishing patterns of internationalisation. 
In the area of international supply decisions not much work has been done. 
 
In each of the five dimensions there are important triggers for a research agenda, especially in 
relation to performance. Much has been suggested about the positive contribution of 
outsourcing to performance but few tests have been undertaken. There is a hunch that the 
partnership (or voice) type of supplier relation contributes to supplier performance but tests 
are missing. The same applies for internationalisation of the supply base: global sourcing is 
said to be good for performance, but empirical evidence is lacking. Where networks are 
concerned an important step forward would be to find a way to start comparing various 
networks. The topic of international supply decisions would benefit most from 
conceptualisation and measurement of what possible ways firms have to make international 
supply decisions. One important general conclusion is that mainland Europe appears to 
largely have been forgotten in studies of sourcing. A good approach to study these topics 
would be to replicate existing work and extend it by introducing new concepts or testing 
grounds. Chapter 2 laid the groundwork for the construction of a conceptual framework. 
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Chapter 3: A framework for understanding 
global sourcing strategy 
 
 
The  a im o f  th i s  chap t e r  i s  t o  d e s c r ib e  th e  exac t  th eo r e t i ca l  r e l a t i on s  th i s  s tudy  w i l l  
inv e s t i ga t e . While the previous chapters sketched the literature and featured a broader scope, 
this chapter will explicitly narrow down towards a set of hypo th e s e s . The study will focus on 
the relation between three interrelated dimensions of sourcing strategy and firm performance: 
(1 )  in t e rna l  v s .  ex t e rna l  s our c ing ,  (2 )  ex i t  v s .  v o i c e  r e l a t i on s ,  and  (3 )  domes t i c  v s .  
in t e rna t i ona l  s our c ing .  Obviously defining and explaining what sourcing performance is, 
precedes any attempt to explain the drivers of sourcing performance. So first the dependent 
variable of sourcing performance is discussed. After having clarified the concept of sourcing 
performance, as it is understood in this study, in section 3.1, its causes can be discussed. These 
causes of sourcing performance are the different international sourcing strategies that were 
discussed in chapters 1 and 2, which form the independent variables, and other explanations, 
which are used as moderating or control variables. In section 3.2 a basic model is presented in 
an attempt to explain the international sourcing performance of firms. Section 3.3 expands 
upon this model by introducing moderating variables. The fourth and final section of this 
chapter discusses some important control variables. 
 
 
3.1 Sourcing performance 
The essence of strategic management is to explain how organisations achieve sustainable 
competitive advantage (SCA). In other words, strategic management is all about performance 
differentials between firms. This study is an attempt to explain these differentials where the 
effects of sourcing strategy are concerned. Hence th i s  s tudy  l ooks  a t  th e  p e r f o rmanc e  
e f f e c t s  o f  cho i c e s  made  by  f i rms  c on c e rn ing  th e i r  inpu t s . 
This raises the interesting and difficult question how the performance effects of 
sourcing strategy can be measured. Many attempts have been made in strategy and 
organisation research to capture performance with mixed results. This led Venkatraman and 
Ramanujam (1986: 801) to suggest that: 
 
“The treatment of performance in research settings is perhaps one of the 
thorniest issues confronting the academic community today”. 
 
Of course considerable progress has been made since, both through an increased conceptual 
understanding of performance and the wider range of analysis techniques and data currently 
available. The problem of dealing with performance is essentially two-headed. First of all it is 
difficult to define the very concept of performance. What is an effective outcome and what is 
not? The second problem is the difficulty of finding adequate measures in empirical settings to 
capture performance as it has been defined. While the latter problem will be a prime concern 
of the methodological chapter, an attempt will now be made to define the performance 
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outcome of the global sourcing strategy of a multinational firm. A first general definition of 
sourcing performance is: 
 
The  d e g r e e  t o  wh i ch  a  f i rm su c c e ed s  in  fu l f i l l i n g  th e  g oa l s  i t  has  s e t  ou t ,  by  
u s ing  th e  inpu t  s id e  o f  th e  p roduc t i on  p ro c e s s  
 
Earlier, sourcing was defined as an intermediate activity, which has a large impact on its 
effectiveness measures. The effectiveness of end-of-chain activities, such as marketing of a 
product, may easily be measured by the final success of a firm, like its market share or 
profitability. One of the problems in relating strategy to performance is that many factors can 
intervene in the process (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986), causing the independent variable 
(strategy) to have a less significant or non-causal relation with the dependent variable 
(performance). The introduction of any step that increases the distance between the observed 
and the predicted cause is thus to be avoided in order to minimise these biases. This implies 
that the preferred mode of analysis is that which minimises the length of the causal chain, i.e. 
the mode that uses close-by measures of success. For intermediary activities it is therefore 
better to look for intermediary success measures. However, as it will turn out later, earlier 
work (e.g. Helper & Sako, 1995; Murray et al, 1995a) had major problems finding variables 
that fulfil the criterion of a short causal chain. The major limitation is that no generally agreed 
upon measure exists for intermediary performance at the firm or business unit level. There are 
of course some industry or firm specific measures for intermediary performance but these can 
not be generalised. Therefore measurement at the firm level has to occur at the end of the 
chain, on the firm’s output side. Given that there is no intermediary measure available, this is 
the best measurement solution. So sustainable competitive advantage due to sourcing will be 
measured as an end-of-chain, organisational level construct. 
 
Three ways of obtaining sustainable competitive advantage 
It is now generally recognised that there are traditionally three streams of literature that help 
us to understand the attainment of sustainable competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997): 
1. Pos i t i on ing : a better market position vis-à-vis competitors, expressed in terms of lower 
costs, a differentiated product or a combination thereof (Porter, 1985); 
2. Resour c e  bas ed : a more valuable stock of internal resources and capabilities or a superior 
ability to combine resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989); 
3. Transa c t i on  c o s t s : a better governance, also framed as economising, leading to 
transaction cost advantages (Williamson, 1991). 
If we combine the latter two the notion that emerges is that managing external relations in 
such a way as to maximise joint resources and capabilities leads to competitive advantage of 
itself. This is a recent fourth perspective called r e la t i ona l  r en t . This perspective is expressed 
as follows (Dyer & Singh, 1998: 661): 
 
“[F]irms who combine resources in unique ways may realize an advantage over 
competing firms who are unable or unwilling to do so. Thus, idiosyncratic 
interfirm linkages may be a source of relational rents and competitive advantage.” 
 
A framework for understanding global sourcing strategy 
 51
Thus, we have two modes in which these long-term advantages come about in sourcing, either 
internally or through an external relation. Internally, there is associational specialisation 
(Barnard, 1938) or a distinctive c ompe t en c e  (Selznick, 1957) to perform certain tasks. One 
might think of a distinctive competence in sourcing strategy, when a firm is better at managing 
the input side than its competitors or has better manufacturing capability (Kotbe, 1992). 
Externally there is r e la t i ona l  r en t  (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Dyer and Singh (1998: 662) define 
four determinants of relational rents:  
 
1. investments in relation-specific assets; 
2. substantial knowledge exchange, including the exchange of knowledge that results in joint 
learning; 
3. the combining of complementary, but scarce, resources or capabilities (typically through 
multiple functional interfaces), which results in the joint creation of unique new products, 
services, or technologies; 
4. lower transaction costs than competitor alliances, owing to more effective governance 
mechanisms. 
 
Firms looking for relational rent need to be concerned with the four measures of investments, 
learning effects, unique new products, services or technologies and effective governance 
mechanisms. While investments, the first determinant, are essentially an input for the other 
three determinants, the second through fourth determinants Dyer and Singh mention are 
indirect effects of relations. The first indirect effect is l e a rn ing . Learning is a dynamic and 
often path dependent process (Teece et al, 1997), which implies that a buyer and supplier can 
build sustainable advantage once they have gone through a specific learning process. Other 
firms can not imitate that process so easily. The second indirect effect is i nnova t i on . If new 
products are developed or new production process are introduced as a consequence of a 
sourcing relation, this can help a firm in improving its long-term performance (Nishiguchi, 
1994). Thirdly, more effective governance mechanisms could be realised by performance 
measurement (monitoring) in specific areas in order to tackle bottlenecks in the relation. This 
is also employed as an outcome of strategic performance by Murray et al (1995a). Of course it 
can also be important to avoid too many idiosyncratic investments. Some flexibility of the 
sourcing configuration needed in the long run (Nishiguchi & Beaudet, 1998). A firm that can 
more easily switch suppliers or supplier locations has a flexibility advantage over competitors. 
This requires a balancing act between the benefits of idiosyncratic investments and the ability 
to redefine those investments. Under the continuous threat of exit by one of the partners it is 
difficult to engage in joint learning for example. Using a f l ex ib l e  n e twork  approach can 
guarantee such switching possibilities are constantly available. 
 
Categorising performance effects of sourcing 
Two categorisations of sourcing performance are necessary. First, two  t yp e s  o f  p e r f o rmanc e  
w i l l  b e  d i s t in gu i sh ed ,  e c onomi c  and  s t ra t e g i c  p e r f o rmanc e . Any human activity has direct 
and indirect effects. In the strategy literature such effects are often referred to as economic 
and strategic performance (Murray et al, 1995a; Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998). Firms seek to 
obtain both types of performance. Economic performance refers to how well a firm is 
performing now while strategic performance refers to its ability to perform in the long run. 
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While direct, economic performance effects are often easy to distinguish at one particular 
moment in time, indirect, strategic performance effects can involve complex causal chains and 
longer periods of time. The source of these long term performance effects is in relational rent 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998) or associational specialisation (Barnard, 1938): these effects reside either 
within the firm or between the firm and its partners. 
Economic performance effects are those performance effects of sourcing that occur 
in the short term and are directly related to transactions and relations. In sourcing the direct 
effects of a delivery are the attributes of that particular delivery, such as the price and quantity 
of goods, the perceived quality and the service attached to a delivery. These attributes are 
often referred to as the tangible elements of a delivery because they can easily be specified and 
recorded in a contract. A contract requires a supplier to deliver quantity A of component B 
with quality C at time D. Financial performance of a firm is the aggregate outcome of all of its 
deliveries: changed product attributes will directly influence financial performance. Thus a 
firm’s financial performance is also a direct effect. When measuring economic performance of 
a firm the literature usually relies on financial measures. 
In contrast, strategic effects are those performance effects of sourcing that occur in 
the long term and flow indirectly from transactions and relations. The indirect effects of a 
particular delivery include a much wider array of items. They may include the attributes of the 
next delivery, learning effects of one of the parties concerned and product innovation to 
mention only a few. These attributes are often referred to as intangible elements because it is 
difficult to specify them ex ante Murray et al (1995a) in their analysis similarly make a two-fold 
distinction between financial and strategic performance. Strategic performance may be seen as 
an indirect effect, occurring in the longer run. Performance effects can be said to be strategic 
when they deliver sustainable competitive advantage to the firm. 
 
A second distinction that needs to be made pertains to the level of analysis of performance 
effects of sourcing. Two l e v e l s  o f  ana l y s i s  a r e  d i s t in gu i sh ed .  The  f i r s t  l e v e l  i s  
p e r f o rmanc e  o f  th e  f i rm (o r  bus in e s s  un i t )  a s  a  who l e . This is what is normally implied by 
firm performance in theories of the firm or in stock markets and the form of performance 
measurement most commonly witnessed in strategic management studies. However, as we 
move towards a more detailed level of understanding sourcing strategy, namely a particular 
buyer-supplier relation, it is necessary to come up with a more detailed understanding of 
performance. For it is unlikely a buying firm judges the effectiveness of its relation with a 
single supplier by reference to its overall performance. The  s e c ond  l e v e l  i s  p e r f o rmanc e  o f  a  
par t i cu la r  supp l i e r . For firms will attach different performance criteria to relations with 
suppliers. Buying firms will seek attributes that relate much more closely to a particular 
supplier’s performance. So there are two levels of performance, namely firm performance and 
supplier performance. Supplier performance relates to all deliveries of a particular supplier to a 
buying firm, or more narrowly to all deliveries of a particular supplier to one product within a 
buying firm. This also conforms to existing literature (for instance compare Murray et al, 
1995a, with Poppo and Zenger, 1998), although existing articles understandably focus solely 
on one level or the other. 
An argument could be made for the network or dyadic level instead of the firm level. 
However, supplier performance concepts at the firm level have better measurability and 
obviously relate better to firm performance. Network level concepts, like embeddedness 
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(Granovetter, 1985), may be more appealing to some observers but they pose severe 
limitations on what questions can usefully be answered in the context of sourcing due to 
problems of delimitation and level of analysis problems. The performance of a network is very 
difficult to translate back into firm performance due to appropriation issues, inseparability etc. 
(Ring, 1999). This makes it difficult to relate network performance to the other dimensions in 
this research, internal vs. external sourcing and domestic vs. international sourcing. Such a 
comparison would in fact require an entirely separate empirical measurement. Furthermore 
the development of a theory of the performance of networks is still rather premature 
(Grandori, 1999; Ring, 1999). 
 
Economic performance at the supplier level is dependent upon processes that determine the 
flow of goods in deliveries and related information between buyer and supplier. The extent to 
which suppliers perform satisfactorily is judged by measuring the outcomes of a transaction or 
a range of transactions. Oft-cited elements of economic performance in deliveries include28: 
 
• Costs, overall costs or total costs of ownership; 
• Quality of deliveries; 
• Responsiveness of suppliers or extent of service; 
• Reliability of deliveries; 
• Speed of deliveries; 
 
These are all measures that are included in supplier performance measurement systems or 
logistics performance measurement systems as they are often called (see Mol, 1999; Van 
Weele, 2000). There are no absolute standards as to what is a good delivery time or service 
level, since this will depend heavily on the type of product, the production system, the 
strategic focus of the company, geography and other factors. 
 A firm’s operations are usually judged by financial ratios, more specifically 
profitability of the firm within a given time period. In order to obtain a comparable measure 
profits are divided by a size measure of the firm, like total assets, sales or investments. These 
are the kinds of indicators that lie at the heart of an investor’s judgement of a firm. If a firm 
does not return enough money, investors and banks will be unwilling to provide it with 
funding. Many studies in strategic management also use such financial performance measures 
to assess the success of a firm (e.g. Capon, Farley & Hoenig, 1990). Therefore often-used 
measures of economic performance at the firm level include: 
 
• Financial ratios such as return on sales or return on investment29. 
 
                                                           
28 This list was generated through a literature search combined with some of the interviews with firms 
and discussions with academics. Key literature in this area includes (Murray et al, 1995a; Nooteboom, 
1999: 116-117; Poppo & Zenger, 1998). Interviews with managers in the Netherlands were used to 
corroborate these understandings from the literature. Managers admitted to using these goals in their 
sourcing policies. Many of these interview results have been discussed by Tecson (1998) and Mol (1999). 
29 Obviously there are many other measures including shareholder value, EBITDA and such. 
Unfortunately most strategy research does not have such measures available for example because they 
are not collected within all firms or at all levels in a firm. 
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Sourcing firms may differ in their approaches to improving economic performance. However, 
an essential feature of economic performance is that it is relatively easy to replicate, making it 
not highly valuable as a firm resource (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). The argument of easy 
replication is only partially true in practice. A good example is the quality control system of 
Japanese automobile firms. When they attempted to replicate these systems it took US and 
European competitors considerable time to come even close to Japanese quality levels. To 
successfully implement such a system there is much more involved than simply the decision to 
implement it. Path dependencies (David, 1993) are only one reason that firms find it difficult 
to implement systems that are alien to them. 
 
Strategic performance is dependent upon processes that determine the interaction 
characteristics between buyer and supplier and the traits of their relation. In a sense it is the 
double loop (Argyris & Schon, 1978) of the buyer-supplier relation, which is not concerned 
with product deliveries but with processes that lie behind these deliveries such as inter-partner 
capabilities or inter-partner learning (Hamel, 1991). These are elements of the relational rent 
concept of Dyer and Singh (1998). Oft-cited measures of strategic performance at the buyer-
supplier relation level include30: 
 
• Joint learning to develop capabilities; 
• Joint innovation; 
• Network management; 
 
These measures are usually not part of the performance measurement system of a supplier, 
although there is an increasing tendency among practitioners, at least in the Netherlands (Mol, 
1999) to include them as important indicators of supplier performance. Similar to economic 
supplier performance measures there is no absolute standard as to what constitutes a 
satisfactory performance level. It is very hard to translate these measures into monetary value. 
In fact, it is highly likely that these performance standards are often defined ‘on the fly’. Only 
as a relationship develops are partners able to see what kind of learning and innovation they 
are able to get out of that relationship. If the partners would precisely know in advance what 
they would learn, there is probably little reason to engage in a partnership type of relation. On 
the other hand there is usually a vague idea of the direction in which learning will take place. 
Buyers can assess the competence base of suppliers and feed on that competence base. 
Furthermore they can look at a supplier in terms of its competence growth. 
At the firm level, the strategic performance of a firm is often judged against its long-term 
ability to obtain market positions and its potential to grow. Instead of only reaping profits in 
the short term, many firms are better off by gaining market share for the long term31. This 
seems to be true particularly in business-to-business markets where customer loyalty is more 
important than in consumer markets since switching costs are higher and reputation can easily 
                                                           
30 See previous note and Nishiguchi (1994) who discusses the strategic advantages of a flexible 
configuration of suppliers. 
31 Obviously there is a trade-off at some point: firms that sacrifice too much short-term profitability may 
no longer be able to sustain growth. 
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be destroyed given larger information availability and the higher relative importance of single 
buyers. Thus often-used measures of economic performance at the firm level include: 
 
• Output ratios such as market share and sales growth rate. 
 
Strategic performance effects of sourcing occur in the longer term and can be sustained over a 
longer period of time (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). From a strategic management point of 
view it is most interesting to find the effects that affect the sustainable competitive advantage 
of the firm. Indirect effects occur as the consequence of a transaction or a series of 
transactions within a relationship. This implies some learning process has to occur to absorb 
information from the transaction or relationship. This type of performance is much harder to 
replicate since it can (Dyer & Singh, 1998: 662) “only be created through the joint 
idiosyncratic contributions of the specific alliance partners”. In the case of a single firm a joint 
purpose (Barnard, 1938) is readily available through the organisation’s goals. In the case of 
multiple firms a joint purpose needs to be created before these knowledge sharing routines 
can be attained (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Strategic performance through sourcing arrangements is 
a valuable resource for both the buyer and the supplier involved (Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). 
Table 1 summarises the various performance effects that are the focus of this study. 
 
 Short term (economic) Long term (strategic) 
Firm 
performance 
How well is the firm fulfilling demands 
posed on a daily basis: Financial returns 
How well is the firm positioned for years to 
come: Market position 
Supplier 
performance 
How well are deliveries by the supplier 
meeting standards: Delivery attributes 
How well does a relationship contribute to 
long run development: Relationship attributes 
Table 3.1: Summary of performance effects under investigation in this study. The dimensions 
are explained above and stem from earlier research (for example Murray et al 1995a, 
Williamson, 1991b). 
 
 
3.2 The basic model 
This section focuses on the question how sourcing performance can best be explained. Which  
mode l  i s  mos t  u s e fu l  t o  exp la in  s our c ing  p e r f o rmanc e?  This raises the question what  
independen t  var iab l e s  shou ld  b e  u s ed  t o  exp la in  th e  d ep enden t  var iab l e ,  s our c ing  
p e r f o rmanc e 32. In order to clarify the reasons for choosing particular independent variables, a 
number of criterions are now put forward for choosing independent variables. 
                                                           
32 At this point it is important to notice that a) the previous two chapters have already discussed possible 
independent variables, b) a key conclusion of this discussion was that the literature has perhaps identified 
the proper dimensions but has not always been clear as to what the expected relations between these 
dimensions and performance are. While this study draws heavily on existing literature to compose a 
theoretical framework, it was also shown that existing literature is incomplete particularly with regards to 
international sourcing. In this sense this study is primarily of a theory-testing nature but also has to rely 
on an exploratory framework and exploratory analyses at times. As was suggested in chapter 2 the study 
is therefore of the type ‘replication with extension’. 
The next few paragraphs will undoubtedly be partly redundant in that they seek to re-establish 
what the literature has already found before, namely what dimensions of sourcing matter to explain firm 
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Choosing independent variables 
First of all and most obviously, a valid independent variable must bear some obvious 
theoretical relationship to the phenomenon one wishes to explain. In the case of sourcing it is 
unlikely that a clear relation can be established between say the number of trees in the home 
country and the performance of a particular firm. This seems an irrelevant independent 
variable. A theoretical relation has to exist a  pr i o r i . Statically the question is whether the 
independent variable has any explanatory power for the phenomenon under scrutiny. If the 
independent variable does not add to the explanatory power, in statistical terms the R2, then 
there is no reason for including it in the model (Gujarati, 1995). 
 Second, and related to the first point is the size of the effect of the independent 
variable. Can we expect this variable to be significant, both in the conceptual and the statistical 
sense? Preferably the variables that are included should be those that are expected to have the 
largest impact on the dependent variable. This will increase the explanatory value of the 
theoretical model and thus add to the explanation of the dependent variable sourcing 
performance. For instance, the educational background of a manager may impact sourcing 
performance to some extent, but does not seem to have the same magnitude as the choice 
between internal and external sourcing33. Thus when constructing a model it is advisable to 
include the most relevant variables to the research topic (Gujarati, 1995). 
 The third criterion for independent variables relates to the strategic management of 
firms. Is this variable something that may be changed by a decision-maker? This implies that 
only those variables that can be influenced by managerial decisions of a firm are independent 
variables. Take for example the Alps that could systematically lower the sourcing performance 
of firms based in Switzerland because of transport difficulties. This would probably qualify as 
an ‘interesting to know’ fact, but hardly seems to be under the control of the sourcing 
manager of a Switzerland-based firm. Therefore this is a point not worthy of inclusion as an 
independent variable. This does not imply that there is no room for such a variable in the 
model. Perhaps it can be useful as a moderating or control variable. This criterion explicitly 
adds an instrumental purpose to this study, finding the best way to do something. This is not 
problematic since improving existing systems is a key facet of science, natural or social. All 
empirical scientific studies can become instruments, depending on how decision-makers 
employ them. 
 Fourth, it is obvious that in an empirical study only those variables can be included 
that can be tested in the field. Is this variable open for empirical testing? Before setting up the 
empirical research an estimation has to be made of the viability of obtaining data on this 
variable. Including a variable that can not be tested, such as a tacit belief of a manager that can 
not be made explicit, seems a useless exercise. 
 Finally, the total number of independent variables must be as limited as possible in 
order to obtain a parsimonious model. For each possible variable it must be asked whether 
this is a logical variable to include in the model. Limiting the number of variables contributes 
                                                                                                                                                    
performance. The next few paragraphs imply neither that entirely new independent variables have to be 
‘invented’ nor that existing theories need to be replaced. 
33 Although of course the educational background of the manager may also influence the choice between 
internal and external sourcing and thereby indirectly affect performance in theory this is at most a minor 
effect. 
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to the conceptual clarity of the model. What sense can be made empirically of an extremely 
complicated model?  A model with 25 independent variables that are all deemed relevant 
might lead to an outcome where everything matters a little bit. However, what really matters 
in research is not what matters a little bit, but what matters most.  
 
Thus a number of criteria are attained to guide model construction: 
1. Independent variables must have a theoretical relation to the dependent variable; 
2. Independent variables chosen must be those that are likely to have a large explanatory 
power; 
3. It must be possible for an actor, in this case a manager of a sourcing firm, to 
systematically influence the independent variables; 
4. The independent variables must be open to empirical scrutiny; 
5. The total number of independent variables must be as limited as possible to make the 
model parsimonious, conceptually clear and empirically manageable. 
 
It is a basic assumption of this research that only a combination of economic exchange 
structures and social exchange processes can help us explain the outcomes of firm behaviour 
and sourcing strategies, following for example Oliver (1997) and Nooteboom (1999). We need 
not only an economic explanation of when markets and hierarchies are the preferred mode 
(Coase, 1937), but also an explanation of how different types of interaction affect social 
relationships, particularly through the intertwined mechanisms of trust (Luhmann, 1968) and 
power (Luhmann, 1975). 
 Thus we need to look beyond the economic object of study of governance decisions. 
And we need to look beyond the sociological object of study of social relations. The single 
most important reason for doing this is that managers do so too. They do not single out a 
decision on whether to outsource without taking into account potential suppliers that could 
deliver a product. Furthermore studies of organisation only stand to gain from incorporating 
multiple perspectives. Therefore it is appropriate to look at issues that are usually the subject 
of study of different fields of management and to incorporate theoretical angles from these 
different fields. 
In combination with the five decision criteria outlined above this leads to the 
following fundamental choice. Thi s  s tudy  a t t empt s  t o  l o ok a t  in t e rna t i ona l  s our c ing  
s t ra t e g y  in  t e rms  o f  wha t  s our c e s  a r e  u s ed  a s  we l l  a s  how th e s e  s our c e s  a r e  manag ed . 
Thus a three-dimensional model is developed that incorporates a) the make or buy decision, 
b) the type of relation between buyer and supplier, and c) the effects of internationalisation34. 
With this essential choice in mind, construction of the theoretical model can commence. All 
three of these dimensions were discussed at length in chapters 1 and 2. 
 
                                                           
34 As stated in a previous note this choice does not imply anything fundamentally different from existing 
literature. It merely confirms that existing literature has, perhaps unconsciously, come to the same 
conclusions in terms of what dimensions of sourcing matter to assess firm performance. 
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Figure 3.0: independent and dependent variables 
 
Internal or external sourcing 
According to Coase (Coase, 1937) the existence of organisations can be attributed to market 
failure or ‘marketing costs’. Thus firms are constantly weighing the total costs, including 
transaction and production costs, of the market and hierarchy modes. Purely theoretically they 
are thought to do this in an optimal way (Williamson, 1991b) such that a firm always chooses 
the right degree of external sourcing because for every choice the right alternative is applied. 
There are multiple reasons to believe this is not true in practice though. First, the decision to 
outsource is surrounded by many uncertainties regarding eventual payoffs and the true costs 
and benefits of the make-or-buy decision are rarely known in advance. Second, firms are 
normally not able to specify learning and innovation effects connected to make or buy in 
advance. If a firm would be able to specify those effects, then they can simply be implemented 
now. Third, as the number of decisions to be made increases, the firm is less able to devote 
enough attention to each individual decision, causing less than perfect information to be 
available. Fourth, there are all kinds of path dependencies in a firm’s internal sourcing and 
external relations that obviously limit the degree of strategic choice. Fifth, firms are limited by 
both their physical location as well as their positions in the market and inter-firm networks. 
Sixth, it is well-known that all kinds of psychological effects co-determine eventual decisions 
that managers make, for example so-called ‘bandwagon effects’ that cause firms to behave 
alike. Seventh, and this is a very important reason for deviations, other goals than purely 
economic goals may co-determine a firm’s eventual choices. This applies at the firm level 
where interests of other stakeholders like employees or the environment may conflict with 
purely economic performance. It similarly applies at the managerial level where a manager may 
be driven by private interests like those described by agency models. In short: there is a variety 
of reasons why actual firm behaviour may differ from (economically) theorised firm behaviour. 
 
Empirically the relation between internal or external sourcing and performance is not very well 
researched. Although there have been numerous studies of vertical integration (Capon, Farley, 
& Hoenig, 1990) they often focus on other dimensions of vertical integration than sourcing, 
for example on corporate diversification and scope issues. The literature on the effects of 
vertical integration on performance is not conclusive, although most of the literature seems to 
suggest vertical integration (internal sourcing) is positively related to financial performance 
(Capon et al, 1990). More recently at least part of the literature seems to suggest that given a 
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high level of asset specificity it is better to source internally (Poppo & Zenger, 1998) or even 
that it is altogether better to source internally (Murray et al, 1995a). Murray et al (1995a) found 
a positive but not significant relationship between internal sourcing and economic 
performance. This literature would generate the expectation that external sourcing and 
economic performance are negatively related. 
 Other research often does not distinguish between types of performance, but there is 
a lot of anecdotal evidence available that external sourcing is often used as a way of increasing 
short-term, measurable outcomes. Hendry (1995) suggests outsourcing improves such 
indicators as contracting costs and short-term flexibility35. Other research has linked 
outsourcing with improvement of cost levels, customer satisfaction or risk levels (e.g. Cross, 
1995; Monczka & Trent, 1991; Quinn, 1992). Through focusing on its core competencies a 
firm can improve overall cost levels by outsourcing certain activities to best-in-world outside 
suppliers (Quinn, 1999). This generates the counter expectation that external sourcing and 
economic performance are positively related. 
Strategic performance seems to improve when firms integrate activities. Murray et al 
(1995) found a positive relation between internal sourcing and strategic performance when 
controlling for several other factors. Hendry (1995) also warns of negative long-term effects of 
outsourcing in the form of a loss of internal knowledge and learning capability. The possibility 
of opportunism always exists (Williamson, 1985) meaning knowledge can leak to suppliers or 
suppliers make use of incomplete contracts in other ways. These empirical results seem to be 
in line with the predictions of transaction cost economics and the knowledge-based view of the 
firm. Regardless of whether a negative reason (market failure), or a positive reason (shared 
knowledge, routines and language) exists: if items are sourced internally, firms usually try to 
obtain some form of advantage over a longer period of time. 
 Thus, while external sourcing is usually associated with an attempt to optimise short-
term, economic variables, internal sourcing is used to optimise the firm strategy in the long 
run. This coincides with the investments made and switching costs. Once a firm internalises a 
part of the value chain, it is making investments and running into switching costs that make it 
less likely to expect short-term changes. A firm that outsources, however, is better able to 
switch from one supplier to another and as a consequence is better in adapting its short-term 
performance. If this is true there is a trade-off between short term and long term 
performance. Alternatively we find hypothesis 1b. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: External sourcing is positively related to economic 
performance. 
Hypothesis 1b: External sourcing is negatively related to economic 
performance. 
Hypothesis 2: External sourcing is negatively related to strategic 
performance. 
 
 
                                                           
35 At the same time Hendry exposes scepticism concerning the long-term consequences of outsourcing 
on elements like firm capabilities. 
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Exit or voice relations 
The second dimension is not concerned with whether a source is located inside or outside a 
firm, but with how external sources are managed. Different types of relations with external 
suppliers exist. Most often a dichotomy or continuum is proposed between low social 
interaction and high social interaction within the relationship. A range of names has been put 
forward to portray these different ideal types of relations. The former type of low or no social 
interaction is a/o deemed arm’s length relation (Williamson, 1985), market (Williamson, 1975), 
discrete market relation (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992) and exit relation (Helper, 1987). In the 
low social interaction type actors are described as atomistic, with no clear social network 
between them (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). For the high social interaction type authors a/o 
mention alliances (Gulati, 1995), networks (Gulati, 1998), partnerships (Martinsons, 1993), 
voice relations (Helper, 1987) and relational contracts (Williamson, 1979) or relational 
contracting (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). 
 In this study the emphasis is on the dichotomy between exit and voice (Helper, 
1987). Firms are not seen as atomistic units but as parts of intertwined networks of firms 
(Richardson, 1972; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). A theory of exit, voice and loyalty in dyadic 
relations has already been developed. This theory of exit, voice and loyalty resides with 
Hirschman (1970). In buyer-supplier relations it has been interpreted (Helper, 1987; Helper, 
1991) as providing firms with two ways to manage qualitative and quantitative changes in 
output. Exit (Hirschman, 1970: 33) is when a change occurs and ‘the customer goes over to 
the competition’. Hirschman states that (1970: 21): 
 
“by inflicting revenue losses on delinquent management, exit is expected to 
make that ‘wonderful concentration of the mind’ akin to the one Samuel 
Johnson attributed to the prospect of being hanged’. 
Voice he defines as (Hirschman, 1970: 33): 
“any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state 
of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the management 
directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of 
forcing a change in management, or through various types of action and 
protests, including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion”. 
 
Hirschman (1970: 36) interprets voice as an alternative to exit, where the decision to exit will 
“o f t en  b e  taken  in  th e  l i gh t  o f  th e  p ro sp e c t s  f o r  th e  e f f e c t i v e  u s e  o f  v o i c e” (1970: 37, 
emphasis in original). Buyers will first try the voice option or at least contemplate its merits, 
before deciding to exit. Exit occurs in case voice is thought to be ineffective or has proven to 
be ineffective. According to Hirschman (1970: 41) voice is most likely to occur in markets 
with few buyers or where a few buyers account for an important proportion of sales. Few 
buyers, or an oligopsony, is a normal characteristic of business-to-business markets, which 
explains the merits of the exit-voice-loyalty theory for explaining buyer-supplier relations36. 
                                                           
36 Unlike in business-to-consumer markets, where single consumers are generally unable to communicate 
directly with the management of the firm, voice appears a more plausible alternative in industrial 
markets. 
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Much research in recent years has aimed not at voice but at trust. This brings to 
mind what the role of trust is in the exit-voice-loyalty framework. Entities are continuously 
being faced with uncertainty, which they try to reduce (Luhmann, 1968). The trust mechanism 
provides an opportunity to do so as it reduces the perceived complexity of the outside world 
because actions of others become more predictable. Trust is best viewed as a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for voice to occur. If there is no trust there is no voice but if there is 
trust there is not necessarily voice. Voice requires another condition, namely value 
(Nooteboom, 1999). Only if both parties see an exchange as value generating it will be 
executed. Trust is a characteristic of the relationship between two or more parties unlike 
power, which is a mediating variable on that relationship (Luhmann, 1975). In Luhmann’s 
terms power is a catalyst which changes the probability of events (Luhmann, 1975). 
Improbable events can become more probable through power, whereas probable events can 
become less probable. Power can occur in both low and high-trust relations as it is not 
connected to the type of relation, even though it may influence that particular relation. 
 
What are the performance effects of one type of relation (exit) vis-à-vis another (voice)? 
Hirschman (1970) does not devote much attention to this question. His preoccupation seems 
to be with the question in which cases voice and exit are effective. He notes (1970: 80) that in 
order for voice to be effective there has to be at least an option of exit. But this option of exit 
should not be too easy to attain. This statement is perhaps more telling of the role of 
switching costs in the framework than of the influence of voice on performance. Others have 
filled some of the blanks in Hirschman’s work, although this may not have been their primary 
concern. Gulati (1998) suggests embedded ties often lead to higher results, particularly in cases 
of high uncertainty. Uncertainty rises with the length of the time frame. The longer the time 
period over which a decision has to be made, the more likely it is that sources of uncertainty 
will boil up. Thus, when the time frame is more limited, voice may not be the preferable 
option. In Luhmann’s (1968) conception of trust the extent to which the uncertainty reducing 
mechanism of trust has to be employed is generally smaller if the time period concerned is 
shorter. 
This is a plausible argument: in order to regain the investments that a voice strategy 
requires, a longer time horizon is needed to judge the results. Thus only over the longer term 
can we really distinguish the positive outcomes of a voice strategy. In case of voice joint 
innovation and learning is much easier to attain than with exit. Under the constant threat of 
exit by the other partner, no organisation or person is willing to invest much in a relation. 
Without mutual investments innovation and learning can not be achieved. Thus following a 
voice strategy will be positively related to long-term performance. 
Exit is in essence a strategy of divestiture. Exit is applied immediately and it is 
exercised for the sake of immediate returns. The new supplier has to offer some direct 
benefits. Thus exit aims at improving the short-term performance of the firm. Threatening to 
exit can be an effective bargaining tool for a customer to help reduce prices or to improve the 
priority assigned to shipments of that customer. If this is the case, then exit is a useful option 
to increase performance. On the other hand, a firm’s economic goals may also need some 
form of co-ordination that an exit regime does not offer. For example, reducing delivery times 
or improving product quality often require joint initiatives of customer and supplier. Even 
cost reduction can require such co-operation because very detailed information from a 
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supplier is often necessary to achieve insights in the cost structure of the supply chain. In such 
cases, voice may still be the preferred option, even for short-term economic goals. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Voice relations are negatively related to economic 
performance. 
Hypothesis 3b: Voice relations are positively related to economic 
performance. 
Hypothesis 4: Voice relations are positively related to strategic 
performance. 
 
 
Domestic or international sourcing 
In most of the writings on global sourcing and indeed on internationalisation in general there 
is a notion that internationalisation of activities is beneficial to a firm. To overstate the point: 
the more international an activity is, the better the performance of that activity. This idea 
seems to be behind much of the literature on globalisation and the multinational firm. In fact, 
starting with Ricardo’s (1978) theory of comparative advantages, international trade is 
expected to reap positive welfare effects. Hymer (1976) suggested that internationalisation 
through FDI by a firm is an attempt to increase profitability by benefiting from structural 
imperfections in different markets. In Dunning’s (1988) eclectic paradigm internationalisation 
is the outcome of a firm’s attempt to optimally utilise advantages from different locations 
given certain internalisation and ownership advantages. In the revised product cycle model of 
Vernon (1979) countries differ in their scarcity pattern: in some countries labour may be scare, 
in others raw materials or space. A firm internationalises in order to combine these different 
types of scarcity in a beneficial manner. In sourcing a similar point has been made by Kotabe 
(1998). Kotabe (1998) suggests that global sourcing is a means to increase a firm’s 
competitiveness. Thus, Kotabe expects a high degree of internationalisation in sourcing to be 
positively related to sourcing performance at least if international sourcing has been a strategic 
choice by the firm and not an imperative dictated by the industry or headquarters. 
The impact of internationalisation of sourcing on performance is usually not estimated 
separately for economic and strategic performance. However, Dunning (1993), following 
Behrman (1972), assigns four different motives to foreign production activities, which is a 
step towards such a separation. These four kinds of MNC types are resource seekers, market 
seekers, efficiency seekers and strategic asset or capability seekers (Dunning, 1993). Dunning 
further mentions three other motives that are applicable only under specific circumstances: 
escape investments, support investments, and passive investments. These motives can be 
extended from internal sourcing of final goods to internal or external sourcing of 
components, because of the general nature of this typology. 
 
Resource seekers internationalise to obtain (Dunning, 1993: 57): 
 
“particular and specific resources at a lower real cost than could be obtained in 
their home country (if, indeed, they could be obtained at all)”.  
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Resource seeking is an economic process, from which no long-run advantage can be obtained. 
Resource seeking by operating foreign supplies can lead to lower real costs. But others can 
replicate this process at a limited cost.  
Market seekers, the second type, are characterised by Dunning (1993: 58) as: 
 
“enterprises that invest in a particular country or region to supply goods or 
services to markets in these or in adjacent countries”. 
 
It is sometimes of great importance to choose a supplier in the country of production and 
sales, particularly if transportation costs are high and if the industry is characterised by a high 
degree of government involvement or by national sentiments. Unless prevented by 
institutional barriers others can replicate such a sourcing pattern.  
The third type of international activity is efficiency seeking with the following primary 
goal (Dunning, 1993: 59): 
 
“to rationalize the structure of established resource based or market-seeking 
investment in such a way that the investing company can gain from the 
common governance of geographically dispersed activities”. 
 
Many MNCs have been or are currently involved in rationalisation of the supply base by 
reducing the number of suppliers. Since it is essentially a process of restructuring, others are a 
priori able to do the same.  
The fourth and final type of activity are the strategic asset seekers, which are: 
(Dunning, 1993: 60): 
 
“those which engage in FDI, usually by acquiring the assets of foreign 
corporations, to promote their long-term strategic objectives – especially that of 
sustaining or advancing their international competitiveness”. 
 
A modified version of this in sourcing would be a relationship with an international supplier 
aimed at developing a unique joint resource base. This latter type seems to be the only of the 
four types of international activity that explicitly seeks to obtain strategic advantage and builds 
on idiosyncratic advantages. The first three types appear to concentrate mainly on obtaining 
short-term economic advantage. 
 Of the other three only the first two apply to sourcing. Passive investments occur 
only in case of FDI, when a firm holds stock in a foreign firm. The escape motive is also of a 
strategic nature since it seeks not to improve economic performance but to establish new 
sourcing positions. Firms using the escape motive intend to (Dunning, 1993: 61): 
 
“….escape restrictive legislation or macro-organizational policies by home 
governments”. 
 
In the case of international sourcing this can amount to s our c ing  i t ems  f r om abroad  tha t  
can  no t  b e  p roduc ed  o r  p e rhaps  on l y  b e  p roduc ed  a t  exc e s s i v e  c o s t s  in  th e  home  
c oun t r y  due  t o  l e g i s l a t i on . Another way of escaping from potential government pressure 
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would be to set up a parallel source in case something occurs with the reliability of deliveries 
or as a bargaining tool with suppliers or even governments. Obviously such safeguards in the 
form of multiple sources induce additional transaction costs and are only useful when critical 
inputs are concerned. Support investments equally apply to sourcing, although they are 
perhaps better called sourcing support activities. Their purpose is to (Dunning, 1993: 61): 
 
“support the activities of the rest of the enterprise of which they are a part.” 
 
These are activities like a call centre connected to the sales of the product or after-sales 
maintenance. This is nothing to do with strategic performance but is simply a way to 
economically operate some necessary but not essential activities of a firm. 
 
The overall idea is clearly that international sourcing is used as a means to improve firm 
performance, both in the short and the long haul. One final argument in favour of this line of 
reasoning is the self-selection bias of firms that internationalise their sourcing. Why would a 
firm take the trouble of internationalising its supply base if it feels it has nothing to gain from 
doing that? Hence firms that are found to source internationally must have perceived there 
were valid reasons to do so (higher performance). There is not much literature available to 
support a notion to the contrary. There is fragmented evidence that elements of sourcing may 
be more difficult internationally. One work that comes to mind is that of Levy (1995) who 
argues that international sourcing complicates supply chains. Another area of work involves 
the difficulties associated with operating in other cultures (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996). 
But no clear statements have been made that internationalisation of the supply base will 
decrease genereal firm performance. Thus, the following hypotheses are obtained. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The degree of international sourcing is positively related to 
economic performance. 
Hypothesis 6: The degree of international sourcing is positively related to 
strategic performance. 
 
Figure 1 combines these 6 hypotheses and displays the basic research model. This model will 
be the focus of attention in chapter 8. 
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Figure 3.1: basic research model (chapter 8). 
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3.3 Moderating variables 
There are several important moderators on the theoretical relations described above. What a 
moderator is, is best described by Baron and Kenny (1986: 174) who define it as a  
 
“variable that affects the direction and / or strength of the relation between an 
independent or predictor variable and a dependent or criterion variable”.  
 
In a moderator model there are three different variables that help predict the dependent 
variable. First, there is the main effect or predictor. The hypotheses described earlier are all 
examples of such main effects. Second, there is a direct effect of the moderator. Similar to the 
main effect a moderator can help predict the dependent variable in its own right. Third, and 
this is the most complex variable, there is an interaction effect between the predictor variable 
and the moderator variable. This interaction effect is simply calculated by multiplying the 
value of the predictor by the value of the moderator. As Baron and Kenny (1986: 174) state 
 
“a basic moderator effect can be represented as an interaction between a focal 
independent variable and a factor that specifies the appropriate conditions for 
its operation”. 
 
Thus the reason for specifying moderating variables is a belief that they not only help explain 
the dependent variable directly but also through an interaction with the main or predictor 
variable. But how should the outcomes of this interaction effect be interpreted? If a 
moderator is said to be positive, this means that the interaction between the predictor and 
moderator is positively related to the dependent variable (see also Hair, Anderson, Tatham & 
Black, 1998). This implies that the value of this relation will be higher for high values of the 
moderator. For a negative interaction effect, this line of reasoning is simply mirrored, high 
values of the variable lower the value of the main effect. Table 3.2 captures this discussion and 
provides an illustration. 
 
 Interaction effect positive Interaction effect negative 
Meaning Main effect more positive / less 
negative for high values of 
moderating variable 
Main effect less positive / more 
negative for high values of 
moderating variable 
Illustration X * Z is a positive moderator on the 
relation between X and Y: 
The higher the value of Z, the higher 
the value (β) of  the relation between 
X and Y 
X * Z is a negative moderator on 
the relation between X and Y: 
The higher the value of Z, the lower 
the value (β) of  the relation 
between X and Y 
Table 3.2: Summary of various possible effects of the interaction variable. 
 
In this study all specified interaction effects will be of the linear type (the most common and 
most simple type, see Baron and Kenny, 1986). In order to discuss these moderators in an 
ordered manner, they will now be presented in blocks per dimension of sourcing strategy. At 
the end of each of these blocks the discussion will be recaptured in a graphic model. These 
three graphic models serve as the basis for discussion in the chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
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Internal vs. external sourcing 
Asse t  sp e c i f i c i t y  
Transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1979) suggests that three characteristics of a 
transaction dictate whether an input is sourced internally or externally: asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency. Later the influence of frequency was put into question by 
Williamson (1995). Empirical research confirms that a lot of the statistical variance in make-
or-buy decisions can indeed be explained by this model and particularly by asset specificity 
(Walker & Weber, 1984; Williamson, 1991a). Williamson (Williamson, 1991b) concluded that 
the specificity of the product exchanged to a large extent predicted whether the product 
would be exchanged with an external supplier or not. The higher the asset specificity, the 
more likely a firm is to source internally, since it can not rely on opportunistic parties in the 
market to behave as it wishes them to. Empirical evidence not only suggests that the choice 
between make or buy is influenced by asset specificity, but also that the effectiveness of that 
choice is determined by the asset specificity (Murray et al, 1995; Poppo & Zenger, 1998).  
However, it is questionable whether asset specificity is the ultimate cause of the make-
or-buy relation and the resulting performance or a by-product of a firm’s activities and 
strategy (Nishiguchi, 1994). This raises the question of the logical adequacy of the relation. Is 
the ra i s on -d ’ ê t r e  of an organisation really a failure of the market? There is a counter view 
(Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992) that suggests organisations possess unique features of 
themselves that make organisations a more efficient form of governance for particular 
economic exchanges. Thus there is another reason to use the organisation, besides market 
failure. Barnard (1938: 137) puts it in the following way: 
 
shared purpose is “the unifying element of formal organization”  
and (1938: 86) “[t]he necessity of having a purpose is axiomatic, implicit in the 
words ‘system’, ‘coordination,’ [and] ‘cooperation’”. 
 
This counter view, often referred to as knowledge-based view of the firm, differs from 
transaction cost economics in a number of other respects too (Poppo & Zenger, 1998). First, 
and perhaps most importantly, the knowledge-based view presupposes that the shared history 
of exchange partners matters for the present state of the relationship. Through repeated 
exchanges within a firm, routines can be developed that increase the efficiency of governance 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). Furthermore a common language and pool of knowledge are 
developed within the firm. This leads knowledge-based scholars to a different interpretation 
of the relationship between asset specificity and internal sourcing. It is not market failure that 
causes internal sourcing but the competitive advantage that can be derived from internal 
routines, knowledge and a firm language. Thus, the knowledge-based view makes similar 
predictions, but with a different explanation than transaction cost economics. If shared 
knowledge, routines and language are important, a firm will source internally. This implies that 
external sourcing is negatively related to performance if shared knowledge, routines and 
language are important.  
However, empirically asset specificity and intra-organisational capabilities can imply 
more or less the same measure. Both are usually measured by the degree of unique human, 
location and physical inputs that are needed to produce a product (Poppo & Zenger, 1998; 
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Walker & Weber, 1984). Thus as far as predictions related to asset specificity, external 
sourcing and performance are concerned there are no substantial differences between the two 
approaches although the two approaches obviously apply different arguments to make their 
case. This leads to the following hypothesis37: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Asset specificity negatively moderates the relation between 
external sourcing and performance 
 
Unce r ta in t y  
The economic uncertainty a firm faces is an important variable to consider in outsourcing 
decisions. It has been argued that firms facing h i gh  unc e r ta in t y  in  t e rms  o f  v o lume  
f lu c tua t i ons  w i l l  t end  t o  ou t s our c e  r i sks  (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994). Through carrying over 
production responsibilities and volume risks to suppliers, firms are thought to become more 
competitive. However, a supplier would normally be expected to add a risk margin to its cost 
price if there is much uncertainty so such gains may be negligible. Gilley and Rasheed (2000) 
find that uncertainty is actually a negative moderator for the outsourcing-performance 
relation. That is, if there is much uncertainty in their environment, firms are better off by not 
outsourcing so many activities. These findings are in line with the predictions put forward by 
Williamson (1985), who suggests that under conditions of uncertainty it will not be economic 
to source externally since transaction costs will rise exponentially given the presence of 
incomplete contracting in case of high uncertainty. Suppliers will not be willing to take on 
unnecessary risks unless they can charge a premium on prices, which would make external 
sourcing more expensive and less attractive. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Uncertainty negatively moderates the relation between 
external sourcing and performance 
 
Innova t i on  
In industries where innovation plays a particularly large role, it may be beneficial to internalise 
production activities (Murray et al, 1995). It is generally easier to develop product and process 
innovations internally. Furthermore if highly innovative products are being outsourced, this 
may lead to leaking of knowledge to competitors or to the supplier, encouraging potential 
entry in the industry by the supplier. Innovations can not be specified in advance, which 
causes any contract involving innovation to be incomplete and raises the transaction costs of 
dealing with external parties. Thus outsourcing is not a good solution for firms in highly R & 
D intensive environments. Outsourcing will be a better solution for low-tech products that are 
nearing the end of their product life cycles since the effects of knowledge spillovers to 
competitors or suppliers will be negligible, as technology is not a key competitive factor 
anymore. Even if some R & D activities are sourced externally, key R & D inputs will usually 
be sourced from within the industry and not vertically, from suppliers. 
 
                                                           
37 Recall the discussion above: this specification implies that if the relation between external sourcing and 
performance is negative, it will be more negative under conditions of high asset specificity. If, on the 
other hand, the main relation is positive, it will become more positive under conditions of low asset 
specificity. 
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Hypothesis 9: Innovation negatively moderates the relation between 
external sourcing and performance 
 
Fore i gnne s s  
It has often been argued that MNCs obtain a higher performance than local firms because 
they have particular inherent advantages over local competitors (Hymer, 1976; Dunning, 
1993). Producing and selling in multiple countries allows MNCs to reap scale benefits. Global 
brand names help to introduce products in foreign markets more easily. Furthermore MNCs 
are able to develop production capabilities in one country and transfer those to other 
countries. However, when it comes to their local networks, MNCs are faced with a 
disadvantage (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Because they do not have a local supply base in a 
host country, they need to either use foreign sources or build up a new supply network. If 
they build a new supply network in the host country they will have to overcome problems 
relating to language, culture and other institutions. One example is the necessity to explore 
contract law in the host country. Local firms have been around much longer and have more 
experience in constructing and improving their supply network. Governments will under 
normal conditions also be more supportive of local firms than of their foreign competitors. 
MNCs face a ‘liability of foreignness‘ problem (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) in their sourcing 
network. It is expected that while the overall performance of subsidiaries of multinational 
firms is higher, the ability of foreign MNCs to leverage their network of outside suppliers to 
obtain higher performance is limited in comparison to local firms. 
 
Hypothesis 10: Being a foreign firm negatively moderates the relation 
between external sourcing and performance 
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Figure 3.2: overview of the external sourcing model, four moderators and  
control variables (chapter 5). The control variables are discussed in section 3.4. 
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Exit vs. voice relation 
Loya l t y  
The discussion of Hirschman’s ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty’ above was limited to the first two 
elements. Loyalty, the third element of Hirschman’s theory, is a mediating variable. The most 
useful interpretation of loyalty seems to be one where we start by explaining how the level of 
loyalty co-determines voice or exit. If a buyer is loyal to the selling organisation, it is less likely 
to depart that supplier and thus more likely to opt for voice. Loyalty causes such attachment 
directly but also indirectly through the increased influence loyal members will have on the 
selling organisation’s policies. As Hirschman (1970: 78) frames it: “loyalty holds exit at bay 
and activates voice”. For exit to be applied there is no necessity of voice. In fact, this can be 
reversed: when there is loyalty, exit is less likely. Thus voice becomes more likely as the level 
of loyalty rises. 
 Moving on to an explanation of how loyalty helps to achieve effectiveness when 
applying voice it appears one should not search for direct performance effects of loyalty. 
Loyalty is not meaningful unless it can be exploited within the confines of a particular relation. 
Undoubtedly most instances of loyalty (e.g. personal loyalty to a country) are hardly ever truly 
put to the test. Instead the performance effects of loyalty will run through the exit and voice 
mechanisms. Loyalty best fulfils its role as a mediating variable when (Hirschman, 1970: 80) 
‘the effective use of voice requires a great deal of social inventiveness’ and when substitutes 
are readily available. But in such cases loyalty indeed helps to increase the effectiveness of the 
voice option meaning its indirect effect is to improve the performance outcome of voice 
relations. If there is more loyalty the investments made in voice relations will have a longer 
payoff period and be more effective. Without such loyalty there may be a voice relation but 
whether this relation holds over time is unclear. If a voice relation is terminated the attached 
investments will be lost. 
 
Hypothesis 11: Loyalty positively moderates the relation between voice 
relations and performance 
 
Buye r  d ep enden c e  
Like any other organisation supplier firms are dependent on their customers. Obviously this 
buyer dependence will vary greatly among relationships. Some suppliers completely depend on 
one buyer, while others have a well-balanced portfolio of customers. The extent to which a 
supplier is willing to commit resources to a particular buyer will be a function of its 
dependence on that buyer and the likelihood of a continued relationship (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995) elaborate on this by introducing scales of dependence: 
buyers and suppliers are dependent upon each other to some extent. They furthermore 
suggest that a high dependence of suppliers upon buyers, would lead the buying firm to obtain 
superior performance results, as the supplier has only limited options at its avail (Ruigrok & 
Van Tulder, 1995: 83). A supplier with a large buyer dependence will often be in a situation of 
lock-in. It is unable to dispose of the buyer, unless at excessive costs. Therefore it is often best 
off by also trying to lock the customer in through developing valuable joint routines. This will 
allow the supplier some room for manoeuvring within the relationship. The effectiveness of 
the voice mechanism will be strengthened when a supplier commits more resources to a 
relation because it is more dependent on that relation. 
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Hypothesis 12: Buyer dependence negatively moderates the relation 
between voice relations and performance 
 
Supp l i e r  d ep enden c e  
Conversely a buying firm will also be more willing to put resources into a relationship if the 
relative importance of that relationship is larger (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). If a product’s costs 
or value are to a large extent determined by the performance of a single supplier, it will be 
worthwhile to invest more in the relationship with this supplier since the supplier is of key 
importance to the production process. Since the actual performance outcome of a buyer-
supplier relationship depends upon mutual commitments, larger supplier dependence will be 
helpful to increase the effectiveness of voice relations. Particularly if buyer and supplier are 
mutually dependent, there may be lock-in in the relation. In such cases a long-term relation 
geared towards value creation, quasi-integration of the supplier, may be the most effective 
solution. 
 
Hypothesis 13: Supplier dependence positively moderates the relation 
between voice relations and performance 
 
Power  
Power is a variable that potentially moderates relations: a catalyst according to Luhmann 
(1975). Conceptually power in dyadic relations is often seen as a means to improve the 
effectiveness of the more powerful party at the expense of the less powerful party. Applied 
game theory (Schelling, 1969) suggests that the outcome of a bargaining process can be 
uneven if power differences exist between actors. A buying firm with high power can obtain 
superior performance results from a relation with a supplier. This is also in line with Porter’s 
(1980) five forces model. Here a low bargaining power of suppliers directly enhances industry 
profits, as it is one of the five forces that predict inter-firm rivalry in an industry and the 
competitiveness of firms. According to Porter (1980) power causes a game of appropriation: 
those with most power are best able to appropriate the profits from a buyer-supplier relation. 
Power may also differ per buying firm. Power can be excerpted indirectly via other players in 
the network that the dyadic buyer-supplier relation is a part of. Therefore a broader 
conception of power is necessary that incorporates the sourcing firm’s power with respect to 
other actors in the network. Power is manifested in market and institutionalised power of the 
buyer. 
 Murray et al (1995a) do not find the hypothesised negative moderating effect of 
supplier bargaining power on the relation between internal sourcing and market performance. 
Thus, if suppliers had a lot of bargaining power this did not have the expected catalytic effect. 
However, the authors themselves question this particular outcome, as the Cronbach alpha 
associated with this question was rather low. Furthermore they did not incorporate the other 
side of the bargaining relation, the power of the buyer itself. Instead they focused on the 
power of suppliers only. So a second look at the influence of power is appropriate.  
 
Hypothesis 14: Power negatively moderates the relation between voice 
relations and performance. 
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Figure 3.3: Overview of the voice relation model,  
four moderators and control variables (chapter 6). 
 
 
Domestic vs. international sourcing 
In t e rna t i ona l  expe r i en c e  
A firm that is exposed to international situations, for example through FDI, exports or being a 
multinational firm in general, will gain valuable experience in managing the internationalisation 
process. This previous experience can help a firm make proper international sourcing 
decisions, for example because the firm will know what pitfalls to avoid when it decides to 
source from a foreign country. Furthermore the firm’s awareness and knowledge of foreign 
sources will be higher since it will have encountered foreign suppliers when it 
internationalised. In that sense, a network of weak ties has been formed (Granovetter, 1973) 
that is activated when new supply decisions are made. There are many indications in the 
literature that previous foreign experience is helpful when embarking upon initiatives in new 
countries (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen & Bell, 1997). Similarly international experience in 
other areas of management will be helpful in international sourcing. Firms that can build upon 
international experience will be better able to exploit international sourcing as a means of 
increasing competitiveness. 
 
Hypothesis 15: International experience positively moderates the relation 
between international sourcing and performance. 
 
Fore i gnne s s  
In hypothesis 10 it was contemplated that foreign firms are at a disadvantage when sourcing 
externally because they are less familiar with the local supply network. However, once it has 
been decided that an external source will be used and the choice emerges as to whether to use 
a local or an international supplier, this will turn into an advantage for foreign firms. Since 
they already have a home-based sourcing network their knowledge of and experience with 
sourcing from multiple countries is larger. In fact, their international sourcing network will be 
stronger than their local sourcing network. In the case of international sourcing foreign firms 
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can apply their foreignness because as a foreign firm they inherently have more international 
ties. Thus foreign firms can be expected to be better at leveraging international sourcing to 
increase performance. 
 
Hypothesis 16: Being a foreign firm positively moderates the relation 
between international sourcing and performance. 
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Figure 3.4: overview of the international sourcing  
model, two moderators and control variables (chapter 7). 
 
 
3.4 Control variables 
Some variables do not moderate the key relations but are of importance as an explanation of 
firm performance. These variables are now listed. They are control variables in various 
analyses in this study. Control variables are found at three levels in this study: the environment 
(the market), the firm and the buyer-supplier relation. 
 
Indus t r y  
Most of organisation theory and particularly the part of OT concerned with effectiveness 
outcomes (strategic management) has drawn upon the notion of inter-industry differences38. 
Among industries relations between variables may be stronger or weaker or they may actually 
take on an opposite sign. What is a good sourcing strategy in food processing may be 
disastrous in the production of electronic components. Between industries we find differences 
in performance indicators like Return On Sales (ROS). The average ROS in an industry 
depends on the number of times a firm is able to deploy its assets productively. In the retail 
business profit margins are much lower than in manufacturing industries. Some industries 
have lower ROS because of intense competition. For these and a range of other reasons 
industry is included as a control variable. 
 In this research model industry is likely to have an effect on all key variables: the 
performance levels, the level of outsourcing, the relation type, and the level of 
                                                           
38 There is a longstanding debate on industry level vs. firm level explanations. It is not necessary to 
include that in the current discussions, but see for example Rumelt (1991). 
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internationalisation. Lane and Bachmann (1996) found very different inter-firm relations in 
two industries across the UK and Germany. De Wit, Mol and van Drunen (1998) compared 
34 buyers and suppliers in the Rotterdam area. They found that the level of outsourcing 
differed strongly among industries. Furthermore there were substantial differences in the 
relations between buyers and suppliers. Some industries showed more of an arm’s length 
pattern while others were engaged in partnerships. Some industries had a very local pattern of 
sourcing while others operated across border to some extent. Through including industry as a 
dummy variable part of the explained variance in performance will be attributed to industry 
effects. 
 
Firm s iz e  
Firm size matters and is habitually included in the analysis of performance. Size of the firm 
matters in international sourcing. For example: De Wit, Mol & van Drunen (1998) noticed in 
their limited sample in the Netherlands that larger firms were better able to form networks of 
suppliers and seemed more inclined to internationalise their supply bases. Furthermore size of 
the firm is known to positively influence performance outcomes (see Baine and the SCP 
group as well as the PIMS studies). Most other studies confirm these results (Capon et al, 
1990). Including size of the firm in the analyses will help to increase the explanatory power of 
the analyses and correctly attribute effects to other variables. 
 
Produc t i v i t y  
Some firms are better at employing their labour force than other firms. Because of better 
human resource management, higher productivity through information systems or simply 
because they are lucky enough to have people with more skills. Firms that are able to produce 
the same output as their competitors with fewer employees, stand to save money and to 
improve profitability. This is in line with the general trend in knowledge management to 
recognise people as a key driver of a firm’s competitiveness. If this is true then higher 
turnover per employee, which is a measure of firm productivity, should lead to higher 
profitability. 
 
Genera l  f i rm s t ra t e g y   
Obviously sourcing strategy is only a part of a firm’s overall strategy, though not a small part. 
Some of the other aspects of a firm’s strategy would include its human resources policy, its IT 
strategy and its market positioning. The competitive position in the market is generally seen as 
the single most important strategic choice a firm makes (Miles & Snow, 1978; Porter, 1985). 
Does a firm want to bring to market an innovative and differentiated product? Or does it 
focus on being cost efficient by following competitors’ technological leadership? A third 
option still is to do a bit of both, what Porter (1985) refers to as being stuck in the middle. 
This fundamental choice will be of importance to explain a firm’s performance and therefore 
it is useful to include general firm strategy as a control variable. 
 Several different approaches for measuring this distinction have been proposed, of 
which Porter’s (1985) generic strategies and Miles and Snow’s strategic types are the most 
important ones. Porter (1985) distinguishes between cost leadership, differentiation, cost 
focus and focused differentiation strategies. Miles and Snow (1978) propose four types: 
prospector, analyser, defender and reactor. These two approaches have been shown to be 
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largely consistent and an empirical tool has been developed on the basis of the Miles and 
Snow category that is thought to be an effective representation of Porter’s types as well 
(Shortell & Zajac, 1990).  
 
Trus t  
Much has been written about trust in recent years (e.g. Lane & Bachmann, 1998; Mayer, Davis 
& Schoorman, 1995; Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 1997), also in relation to 
performance (Nooteboom, 1999; Ring, 1999; Uzzi, 1997). In this study trust between buyer 
and supplier is not seen as a moderator on the relation between voice and performance but 
instead as a prerequisite. In order to have voice both trust and value to the partner are needed 
(Nooteboom, 1999). Trust will have an impact on voice and may have an independent impact 
on performance, but the level of trust will not co-determine the effectiveness of voice in 
obtaining performance. Trust is unlike loyalty, which is seen as a positive moderator or power, 
which is seen as a negative moderator. While trust is likely to have an impact on performance, 
certainly when it is measured in terms of supplier satisfaction, this impact is not the focus of 
the study. Fundamentally, trust differs from loyalty in that being loyal to a partner goes 
beyond trust. Trust is a necessary but not sufficient condition for loyalty. 
 
Longev i t y  
The length of a relation between a buyer and supplier may co-determine the extent to which a 
buying firm is satisfied with a relation. If two firms have been engaging in economic 
exchanges for a very long time, performance in the form of supplier satisfaction may be an 
artefact of the length of the relation. Personal ties may have developed that cause the sourcing 
manager to judge the supplier positively regardless of other factors. Thus it is necessary to 
control for longevity. 
 
Responden t  chara c t e r i s t i c s  
In survey research there is always a chance to obtain outcomes that are an artefact of the 
respondent’s background. Therefore it is necessary to control for some key characteristics of 
the respondent. This research aims at sourcing managers. Both the seniority and tenure of 
respondents will differ and this can have severe consequences for research outcomes. 
Managers with longer tenure may be more knowledgeable in a number of areas, for example 
the degree of process innovation. Similarly a higher management function can imply more 
knowledge of particular figures or it could mean a lack of detailed knowledge, which could in 
turn influenced the measured performance where performance is a perception variable. Hence 
respondent characteristics cause effects that need to be controlled for. 
 
Expor t  in t en s i t y  
Firms that export a large percentage of their sales may have above average performance 
(Goedegebuure, 2000).  There are several reasons for this. Exporting firms may spread their 
risks among several markets, thereby decreasing their sensitivity to a single market and 
allowing management focus to shift among markets when necessary. Furthermore there will 
also be a large self-selection bias attached to exporting firms: only those firms with somehow 
superior products will be able to export these products. Such firms may be expected to have 
an above average performance. Another argument is that it will mostly be firms with a large 
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market share locally that start to export their products because they are more likely to achieve 
saturation in the local market. In all there are various reasons to expect a superior 
performance of firms with a high export intensity and therefore this effect should be 
controlled for. 
 
 
Chapter summary 
Chapter 3 discussed the conceptual framework of this study. First the concept of sourcing 
performance, the dependent variable of this study, was discussed. Sourcing performance was 
categorised along two dimensions, the type of performance and the level of analysis. Two 
types of sourcing performance were distinguished, economic and strategic performance. 
Economic performance occurs in the short term and is directly related to transactions and 
relations. Strategic performance of sourcing occurs in the long term and flows indirectly from 
transactions and relations. Two levels of analysis were distinguished, the firm and supplier 
level. At the firm level sourcing has an impact on a firm’s overall performance. At the supplier 
level single suppliers achieve a certain performance level. 
 
Based on the previous chapters three independent variables were identified and hypotheses 
were presented as to how they relate to sourcing performance. Outsourcing is hypothesised to 
be either positively or negatively related to economic performance and to be negatively related 
to strategic performance. Voice relations are believed to be either positively or negatively 
related to economic performance and to be positively related to strategic performance. 
Internationalisation is thought to be positively related to both economic and strategic 
performance. These hypotheses are the basis of later empirical chapters. 
 
Two other types of variables were identified, moderating and control variables. The 
moderating variables that are hypothesised to influence the outsourcing – performance 
relation are asset specificity, uncertainty, innovation and foreignness. The moderators related 
to the voice – performance relation, are loyalty, power, buyer dependence and supplier 
dependence. The moderating variables associated with the internationalisation – performance 
relation, are foreign experience and foreignness. A set of control variables was listed that helps 
to explain performance but is not at the centre of attention in this study. These include 
variables at the environmental level, the firm level, the supplier relation level, and the 
respondent level. 
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Chapter 4: Grasping sourcing – research 
method 
 
 
The empirical research carried out in this study relies on multiple methods and sources. The 
methods include both quantitative and qualitative research. The sources include both primary 
data and secondary data. In this study different methods are seen as complements and no 
method is seen as fundamentally superior over another method. Scientific research occurs in 
recurring circles of theory development and theory testing. Different research methods are 
useful for different purposes (Yin, 1994). Qualitative research is most useful in developing 
theory further by providing new insights from the field. But its use is not entirely limited to 
the theory development stage. Quantitative research is most useful in testing theories. 
Similarly, its use is not entirely limited to theory testing. 
 The research framework presented in the previous chapter is mostly based on 
existing conceptual work but also draws on earlier empirical tests. As the bridge between the 
research framework and empirical research is constructed it is important to be informed by 
practice and the empirical setting. How do managers in the field deal with the issues described 
earlier? What do they see as appropriate means to improve performance? Studying people 
implies there is a possibility to discover their internal logic even without studying their actual 
behaviour in detail by looking at how managers express this logic. For this research phase this 
study draws on both interview techniques and case studies. Interviews and case studies were 
applied to support theory development. 
 To test the research framework, quantitative, statistical techniques are used. These 
techniques are used with a large database obtained from a third party and with survey data that 
were collected as a part of this study. The statistical techniques used here range from very 
basic techniques, like calculating descriptives and frequencies to somewhat more advanced 
techniques like factor analysis and regression analysis. The actual tests of theory are all based 
on multiple regression analysis, a technique well equipped to simultaneously test the effects of 
multiple variables on one dependent variable. Regression provides an answer to the question: 
to what extent can we explain the outcome of a dependent variable given the values of a set of 
independent variables? All of these methods will now be discussed in more detail. By far the 
most attention is devoted to the survey as it occupies the largest role in later chapters. 
 
 
4.1 Interviews 
A number of interviews were held with managers knowledgeable on the sourcing strategy of 
their firms. A majority of these interviews were conducted as part of a research project during 
the first year of the study. The results of this study were published in Tecson (1998). The 
purpose of these interviews was to obtain insights into different elements of international 
sourcing strategy and how this strategy effects performance. Obviously this could only be 
done using unstructured and semi-structured interviews. Most interviews were semi-structured 
in nature, including a range of topics and questions to be addressed, but the interviews also 
left room for open discussion. At a later stage interviews were used to help prepare the survey 
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and to test the survey. Managers working in the purchasing field were asked to fill out the 
survey to help identify its weaknesses and possible pitfalls. The aim of the interviews was to 
support theory formation or survey development. This study will only report interview 
findings as additional or anecdotal evidence. The nature of the interviews is not adequate to 
use them in any theory-testing format. 
 
 
4.2 Case studies 
This dissertation contains two qualitative studies, which are best called mini-cases. One of 
these mini-cases deals with the influence of IT in the sourcing process. This study is based on 
multiple interviews supplemented by company sources and public data. It reflects the 
experiences of Philips Medical Systems and Stork Industrial Systems. The second mini-case, 
on the Ford Mondeo, deals with global sourcing and is entirely based on secondary data. Like 
with the interviews the primary purpose of the case studies is to support qunatitative analysis 
and not to explicitly test any theory. These cases are mostly illustrative. However, the case 
study of Stork and Philips will also serve to generate insights into the influence of IT in 
sourcing because the role of IT in sourcing is a topic that has not been studied very 
extensively yet in the literature. This is particularly true for Internet-based applications. 
Therefore there is little theory that can be tested and it is much more important to develop 
such theory further than to test what little theory we have. New theory should guide later 
research on the topic. 
 
 
4.3 Database 
An important technique in this dissertation is the exploration of a large database. Access to 
this database has kindly been provided by the CBS (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek – 
Statistics Netherlands). This database is particularly suited for statistical techniques, most 
prominently regression analysis, which will be applied in th eo r y  t e s t in g . Given the nature of 
the data these tests have to be restricted to one core hypothesis, namely the one concerning 
the influence of outsourcing on firm performance. 
CBS collects data from all manufacturing firms the Netherlands, both Dutch firms 
and foreign subsidiaries, with more than 20 employees on a yearly basis. These data are 
collected at the level of individual business units (BUs), which may or may not be part of a 
larger firm. Firms are legally obliged to provide correct information to CBS. The data that are 
collected are quantitative in nature including items like turnover, industrial purchasing, 
profitability, markets share and exports. For this study access was granted to firm level data on 
a set of just over 8,000 BUs of manufacturing firms. Some 4,800 BUs were selected from 
these 8,000 based on whether they are involved in manufacturing and whether they had 5 or 6 
years of data available for the 1993-1998 period. The latter criterion indicates these firms 
consistently exist and provide data over a longer time period, effectively ruling out new firms, 
for which different patterns would apply. Using these data a number of additional firm level 
measures were calculated. The firm level data were then complemented by publicly available 
data at the 3-digit industry level, including detailed data on investment and industry 
concentration. Finally a number of country-specific measures were added. The 4,800 firms are 
divided over 85 separate 3-digit level industries that are coded according to the NACE system, 
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which is the European equivalent to the SIC in the United States. Manufacturing as it is 
defined here includes the NACE codes 15 through 37. In this study the analysis is mostly 
limited to 1998, which is appropriate given the fact that the structures under investigation 
hold over time (Mol and Gedajlovic, 2001). Multiple measures were used, which are now 
described in detail. 
 
FIRM PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Following earlier studies (Murray et al, 1995a) two separate measures were created for the year 
1998. The first measure is return on sales (ROS), calculated as 1998 net profits over total 1998 
sales of the BU (‘ROS98’). This measure reflects the financial performance of a BU. The 
second measure is market share, calculated as 1998 sales of the business unit over total 1998 
sales in the 3-digit industry (‘MARSHA98’). This measure reflects the market performance of 
a BU. 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The degree of external sourcing (‘EXTSOU’) was calculated as i ndus t r ia l  pur chas ing  ov e r  
t o ta l  sa l e s . This measure indicates to what extent a firm relies on external suppliers to 
produce its products. The nationality of the firm (‘FOREIGN’) is a dummy variable that can 
take on the value of 0 for a Dutch firm and 1 for a subsidiary of a foreign firm. Out of the 
1,650 firms in the sample 530 are foreign subsidiaries. For asset specificity no firm level data 
are available in this database. However, there is a 3-digit industry level measure (‘ASSPEC’) 
that divides t o ta l  inv e s tmen t s  by  th e  indus t r y  o v e r  t o ta l  tu rnov e r  o f  th e  indus t r y . This 
provides a consistent and theoretically appropriate measure for the level of asset specific 
investments in a given year. Asset specificity is a strategic choice of firms but only to a limited 
extent (Nishiguchi, 1994). By far the larger part of the variance in asset specificity is not found 
at the firm level but at the industry level. The kinds of specific investments firms in a 
particular industry need to make are fairly similar. Once one starts to compare between 
industries there will be much bigger differences. The product a firm manufactures is a fairly 
reasonable predictor for the level of specific assets it needs. The uncertainty a firm faces was 
calculated as the variance of the firm’s respective ROS figures for all the years 
(‘FIRMUNCE’). This is a fairly standardised measure for uncertainty. To measure innovation 
a 3-digit industry level measure was employed that was calculated as total research and 
development costs in a given year over total turnover (‘RNDINT’). Here a similar argument 
applies in that the variance of R & D spending within industries will be much smaller than the 
variance between industries. 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
To control for possible industry level effects, industry dummies were added. Since the sample 
consists of firms from 82 different industries, 82 dummies were added. Obviously industry 
effects play a substantial role in explaining firm performance (Porter, 1980; Rumelt, 1991). 
ROS measures can vary widely between industries, depending on how many investments are 
needed to produce a given turnover. ROI measures, which are not available in these data, are 
generally more stable across industries because shareholders and banks pose return levels on 
their investments that are equal across industries. The size of the firm is another obvious 
variable to control for in any study of firm performance as large larger firms have often been 
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shown to be more profitable. To control for size of the firm the log of the sales of the firm in 
a given year was used (‘LOGSALES’).  
 
 
4.4 Survey 
The main research tool of this study is a mail survey among sourcing managers. The mail 
survey technique usually relies on a substantial group of respondents, typically at least 
hundreds of respondents (Fowler, 1993). That allows for a range of statistical techniques to be 
applied. Furthermore surveys in social sciences often draw upon people’s perceptions rather 
than collect ‘hard’ data (Dillman, 1978). There are several reasons for this. First, respondents 
may not always be able or willing to provide such hard data. It is for example doubtful that 
many firms measure exactly the number of times they have been in touch with their largest 
supplier over the last month. Likewise some figures are not even provided for scientific 
purposes like profitability. Second, many of the variables that social scientists are interested in 
hardly exist outside of people’s perceptions. Is it possible to come up with an exact measure 
of ‘trust’ that is valid across all respondents? Third, perception based questions can be 
answered much quicker. They do not require the time to gather or process information that 
hard data do.  
The mail survey in this study combines a range of perception questions with hard 
data but hard data are only used when this was seen as most appropriate. Even so, there are 
issues of exactness attached to these questions. We can not take the values as they are but can 
trust that if any errors have occurred in filling out questions these will be levelled by the 
statistical methods applied. Perception questions usually combine to form multiple-item or 
summated scales. Summated scales are means of using multiple questions to measure one 
construct. The construct of trust exposes itself in several ways but these ways are strongly 
intertwined. The answers to multiple questions are added to form one summated scale. These 
summated scales are much more reliable than the items they are composed of because they 
make the measurement error attached to a single item less influential. 
 
Sample selection 
Before being able to select a sample, four important questions needed to be answered on the 
location of the research, the industries to be covered, the level within the firm to choose, and 
the respondents within firms. Early on a decision was made to concentrate the survey on 
Western Europe. The two main reasons for this were the gaps in the literature defined in 
earlier chapters and the physical location of the researcher. Furthermore it was decided to 
focus this research entirely on the manufacturing sector. Earlier literature has put forward a 
rather clear idea of what sourcing strategy is for manufacturing firms and how supply chains 
are constructed. For services firms this is far less clear. This coincided with the general 
research focus of the larger research group, which was in manufacturing rather than in 
services. In this group core firms were identified, which are central to supply chains (Van 
Tulder, Van den Berghe and Muller, 2001). These firms are researched in terms of their 
internationalisation in a number of areas and the impact of internationalisation on nations. A 
third choice was what level within the firm to address. This depends largely on the research 
questions being asked. The theoretical model identified a relation with a supplier as an 
important predictor of performance. And previous literature has suggested that sourcing 
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strategy is best measured at the level of specific products (Kotabe, 1992). This ruled out the 
option of using corporate measures since corporate measures are aggregates of multiple 
products and multiple locations for most firms. Thus the sample had to be limited to the 
business unit level, where a key product would be easily identifiable. The final question was 
whom to address within those business units. While top management would be able to answer 
a wide range of questions, there were two drawbacks connected to contacting top 
management. First, top management might not be very knowledgeable on certain aspects of 
sourcing strategy, such as details on the relation with particular suppliers. Second, top 
management was less likely to answer given both time pressures and the large amounts of 
similar requests from researchers. Thus specialised managers appeared more suitable, 
particularly since there appeared to be few questions in the questionnaire that might go 
beyond their knowledge.  
The specialised managers would have to come from the sourcing and purchasing 
area. Thus a sample of purchasing or sourcing managers at the business unit level of 
manufacturing firms located in Europe was needed. Note that the firms themselves did not 
necessarily have to be European. In fact, a lot of global sourcing research draws on foreign 
subsidiaries (e.g. Murray et al, 1995a). 
 
In finding a sample various options were evaluated. Constructing an entirely new database of 
respondents appeared too complicated, given both the unwillingness of some firms and the 
problem of where to start. Therefore an existing database of sourcing managers had to be 
traced. There was the option to limit the sample to only one or a few industries. Given the 
needed sample size, this implied that a cross-European data source had to be found. Some 
efforts were undertaken to discover how realistic such an option would be through European 
industry associations, like the European plastics producers association. It appeared that these 
associations did not have separate files of sourcing managers. Furthermore the sample size 
and breadth were unclear. Thus the option of using specialised purchasing organisations was 
seen as more useful.  
There is no European organisation of purchasing managers like the NAPM, the 
National Association for Purchasing Management in the United States. However, there is a 
global federation of national organisations called IFPMM, the International Federation of 
Purchasing and Materials Management. The members of this organisation are not firms but 
the various national associations. The web site of IFPMM and two separate meetings with an 
academic expert and the Dutch purchasing organisation NEVI (Nederlandse Vereniging voor 
Inkoop – Dutch Association for Purchasing) revealed that setting up a sample through 
IFPMM might not be possible at all or could take a number of years. Thus it appeared wiser 
to contact the member organisations directly. However the various purchasing organisations 
in Europe have a different degree of organisation and different goals. There is little unity and 
contacts are often limited. Thus the same two sources (an academic expert and NEVI) 
suggested contacting a leading country first. CIPS, the Charted Institute of Purchasing and 
Supply in the United Kingdom was chosen. CIPS was unable to co-operate because it had 
previously sent out other surveys to its members. At that point it became clear that 
conducting an international survey would be very difficult if not impossible. Domestic 
researchers would be preferred over foreigners. Furthermore there were other obstacles 
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including language and administrative barriers that limited the possibilities of a cross-
European survey. Overcoming these would take too much time, perhaps years. 
However, such problems did not emerge in contacts with NEVI because it was 
Dutch and in fact located in Zoetermeer, within a 20-kilometer radius from Rotterdam. NEVI 
was willing to co-operate by supplying its list of members in the manufacturing sector. One 
problem with this list was that some firms would not be appropriate to send a survey to. The 
list was somewhat contaminated by non-manufacturing firms and other inappropriate firms. 
Thus a filter was needed to establish which firms would be useful. At that time existing 
contacts with CBS were reinforced. CBS registers almost all Dutch economic activity and has 
a huge database of firms for which certain data are available. Furthermore it has developed 
computer programmes to match its own database with other databases. Thus all firms from 
the NEVI membership database registered as industrial were forwarded to CBS. Appendix 
describes what sectors from the NEVI database were selected. CBS then ran the programme 
to match the NEVI database with its own database. Those firms that were matched by this 
programme were included in the sample. Furthermore a number of business units of large, 
legally complex, firms were added to the sample. 
 
Given the means of selecting respondents a bias may be expected in terms of the sample 
composition. What kinds of firms become members of a purchasing organisation? One may 
expect that, generally speaking, members of a purchasing organisation tend to be larger firms 
and firms that purchase more. Furthermore a bias towards particular industries can occur that 
is due to the importance given to purchasing within the industry. How representative is the 
sample that was chosen for the Dutch manufacturing sector at large? Table 1 displays the 
number of firms within a particular industry in a major part of the Dutch manufacturing 
sector and in the sample. Unfortunately it is not possible to conduct an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) here because that would require bundling the two files, which would introduce bias 
since many firms in the sample also appear in the larger database. Thus the analysis has to be 
limited to comparing the descriptives. It is obvious that some industries are underrepresented 
in the sample while others are overrepresented. Of the underrepresented industries, numbers 
17 (textiles), 18 (clothing), 20 (wood and wood products) mostly consist of smaller firms. 
Other industries like number 22 (printing) are perhaps less fit for an analysis of sourcing 
strategy. 
 
Table 4.1: Industry-by-industry composition of the sample and the Dutch manufacturing 
sector at large. Sources: CBS database and survey39. 
                                                           
39 SBI 2-digit level industry number 74 is not a part of manufacturing. Inspection after the survey 
revealed these were firms active in engineering. See also the remarks about non-respondents later in this 
chapter. 
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 Frequency in Dutch 
industry 
Percentage of Dutch 
industry 
Frequency in sample Percentage of 
sample 
15 1137 13.9 82 10.4 
16 13 .2 5 .6 
17 233 2.8 7 .9 
18 127 1.5 3 .4 
19 66 .8 2 .3 
20 244 3.0 7 .9 
21 228 2.8 27 3.4 
22 868 10.6 15 1.9 
23 23 .3 9 1.1 
24 404 4.9 92 11.7 
25 430 5.2 53 6.7 
26 359 4.4 22 2.8 
27 100 1.2 24 3.0 
28 1369 16.7 88 11.2 
29 1144 13.9 184 23.4 
30 50 .6 10 1.3 
31 211 2.6 35 4.4 
32 73 .9 17 2.2 
33 231 2.8 30 3.8 
34 187 2.3 20 2.5 
35 221 2.7 18 2.3 
36 460 5.6 32 4.1 
37 31 .4   
74   5 .6 
Total 8209 100.0 787 100.0 
 
Going beyond these industry patterns, there is also a comparison to be made at the firm level. 
Again, averages have been calculated for the Dutch manufacturing sector at large as well as for 
the sample. Table 2 displays those calculations. The firms in the sample, the NEVI members, 
are generally a) much larger, b) more purchasing intensive and c) more profitable. It is quite 
difficult to compare the two groups statistically, because one (the sample) is a part of the other 
(Dutch industry). However, t-tests can be run on Dutch industry as a whole to see whether 
values for Dutch industry differ significantly from values for the sample. The outcomes of 
these t-tests are not correct in the sense that they are biased by the presence of firms from the 
sample. However, significance levels on these t-tests present a conservative test. If there are 
differences with the sample firms included, these differences will become larger upon 
excluding the sample firms. Thus if a significant difference is found, this will certainly persist. 
Testing for a conservative 99% confidence interval, significant differences (.000 significant) 
were indeed found for all variables except the last one, return on sales, where the significance 
level was .199. None of these differences are particularly surprising. In fact, they confirm the 
self-selection bias that might be expected: only the larger and more purchasing intensive firms 
join a purchasing organisation. Thus the sample is probably not a good representation of 
Dutch manufacturing at large. However, it does appear to be an appropriate sample to look at 
sourcing activities manufacturing firms of above average size in the Netherlands. 
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 Dutch industry 
mean 
Dutch industry 
standard deviation 
Sample 
mean 
Sample standard 
deviation 
Industrial sales 49356 255216 153406 554391 
Employees 104 493 323 1399 
Industrial purchasing 29382 168779 83098 301448 
Gross profits 6205 41191 23236 107514 
Purchasing as % of sales .4927 .3818 .5349 .1919 
Return on sales .1014 .6921 .1127 .3248 
Table 4.2: differences between the sample and the Dutch manufacturing sector at large in 
1998. For Dutch industry at large N = 6,43340. For the sample N = 704. Amounts are in 
millions of Dutch guilders. Sources: CBS database and survey. 
 
Survey design 
A crucial stage in survey-based research is the design of the survey (Fowler, 1993). This 
involves multiple steps, including translating the research model into questions, finding an 
appropriate structure, formulating the questions in the appropriate language, testing the 
questions and coming up with an effective design. 
The structure that was chosen was to narrow down the questions in three stages. The 
first part of the survey focused on general questions, including the respondent’s place within 
the organisation, the role of purchasing in the organisation, the extent of international linkages 
within the firm and the firm’s general strategy. The second part of the survey started by asking 
the respondent to pick one particular product, which was referred to as ‘product X’ in the 
remainder of the survey. This product was chosen by respondents on the basis of producing 
most turnover for the firm. Thus product X can be said to be the firm’s most important 
product. Respondents were also asked to write down the name of the product, for possible 
crosschecking. In the second part the questions focused on the sourcing strategy of the firm, 
the degree of asset specificity of the product, technological and volume uncertainty, the 
marketing and financial results of the product, the geographical distribution of the supply 
base, process and product innovation and the extent of E-commerce usage. The third part of 
the survey dealt with supplier relations. It would be inappropriate to ask for the ‘mean’ 
relations with all suppliers for both cognitive and content reasons. For instance what is the 
average trust in suppliers? Respondents will be troubled to answer this question in various 
ways. So the choice was made to address only relations with the largest supplier. Under 
circumstances the largest supplier can be used as an approximation for the entire supply base. 
This of course depends on the importance of the largest supplier to the focal firm. 
Alternatively the relation with the largest supplier can be thought of as a reflection of the 
firm’s ability to build relations with suppliers. Respondents were asked to identify the largest 
supplier for product X. They were then asked a range of questions about this supplier 
including the longevity of the relationship, its development over time, the importance of the 
supplier for product X, the importance of the firm for the supplier, the extent of co-
operation, the degree of trust, the possibilities for switching or substitution, the negotiation 
power of the supplier vis-à-vis the firm, the impact of the supplier on the product, the 
                                                           
40 The large difference between the previous table and this table is due to missing firm level data for 
1998. Some firms did not yet provide data to CBS while others did not provide data for any years. In 
later analyses a subset was created to avoid this problem. 
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location of the supplier, the monitoring mechanisms employed by the firm, the commitment 
to the supplier and product-related as well as relation-related satisfaction measures. 
It is generally advisable to use as many proven measures from previous empirical 
research as possible when formulating questions. If these are not available, new questions 
should be tested more rigorously. Luckily, it was possible to find measures for many items 
from earlier research on sourcing strategy, most prominently from Mohr and Spekman (1994) 
and Murray et al (1995a). These measures were adapted to the situation of the survey. Some 
other items were rather straightforward intellectually such as questions regarding a 
respondent’s experience within the current job. These questions were simply inserted. And 
there was a small third category of questions that really needed to be built from scratch. These 
questions were designed rather carefully and stressed during the test phase. Appendix A 
includes all the different questions in English, including the original items used by other 
authors. Appendix B contains the text of the entire survey as it was sent out in Dutch. 
 Testing and improving the survey was a process that took several months and 
consisted of three distinct phases. In the first phase the initial design was discussed with a 
number of academic peers. In this first phase the emphasis was placed on finding measures 
that appropriately represented the theoretical concerns of the study. Several improvements 
were made during this phase. Something that also became clear during this phase was that the 
initial translation of some items was somewhat mechanical: the text did not really work well in 
Dutch. This was changed in later versions to improve readability. In the second phase the 
survey was tested by a group of non-academics not related to this research and outsiders to 
the sourcing field. These people have a good general feel of the economy and business in 
general as well as a solid grip of Dutch. Several other improvements were made. In the third 
phase the survey was tested using (former) sourcing managers that were asked to relate the 
questions to their own experiences. This revealed that several questions were not posed in the 
appropriate manner. Again corrections were made to overcome this problem.  
 
Sample development 
The data collection stage followed many of the guidelines provided by the survey literature 
(Dillman, 1978; Dillman, 1991; Fowler, 1993; Yammarino, Skinner & Childers, 1991). 
Chronologically the different stages were undertaken as in table 3. 
 
Week Activity Results 
0 (December 15) 
 
• First round of surveys sent out by 
regular mail 
79 valid surveys returned by regular 
mail 
4 (January 11) 
 
• Second round of surveys sent out by 
regular mail 
84 valid surveys returned by regular 
mail 
8 & 9 (February 14–
27) 
• Phone calls to remaining respondents 
• Some 140 surveys sent out on request 
by regular mail, e-mail and fax 
494 respondents provided a reason 
for not returning the survey 
11 (March 15) 
 
• Mail box closed 41 valid surveys returned by regular 
mail, e-mail and fax 
Table 4.3: chronological overview of survey activities. 
 
Obviously one of the most important yet difficult aspects of survey research is to obtain 
decent response rates. Given the length of this survey, which included a maximum of 84 
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boxes and 16 A5 size pages in total, this appeared a pressing problem. The literature on 
responses to surveys has suggested a wide variety of means to stimulate individuals to fill in 
surveys (Yammarino et al, 1991) not all of which are applicable to organisational research. 
Mailings to respondents included a survey, a return envelope with a Freepost address 
written on it, a card on which an address could be entered for receiving the results of the 
research and an overview of previous research results. The return envelope made it easier for 
respondents to mail back their responses. The Freepost address was used to minimise costs 
on behalf of the respondent. Respondents were given the possibility to receive the results of 
the survey in order to stimulate their interest in the research and to create a give-and-take 
situation. Previous research results were provided to show that this was serious scientific work 
that nonetheless appealed to sourcing managers in the field. Much attention was devoted to 
making the survey and the other components look attractive and serious to the respondent. 
 Since the size of the sample and the number of operations to be performed were too 
much to handle for a single person, several people were involved in the data collection stage. 
When the two big loads of postal surveys were sent out, people were instructed how to code 
the surveys, where to sign letters and what envelops to send out in what manner. The phone 
calls were conducted using a two-page protocol that described how to introduce the research 
and what to say in what particular circumstance. Furthermore people were given feedback 
concerning particular cases leading to routinisation of the process. Similarly, a protocol was 
developed to guide data entry. This protocol described exactly what number to enter at what 
question. Furthermore the guideline was provided to always contact the main researcher if 
unexpected or unclear results were found. This ensured that all data were entered in exactly 
the same fashion. After data entry there were several checks on whether or not data were 
entered correctly, including looking for values outside the predefined range, extremely high or 
low values and impossible ratios or combinations of data. Obviously, a number of 
respondents did not fill out all questions. Sometimes they could not fill out the question 
because it did not apply or the answer was unknown to them but at other times they appeared 
to have forgotten to answer a particular question or two pages of the survey. The main 
researcher decided on a case-by-case basis whether or not the respondent should be contacted 
to obtain the missing answers. In almost all cases contacting the respondent indeed led to a 
positive result. Some firms were not willing to provide certain data, particularly data on firm 
turnover and financial and market performance. 
 
Response breakdown 
The total valid response of the survey is 204, of which 200 were in time to be used for 
analysis. Whether or not a response is deemed valid depends on the extent to which the 
survey was completed. Some potential respondents started to fill out the survey to only then 
discover they could not complete it. If at least 80% of the survey was completed, a response 
was seen as valid. The original sample consisted of 787 firms. Thus the gross response rate is 
204 / 787 * 100% = 25.9%. Because up to 2,000 telephone calls were executed, it was 
possible to analyse in some detail the reasons for non-response among a great majority of 
firms in the sample. Table 4 provides an overview of different categories in the sample. From 
the 787 surveys 19 were returned by the mail service because the firm no longer resided at that 
address. Based on the telephone interviews as well as written response by a small group of 
people a substantial group of potential respondents, 175, cited a lack of time as the reason for 
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not responding. During the first round many people were busy with end-of-year activities. 
Furthermore a substantial number of people were working on implementing projects, taking 
much of their time. And a small group of firms working closely with the agricultural sector 
was occupied by the foot-and-mouth disease and BSE. Another 11 people were not interested 
while 24 admitted that their firm never co-operates with surveys like these. A very small group 
of 4 people found the survey to be too complicated or too long and 5 people had other 
reasons not to answer. Then 7 people cited a combination of reasons, like no time and not 
interested with another 9 people who mostly returned the survey by regular mail, cited no 
reason at all. Even though many phone calls were made, 122 people were actually not reached 
by telephone at all. The reasons for this varied. Some people were on a longer holiday or 
absent due to illness. Others were on foreign trips, engaged in local festivities or were simply 
very busy. And there was a quite substantial group of firms whose telephone numbers we 
were unable to track. One firm in the database even carried a phone number that was over 6 
years old. This clearly indicated a need on the side of NEVI to update the database. Of the 
firms that we spoke to and that did not react negatively, 25 promised to try to send in the 
survey at a later stage while 85 requested a new survey. This latter action was closely 
connected to a problem in the database that we discovered while making the phone calls. It 
appeared that at least 100 to 150 people that were sent a survey were no longer working in the 
company or were now working in an entirely different department of the company. Some 
people had left the company three to four years ago. Thus the survey had to be resent to 
another person. Obviously this did not influence the number of responses in a positive 
manner. Also it appeared during the phone calls that a substantial number of firms, 63, did in 
their own opinion not deal with sourcing strategy (‘uitbestedingsstrategie’) as it was 
investigated here. Another four firms were added to this category at a later stage when further 
inspection revealed that these firms were really engineering firms and not manufacturing 
firms41. These 67 firms were in their own opinions simply not able to return the survey. 
Similarly, 30 respondents were unable to return the survey, because they were not 
knowledgeable in this area. These people had only taken up their job weeks ago or did not 
have a good overview otherwise. Thus it appears fair to conclude that a group of 19 (never 
delivered) + 67 (firm can not respond) + 30 (individual can not respond) = 116 firms can be 
dropped from the sample when calculating the effective response rate. 
 
                                                           
41 No data were available from the CBS for these non-responding firms. They are all business units of a 
Dutch industrial manufacturing firm. Later inspection was based on publicly available reports from this 
firm. 
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 Frequency Percentage of the sample 
Returned by mail (wrong address) 19 2.4 
No reason cited 9 1.1 
Lack of time 175 22.2 
Not interested 11 1.4 
Firm profile does not fit survey 67 8.5 
Respondent unable to answer 30 3.8 
By principle 24 3.0 
Combination of reasons 7 .9 
Survey too complicated 4 .5 
Other reasons 5 .6 
To be sent 25 3.2 
Sent a third survey 85 11.3 
Respondent never reached 122 15.5 
Valid surveys received 204 25.9 (30.4 effective rate) 
Total 787 100.0 
Table 4.4: An overview of responses and reasons for not responding. 
 
This implies the effective response rate for the survey was 204 / 671 * 100%, or 30.4%. Given 
the length of the survey, 16 pages of A5 paper containing 89 different questions, this is a good 
response rate. The response rate stands out positively when compared to other research in 
sourcing strategy. Gilley and Rasheed (2000) sent out their survey to two different 
respondents within a firm to receive responses from only 17% of the firms. Murray, Kotabe 
and Wildt (1995a) achieved an effective response rate of 22%. For large, randomly selected 
samples responses can fall even lower, as is the case in Poppo and Zenger (1998) who barely 
achieve a 5% response rate. In general, surveys in Western Europe tend to amount to 
somewhat higher responses than in the US, but even correcting for that effect more than 30% 
is a good response rate.  
The high response rate of over 30% is a first indication that non-response may not 
be a significant problem with this survey. However, more evidence is needed to substantiate 
this statement. The question is how representative the response group is for the original 
sample? An often-encountered problem with survey research is that the respondents may not 
represent an appropriate reflection of the sample from which they were drawn (Fowler, 1993). 
The basic problem is that no survey data are available from non-respondents because they 
have not returned the survey. Thus it is difficult to find out how non-responding persons 
would have responded. Multiple techniques have been invented to check whether non-
response is a problem. One of the more common techniques is to compare the results of early 
and late respondents and see whether this generates any differences. This method has often 
been criticised for being inaccurate and not telling anything about the non-respondents 
themselves. Another method is to call a limited number of non-respondents and interview 
them to gather some basic data, often the control variables. These are subsequently compared 
to the data of respondents. A new problem introduced here is whether or not the telephone 
interview generates a new form of bias not present in the mail survey. If non-perception data 
are gathered this is obviously not a problem. In this research, however, none of these methods 
had to be applied. Since CBS data were available to carry out these checks a direct test could 
be applied to check for differences between respondents and non-respondents. Table 5 
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summarises the differences between respondents and non-respondents on a number of key 
dimensions. Industrial purchasing and purchasing as a percentage of sales are key independent 
variables. Employees and industrial sales are control variables. Gross profits and return on 
sales are dependent variables. The ANOVA analysis reveals that none of the observed 
differences between respondents and non-respondents are significant. Thus, we have 
established that no response bias has occurred in the sense of excluding or including particular 
types of firms in terms of turnover, number of employees, purchasing intensity or 
profitability. 
 
 Mean 
respon-
dents 
Mean non-
respon-
dents 
Mean square 
between 
groups 
Mean  square 
within groups 
F-Test Signifi-
cance of 
F-test 
Industrial 
sales 
131830 160818 112579598848 307626958235 .366 .545 
Employees 
 
256 346 1078654 1958601 .551 .458 
Industrial 
purchasing 
61924 90372 108419998063 90845955478 1.193 .275 
Gross profits  
 
24884 22670 657142405 11574803309 .057 .812 
Purchasing as 
% of sales 
.5157 .5415 .089 .037 2.421 .120 
Return on 
sales 
.1139 .1123 .000 .106 .003 .954 
Table 4.5: Analysis of variance between responding and non-responding firms for 1998 data. 
N = 704, which includes 524 non-responding firms (from 587) and 180 responding firms 
(from 200). Amounts are in millions of Dutch guilders. The data for this comparison are taken 
from the CBS database. 
 
Although these firm level data confirm that non-response is not a problem with this survey it 
is also important to establish whether the respondents provide a picture of the various Dutch 
manufacturing industries similar to the sample at large. To make this comparison, the 
frequencies of various industries in the sample were measured. They are displayed in table 6. 
As before it is not very useful to use a statistical test given the small numbers appearing in the 
cells. Thus the discussion is limited to visual inspection. What is apparent is that the so-called 
OEM companies (original equipment manufacturers), in Dutch usually referred to as 
‘maakindustrie’, are very well represented, particularly industries 28, metal-based products and 
29, machinery. These are firms with serial production of complicated multi-component 
products. The industries that are not so well represented are the so-called process or batch 
industries like industries 15, food and beverages and 24, chemicals. The more traditional 
industries like leather products and furniture appear to be represented normally. This could be 
an indication that this survey was perhaps more difficult to answer for parts of the process 
industries. Some of the phone calls that were made afterwards seemed to confirm this. This is 
not necessarily a problem, although it does seem to indicate that the findings are perhaps not 
representative for industry at large, a conclusion drawn before. The inclusion of industry 
dummies in later analyses should help to track the influence of various industries on the 
outcomes. 
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 Frequency among 
respondents 
Percentage of 
respondents 
Frequency in 
sample 
Percentage 
of sample 
15 13 6.5 82 10.4 
16 4 2.0 5 .6 
17 3 1.5 7 .9 
18 1 0.5 3 .4 
19   2 .3 
20 1 0.5 7 .9 
21 6 3.0 27 3.4 
22 4 2.0 15 1.9 
23 1 0.5 9 1.1 
24 16 8.0 92 11.7 
25 14 7.0 53 6.7 
26 6 3.0 22 2.8 
27 5 2.5 24 3.0 
28 31 15.5 88 11.2 
29 56 28.0 184 23.4 
30 3 1.5 10 1.3 
31 5 2.5 35 4.4 
32 3 1.5 17 2.2 
33 8 4.0 30 3.8 
34 7 3.5 20 2.5 
35 4 2.0 18 2.3 
36 9 4.5 32 4.1 
74   5 .6 
To
tal 
200 100.0 787 100.0 
Table 4.6: Industry-by-industry composition of the respondent  
group and the sample. Sources: CBS database and survey. 
 
Another important characteristic is the home base of the responding firms. This will be used 
as a potential explanation for international sourcing patterns in later chapters. Some 21% of 
the respondents are non-Dutch firm as depicted in table 7. Although many foreign firms are 
present in the Dutch economy with European or regional headquarters, it is well known that 
the number of manufacturing firms established in the Netherlands by foreign firms is rather 
limited. Although it attracts substantial inward FDI, the Netherlands is generally not seen as 
an extremely attractive place for FDI in manufacturing activity. Most of the investments 
flowing into the country are directed towards services and distribution. Dutch firms were 
slightly more likely to complete the survey than were foreign firms. This difference is quite 
marginal though. 
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 Frequency among 
respondents 
Percentage among 
respondents 
Frequency 
in sample 
Percentage 
in sample 
Australia   1 .1 
Belgium 2 1 12 1.5 
Denmark   3 .4 
Finland 2 1 6 .8 
France 2 1 10 1.3 
Germany 9 4.5 29 3.7 
Ireland  2 1 4 .5 
Israel 1 .5 2 .3 
Italy   1 .1 
Japan 2 1 6 .8 
Luxembourg 1 .5 3 .4 
Netherlands 157 78.5 591 75.1 
Neth. Antilles 1 .5 11 1.4 
Norway   1 .1 
Sweden 5 2.5 9 1.1 
Switzerland 3 1.5 13 1.7 
United 
Kingdom 
4 2 26 3.3 
United States 10 5 59 7.5 
Total 200 100.0 787 100.0 
Table 4.7: Country-by-country composition of the respondent group and the sample. Sources: 
CBS database and survey42. 
 
This provides an accurate picture of the responding firms. However, what are the 
characteristics of the responding individuals? There are two measures in the survey that can 
help answer that question. The first is the job composition of the respondents. Respondents 
were asked to identify their job from within 6 choices. Out of 200 respondents 6 were CEOs, 
11 were vice-president of purchasing and 1 was a purchasing advisor. A further 34 people 
were purchasers and 35 occupied another job. By far the largest group of people, 113 or 
56.5% of the respondents identified themselves as purchasing managers. The fact that so few 
respondents belonged to top management was not surprising. Purchasing is usually not an 
activity performed at the top level and the outcomes correspond well with the membership 
base of NEVI. 
 The second question that was asked to assess the nature of the responding 
individuals was “when did you take up your current job”? Figure 1 below shows the 
distribution of the responses to this question. It is clear most of the respondents have taken 
up their jobs in the course of the 1990s, however there is some deviation as one respondent 
has been in this job from as far back as 1965. On average the respondents started in late 1993. 
Perhaps the tenure of the respondents will be of use in later explanations of results. 
 
                                                           
42 The firm from the Netherlands Antilles will be treated as a Dutch firm in later analyses. Not only are 
the Netherlands Antilles a part of the Netherlands legally, but is it also quite reasonable to assume this 
firm is registered as Netherlands Antilles for tax purposes only. 
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Figure 4.1: Number of respondents that started their jobs in a given year. Total number of 
respondents is 200. 
 
 
Measurement: reliability and validity 
Empirical scientific studies face the difficult task of finding the proper empirical constructs to 
represent often complicated theoretical scientific models. As Carmines and Zeller (1994: 2) 
put it ‘measurement is most usefully viewed as the process of linking abstract concepts to 
empirical indicants’. Thus any measurement needs to take into account both theoretical and 
empirical concerns. The theoretical concerns mostly relate to whether a measurement is valid, 
that is whether an indicator measures what it purports to measure (Carmines & Zeller, 1994: 
4). Validity is judged against the background of a theoretical variable. Thus validity is a matter 
of degree (Carmines & Zeller, 1994) in the sense that a measure is not either valid or not valid. 
The empirical concerns are mostly related to reliability of the measure. Reliability is best seen 
as ‘the extent to which an experiment, test or any measuring procedure yields the same results 
on repeated trials (Carmines & Zeller, 1994: 3). Reliability is, by necessity, a matter of degree. 
 How should the reliability and validity of the measures used in this survey be 
assessed? Validity has multiple dimensions including criterion-related validity, content validity 
and construct validity. Here, the latter is of most importance because as Cronbach and Meehl 
noted (1955: 282): 
 
“Construct validity must be investigated whenever no criterion or universe of 
content is accepted as entirely adequate to define the quality to be measured”. 
 
The way construct validity is most usefully assessed when multiple items are used to form a 
scale is through factor analysis. It is important to stress that factor analysis itself is not a 
theory-free tool. Theoretical convictions must exist that predict that several items will load 
onto factors. With this in mind the SPSS Factor programme (data reduction – factor) was ran 
to assess validity. In order to measure reliability, the classical test theory was followed 
(Nunally, 1978) using the internal consistency method. This method relies on Cronbach’s 
alpha (Cronbach, 1951), or simply alpha, as an indicator of reliability. This is the standard 
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procedure for reliability in surveys like these. Alpha was calculated using the SPSS reliability 
programme (scales – reliability). 
 How are the construct validity and reliability determined in practice? The factor 
analysis is run in such a way that a number of components will show up equal to the number 
of columns or items. Thus if 3 items have been tested, 3 components will appear. If the 
correlation table is the basis for the factor analysis then the combined eigenvalues of the 
components will be equal to the number of components. Eigenvalue is defined by Hair et al 
(1998: 89) as the amount a variance accounted for by a particular factor. In the said example 
the combined eigenvalues will be 3. To test whether a component is unidimensional, which is 
necessary for a scale to be formed, the eigenvalues of components are examined. The 
eigenvalue of the first component is by definition equal to or larger than 1. What is important 
is that the eigenvalues of all other components are smaller than 1 because that implies a 
construct is unidimensional. Once it has been established that a construct is unidimensional 
the next step is to assess the reliability through Cronbach’s alpha. What a good value of 
Cronbach’s alpha is depends on the research aim. For truly tested scales a value of over .8 or 
even over .9 must be attained (Carmines & Zeller, 1994). Otherwise .7 is seen as good enough 
or even .6 in more exploratory research (Hair et al, 1998). In general it is true that the more 
widely a scale has been applied in previous literature, the stricter demands are upon alpha. 
 
The formula for Cronbach’s alpha is43: 
 
α = N/(N-1) [1 - ∑σ2(Yi) / σχ2] 
 
Now the reliability and validity of all variables in the survey that consist of multiple items will 
be assessed. Both the eigenvalues and the Cronbach Alpha values will be shown and a short 
discussion accompanies these outcomes. As noted before Append ix  A contains all the 
scales, while Append ix  B  contains the survey itself. Most scales were taken from previous 
research and only very few were constructed for this survey. The test procedure was described 
above. 
 
Uncertainty 
The uncertainty measure used in the survey relates to the volume and technological 
uncertainty surrounding the product. Respondents were asked to provide perceptions of how 
uncertain volumes are (VOLUNCERT), to what extent the volume uncertainty can be 
predicted (INVREL), how often product specifications are changed (SPECFREQ) and how 
likely future specification changes are (FUTSPEC). The correlation matrix of these four 
measures is shown below with the means of the measures. 
                                                           
43 The formula shows that alpha can be increased either by increasing the average correlations among 
variables or by increasing the number of items in the scale. The latter is often difficult in management 
research given the very limited time respondents can spend on completing surveys. In this research the 
basic strategy was to not cut down the number of variables and use limited numbers of items per scale. 
In the sourcing field this seems to be the most widely applied approach. 
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 MEAN VOLUNCERT SPECFREQ FUTSPEC INVREL 
VOLUNCERT 2.8636 1.000 .299 .261 .417 
SPECFREQ 2.3485 .299 1.000 .392 .161 
FUTSPEC 2.7980 .261 .392 1.000 .151 
INVREL 2.9697 .417 .161 .151 1.000 
Table 4.8: Descriptives and correlations of uncertainty measures. N = 198. 
 
From the next table, table 9 it can be concluded that the first factor has an eigenvalue of more 
than 1 while the second factor has an eigenvalue of less than 1. Thus the construct validity of 
the scale is barely good enough. If the second factor would have an eigenvalue of more than 
1, this implies that there is no unidimensionality, which again means that not one single scale 
can be formed44. The reliability of the scale is highest if all four items are included, but 
Cronbach’s alpha is only .61, which is rather low and somewhat worrisome. The final row in 
the table shows the range of potential alphas that would emerge, were one of the items to be 
deleted. If this uncertainty scale was split into two separate scales for technological uncertainty 
and volume uncertainty the outcomes of the analyses did not improve. Thus it is best to 
consider this as one scale for uncertainty in general. 
 
Eigenvalue 1 1.847 
% of variance 1 46.17 
Eigenvalue 2 .989 
% of variance 2 24.71 
Eigenvalue 3 .612 
% of variance 3 15.30 
Eigenvalue 4 .553 
% of variance 4 13.82 
Alpha .6084 
Deleted item alpha .4869 - .5840 
Table 4.9: factor eigenvalues, alpha and range of alphas with one item deleted. 
 
Asset specificity 
Four possible items were identified for the asset specificity scale. One was a general item that 
could cover asset specificity as a whole. The other three were specific items for human asset 
specificity in the sense of unique technical capabilities of employees (UNITECH), physical 
asset specificity in the sense of unique production equipment (PRODEQ) and site specificity 
in the sense of unique production locations (PRODLOC). It appeared that including the 
general item did not include either the reliability or the validity of the scale. In fact, alpha 
decreased by 0.02. The reason could be differences between the questions: the general 
question asked for what the replacement value of assets would be while the three specific 
questions concentrated on uniqueness of skills. Adding items without improving the reliability 
of the scale is not advisable unless there is a compelling theoretical argument to do so. In this 
case the general item is believe to be nothing more than a combination of the specific items 
                                                           
44 Also note that while a larger number of items will generally increase Cronbach’s alpha (given the 
nature of the formula), it will also increase the likelihood of a second factor of more than 1. If this would 
occur, factor rotation or other measures should be implemented. 
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and there is no specific reason to include it. Therefore only the three specific components 
were retained. 
 
 MEAN UNITECH PRODEQ PRODLOC 
UNITECH 4.0914 1.000 .430 .490 
PRODEQ 4.1117 .430 1.000 .399 
PRODLOC 3.0508 .490 .399 1.000 
Table 4.12: Descriptives and correlations of asset specificity measures. N = 197. 
 
From the next table it can be concluded that the first component of the three components 
explains by far the most variance. Also Cronbach’s alpha is .70, which is satisfactory for a 3-
item scale. Leaving out one of the three items results in a decrease of the scale, implying that 
the three items above provide the match. 
 
Eigenvalue 1 1.881 
% of variance 1 62.684 
Eigenvalue 2 .613 
% of variance 2 20.431 
Eigenvalue 3 .507 
% of variance 3 16.884 
Alpha .6983 
Deleted item alpha .5695 - 
.6566 
Table 4.13: factor eigenvalues, alpha and range of alphas with one item deleted. 
 
Process innovation 
Three possible items were used to form the process innovation scale. These were the level of 
process innovations of the product compared with other products in the firm (PROCPROD), 
the level of process innovations of the product compared with competing products 
(PROCCOMP), and the applicability of process innovations elsewhere in the firm 
(PROCINFI). 
 
 MEAN PROCPROD PROCCOMP PROCINFI 
PROCPROD 2.9263 1.000 .721 .351 
PROCCOMP 3.0263 .721 1.000 .365 
PROCINFI 2.5579 .351 .365 1.000 
Table 4.14: Descriptives and correlations of process innovation measures. N = 190. 
 
From the next table it can be concluded that the first component of the three components 
explains by far the most variance. Also Cronbach’s alpha for the three items is .73, which is 
satisfactory for a 3-item scale. However, leaving out the third item increases the alpha by .11, 
which is very substantial. Given this large difference, there is ground to believe it is better to 
exclude item 3, applicability of process innovations elsewhere in the firm. Theoretically this 
also makes some sense, as the third item does not ask for how much process innovation there 
actually is, but asks for the applicability of the process innovations elsewhere. Although this is 
a measure of the value of the process innovations to the firm, it may indeed be quite different 
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from the level of innovations as such. Thus the scale was formed on the basis of the first two 
items only and has a .84 Cronbach’s alpha. 
 
Eigenvalue 1 1.982 
% of variance 1 66.068 
Eigenvalue 2 .739 
% of variance 2 24.644 
Eigenvalue 3 .279 
% of variance 3 9.289 
Alpha .7263 
Deleted item alpha .5177 - .8379 
Table 4.15: factor eigenvalues and alpha. 
 
Product innovation 
Three possible items were used to form the product innovation scale. These were the level of 
product innovations of the product compared with other products in the firm 
(PRODPROD), the level of product innovations of the product compared with competing 
products (PRODCOMP), and the applicability of product innovations elsewhere in the firm 
(PRODINFI). 
 
 MEAN PRODPROD PRODCOMP PRODINFI 
PRODPROD 2.9263 1.000 .667 .297 
PRODCOMP 3.0263 .667 1.000 .442 
PRODINFI 2.5579 .297 .442 1.000 
Table 4.16: Descriptives and correlations of product innovation measures. N = 193. 
 
From the next table it can be concluded that the first component of the three components 
explains by far the most variance. Also Cronbach’s alpha for the three items is .71, which is 
satisfactory for a 3-item scale. However, leaving out the third item increases the alpha by .09, 
which is substantial. As with the previous item this large difference indicates it is better to 
leave out the third item. Doing this also makes sense theoretically as discussed above. Thus 
the scale was formed on the basis of the first two items only and has a .80 Cronbach’s alpha. 
 
Eigenvalue 1 1.955 
% of variance 1 65.177 
Eigenvalue 2 .734 
% of variance 2 24.461 
Eigenvalue 3 .311 
% of variance 3 10.362 
Alpha .7119 
Deleted item alpha .4543 - .7997 
Table 4.17: factor eigenvalues, alpha and range of alphas with one item deleted. 
 
Strategic performance 
Two possible items were used to form the strategic performance scale. These were market 
share of the product compared with the largest three competitors (MARKSHAR) and sales 
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growth of the product compared with the largest three competitors (SALEGROW). These 
measures stem from earlier sourcing research (Murray et al, 1995a). 
 
 MEAN MARKSHAR SALEGROW 
MARKSHAR 3.4213 1.000 .430 
SALEGROW 3.3293 .430 1.000 
Table 4.18: Descriptives and correlations of market performance measures. N = 197. 
 
From the next table it can be concluded that the first component of the two components 
explains by far the most variance. What is problematic is that Cronbach’s alpha for the two 
items is only .58, which is low, even for a 2-item scale. This causes concern over the reliability 
of this measure. In chapters 5 through 7 there will be additional discussion on the 
consequences of these low values. Perhaps it would in retrospect have been better to add 
more items to this question like questions on the firm’s market positioning. 
 
Eigenvalue 1 1.430 
% of variance 1 71.500 
Eigenvalue 2 .570 
% of variance 2 28.500 
Alpha .5865 
Table 4.19: factor eigenvalues and alpha. 
 
Economic performance 
Two possible items were used to form the economic performance scale. These were return on 
sales of the product compared with the largest three competitors (RETSALES) and return on 
investment of the product compared with the largest three competitors (RETINV). These 
measures stem from earlier sourcing research (Murray et al, 1995a). 
 
 MEAN RETSALES RETINV 
RETSALES 3.2011 1.000 .460 
RETINV 3.1958 .460 1.000 
Table 4.20: Descriptives and correlations of financial performance measures. N = 189. 
 
From the next table we see that the first component of the two components explains by far 
the most variance. What is somewhat problematic is that Cronbach’s alpha for the two items 
is .63, which is not really high, even for a 2-item scale. This causes slight concern over the 
reliability. Similar to the previous item there will be more discussion in chapters 5 through 7. 
Perhaps it would have been better to add items to this question concerning return on assets or 
profit margins per item. Another option is to empirically combine strategic and economic 
performance. This produces a more reliable performance measure with an alpha of 0.67. 
 
Eigenvalue 1 1.460 
% of variance 1 72.989 
Eigenvalue 2 .540 
% of variance 2 27.011 
Alpha .6299 
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Table 4.21: factor eigenvalues and alpha. 
 
Stability 
Two possible items were used to form the stability scale. These were relationship development 
with the largest supplier (RELDEV) and purchasing volume growth with the largest supplier 
(PURVOL). 
 
 MEAN RELDEV PURVOL 
RELDEV 3.5879 1.000 .432 
PURVOL 3.5829 .432 1.000 
Table 4.22: Descriptives and correlations of stability measures. N = 199. 
 
From the next table it can be concluded that the first component of the two components 
explains by far the most variance. What is problematic is that Cronbach’s alpha for the two 
items is only .60, which is low, even for a 2-item scale. This causes concern over the reliability 
of this measure. However, in the original article an Alpha of 0,68 was reported (Nooteboom 
et al, 1997). This indicates that the measures have been shown to be more reliable in other 
studies, which provides some secondary support for applying the measures in this study. 
 
Eigenvalue 1 1.432 
% of variance 1 71.590 
Eigenvalue 2 .568 
% of variance 2 28.410 
Alpha .5980 
Table 4.23: factor eigenvalues and alpha. 
 
Voice relation 
Three possible items were used to form the voice relation scale. These were co-operation in 
problem solving (COOPPROB), flexible responses to questions by the supplier 
(FLEXRESP), and receiving help from the supplier in case of an emergency (EMERHELP). 
 
 MEAN COOPPROB FLEXRESP EMERHELP 
COOPPROB 3.9000 1.000 .679 .532 
FLEXRESP 3.7300 .679 1.000 .627 
EMERHELP 4.0750 .532 .627 1.000 
Table 4.24: Descriptives and correlations of voice relation measures. N = 200. 
 
From the next table it can be concluded that the first component of the three components 
explains by far the most variance. Also Cronbach’s alpha for the three items is .83, which is 
high for a 3-item scale. No improvement can be made by deleting any of the items, so the 
summated scale was formed by using these three items. 
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Eigenvalue 1 2.227 
% of variance 1 74.248 
Eigenvalue 2 .473 
% of variance 2 15.772 
Eigenvalue 3 .299 
% of variance 3 9.981 
Alpha .8250 
Deleted item alpha .6942 - .8084 
Table 4.25: factor eigenvalues, alpha and range of alphas with one item deleted. 
 
Trust 
Four possible items were used to form the longevity scale. These were trusting the supplier to 
live up to all conditions of a contract (CONTTRUS), trusting the supplier to take beneficial 
decisions (DECITRUS), trusting that the supplier will provide a good deal (DEALTRUS), and 
harmony in the relationship (RELAHARM). 
 
 MEAN CONTTRUS DECITRUS DEALTRUS RELAHARM 
CONTTRUS 3.7538 1.000 .524 .347 .479 
DECITRUS 3.5377 .524 1.000 .660 .556 
DEALTRUS 3.5477 .347 .660 1.000 .652 
RELAHARM 3.6734 .479 .556 .652 1.000 
Table 4.26: Descriptives and correlations of uncertainty measures. N = 199. 
 
From the next table it can be concluded that the first component of the four components 
explains by far the most variance. Also Cronbach’s alpha for the four items is .82, which is 
satisfactory for a 4-item scale. Dropping the first item leads to an increase in alpha of 0.01. 
The three remaining items would have an alpha of 0.83. However, dropping this item implies 
that a theoretically important aspect of trust, the extent to which contracts prove to be 
binding, would have to be deleted. Thus several tests will be undertaken in later chapters, 
mostly in chapter 6, to assess whether statistical problems would arise from using all four 
items. On the basis of these empirical tests it will be decided whether the four-item scale can 
be applied. 
 
Eigenvalue 1 2.620 
% of variance 1 65.508 
Eigenvalue 2 .677 
% of variance 2 16.935 
Eigenvalue 3 .443 
% of variance 3 11.063 
Eigenvalue 4 .260 
% of variance 4 6.495 
Alpha .8241 
Deleted item alpha .7475 - .8317 
Table 4.27: factor eigenvalues, alpha and range of alphas with one item deleted. 
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Loyalty 
Three possible items were used to form the loyalty scale. These were stopping to buy the 
largest supplier’s products (STOPBUY), not being committed to buying the largest supplier’s 
products (NONCOMMI), and minimal involvement with the largest supplier (MININVOL). 
 
 MEAN STOPBUY NONCOMMI MININVOL 
STOPBUY 4.1256 1.000 .246 .437 
NONCOMMI 3.5628 .246 1.000 .314 
MININVOL 4.0151 .437 .314 1.000 
Table 4.28: Descriptives and correlations of loyalty measures. N = 199. 
 
From the next table it can be concluded that the first component of the three components 
explains the most variance. However, Cronbach’s alpha for the three items is only .59, which 
is low for a 3-item scale. Dropping the second item helps to increase the reliability of this scale 
to .61. Without the second item the scale would be less complete theoretically and therefore 
tests in later chapters, in particular chapter 6, will have to reveal whether it is appropriate to 
include all three items in the scale. Again, there is indirect evidence to conclude that the scale 
may be reliable, as in the original article (Mohr and Spekman, 1994: 142) a Cronbach Alpha of 
0.81 was reported. Thus the reliability in another setting was quite good. 
 
Eigenvalue 1 1.671 
% of variance 1 55.707 
Eigenvalue 2 .774 
% of variance 2 25.804 
Eigenvalue 3 .555 
% of variance 3 18.489 
Alpha .5914 
Deleted item alpha .3929 - .6077 
Table 4.29: factor eigenvalues, alpha and range of alphas with one item deleted. 
 
Power 
Four items were used to form the power scale45. These were the supplier’s negotiating power 
(NEGOPOW), the onetime costs involved with switching suppliers (SWITCHCOS), the 
inverse value of the number of alternative suppliers (ALTERSUP), and the inverse value of 
the number of alternative products (ALTERPROD). 
 
 MEAN NEGOPOW SWITCHCOS ALTERSUP ALTERPROD 
NEGOPOW 3.1818 1.000 .238 .442 .248 
SWITCHCOS 3.6869 .238 1.000 .326 .282 
ALTERSUP 2.3535 .442 .326 1.000 .568 
ALTERPROD 3.1768 .248 .282 .568 1.000 
Table 4.30: Descriptives and correlations of power measures. N = 200. 
                                                           
45 A total of 9 different items were used to distinguish power. However, only 1 reliable component could 
be found. The best match is achieved with these 4 items. It is possible to add the supplier’s negotiating 
power and the onetime costs involved with switching suppliers but this decreases alpha to 0.66. Other 
options show lower alphas and are not reported here due to space constraints. 
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From the next table it can be concluded that the first component of the two components 
explains the most variance. Cronbach’s alpha for the four items is .67, which is a bit low for a 
4-item scale. Alpha can be improved slightly by leaving out the second item and in fact even 
more by leaving out both the first and the second item (to .73). Therefore further tests in 
subsequent chapters will have to reveal whether a 4-item or a 2-item scale provided the best 
solution. It appears this scale is not the best of all scales, but can be used. 
 
Eigenvalue 1 2.076 
% of variance 1 51.892 
Eigenvalue 2 .779 
% of variance 2 19.465 
Eigenvalue 3 .759 
% of variance 3 18.972 
Eigenvalue 4 .387 
% of variance 4 9.671 
Alpha .6670 
Deleted item alpha .4782 - .6713 
Table 4.31: factor eigenvalues and alpha. 
 
Short term supplier performance 
Five possible items were used to form the short-term supplier performance scale. These items 
were satisfaction with delivery quality (DELQUAL), satisfaction with responsiveness to 
problems (PRORESP), satisfaction with the cost of deliveries (DELCOST), satisfaction with 
the reliability of deliveries (DELREL) and satisfaction with the speed of deliveries 
(DELSPEE). 
 
 MEAN DELQUAL PRORESP DELCOST DELREL DELSPEE 
DELQUAL 5.3550 1.000 .515 .454 .600 .503 
PRORESP 5.1800 .515 1.000 .311 .548 .596 
DELCOST 4.6950 .454 .311 1.000 .408 .337 
DELREL 5.2900 .600 .548 .408 1.000 .703 
DELSPEE 5.1200 .503 .596 .337 .703 1.000 
Table 4.34: Descriptives and correlations of  
short-term supplier performance measures. N = 200. 
 
From the next table it can be concluded that the first component of the three components 
explains by far the most variance. Cronbach’s alpha for the five items is .83, which is 
satisfactory for a 5-item scale. However, dropping the third item, cost, helps to increase the 
reliability of this scale to .85, which is high for a 4-item scale. On the other hand excluding the 
costs of delivery is quite a significant backward step theoretically since the cost of deliveries is 
usually thought of as the key aspect of judging supplier performance at least by theoreticians 
and suppliers. Buyers sometimes claim that other elements such as quality and reliability are 
more important (Nooteboom, 1999: 140). Therefore this is in particular a case where the best 
solution is to retain all five measures unless analyses in subsequent chapters prove differently. 
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Eigenvalue 1 3.018 
% of variance 1 60.360 
Eigenvalue 2 .771 
% of variance 2 15.422 
Eigenvalue 3 .476 
% of variance 3 9.517 
Eigenvalue 4 .464 
% of variance 4 9.271 
Eigenvalue 5 .272 
% of variance 5 5.430 
Alpha .8314 
Deleted item alpha .7647 - .8450 
Table 4.33: factor eigenvalues, alpha and range of alphas with one item deleted. 
 
Long term supplier performance 
Three possible items were used to form the long-term supplier performance scale. These were 
satisfaction with learning new capabilities from the largest supplier (NEWCAPA), satisfaction 
with joint innovation with the largest supplier (JOININNO) and satisfaction with the largest 
supplier’s ability to manage his network of subcontractors (SUBCONET). 
 
 MEAN NEWCAPA JOININNO SUBCONET 
NEWCAPA 4.3979 1.000 .626 .461 
JOININNO 4.5550 .626 1.000 .459 
SUBCONET 4.4869 .461 .459 1.000 
Table 4.34: Descriptives and correlations of long-term  
supplier performance measures. N = 191. 
 
From the next table it can be concluded that the first component of the three components 
explains the most variance. Cronbach’s alpha for the three items is.75, which is satisfactory for 
a 3-item scale. Dropping the third item helps to increase the reliability of this scale to .76. This 
is yet another example of a marginal increase that is costly theoretically: it would imply that 
long term goals do not revolve around the supply network but only around the one-on-one 
relation between the buyer and supplier. This seems unrealistic. In chapter 6 various analyses 
will be undertaken to assess the empirical effects of using either two items or three items. 
 
Eigenvalue 1 2.035 
% of variance 1 67.828 
Eigenvalue 2 .591 
% of variance 2 19.710 
Eigenvalue 3 .374 
% of variance 3 12.462 
Alpha .7532 
Deleted item alpha .6209 - .7634 
Table 4.36: factor eigenvalues, alpha and range of alphas with one item deleted. 
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Conclusions: reliability and validity 
All of the above scales had correct construct validity in the sense that all the components were 
un id imens i ona l . In all the scales the first component had an eigenvalue of more than one 
while all of the other components had eigenvalues smaller than one. Furthermore most of the 
scales also had the desired pattern of the first component explaining the bulk of the variance 
and the other components having more or less similar (small) sizes.  
Several of the scales that were used in the survey did not meet the Cronbach alpha 
criterion of .7 posed on non-exploratory research. This is particularly true for the scales that 
were concerned with sourcing strategy in general. Two scales, for market performance and 
stability, did not even reach the .6 level of alpha. This implies any results obtained in later 
stages that related these variables to other variables have to be judged with all possible 
caution. However, such low alpha values also make it unlikely strong results will be found 
using these variables. Given the nature of the survey method, there is not really any possibility 
to go back into the field and gather additional data. On the other hand there were also a 
substantial number of scales that performed very well and this is particularly true for the 
supplier satisfaction measures. This provides confidence for subsequent analyses involving 
these measures. 
In the survey there is a range of questions that do not fall under the header of 
multiple item scales. These items measure a percentage or state and do not measure 
perception. Obviously these questions can and should not be tested using either factor 
analysis or reliability analysis. All that can be done with these questions is to assess whether 
respondents appear to have completed the questions correctly. From the responses and the 
phone calls some questions came out as potentially unreliable. A substantial number of 
respondents were unable to answer the question what percentage of their largest supplier’s 
turnover was taken up by their purchases. This raises questions about the accuracy of the 
remaining answers and about the profile of the non-respondents to this question. The 
question ‘what is your total turnover’ was not always answered correctly. Respondents were 
supposed to answer in terms of total turnover at the corporate level. However, some 
respondents answered in terms of business unit or division turnover. In later chapters a 
remedy for this problem will be put forward. A further suspicion arose over the In t e rn e t  
EDI  questions: it appears likely a substantial number of respondents that answered this 
question positively do use EDI but this is not Internet based EDI. 
 
Table 37 below summarises the empirical measures in both the database and the survey. 
Reference to this table will be made at various points in the study and therefore the reader will 
want to refer to it again. 
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Variable 
(chapter 3) 
Abbreviation 
 
Database measure 
(chapters 5 &  8) 
Survey measure(s) 
(chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8) 
Economic 
performance 
ECONPERF ROS98 (profits over 
sales) 
Relative ROS & ROI (2 items) 
Supplier satisfaction (5 items) 
Strategic 
performance 
STRATPERF (Logged) market share Relative market share & sales growth (2 items) 
Supplier satisfaction (3 items) 
Firm 
performance 
FIRMPERF -- Economic & strategic performance (2 & 2 items) 
Internal vs. 
external 
sourcing 
EXTSOUR Purrat98 (external 
purchasing over sales) 
Totproco (% of production costs by external 
suppliers)  
Purratsu (external purchasing over firm turnover) 
Exit vs. voice 
relations 
VOICEREL -- Voicerel (3 items) 
Domestic vs. 
international 
sourcing 
FORSOUR -- Forsour (% of supplies from abroad) 
Foreisup (foreign supplier) 
Asset 
specificity 
ASSETSPE Asspec (industry 
investments over sales) 
Assetspe (3 items) 
Uncertainty UNCERT Firmunce (variance in 
‘93-’98 ROS) 
Volume uncertainty (2 items) & technological 
uncertainty (2 items) 
Innovation INNOVAT Rndint98 (industry R & 
D over sales) 
Prodinno (2 items) 
Procinno (2 items) 
Foreignness FOREIGN Foreign (dummy) Foreign (dummy) 
Loyalty LOYALTY -- Loyalty (3 items) 
Buyer 
dependence 
BUYERDEP -- Buyerdep (% of largest supplier’s turnover with 
this buyer) 
Supplier 
dependence 
SUPPPLDEP -- Suppldep (% of purchasing with largest supplier) 
Power POWER -- Power (4 items) 
International 
experience 
INTNATEXP -- Being a multinational firm (dummy) 
Industry INDUSTRY 3-digit level dummy 3-way industry dummy 
Firm size FIRMSIZE Log sales 
Employees 
Purchasing budget 
Productivity  PRODUCT Loglabin (logged sales 
per employee) 
-- 
Firm strategy FIRMSTRAT -- 4-way dummy (Miles & Snow) 
Trust TRUST -- Trust (4 items) 
Longevity RELLENGTH -- Number of years with supplier 
Respondent 
characteristic 
RESPCHAR -- Experience (years in position) 
Position (4-way dummy) 
Industry 
concentration 
INDCON Indcon98 (Herfindahl 
index) 
-- 
Export 
intensity 
EXPINT Firm exports over sales -- 
Product stan-
dardisation 
PERCSTAN -- % of standardised inputs in product 
Relational 
growth 
RELGROW -- Improvement of relation over time (2 items) 
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Table 4.37: Overview of empirical measures in the survey and database and their relation to 
variables. 
 
Chapter summary 
In chapter 4 the methods of the study are described. The study draws on four methods, 
interviews, case studies, a database and a survey. Interviews with sourcing managers and other 
experts were used to derive a feeling of the field. This information was incorporated when 
constructing the theoretical framework. Two case studies are used in the study, which draw 
upon multiple interviews and secondary data. These case studies are mainly used as 
illustrations. The database consists of measures collected by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). CBS 
collects data on external purchasing, various firm performance measures and additional 
variables. In this study the 1998 data are used. The database used here consists of almost 
5,000 firms in a large variety of industries. 
 
The survey is the most important tool of empirical research. A survey was developed based on 
the theoretical model described in chapter 3. This chapter describes how the survey was 
conducted. The survey was mailed twice to almost 800 members of NEVI, the Dutch 
purchasing organisation. The sample contains many of the larger and more purchasing 
intensive manufacturing firms in the Netherlands. Since 204 firms responded in time and 
many others were ineligible for a variety of reasons, an effective response rate of over 30% 
was obtained. The respondents were representative of the sample. The reliability and validity 
of the survey measures was assessed and most measures produced good to very good values. 
Two important measures provided some measuring difficulties: the degree of external 
sourcing and firm performance perceptions.  
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Chapter 5: The outsourcing dilemma 
 
 
Decision-makers in firms are faced with the dilemma of how much to outsource and under 
what conditions to outsource. This chapter will provide results to help answer these questions 
by addressing the question whether outsourcing is a useful explanation of firm performance. 
The leading question of this chapter was formulated in the prologue: Doe s  ou t s our c ing  l ead  
t o  improv ed  f i rm pe r f o rmanc e?  The chapter then continues by testing under what 
conditions outsourcing helps to improve the performance of firms and under what conditions 
outsourcing deteriorates a firm’s performance. Briefly recalling what was discussed earlier, this 
chapter will test the model developed in chapter 3, particularly figure 3.2. This model is 
repeated below in figure 1. All empirical chapters will follow the same pattern: first the model 
and results are presented in a very ‘bare’ form. Then these results are summarised and at the 
end of every chapter the results are discussed in much more detail. Thus section 5.1 contains 
an analysis of the database. Here the effects of external sourcing on both ROS and market 
share are discussed. Section 5.2 briefly summarises the findings and how they relate to the 
hypotheses. Section 5.3 analyses the effects of external sourcing on economic and strategic 
performance based on the survey. Section 5.4 summarises the findings from the latter analysis. 
In the analyses of both data sources the same model (figure 1) is tested but in slightly different 
ways. Section 5.5 contains the discussion of the findings where links are made to the 
conceptual framework and where findings are explained. 
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Figure 5.1: overview of the external sourcing model and its moderators. 
 
 
5.1 Analysis of the database 
The main trend in the Netherlands over the course of the 1990s was to source more from 
external suppliers. This trend was also documented in a recent management article (Mol, 
Schreuder and Goedegebuure, 2001). What is interesting to note is that while process-based 
industries and traditional industries increase external sourcing only slightly if at all, the OEM 
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industries (‘maakindustrie’), including industries like electronics, vehicles and machinery, 
strongly increased their dependence on external sources. Examples include manufacturing of 
bicycles where the purchasing rate increased by 15.5% of turnover and electronic components 
where it rose by 14.1% between 1993 and 1998 (Mol, Schreuder and Goedegebuure, 2001). 
This trend towards increased outsourcing has been occurring for much longer in the 
Netherlands, in some industries even as far back as the 1977-1992 period (De Wit & Mol, 
1999; De Wit, Mol & Van Drunen, 1998). As a whole this database shows an increase of the 
average use of industrial purchasing from 45.2% in 1993, through 46.9% (1994), 48.1% 
(1995), 47.8% (1996), and 48.5% (1997) to 49.1% in 1998. 
 
The CBS database provides a first opportunity to look into the effects of external sourcing on 
performance
46
. An analysis was run to determine the effects of external sourcing on 
competitive performance for the year 1998. Several possible interaction effects were tested. 
Table 1 presents an overview of the variables that will be used in the regression analyses. 
Some of these variables were already discussed in chapter 4. Chapter 4 also provided an 
overview of all measures. Recall that th e  key  var iab l e s  in  th i s  s e c t i on  a r e  ex t e rna l  
s our c ing  (PURRAT98) ,  r e tu rn  on  sa l e s  (NETRO98) ,  marke t  shar e  
(MARSHA98) ,  innova t i on  /  R & D expend i tu r e s  (RNDINT98) ,  a s s e t  sp e c i f i c i t y  
(ASSPEC98) ,  un c e r ta in t y  (FIRMUNCE) and  f o r e i gnne s s  (FOREIGN) . It is 
noteworthy that the number of firms for which certain variables are available differs between 
variables. 
 
Variable name Measure for N Minimum Maximum Mean Stand. Dev. 
RNDINT98 Innovation expenditures 3,486 0 3.132 .352 .439 
MARSHA98 Firm market share 4,640 .0054 83.75 1.445 4.119 
INDCON98 Concentration ratio of industry 4,787 .592 70.59 4.925 6.898 
ASSPEC98 Firm asset specificity 4,342 .8050 13.29 5.314 2.146 
NETROS98 Firm return on sales 4,640 -76.43 84.78 10.05 11.82 
INETRO98 Industry return on sales 4,787 -.394 33.28 10.06 3.920 
EXPRAT98 Firm export intensity 4,640 0 136.147 28.18 32.89 
FIRMUNCE Uncertainty firm faces 4,787 .00 1208 39.76 77.07 
PURRAT96 1996 external sourcing rate 4,779 .2088 145.2 47.83 18.13 
PURRAT97 1997 external sourcing rate 4,777 0 160.6 48.53 18.45 
Cont inued  on  next  pag e
                                                           
46 The materials used in this section show many similarities to Mol and Gedajlovic (2001) but also differ 
slightly. In Mol and Gedajlovic (2001) less firms are used, only 1,650, but multiple years of data (1993-
1998) in a panel data analysis. Since most of the effects we found there are constant over time there is 
little reason to use all years of data here. Furthermore it is better to use the entire set of 4,787 firms here 
since they are more representative of the whole range of industrial firms in the Netherlands and 
therefore more similar to the firms analysed in the survey. Obviously 1998 data are also closer to the 
moment the survey was sent out, late 2000. This again improves the extent to which comparisons can be 
made in this chapter and chapter 8 between the two data sources. 
47 For several firms ratios may appear unlikely, because these firms export more than they sell or 
purchase more than they sell. However, this is acceptable for a single year of data because of possible 
time lags in reporting. Firms that consistently showed this pattern were removed from the database at an 
earlier stage. Cases where data appeared particularly unlikely (e.g. where profits were 80% of sales) were 
also removed. 
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Variable name Measure for N Minimum Maximum Mean Stand. Dev. 
PURRAT98 1998 external sourcing rate 4,640 .1131 179.2 49.07 18.68 
INDPUR98 1996 industry external sourcing rate 4,787 18.22 78.10 49.12 9.254 
EMPLOY98 1998 number of employees 4,640 2 5,559 109.34 237.0 
LABINT98 1998 turnover per employee 4,640 22.03 21,113 355.8 506.7 
LOGLAB98 Log of 1998 turnover per employee 4,640 3.09 9.96 5.6165 .6353 
FOREIGN Foreign or Dutch firm 1,650 0 1 .3212 .4671 
EXP98 1998 firm exports 4,640 0 4,966,985 26,949 152,116 
PURCH98 1998 firm industrial purchasing 4,640 18 5,437,194 31,111 164,910 
SALES98 1998 firm sales 4,640 878 6,707,354 53,041 239,432 
LOGSAL9848 Log of 1998 firm sales 4,640 6.78 15.72 9.756 1.210 
Table 5.1: descriptives for the database variables used in the analysis (key variables are in 
bold). For an overview of variables see table 4.37. Most data are presented as percentages. 
Exp98, ini98 and, sales98, are in thousands of Dutch guilders and indcon98 is a Herfindahl 
index49. Employees (wkn98) is simply the number of employees and labint98 is the turnover 
per employee in thousands of guilders. Loglab98 and logsal98 are logarithmic functions of 
labint98 and sales98. Foreign is a dummy variable, with 0 being a Dutch firm and 1 a foreign 
firm. The listwise valid N (firms with all data available) is 1,004. Without the country variable 
(‘foreign’) it is 3,109. 
 
Table 1, in appendix C, presents the correlations between the key variables in the analysis. 
Several control variables have been omitted because of space constraints as well as the low 
relevance of information. Given the large number of observations it comes as no surprise that 
almost all correlations are significant at the .05 level and that many are in fact significant at the 
.01 level. However, some correlations are particularly strong, giving a first indication of 
possible relations. Asset specificity relates negatively to external sourcing as predicted by 
transaction cost logic. Furthermore larger firms and export dependent firms use more external 
sourcing. Industries with larger firms and more export dependent firms invest more in R&D 
activities. External sourcing is correlated negatively with return on sales while asset specific 
investments, size of the firm, being a foreign firm and R&D expenditures are correlated 
positively with ROS. Finally there might be some multicollinearity problems when using both 
the firm level and industry level measures of industrial sourcing since they have a strong 
correlation. With this in mind the regression analyses of these data can commence. 
 
Return on sales (ECONPERF) 
This chapter and the next three chapters will rely on statistical modelling techniques. Models 
will be presented mathematically representing the dependent variable (performance) on the 
left-hand side of the equation and the independent (explanatory) variables as on the right-
                                                           
48 A logarithmic function is applied to sales before analysis. This is a standard procedure to overcome 
large size differences that disrupt the analysis since sales is exponentially distributed. If a logarithmic 
calculation is not applied, a few very large firms will obliviate the effects of size differences between all 
other firms. A similar operation would have to be applied to include purchasing or exports in the 
analysis, but they are not used directly. 
49 A Herfindahl index is used to describe the extent of concentration of firms within an industry. It is 
calculated as the sum of the squared individual market shares of all firms. 
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hand side. After this mathematical formulation, the outcomes of the statistical analyses will be 
provided. These statistical analyses show the measures (‘proxies’) that are used to represent 
the theoretical variables of the mathematical formulations. Therefore two steps are taken. 
First, the theoretical relations identified in chapter 3 are translated into a formal model. 
Second, the formal model is tested by means of regressing the measures described in chapter 4 
and summarised in table 4.37 on performance. 
 
The first model that was employed was a basic model incorporating only control variables. 
The reason for testing such a model is that the test can indicate whether the control variables 
are a useful explanation of the dependent variable. The question that is asked is essentially ‘is 
this model better than no model’? This would be expected since control variables are added to 
a model with the explicit purpose of explaining part of the variance. The first model can be 
formulated as50: 
 
(1) ROS98 = β0 + β1 * log sales98 + β2 * log labint98 + β3 * export ratio + β4 
* industry + ε 
 
Table 2 displays the results of this model51. Industry dummies are not reported here nor in any 
of the following analyses because of space constraints and to obtain a clearer presentation. 
Since over 80 different industries are involved, the reports would become somewhat lengthy. 
As expected various industry dummies are significant in all of the analyses. Detailed industry 
data are available upon request. The table reveals several interesting things. First of all the 
model itself is strongly significant with an F-value of 8.54, suggesting th i s  mode l  i s  b e t t e r  
than  no  mode l  a t  a l l . This is not unexpected, as control variables are included in the model 
because it is believed they explain part of the variance in the dependent variable. Second, the 
basic model has moderate explanatory value, with an ad ju s t ed  R2 o f  .12 . This implies it is a 
good model to start with but not a great model for explaining a firm’s return on sales in 1998. 
Third, all firm level variables come out as significant. Size of the firm is positively related to 
ROS98. Turnover per employee is strongly positively related to ROS98. And the export level 
is negatively related to ROS98 in this model. 
 
                                                           
50 For those who are not very familiar with regression models Gujarati (1995) will form a good 
introduction. The simple model presented here consists of an intercept or constant β0, several 
coefficients β1……n  that related to explanatory variables X1……n and an error term ε that covers 
unexplained variance. 
51 In the analyses on ROS98 several firms were removed from the sample because a look at the data 
revealed that their reported ROS figures, such as +85% or –70% appeared incorrect due to typing 
errors, one time charges or other reasons. 
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 Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
Constant  -7.100 .000 
LOGSAL98 .062 3.061 .002 
EXPRAT98 -.051 -2.796 .005 
LOGLABIN .157 7.296 .000 
 F-test: 8.54 .000 
 R2: .141 
 Adj. R2: .124 
Table 5.2: basic model for explaining ROS9852. N = 4,625. Included  
variables are size of the firm, export intensity and productivity. 
 
After reviewing these results the key independent variable of this analysis, external sourcing, 
can be added to the model. This leads to the following formula: 
 
(2) ROS98 = β0 + β1 * log sales98 + β2 * log labint98 + β3 * export ratio + β4 
* industry + β5 * purrat98 + ε 
 
Table 3 reports the results of this next analysis. The model as a whole, which was already 
significant, has now become stronger with an F value of just over 21. Also, the explanatory 
value of the model, the adjusted R2, has risen to .28, more than double the basic model. There 
is strong evidence for a negative relation between external sourcing and ROS in this analysis. 
Exte rna l  s our c ing  c omes  ou t  a s  th e  s ing l e  mos t  impor tan t  exp lana t i on  f o r  ROS in  th e  
mode l , with a t-value of close to 30, and the model as a whole improves with the inclusion of 
external sourcing. Also noteworthy is that the effect of size of the firm becomes stronger, 
while the effect of exports becomes insignificant. Thus in this more advanced model export 
intensity is not an explanation for performance of the firm anymore. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
Constant  -14.374 .000 
LOGSAL98 .082 4.184 .000 
EXPRAT98 -.025 -1.554 .120 
LOGLABIN .429 20.247 .000 
PURRAT98 -.526 -30.862 .000 
 F-test: 21.03 .000 
 R2: .290 
 Adj. R2: .276 
Table 5.3: model for explaining ROS98 incorporating external sourcing. N = 4,625. 
 
Knowing that external sourcing appears to be an important variable in explaining ROS, it then 
becomes interesting to add further moderating variables. The general model that is tested has 
the following shape: 
 
                                                           
52 Again for space constraints and to simplify the tables, the unstandardised Betas and standard errors 
are not reported here. They are available upon request. 
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(3) ROS98 = β0 + β1 * log sales98 + β2 * log labint98 + β3 * export ratio + β4 
* industry + β5 * purrat98 + β6 * moderator + β7 * purrat98 * moderator + ε 
 
where ‘moderator’ is one of the moderating variables discussed in chapter 3. At this point a 
slight econometric problem is faced. Some of the moderating variables are based on industry 
level data, for instance asset specificity. Introducing these variables into the previous statistical 
models will cause a perfect correlation with the industry dummies. This implies that SPSS is 
unable to process them in the analysis and will throw out these moderating variables. There 
are three simple solutions to this problem. The first solution would be to leave out the 
industry dummies and only use the moderating variables. This is not an ideal solution because 
a large part of the explanatory value currently attached to the model will be lost. So far the 
industry dummies have included any industry level effects on performance, including industry 
level asset specificity, industry level R & D and others. If the dummies are replaced by the 
moderating variables only a part of the industry level effects will remain. Theoretically there 
are reasons to believe that average firm performance will differ between industries, depending 
on the industry’s characteristics (see for example the five forces model of Porter, 1980). A 
second solution would be to not use the moderating variables themselves and just use the 
interaction between the moderators and external sourcing. This is econometrically viable but it 
is somewhat unusual in empirical research to only test the interaction effect without including 
any possible direct effects of the moderator. The reason it is unusual is that is impossible to 
tell whether the interaction effect between the moderator and the independent variable is in 
fact larger than the effect of the moderating variable itself. A third solution is to standardise 
the dependent variable through its industry value and then leave out the industry dummies. 
This simply implies that the average industry ROS is subtracted from a firm’s ROS. This 
standardised ROS value then becomes the dependent variable. Once this has been done 
moderating variables can be entered without causing any econometric problem. Obviously 
after standardisation it is necessary to look at the model from equation 2 again before running 
models from equation 3. This, however, showed that the model became much weaker with 
the explanatory value being halved, implying the model is statistically less useful and can not 
be compared to any of the other models presented here. The reason this occurs is because 
inter-firm variances in performance are artificially suppressed by standardisation. 
 All three of these solutions were attempted to find a correct model. In fact, a 
combination of solutions appeared to provide the best results. It is unfortunate that industry 
level effects and variables based on industry can not be tested simultaneously. The model that 
was tested in equation 2 holds up strongly without including industry dummies. This does not 
imply that industry effects are not important or that the best model is obtained without using 
industry variables, but simply that even without accounting for industry the model is helpful 
to explain firm performance. Again as in previous models, th e  ex t e rna l  s our c ing  and  
produc t i v i t y  va r iab l e s  a r e  th e  b e s t  p e r f o rming  var iab l e s  in the model.  
Furthermore it appeared impossible to include both the industry level variables of 
asset specificity or R & D and the interactions between these variables and external sourcing. 
If this was attempted severe multicollinearity problems were introduced. Multicollinearity 
problems occur when variables are strongly correlated or more generally when an independent 
variable can to a large extent be explained by other independent variables in the model. The 
problem they cause is that the Betas predicted by the analysis become less reliable, implying 
Chapter 5 
 113
that the value that is found could be any other value. Thus the outcomes can not be trusted. 
Multicollinearity is detected by looking at the one-by-one correlations among dependent 
variables and by looking at variance inflation factor (VIF) scores. VIF values for independent 
variables are calculated by regressing all other independent variables on this independent 
variable. The VIF value is the 1 minus the R2 of this regression analysis. 
Two basic strategies exist for such a problem. First, it is possible to combine 
variables in a single factor. In this study, this is th eo r e t i ca l l y  unde s i rab l e . Second, one or 
more variables can be omitted from the analyses. Multicollinearity is a problem with the 
industry level interaction variables. Since the variance in external sourcing within industries 
was limited relative to the variance in the industry level indicators, the interaction variables 
tended to correlate strongly with the industry level variables, including correlations of over 
.90. These correlations can be found in table 3 of appendix C. Thus s epara t e  ana l y s e s  we r e  
made  in c lud ing  on l y  th e  indus t r y  l e v e l  va r iab l e s  o r  on l y  th e  in t e ra c t i on  var iab l e s  w i th  
indus t r y  dummie s . These analyses are shown in two separate tables. 
The first table, table 4, shows three models, one that includes the base variables 
without industry dummies, one that includes base variables and the moderating variables 
without industries and finally an optimised version of this second model. This version 
excludes insignificant variables from the analysis. These were dropped one by one based on 
their contribution to the model in terms of their significance level. As in previous analyses, the 
external sourcing and labour intensity variables are found to be important explanations of 
ROS. The sales variable is also positively related to ROS, as are R & D expenditures. The R & 
D expenditures variable is only moderately significant. This, however, may be caused by the 
fact that industry level measures are used here and not firm level measures. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
Constant  -13.964 .000  -1.500 .134  -12.685 .000 
LOGSAL98 .078 4.030 .000 .047 1.298 .195 .063 2.964 .003 
EXPRAT98 -.008 -.539 .590 .034 1.055 .292    
LOGLABIN .395 19.671 .000 .287 7.770 .000 .403 17.606 .000 
PURRAT98 -.544 -35.294 .000 -.576 -17.706 .000 -.572 -32.004 .000 
UNCERTA    -.037 -1.333 .183    
FOREIGN    .007 .225 .822    
RNDINTEN    .026 .881 .378 .029 1.909 .056 
ASSSPEC    -.016 -.549 .583    
 F-test: 349.091 .000 F-test: 46.975 .000 F-test: 282.557 .000 
 R2: 232 R2: 275 R2: 251 
 Adj. R2: .231 Adj. R2: .269 Adj. R2: .250 
Notes No industry dummies No industry dummies No industry dummies 
Table 5.4: hierarchical regression models for explaining ROS98 incorporating  
external sourcing and various moderating variables. N = 4,625 / 1,001 / 3,37253. 
                                                           
53 Obviously the exclusion of over 80 industry dummy variables will raise the value of adjusted R2 
compared to R2 significantly since the adjustment is made based on the number of variables. It also 
raises the value of the F-test since the explained sum of squares is divided over the number of variables 
used minus 1. Also take note that the sample size changes radically once foreignness is included and also 
when R & D expenditures are included. Several tests were ran to establish whether this altered the 
relation between variables, which it did not. It does, however, limit the statistical power of the tests, 
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The next table, table 5, does not include the moderating variables but instead includes the 
interactions between the moderating variables and external sourcing54. In these models the 
interaction effects are run one at a time. Unfortunately problems of multicollinearity 
prevented running the third and the fourth model with both external sourcing and the 
interaction effect between external sourcing and R & D expenditures and asset specificity 
respectively. Tolerance values dropped as low as .08 and 10 in these equations. Therefore the 
model was run without external sourcing55. The expected negative values are found for both 
the uncertainty and asset specificity interactions. For the R & D interaction a positive but not 
significant effect was found, while an unexpected moderately positive effect was found for the 
foreignness interaction. 
 
 St. β  t-value Sig. St. β  t-value Sig. St. β  t-value Sig. St. β  t-value Sig. 
Constant  -13.837 .000  -2.162 .031  -7.482 .000  -13.311 .000 
LOGSAL98 .078 3.972 .000 .075 2.566 .010 .059 2.441 .015 .083 3.914 .000 
EXPRAT98 -.022 -1.368 .171 .022 .798 .425 -.037 -1.903 .057 -.039 -2.291 .022 
LOGLABIN .425 19.963 .000 .264 8.181 .000 .228 9.422 .000 .365 16.280 .000 
PURRAT98 -.517 -29.373 .000 -.513 -18.921 .000       
PURRAT98 X 
UNCERTA 
-.029 -2.212 .027          
PURRAT98 X 
FOREIGN 
   .044 1.850 .065       
PURRAT98 X 
RNDINTEN 
      -.565 -14.316 .000    
PURRAT98 X 
ASSSPEC 
         -.560 -26.455 .000 
 F-test: 20.871 .000 F-test: 9.506 .000 F-test:14.018 .000 F-test: 21.981 .000 
 R2: .291 R2: .353 R2: .194 R2: .254 
 Adj. R2: .277 Adj. R2: .316 Adj. R2: .180 Adj. R2: .243 
Notes Industry dummies Industry dummies Industry dummies Industry dummies 
Table 5.5: hierarchical regression models for explaining ROS98 incorporating external 
sourcing and various interaction effects56. N = 4,625 / 1,583 / 3,372 / 4,193. 
                                                                                                                                                    
which explains some of the drops in significance in the second model. In particular the logsales variables 
lose significance. 
54 As discussed above one alternative method of running these regressions with interactions that is 
sometimes suggested is to include all variables and simply accept the multicollinearity. This, however, 
makes interpretations of βs impossible, forcing interpretations of changes in adjusted R2. Throughout 
this study this method was executed as well, leading to similar results in terms of the signs of interaction 
variables, although significance levels may have varied in either direction. Thus the current method is 
supported by these analyses (available upon request). 
55 When running the fourth model with both variables there was also a negative sign associated with the 
interaction but it did not come out significantly, which appears to be due to the aforementioned 
multicollinearity problems. In the third model there was a positive but not significant sign associated 
with the interaction effect. The probable cause of the multicollinearity is not just the correlation between 
external sourcing and these two interaction variables but also the industry effects that were used in the 
models. 
56 As pointed out by Masaaki Kotabe in a comment on an earlier version, one other intervening variable 
that could explain the negative relation between external sourcing and financial performance is industry, 
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Possible problems with the regression analyses 
There are several important assumptions underlying regression analysis. If one, a few or all of 
these assumptions are violated this can considerably lower the reliability of outcomes or make 
regression analysis impossible to use altogether. Thus it is necessary to conduct various 
procedures to prove that results are reliable. 
 
The following support was gathered for viewing the regression assumptions as unproblematic 
in the analyses: 
 
• The dependent variable, ROS98 is more or less normally distributed, though 
somewhat skewed. 
• Inspection of residuals from the analysis did not reveal major departures from 
normality. 
• Visual inspection of partial plots of the dependent variable and the key 
independent variables did not reveal heteroskedasticity. 
• Durbin-Watson tests produced figures close to 2, meaning no serial correlation 
(autocorrelation) is found among the residuals. 
• None of the variables in the models presented here have tolerances that 
approach 0 (values range from 0.3 upwards), implying multicollinearity is not a 
problem in the models presented here. 
 
 
Market share (STRATPERF) 
As the analysis on market share is performed, an immediate problem emerges in that market 
share is not a normally distributed variable. Not only is it truncated on the left and right side 
(it is not possible to have a market share of less than 0 or more than 1) but more importantly 
most firms have a market share close to 0 and only very few have a large market share. Thus 
the distribution of the market share variable is exponential. A variable that is clearly 
exponentially distributed can not be used in a normal regression procedure. This implies that 
the variable had to be normalised, for which it is necessary to calculate the logarithm of the 
market share. After this was done the variable ‘logmarsh’ that was obtained indeed showed a 
close to normal pattern. However, more restrictions appear. Since market share is calculated 
as size over industry sales the dependent variable is perfectly explained (R2 = 1) when both 
size of the firm and industry dummies are included. Furthermore it is inappropriate to control 
for size of the firm when explaining the relative size of the firm (market share). Thus the size 
measure was excluded from further analysis. Even without the size variable the models with 
industry dummies would score very high in terms of R2 (.73 and higher). This is obvious: once 
a dummy is included that represents a linearly correlated measure of average market share, 
                                                                                                                                                    
given the product life cycle considerations (Vernon, 1979) discussed earlier. A test that included the 
interaction between external sourcing and industry was conducted. This test revealed that the interaction 
effect itself is not really substantial, although including the industry level of sourcing in combination with 
the firm level of sourcing does add to the R2 of the equation. See also Mol and Gedajlovic (2001) for a 
confirmation of these findings and the end of this chapter for a more detailed discussion. 
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most of the variance in market share between firms is already explained. Furthermore this also 
tends to dilute the effects of variables other than industry. The problem that arises is twofold. 
First we explain what we already know, that in an industry where average market shares are 
low, most firms’ market shares will be low. And second that all other effects, which are the 
effects we actually seek to explain, will disappear because they your marginal compared to the 
industry effects. A final consideration is that this study does not seek to blindly increase R2 of 
the analyses.  
However, it would also be inappropriate not to include any industry level control in the 
analyses. Therefore a moderate version of industry was included, the industry concentration 
ratio. This ratio is calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of all firms in an 
industry, also known as a Herfindahl index. This does represent the industry well in the sense 
that it will keep check of the distribution of market shares in the industry. Since this is also an 
exponential function with most industries being densely concentrated and a few not, a 
logarithmic function is again applied to obtain ‘logindco’. The following model results, which 
runs parallel to equation 1 but is slightly different given the modifications that were needed: 
 
(4) Logmarsh = β0 + β1 * logindco + β2 * log labint98 + β3 * export ratio + ε 
 
Now the analysis can begin. Please note that all the analyses are still limited to the year 1998. 
Table 6 reports the analyses for the basic model. The table shows that as expected industry 
concentration relates positively to a firm’s market share. Furthermore, more productive and 
more export intensive firms also have a larger market share. This is also to be expected. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
Constant  -43.943 .000 
LOGINDCO .170 14.250 .000 
LOGLABINT .413 36.207 .000 
EXPRAT98 .368 31.925 .000 
 F-test: 1210.157 .000 
 R2: .439 
 Adj. R2: .439 
Table 5.6: basic model for explaining logged market share. N = 4,640. 
 
As before, the model is now extended to include external sourcing, obtaining an equation that 
combines equations 2 and 4. The results of this analysis are shown in table 7. Unlike in the 
regression analyses that were used to estimate ROS, external sourcing does not have a strong 
influence in analyses to estimate market share of the firm. In fact, its t-value is far lower than 
that of any of the other predictors in the model. Also, including external sourcing does not 
add much to the model in terms of explanatory value. 
 
                                                           
57 Please note that F-tests of these models are much higher than for ROS models, primarily because 
another way of controlling for industry has been chosen. With industry dummies, the number of 
variables included in the analyses was close to 100, here it is only 4. 
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 Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
Constant  -41.495 .000 
LOGINDCO .416 36.408 .000 
LOGLABINT .343 25.431 .000 
EXPRAT98 .168 14.067 .000 
PURRAT98 .048 3.645 .000 
 F-test: 913.3 .000 
 R2: .441 
 Adj. R2: .440 
Table 5.7: basic model for explaining logged market  
share including external sourcing. N = 4,640. 
 
Now the moderators and interaction effects will again be included in the analyses, combining 
equations 3 and 4, in table 8. Here similar problems arise with multicollinearity as in the ROS 
analyses and the same solution was chosen to first present the moderating variables separately 
and to then present the interaction variables. The first table incorporates the results with the 
moderator variables only. The first model includes all variables while the second model results 
after optimisation efforts. As can be witnessed from the first model, outsourcing remains 
positively related to market share but this relation loses its significance. This confirms that the 
relation is rather weak. Another finding from both models is that foreign firms have larger 
market shares (as expected) and that firms coping with uncertainty have smaller market shares. 
This is as expected as large firms usually produce a more consistent turnover over time. 
Finally, being in an in industry with large specific investments and many R & D activities is 
also a negative predictor for market share. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  -9.604 .000  -9.661 .000 
LOGINDCO .507 17.669 .000 .504 17.680 .000 
LOGLABIN .193 6.778 .000 .206 8.079 .000 
EXPRAT98 .224 7.978 .000 .227 8.133 .000 
PURRAT98 .028 .961 .337    
FIRMUNCE -.057 -2.334 .020 -.057 -2.333 .020 
ASSPEC98 -.069 -2.609 .009 -.077 -3.077 .002 
RNDINT98 -.339 -11.636 .000 -.341 -11.747 .000 
FOREIGN .066 2.492 .013 .064 2.417 .016 
 F-test: 84.345 .000 F-test: 96.270 .000 
 R2: .403 R2: .403 
 Adj. R2: .398 Adj. R2: .398 
Table 5.8: extended model for explaining logged market share including  
external sourcing and moderator variables. N = 1,008 / 1,00858. 
 
                                                           
58 Again note that including foreignness decreases the sample size by a factor 4. Similar results emerged 
from an analysis that did not include foreignness. All the signs are the same in that model. External 
sourcing is barely slightly significant (7.1%) with a positive sign, implying that it is mostly sample size 
that induces significance and confirming the weakly positive relation between external sourcing and 
market share reported earlier. 
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In the next table, table 9, the results of the models incorporating the interaction effects are 
shown. The interactions with both R & D expenditures and uncertainty have the expected 
negative sign and are significant. As in the ROS regressions, foreignness shows a positive and 
given the sample size moderately significant sign. The interaction with asset specificity does 
not come out as significant. In fact, in both the second and fourth models the external 
sourcing variable again loses its significance, confirming the previous conclusion of a weak 
relation59. 
 
 St. β  t-value Sig. St. β  t-value Sig. St. β  t-value Sig. St. β  t-value Sig. 
Constant  -40.145 .000  -12.842 .000  -33.268 .000  -43.191 .000 
LOGSAL98 .416 36.515 .000 .389 17.650 .000 .556 42.131 .000 .357 29.218 .000 
EXPRAT98 .330 24.159 .000 .193 8.131 .000 .275 18.660 .000 .389 27.118 .000 
LOGLABIN .173 14.516 .000 .164 7.174 .000 .203 15.292 .000 .173 13.693 .000 
PURRAT98 .064 4.743 .000 .036 1.558 .119 .126 8.603 .000 .018 1.172 .241 
PURRAT98 X 
UNCERTA 
-.058 -5.103 .000          
PURRAT98 X 
FOREIGN 
   .049 2.219 .027       
PURRAT98 X 
RNDINTEN 
      -.230 -16.655 .000    
PURRAT98 X 
ASSSPEC 
         .016 1.170 .242 
 F-test: 
739.786 
.000 F-test: 144.6 .000 F-test: 705.2 .000 F-test: 648.6 .000 
 R2: .444 R2: .313 R2: .511 R2: .436 
 Adj. R2: .443 Adj. R2: .311 Adj. R2: .510 Adj. R2: .435 
Table 5.9: hierarchical regression models for explaining logged market share incorporating  
external sourcing and various interaction effects. N = 4,640 / 1,591 / 3,383 / 4,20860. 
 
Possible problems with the regression analyses 
There are several important assumptions underlying regression analysis. If one, a few or all of 
these assumptions are violated this can considerably lower the reliability of outcomes or make 
regression analysis impossible to use altogether. Thus it is necessary to conduct various 
procedures to prove that results are reliable. 
 
The following support was gathered for viewing the regression assumptions as unproblematic 
in the analyses: 
 
• The dependent variable, logmarsha, is more or less normally distributed. 
                                                           
59 As with economic performance the possibility of an industry level interaction was tested to look at 
product life cycle and alternative industry level explanations. Including the industry level sourcing as an 
intervening variable did not yield a substantially different result: the moderately positive relation between 
external sourcing and logged market share remained. So perhaps this variable alters the size of the main 
effect but there is no evidence it alters its direction. 
60 Note that in this analysis it was possible to include external sourcing when measuring the effects of a 
asset specificity and R & D expenditures because the industry dummies are missing that together with 
external sourcing caused multicollinearity. 
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• Inspection of residuals from the analysis did not reveal major departures from 
normality. 
• Visual inspection of partial plots of the dependent variable and the key 
independent variables did not reveal heteroskedasticity.  
• Durbin-Watson tests produced figures close to 2, meaning no serial correlation 
(autocorrelation) is found among the residuals. 
• None of the variables in the models presented here have tolerances that 
approach 0 (values range from 0.3 upwards), implying multicollinearity is not a 
problem in the models presented here. 
 
Evidence for time lags 
All of the above analyses are based on the assumption that external sourcing will have an 
immediate impact on a firm’s performance. That is, on the assumption that there is no time 
lag between behaviour and the related outcome. This may be a questionable assumption. At 
least it is an assumption that can be questioned with these same data since the external 
sourcing measure is available for multiple years (1993 through 1998). Table 2 in appendix C 
reports the correlations between the various years for this measure. As expected these 
correlations are high. Also noteworthy is that the correlations are highest between 
neighbouring years throughout the table. This implies that external sourcing strategies are 
reasonably consistent over time for the sample as a whole. 
 In order to test whether there is a time lag between external sourcing and ROS the 
exact same models were ran substituting purrat98 by purrat97 or purrat9661. If the model 
from formula 2 is applied, purrat97 or purrat96 have a lower explanatory value than purrat98. 
This implies that the effects that were found are strongest when using external sourcing data 
from the same year as ROS data. Also, the model itself loses explanatory value (R2 decreases) 
and the model fit F becomes worse. This is even more true for using the 1996 measure than it 
is for using the 1997 measure. After that another model was ran to determine whether 
including both the 1997 and 1998 measures would alter the model. Doing this improved the 
explanatory value of the model, as the adjusted R2 for this model was .29 as well as the model 
fit, since the F value rose to 22.3. However, this model already seemed to generate some 
minor problems of multicollinearity, since tolerance values for purrat97 and purrat98 dropped 
to .23 and .24. In this model there was a negative relation between external sourcing and 
ROS98 for both 1997 and 1998. The effect was larger for 1998 than for 1997. As this analysis 
was expanded further to include the 1996 external sourcing measure, no model improvement 
was obtained. The purrat96 variable was also negatively related to RO98 but barely significant. 
Furthermore the problems of multicollinearity increased as tolerance values dropped as low as 
.18. Thus it seems that there are some spillover effects from one year to another but mos t  
ROS e f f e c t s  o f  ex t e rna l  s our c ing  o c cu r  w i th in  th e  same  y ea r . 
 When these analyses were performed for the market share analysis a slightly different 
picture emerged. Substituting the level of external sourcing in 1998 by that in previous years 
                                                           
61 Most model data are not reported here but are available upon request. Obviously some of the 
underlying correlations are slightly different from one year to another but no relation seems to change 
much. The number of firms changes between years but not by much. Neither of these effects appears to 
influence the essence of the analysis. 
The outsourcing dilemma 
 120
actually increase explanatory power. This effect became strongest in 1995 and then decreased 
again. This implies that the level of external sourcing in 1995 is a better predictor of market 
share in 1998 than the level of external sourcing in 1998. Thus the positive effects of external 
sourcing on market share appear to be lagged 3 years. These results seem to c on f i rm tha t  
a ch i e v ing  s t ra t e g i c  p e r f o rmanc e  w i l l  t ake  l ong e r  than  a ch i e v ing  e c onomi c  p e r f o rmanc e .  
Including multiple years of the external sourcing variable confirmed the large explanatory 
value of the 1995 variable. Interestingly, in some of these models other years of data (mostly 
1993), actually took on a negative, significant value. This is indirect evidence that over an even 
longer-term period, 5 years, external sourcing again has a negative impact on market share. 
The size of this 5-year effect was quite limited compared to some of the other variables, 
although almost as large as the positive effect of the 1995 variable. In the case of market share 
spillover effects from one year to the other appear to be more important. 
 
 
5.2 Findings from the database 
These analyses support several interesting observations. The models that were tested to 
account for return on sales proved to be qu i t e  s t r ong  bo th  in  t e rms  o f  mode l  f i t  and  
exp lana to r y  va lu e . In these models there were few econometric problems, although some 
limitations were posed on the analyses by the fact that certain variables, like asset specificity 
and R & D, were only available at the industry level. The models that were tested to assess 
effects of sourcing on market share were also quite strong although the effect of sourcing was 
one of the weaker effects.  
 
Strong support for several hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1b, of a negative relation between external sourcing and economic performance, 
was strongly supported throughout the analyses62. This also implies that hypothesis 1a, a 
positive relation, is refuted. Hypothesis 2 of a negative relation between external sourcing and 
strategic performance was refuted. In fact, some evidence was found for the opposite effect of 
external sourcing having a positive effect on market share, at least in the longer run. Strongly 
supported in the ROS regressions were hypotheses 7, 8, and 9. Hypotheses 8 and 9 were also 
confirmed in the market share regressions. Hypothesis 7 was insignificant in these analyses. 
Hypothesis 10 was not only refuted but in fact an opposite effect was found in both the ROS 
and market share regressions, although that was only marginally significant. In the discussion 
these findings will be explored further theoretically. 
 
Furthermore there is evidence for performance effects of other variables that were not 
hypothesised because they were not at the centre of attention. The most important of these 
are size of the firm and productivity, both of which relate strongly positively to performance. 
That size is positively related to profitability is hardly surprising given earlier evidence, for 
example in the PIMS studies. Productivity, measured here as turnover per employee, also 
                                                           
62 In this chapter as well as subsequent chapters there will be many references to strong, moderate and 
weak effects. It is difficult to specify exactly what is a strong or weak effect. The strength of an effect 
relates mostly to its significance within the model. Strong effects have to be obtained from a model with 
a high fit and be very significant. 
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related positively to firm performance, whether measured as ROS or as market share. In fact, 
one might think of productivity as an intermediate performance measure, although not one 
appropriate for measuring the effects of sourcing strategy. If a firm is good at obtaining 
advantage from internal resources, like personnel or IT systems, this should provide a 
competitive advantage over other firms. This appears a likely explanation for the effect that 
was found. Furthermore several industry dummies were significant in various analyses, 
implying that the industry a firm operates in, co-determines the firm’s profitability. This was 
expected and confirms earlier strategic management research.  
There is no real evidence for effects of export intensity on ROS, at least not when 
other variables are included in a multiple regression analysis. The relation between export 
intensity and ROS swings from positive to negative and from moderately significant to totally 
insignificant depending on what other variables are included in the analysis. There is the 
expected positive link between export intensity and the firm’s market share. Larger firms 
export more products because of saturation of domestic markets and a self-selection bias. 
Finally, there is some evidence that being in an R & D intensive industry is positively 
related to profitability but negatively to market share. The profitability effect can best be 
explained by looking at the entry barriers and high concentration ratios that are created in R & 
D intensive industries (Porter, 1980). If much R & D activity is needed to compete, scale 
effects increase and larger firms will be most competitive. Because R & D activity is path 
dependent, R & D investments will create exit barriers as these investments can not be fully 
employed elsewhere. It will be increasingly difficult for new entrants to join the industry. This 
will decrease competition and increase average industry profitability (Porter, 1980). This may 
not be the case for new and emerging industries like biotechnology, but those industries are 
only a very limited part of this sample. The negative effect of R & D on market share might 
have to do with the fact that market share is dependent upon the industry a firm operates in 
and R & D is also an industry level indicator. Asset specificity and R & D intensity of an 
industry may very well be positively related to the size of the industry, which again determines 
the number of firms and average market shares. In larger industries more firms operate. 
Finally, uncertainty is negatively related to market share, which appears to be a ‘small firm’ 
problem. Smaller firms, which obviously have smaller market shares, experience larger swings 
in profitability and turnover relative to larger firms, which are usually more stable in this 
respect. Table 10 summarises the findings from the database. 
 
 Economic performance (ROS) Strategic performance (marsha)  
Independent 
variable 
• Strongly negative relation • Moderately positive relation (not in all models) 
Moderators • Asset specificity: strongly 
negative interaction effect 
• Uncertainty: strongly negative 
interaction effect 
• R & D intensity: strongly 
negative interaction effect 
• Foreignness: moderately 
positive interaction effect 
• Uncertainty: strongly negative interaction effect 
• R & D intensity: strongly negative interaction effect 
• Foreignness: moderately positive interaction effect 
Con t i nu ed  on  n ex t  pa g e  
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 Economic performance (ROS) Strategic performance (marsha)  
Other effects • (Log) size is strongly positively 
related 
• (Log) productivity is strongly 
positively related 
• R & D intensity is moderately 
positively related 
• Various industry dummies are 
positively or negatively related 
• Industry concentration is strongly positively related 
• (Log) productivity is strongly positively related 
• Export intensity is strongly positively related 
• R & D intensity is strongly negatively related 
• Asset specificity is negatively related 
• Uncertainty is moderately negatively related 
• Being a foreign firm is moderately positively related 
Table 5.10: Summary of significant findings from the database. 
 
 
5.3 Analysis of the survey 
The survey provides another look at the same issues. The survey obviously draws on a much 
smaller number of firms, 200. Furthermore many of the measures are perception-based and 
not hard data. On the other hand, the survey also provides much more of an in-depth look at 
many issues since it entails variables that the database does not provide. This includes firm 
level data on asset specificity, innovation, and general firm strategy. 
 
Many descriptives were already provided in chapter 4 as part of describing the survey. More 
descriptives are presented in table 11 and several outcomes appear worrisome. First of all 
standard deviations on the performance scores are low, implying there is not much difference 
between respondents in how they have answered the performance questions (the variance is 
low). Inspection of frequencies reveals that most respondents have placed their answer right 
in the middle of the 5-point scales, saying their performance is average. This may cause 
problems in the analyses since these analyses are based on explaining variance. A lack thereof 
frustrates efforts to find statistical relations. Second, the core question for answering the 
questions on external sourcing contains some odd answers. Several firms have indicated they 
are either 0% or 100% reliant upon external suppliers for their production. This seems strange 
and could indicate the question was formulated in the wrong manner. Another problem is that 
the alternative question that is similar to the database measure is inconsistent. The purchasing 
budget appears to be correctly answered given the outcomes. However, the turnover question 
asked for corporate turnover. Not all respondents interpreted it correctly as an analysis of 
well-known firms revealed. Thus an inconsistent measure has been obtained. Furthermore, in 
retrospect it would have been better to ask for bus in e s s  un i t  tu rnov e r  to be able to use this 
as a measure of external sourcing. In later analyses these issues may cause problems. In this 
section the key variables in the analysis are e c onomi c  p e r f o rmanc e  (FINAPERF) ,  s t ra t e g i c  
p e r f o rmanc e  (MARKPERF) ,  f i rm pe r f o rmanc e  (FIRMPERF) .  ex t e rna l  s our c ing  
(bo th  PURRATSU and TOTPROCO),  a s s e t  sp e c i f i c i t y  (ASSETSPE),  unc e r ta in t y  
(UNCERTAI)  and  f i rm innova t i on  (TOTINNOV) . 
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Variable Measure for N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
MIXSTRAT Varying strategy 200 0 1.00 .1400 .3479 
RESPJOB Job of respondent 200 0 1.00 .5650 .4970 
PURINTEG Degree of integration 200 1.00 5.00 3.145 1.140 
FIRMSTRA Firm strategy 172 1.00 5.00 3.611 1.152 
TECHUNCE Techn. uncertainty 198 2.00 10.00 5.147 2.036 
VOLUNCER Volume uncertainty 198 2.00 10.00 5.833 1.841 
FINAPERF Financial performance 189 2.00 10.00 6.397 1.156 
MARKPERF Market performance 197 3.00 10.00 6.751 1.353 
PROCINNO Process innovation 190 0 14.00 8.511 2.891 
PRODINNO Product innovation 193 0 15.00 8.746 2.784 
UNCERTAI Total uncertainty 198 4.00 19.00 10.98 3.143 
ASSETSPE Asset specificity 197 3.00 21.00 11.25 4.332 
FIRMPERF Firm performance 189 8.00 20.00 13.14 2.081 
TOTINNOV Total innovation 189 0 29.00 17.26 5.339 
PURRATSU External sourcing 197 .03 111.11 39.22 21.21 
PERCSTAN Standardised product 197 0 100.00 47.50 34.77 
TOTPROCO External sourcing 198 0 100.00 49.98 31.66 
RESPEXP Respond. experience 200 1965.00 2001.00 1993.8 7.057 
PURBUDGET Purchasing budget 199 1,000,000 3,000,000,000 79,653,175 253,399,553 
TURNOVER Firm turnover 197 6,000,000 160,000,000,000 2,215,670,051 13,241,362,891 
Table 5.11: descriptives for the survey variables used in the analysis (key variables are in bold). 
A description of all variables can be found in table 4.37. Please note that the variables mixed 
strategy and respondent’s job are dummy variables. All other variables are numerical variables 
except purratsu, percstan and totproc, which are percentages, respexp which is a year and 
purbudget and turnover which are expressed in Dutch guilders. Valid listwise N (number of 
firms with all data) = 151.  
 
Table 4 in appendix C gives an overview of the correlations between the variables. The 
various measures of firm performance are correlated in particular with innovation measures 
(positively) and mixed strategy (negatively). There are also positive links between financial 
performance and the job of the respondent as well as the percentage of standardised products 
being sourced. The external sourcing measure is positively linked to general firm strategy. 
Other links include the expected positive link between technological uncertainty and 
innovation and the expected negative link between mixed strategy and innovation. 
Furthermore as expected, asset specificity is positively correlated with innovation and 
negatively with the use of standard products. Then uncertainty is positively related to general 
firm strategy. In general the correlations between the variables in this part of the survey are 
not very strong. 
 
Economic performance 
The analysis again starts with a basic model that incorporates the industry, firm size, the 
degree to which purchasing is integrated in the firm, general firm strategy, the degree of 
product standardisation, respondent job, and respondent experience. Given the fact that the 
number of observations is limited, which limits the number of variables that can be used, and 
the fact that the independent variable was measured relative to industry competitors thus 
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reducing inter-industry differences (the measure standardises a firm’s performance), industry is 
here measured as a threefold distinction63. There are firms active in process industries, firms 
active in traditional industries and firms active in product industries of composed products64. 
The process industry comprises food & beverages, tobacco products, paper, publishing, 
chemicals, rubber and plastics, basic metals, and simple metal products. The traditional 
industry category consists of textiles, apparel, wood products, glass products, and furniture & 
other products. In the product industry category are included machinery & equipment, office 
machinery & computers, electrical machinery, radio, television & communication equipment, 
medical & optical equipment, motor vehicles, and shipbuilding & bicycles. Dummies were 
created for each of these three categories. Given the problems described earlier with the 
turnover measure, size was here measured as the logarithm of the purchasing budget. The 
respondent’s job consisted of 5 dummy variables65. And 6 dummies were created for firm 
strategy. As it turned out this still produced too large a number of variables given the sample 
size. Therefore firm strategy was reduced to the 4 Miles and Snow types and respondent’s job 
was reduced to three types (top management, purchasing specialist and other). Then the 
following basic model was tested. 
 
(4) ECONPERF = β0 + β1 * logpursu + β2 * respjob + β3 * respexp + β4 * 
industry + β5 * purinteg + β6 * percstan + β7 * firmstra + ε 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  6.299 .000  7.382 .000 
LOGPURSU -.167 -2.210 .028 -.142 -1.941 .054 
TOPMAN -.121 -1.418 .158 -.138 -1.844 .067 
PURCHSPE .028 .314 .754    
ANALYSER .354 1.874 .063 .266 2.628 .009 
PROSPECT .351 1.781 .077 .238 2.383 .018 
REACTOR .096 .641 .522    
PROCINDU .065 .522 .602    
PRODINDU -.083 -.633 .528    
RESPEXP .013 .167 .867    
PURINTEG .054 .724 .470    
PERCSTAN -.102 -1.320 .189 -.072 -.989 .324 
 F-test: 1.622 .096 F-test: 2.729 .021 
 R2: .094 R2: .071 
 Adj. R2: .036 Adj. R2: .045 
Table 5.12: basic model for explaining economic performance with survey data. N = 185. 
                                                           
63 With a sample size of less than 200 a rule of thumb is to use a maximum of around 15 to 20 variables 
in the analysis. As there are more than 20 industries involved, it is necessary to reduce this number. The 
threefold distinction that is used here appears to be generally accepted in production and operations 
management as well as in Dutch industry. 
64 As noted before there is a distinction in sourcing behaviour between these three industry types (Mol, 
Schreuder and Goedegebuure, 2001). 
65 There was one respondent providing the job title ‘purchasing consultant’. This respondent was added 
to the group of respondents that provided the title ‘other’. 
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The results of this test are presented in table 12. The test showed that the model did not come 
out significantly when these variables were included. This model does not significantly help in 
understanding economic performance of the firm. However, there are several variables in the 
model that come out as useful predictors of economic performance. The model was 
optimised to see whether these variables alone would yield a better model. The optimised 
model is the second model in table 12. This model is marginally significant. It mostly provides 
indications that firms following a differentiation strategy (analysers and prospectors) perform 
better. The fact that the constant is the most significant variable is not a good sign either. 
 
The model was extended to include the effects of external sourcing similar to equation 2: 
 
(5) ECONPERF = β0 + β1 * logpursu + β2 * respjob + β3 * respexp + β4 * 
industry + β5 * purinteg + β6 * percstan + β7 * firmstra + β8 * external 
sourcing + ε 
 
Actually both measures for external sourcing were tested. The question on the extent to which 
external suppliers carried total production costs is lined up in the first model of table 13. In 
the second model the purchasing rate as it was calculated in the survey was used. Both models 
are non-significant and both variables are non-significant within the context of these models. 
Again the most important predictors appear to be analyser and prospector strategies. A third 
model was tested that included both variables. Since the two measures are mostly uncorrelated 
(a .062 correlation with .386 significance level) this is possible. The third model was optimised 
to obtain the highest possible explanatory value (adjusted R2). This is a reasonable model 
compared to previous models. In this model the percentage of total production cost carried 
by external suppliers is positively related to economic performance. The other external 
sourcing variable, purchasing rate, has the expected negative sign but is not significant. Also, 
size of the firm is negatively related to economic performance. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  6.512 .000  6.201 .000  7.428 .000 
LOGPURSU -.193 -2.527 .012 -.154 -1.982 .049 -.156 -2.066 .040 
TOPMAN -.145 -1.682 .094 -.107 -1.230 .221 -.137 -1.782 .077 
PURCHSPE -.007 -.076 .939 .023 .258 .797    
ANALYZER .366 1.944 .053 .384 2.007 .046 .283 2.734 .007 
PROSPECT .343 1.751 .082 .386 1.914 .057 .228 2.241 .026 
REACTOR .090 .613 .541 .123 .810 .419    
PROCINDU .052 .417 .677 .050 .390 .697    
PRODINDU -.120 -.912 .363 -.093 -.698 .486    
RESPEXP .024 .320 .749 .024 .322 .748    
PURINTEG .038 .500 .618 .045 .603 .547    
PERCSTAN -.115 -1.489 .138 -.112 -1.443 .151 -.091 -1.240 .216 
TOTPROCO .139 1.808 .072    .139 1.863 .064 
PURRATSU    -.077 -.989 .324 -.063 -.836 .405 
 F-test: 1.778 .055 F-test: 1.542 .113 F-test: 2.569 .015 
 R2: .111 R2: .098 R2: .094 
 Adj. R2: .049 Adj. R2: .035 Adj. R2: .057 
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Table 5.13: basic model for explaining economic performance with  
survey data including external sourcing measures. N = 185 / 184 / 183. 
 
As in the database analysis the analysis is now extended to include the effects of possible 
moderators. The following formula is used for this model: 
 
(6) ECONPERF = β0 + β1 * logpursu + β2 * respjob + β3 * respexp + β4 * 
industry + β5 * purinteg + β6 * percstan + β7 * firmstra + β8 * external 
sourcing + β9 * moderator + β10 * external sourcing * moderator + ε 
 
Unlike the database analysis it is possible this time to include both the moderators and the 
interaction variables at the same time because problems of multicollinearity are absent among 
these variables. Due to space constraints the only models that are reported here are those in 
which the moderating or interaction variable had any impact. Neither the foreignness 
moderator nor its interaction had any impact. The asset specificity interaction had the 
expected negative impact for both versions of external sourcing but this was not significant. 
The process and product innovation interactions with both external sourcing measures also 
consistently showed the predicted negative sign but also consistently did not have significant 
impact. The same was true for volume uncertainty. For technological uncertainty there was 
also a negative sign for the interaction with the percentage of production costs but a positive 
sign for the interaction with the purchasing rate. The model that is presented in table 14 
contains only the moderating variables. This model was again obtained by optimising the 
adjusted R2. It shows that product innovation has a positive impact on economic 
performance, along with the variables found in earlier analyses. The percentage of production 
costs variable has lost significance in this model. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  6.558 .000 
LOGPURSU -.129 -1.691 .093 
TOPMAN -.133 -1.711 .089 
ANALYZER .263 2.504 .013 
PROSPECT .189 1.807 .073 
PERCSTAN -.082 -1.110 .269 
PURRATSU -.089 -1.163 .246 
TOTPROCO .119 1.578 .116 
PRODINNO .138 1.842 .067 
 F-test: 2.435 .016 
 R2: .103 
 Adj. R2: .061 
Table 5.14: extended model for explaining economic performance with survey data. N = 178. 
 
Firm performance 
The analyses that were used to assess the effects on strategic performance showed very similar 
results and problems to the analyses on economic performance. In fact, the problems were 
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even worse66. It seems rather useless to report all these outcomes here. However, there is 
another possibility to obtain extended insights into the survey results. Given the high 
correlation between the two types of performance in the study and the fact that only two 
questions were used per scale an obvious possibility was to analyse the effects on firm 
performance as a whole. Firm performance is obtained by cumulating the economic and 
strategic performance measures from the survey, which results in a 4-item scale. As was 
demonstrated in chapter 4 this is actually a more reliable measure than the separate 
performance measures. Furthermore it has the added advantage of having a larger range of 
data points in the dependent variable, meaning more variance can be measured. 
 
Table 15 presents the basic model and both variants of the basic model with an external 
sourcing extension. The first model is described by formula 4 while the other 2 models are 
described by formula 5. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  5.596 .000  5.798 .000  5.452 .000 
LOGPURSU -.049 -.641 .523 -.074 -.967 .335 -.036 -.460 .646 
TOPMAN -.050 -.589 .557 -.073 -.842 .401 -.036 -.414 .679 
PURCHSPE .117 1.325 .187 .085 .943 .347 .118 1.329 .186 
ANALYZER .258 1.360 .176 .271 1.436 .153 .282 1.463 .145 
PROSPECT .293 1.481 .140 .286 1.450 .149 .327 1.615 .108 
REACTOR .022 .144 .886 .014 .092 .926 .051 .338 .736 
PROCINDU .040 .320 .750 .025 .200 .842 .026 .199 .842 
PRODINDU -.121 -.922 .358 -.158 -1.196 .233 -.135 -1.011 .313 
RESPEXP .006 .078 .938 .016 .219 .827 .009 .120 .905 
INKINTEG .019 .254 .800 .001 .014 .989 .017 .227 .821 
PERCSTAN -.005 -.058 .954 -.017 -.222 .824 -.005 -.064 .949 
TOTPROCO    .144 1.868 .063    
PURRATSU       -.066 -.851 .396 
 F-test: 1.494 .137 F-test: 1.649 .082 F-test: 1.382 .179 
 R2: .087 R2: .104 R2: .089 
 Adj. R2: .029 Adj. R2: .041 Adj. R2: .025 
Table 5.15: basic model for explaining firm performance with survey  
data including external sourcing measures. N = 185 / 184 / 183. 
 
The next table, table 16, presents the model with the largest explanatory value that includes 
moderators but not interactions. This model was developed after optimising a model with 
many variables. Taking into account the previous models this is a strong model with both a 
much higher model fit, that is significant at the highest level and a much higher adjusted R2 of 
.12. The reason for this is mostly the strong link between product innovation and firm 
performance that was found in the survey. Reactor strategies that involve a mix of approaches 
are related to lower firm performance. 
 
                                                           
66 Results are available upon request. 
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 Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  17.114 .000 
PURCHSPE .109 1.523 .130 
REACTOR -.137 -1.918 .057 
PURRATSU -.107 -1.496 .137 
TOTPROCO .117 1.636 .104 
PRODINNO .297 3.889 .000 
TECHUNCE -.085 -1.123 .263 
 F-test: 4.897 .000 
 R2: .147 
 Adj. R2: .117 
Table 5.16: extended model for explaining firm performance with survey data. N = 178. 
 
Finally, i n t e ra c t i on  e f f e c t s  were tested between the moderating variables and external 
sourcing, in table 17. As in the analyses on economic performance most interactions had the 
appropriate sign but were not significant. The interactions between product innovation and 
external sourcing caused some problems of multicollinearity. Finally, one effect did show up 
significantly in the model and actually increased the adjusted R2 to .13, which is highest among 
all models tested in this section. This is the effect between external sourcing and asset 
specificity, which shows the predicted negative sign, confirming transaction cost logic. This 
analysis follows equation 6. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  11.430 .000 
REACTOR -.136 -1.905 .058 
PURRATSU -.115 -1.610 .109 
TOTPROCO .487 2.420 .017 
PRODINNO .287 3.760 .000 
TECHUNCE -.080 -1.057 .292 
PURCHSPE .120 1.686 .094 
ASSETSPE .159 1.268 .206 
TOTPROCO X 
ASSPEC 
-.453 -1.954 .052 
 F-test: 4.240 .000 
 R2: .167 
 Adj. R2: .128 
Table 5.17: extended model including interaction variables for  
explaining firm performance with survey data. N = 178. 
 
 
5.4 Findings from the survey 
By now it should be clear that any findings from this part of the survey are to be looked upon 
with some suspicion. There are apparent measurement problems in the survey and for the 
most part models do not seem to work out as they should. Nevertheless several of the 
predicted effects were found in the data. First these problems will be discussed and then the 
findings from the survey will be related to the conceptual framework of this study.  
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Measurement problems 
There are problems related to the measurement of the dependent variable in this part of the 
survey, which can be witnessed by looking at the relatively low R2 values of these regressions. 
Most respondents did not deviate from the average score, meaning there are quite a few 
respondents that scored 3s for both questions on economic performance or both questions 
on strategic performance. Thus the variance between firms may be causing the regressions to 
be ineffective since regression analysis seeks to explain variance between respondents. In 
retrospect it might have been better to pose the performance questions slightly differently. 
Instead of asking for a ‘much lower’ or ‘much higher’ performance vis-à-vis competitors, a 
‘lower’ or ‘higher’ performance would probably have generated more variance. Few 
respondents in the survey chose the extreme value 5 and even fewer opted for 1. On the other 
hand, it seems there is enough variance to explain at least part of the performance of firms. 
What is more troublesome is that there are severe problems with measurement of 
the key independent variable. Two measures were used that both were not completed as 
intended. The question ‘what percentage of your production costs is currently supplied by 
external suppliers’ was probably not well understood by respondents. Many respondents came 
up with values that appear quite unlikely. The second measure was designed wrongly. This 
measure should have been based on business unit turnover. However, respondents were asked 
to fill in the corporate turnover. Yet not all respondents did that. Thus th e  pur chas ing  ra t e  
measur e  tha t  was  ca l cu la t ed  f r om th e  surv e y  i s  bo th  in cons i s t en t  and  on l y  par t l y  
u s e fu l . A small test was conducted to see whether this was indeed a problem. Since analysis of 
the database had shown that the degree of external sourcing did not vary much between years 
the database values of external sourcing for 1998 were compared with the survey values 
(2000). These data were available for 180 firms. Then those firms that had obviously not 
completed the survey with business unit purchasing and business unit turnover in mind were 
deleted from the sample. A regression on the firm performance measure in the survey was ran 
for the remaining 138 firms. In this regression the negative relation between external sourcing 
and firm performance became much stronger and it was the most significant variable along 
with product innovation. Thus a better measurement of the same variables would have led to 
results similar to those found in the analysis of the database. In retrospect it would have been 
better to ask a different question in the first place. 
The fact that two measures that are supposed to represent the same theoretical value 
are almost unrelated also suggests that at least one of the measures does not function 
properly, since theoretically similar measures should ideally have a strong and positive 
correlation. There is little that could be done to repair these faults once the survey had been 
returned. However, this is reason for concern over the findings in this section. In particular, 
there is reason to believe that the relations that were found would have been stronger with 
correct data. The results from the database analysis also seem to support that statement. 
Luckily a backup for this analysis is readily available in the form of the analysis of the database 
presented at the beginning of this chapter although that backup lacks some of the detailed 
measures that the survey presents.  
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Limited support for hypotheses 
It is very d i f f i cu l t  t o  say  whe th e r  hypo th e s i s  1a  o r  1b  and  2  ar e  a c tua l l y  suppor t ed  by 
the survey data. In fact, the two measures disagree with one another as to the nature of the 
relation. There was partial evidence that the hypothesised negative interaction effect in 
hypothesis 7 on the relation between external sourcing and performance exists. No significant 
evidence was found in the survey data that uncertainty plays a part in explaining performance 
directly or through an interaction with external sourcing as was claimed in hypothesis 8. Tests 
were conducted for both volume uncertainty and technological uncertainty and most tests, 
though not all tests, came up with the predicted negative sign but it was not significant. There 
is no evidence in the survey data that innovation plays a significant role as an interaction 
variable on the external sourcing – performance relation (hypothesis 9). There is, however, 
substantial evidence that innovation and in particular product innovation is positively related 
directly to both economic and strategic performance. No significant evidence was found in 
the survey data that foreignness plays a part in explaining performance directly or through an 
interaction with external sourcing as predicted by hypothesis 10. However, the sign of the 
interaction variable did point in the appropriate direction. There is some support for other 
performance effects in the survey. Innovation, in particular product innovation is strongly 
positively related to both kinds of performance. Table 18 below summarises the findings. 
 
 Economic performance Firm performance 
Independent 
variable 
• Unclear due to measurement problem • Unclear due to measurement problem 
Moderators • Asset specificity: no interaction effect 
found 
• Uncertainty: no interaction effect found 
• Innovation: no interaction effect found 
• Foreignness: no interaction effect found 
• Asset specificity: negative interaction 
effect found 
• Uncertainty: no interaction effect found 
• Innovation: no interaction effect found 
• Foreignness: no interaction effect found 
Other effects • Product innovation is positively related 
• (Relatively) market leading strategy is 
positively related 
• Product innovation is strongly positively 
related 
• (Relatively) market leading strategy is 
positively related 
Table 5.18: Summary of findings from the survey. 
 
 
5.5 Discussion 
The more a firm sources from outside suppliers the less profitable it is. There are several 
possible explanations for this finding, which seems unexpected given the managerial logic of 
the 1990s. First there may be explanations concerned with the natur e  o f  measur emen t  o f  
p ro f i t ab i l i t y . It could be that firms are actually not trying to increase their return on sales but 
their return on investment. Since investment data are not available it was impossible to test 
directly whether this is the case. However, it is generally known that return on investment and 
return on equity measures are externally imposed measures by financiers such as shareholders 
and banks. These external providers of capital more or less tend to normalise their demands 
across industries. They demand equal returns on investment from firms in various industries. 
Obviously this is not completely true given the different risk profiles of firms and industries. 
If risks are higher, then so will the demand returns. But in the present sample there is little 
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reason to believe there are large differences in risks. Why would one expect much higher or 
much lower risks for firms that manufacture food products than for firms that manufacture 
metal products? If new services and start-up firms, particularly of the dot.com type, would be 
included this would be a different story. Given the fact that the industries in the sample are 
more or less similar in terms of ROI and that industry level effects were controlled for in the 
analyses it seems reasonable to pose that measurement is not the core explanation of the 
findings. Additional analysis showed that the negative external sourcing – profitability relation 
holds within industries implying such inter-industry differences in the ROS – ROI relation are 
not a prominent part of the explanation. 
A second possible explanation could be in r e v e r s ed  causa l i t y . What if firms that 
perform worse tend to outsource more? This is an interesting explanation that is probably 
partly the basis for the findings. If certain activities are not performed well within the firm, 
which will show in its ROS figures, the firm may decide to outsource them. At first sight this 
is an easy way to get rid of problems. However, these problems are likely to persist since the 
firm lacks management capability in one way or the other. The management of external 
suppliers will usually be more difficult than that of internal activities, given the lack of 
authority incentives (Hennart, 1993). Since the price mechanism is a more important source of 
governance for external suppliers than it is internally, steering will be based primarily on 
output and not on processes (Hennart, 1993). The consequence will be that the firm loses its 
grip of what is happening even more. This runs counter to much of the support that 
outsourcing has received from people in business, especially consultants. They predict a 
positive relation, which is far from the empirical truth as it was found here. Moreover the 
evidence that external sourcing and ROS are negatively related holds over time. In the panel 
data study mentioned earlier (Mol & Gedajlovic, 2001) year-to-year dummies are not 
significant, meaning temporary explanations of ROS involving the level of external sourcing 
among industries are not appropriate. Therefore there is enough reason to believe that 
reversed causality is certainly not the only explanation for the negative relation, although it is 
probably a partial explanation. In future research it would be of interest to look into this 
reversed causality argument more, using other models.  
A third and quite viable argument may be that f i rms  do  no t  hav e  enough  in s i gh t  
into the effects of sourcing on ROS within their own firm. This would explain why firms 
choose a non-optimal level of external sourcing. Given the quite complicated link between 
sourcing and ROS that was discussed in chapter 3 in particular, it may be difficult for decision 
makers to judge whether their overall portfolio of sourcing consists of too little, enough or 
too much outsourcing. It will be difficult to compare the consequences of internal and 
external sourcing given difficulties in a) predicting future outcomes, b) the additional 
transaction costs involved in incomplete contracting, c) aggregating information from a wide 
range of continuously changing sourcing decisions, d) obtaining information about 
competitors’ behaviours, e) comparing the firm’s sourcing strategy - profitability relation with 
that of competitors given differences in the structure and overall strategy of firms. Therefore 
it is quite likely that firms are unable to judge the effects of outsourcing on profitability.  
A fourth and complementary explanation, is that within industries it is possible to 
discern bandwagon  e f f e c t s  o r  i s omorph i sm  (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This would imply 
that there is pressure from the institutional field to increase outsourcing, not knowing this will 
decrease performance. Throughout the last 20 years, but mostly since the early 1990s, firms in 
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the Netherlands have been exposed to ‘core business’ arguments. An often heard riddle from 
consultants (KPMG, 1994) as well as some academics was that in order to concentrate on the 
core business or core competencies a firm would have to disengage from activities, both 
horizontally and vertically. It was suggested that increased focus, by reducing the number of 
different business lines, would increase performance. Furthermore it was suggested that 
supply chains should be divided into more separate elements because co-operation would 
occur across the supply chain (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). This implied vertical de-
integration through outsourcing and increased responsibilities for suppliers. In retrospect it 
now seems this was ill advice and companies that blindly took this advice may have harmed 
themselves. Perhaps it is also true that suppliers are unable to handle these increased 
responsibilities, which will be a topic of further investigation in chapter 6. 
Finally, one might turn to missing interaction effects as a possible explanation for the 
negative relation between external sourcing and economic performance. The interaction 
between industry and the sourcing-performance relation was tested separately since such an 
effect would be a prime candidate. For example it has been suggested that the stage of the 
product life cycle an industry operates in influences the effectiveness of certain sourcing 
patterns (Kotabe 1992, who quotes Vernon, 1979). In later stages of the product life cycle 
profit margins tend to erode as products basically become commodities. When products are 
commodities, it becomes easier to outsource components as the asset specificity decreases. 
Therefore the negative relation could also be caused by the fact that those industries in which 
outsourcing is dominant are also the industries in which profitability is low. This line of 
reasoning was tested here (also in Mol and Gedajlovic, 2001) and it appeared that there may 
be such an effect but this effect is not such that it reduces the negative relation found here. 
Thus the PLC argument may contain some truth but is certainly not strong enough to explain 
the outcomes. 
 
Firms that outsource more seem to be able to gain some market share, particularly after a few 
years. However, over an even longer time period, the effects might become negative. The 
sizes of these effects are limited but they do exist. This was contrary to expectations since the 
predicted sign was negative. Several possible explanations come to mind. Perhaps firms are 
able through outsourcing to free up resources that they can utilise to accelerate growth. In the 
Netherlands a fairly stringent firing policy exists, meaning that people can not so easily be 
fired even after an activity has been outsourced. Firms might re-employ these people 
elsewhere in the firm to obtain additional sales growth. Another type of resource that is freed 
could be research and development capacity. As a firm no longer uses certain technologies, it 
will have to develop less internally and perhaps this benefits other areas of development, 
which will lead to better products and more market share in the long run.  
A second argument is that the activities that were outsourced by manufacturing firms 
in the Netherlands over the time period investigated are really non-core activities that do not 
lead to breaking of intra-firm linkages. This would imply that hypothesis 2 was incorrect in its 
suspicion of loss of internal capacity and that the benefits of integration are simply not there. 
This is obviously an argument that needs further research, probably of a qualitative nature. 
The argument that outsourcing concerned mostly non-core activities for these firms does 
appear to be partly true for the period before 1993 (De Wit et al, 1998).  
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Thirdly, it could be that co-operation with external suppliers is indeed an effective 
means to improve the attractiveness of products in the marketplace, even though these 
products come at a higher production cost. Perhaps joint work with suppliers does indeed 
lead to innovative combinations that increase the value of products (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
This could explain that with the increase in external sourcing, firms are able to consolidate or 
slightly improve their market share. Chapter 6 will deal with this topic in more detail. 
A fourth and very interesting option would be that the hypothesised effect does in 
fact occur, but over a longer time period than was investigated here. Indeed there was some 
indirect evidence that over a 5-year period the effects of external sourcing on market share 
could become negative. If this is indeed the case then the argument could be that the loss of 
internal capabilities does not affect firms for the first few years but only after 5 or more years. 
In some industries, such as the automobile industry or computers, this period more or less 
coincides with the period between development and termination of a product : the life cycle 
of a model. The argument could be that once a new product needs to be developed, firms 
discover their lack of development capacity. This would imply that the benefits of vertical 
integration are not felt until after a number of years. To truly test this hypothesis data would 
be needed over an even longer time period of 10 years or more. 
Fifth, th e  r e v e r s ed  causa l i t y  a r gumen t  app l i e s  e v en  s t r ong e r  h e r e . What if the 
firms that outsource activities are mostly the larger firms? If this is the case, market share is 
not a consequence of outsourcing, but outsourcing is a consequence of firm size. Large firms 
are more likely to benefit from scale advantages when sourcing externally, which makes 
outsourcing a more interesting option. Furthermore larger firms are much more likely to be 
scrutinised by stock markets which have dictated a focused strategy over much of the 1990s 
and have mostly encouraged outsourcing of activities. Furthermore large firms are likely to 
suffer from span of control problems. Because they already have many different activities and 
large numbers of people to manage, outsourcing will provide a kind of instant relief. All these 
arguments make it quite likely that the positive relation between outsourcing and market share 
found here is partly due to reversed causality. 
 Finally, there is an intriguing notion in the possibility of a trade-off between several 
types of performance. It could be that through outsourcing firms trade financial returns for 
market share. By giving up some internal activities they lower profitability, but can spur 
growth. This might be a strategy to obtain dominance in the marketplace in the longer run, 
which could then be translated back into profitability through monopoly power. Thus firms 
would be increasing horizontal dominance by lowering vertical integration. This is in fact what 
some of the proponents of outsourcing suggest (Quinn, 1999), although their arguments 
usually run through profitability and increased focus on competencies and not through market 
share. However, if this is really what firms in this sample are trying to do, then the 
effectiveness of such a strategy is doubtful at the very least. The costs incurred by sourcing 
externally are huge while the benefits in terms of gaining market share are quite marginal and 
in fact these benefits even disappear almost completely if one accounts for multiple 
moderating or interaction effects such as R & D and uncertainty. Firms that follow such a 
strategy appear to be making quite substantial investments in terms of lower profitability to 
obtain relatively small gains in market share. A much more effective way of increasing market 
share appears to be to improve a firm’s productivity. Like with the economic performance 
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regressions, it turned out that industry level interactions (such as product life cycle 
explanations) did not alter the direction of the main effect. 
 
Several other variables interact with the external sourcing – performance relation. Evidence 
was found that it is not good for a firm’s profitability to outsource under conditions of high 
asset specificity, confirming hypothesis 7. This confirms expectations placed on the normative 
use of transaction cost economics by Masten (1993) but also predictions based on the 
resource based view (Barney, 1999) since it is difficult empirically in this analysis to 
disentangle asset specificity and the internal resource base. Essentially this implies that once 
firms have invested in productive capacity they are best off by deploying that productive 
capacity as much as possible instead of outsourcing, which would be equal to a divestment. 
This counters the popular notion in finance theory and stock markets, which suggests that the 
less a firm does internally, the more efficiently it uses its equity base. Furthermore it suggests 
that there are strong switching costs involved when moving from internal to external sourcing 
and even more so when moving from external sourcing to internal sourcing because the 
effectiveness of internal sourcing is dependent upon a certain threshold level of investments.  
Then there was evidence of hypothesis 8 for both profitability and market share. 
When firms face a lot of uncertainty, in terms of profitability fluctuating over time, they are 
better off by internalising activities. This confirms certain earlier views (Gilley & Rasheed, 
2000; Nishiguchi, 1994) and rejects or at least questions the importance of arguments by 
others (Semlinger, 1993). For several reasons it appears better not to outsource the uncertainty 
or risks a firm faces. First, as suggested before there are switching costs involved that may be 
difficult to recuperate. If an external supplier has to take over production, there will be set-up 
costs of production lines and also costs to do with quality control and so on. Furthermore 
terms will have to be negotiated, implying there will be new transaction costs with each switch 
between internal and external sourcing. And there may be a reputational mechanism at work 
here: firms that are known to outsource under good conditions and then terminate contracts 
when the market situation deteriorates may not be the most attractive customers. As 
Nishiguchi (1994) suggests the most respected buyers in Japan are those companies that co-
operate with suppliers through thick and thin. A lack of reputation in the marketplace could 
affect not only the willingness of suppliers to serve a certain customer but also quality and 
service levels attained when supplying that customer67. The high transaction costs attached to 
the use of external suppliers in case of uncertainty outweigh the potential benefits. Therefore 
the use of (small) suppliers as a flexibility reservoir that is reported by Semlinger (1993) and 
others may turn out not to be a very effective mechanism to increase performance although 
outsourcing obviously has a role to fulfil in countering short-term capacity needs. 
Hypothesis 9 was also confirmed in both the ROS and market share regressions, 
meaning that in industries that are highly R & D intensive, outsourcing is not a good 
mechanism to improve profitability. This confirms views on innovation forwarded by Murray 
et al (1995a) who base their argument on the seminal work of Buckley and Casson (1976). As 
firms develop a proprietary knowledge base they will seek to not only protect that from 
outside suppliers but also to exploit that knowledge base internally. Therefore outsourcing is 
not a good option under such conditions since technology will have to be transferred. This 
                                                           
67 A further example of this will be provided in a case study in chapter 6. 
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may not only be difficult to do given the tacit and idiosyncratic nature of certain knowledge 
but may also be undesirable. There is a potential counter argument to be made based on some 
of the theory that is used in the next chapter. There is an increasing trend towards developing 
shared knowledge with suppliers. In order to develop such shared knowledge it is necessary to 
open up the firm’s knowledge base to suppliers. Once knowledge would be shared, internal R 
& D spending would not be expected to be a negative moderator on the outsourcing - 
performance relation. It appears there are several empirical reasons why this argument is not 
valid in the context of this study. First, not very many manufacturing firms in the Netherlands 
have been able to innovate jointly with suppliers (NEVAT, 2000). Second, even in cases 
where joint innovation is existent it is often limited to a very small part of the supply base. 
Thus the extent of inter-organisational innovation is rather marginal in relation to R & D 
expenditures within the firm. Finally, the measure that was used in the analyses in this chapter 
does not include such inter-organisational innovation but is an industry level measure of R & 
D spending. This is a limitation in the sense that it does not allow for a distinction between 
intra-firm and inter-firm innovation.  
Hypothesis 10 was not only refuted but an opposite effect was found meaning that 
foreign firms are better off using outsourcing than are Dutch firms. Although this effect is 
only marginally significant at 6.5% for ROS and slightly less for market share it poses an 
interesting puzzle. Why are foreign firms better at managing external sourcing than are 
domestic firms? There might be several possible explanations that need further exploring in 
later chapters. For one, it could be the case that foreign firms are actually not better at 
managing external sourcing but much worse at managing internal sourcing. That is, they are 
unable to build up the internal capability base that local firms have constructed and therefore 
they are relatively better at using external sourcing. Since there is little evidence that foreign 
firms perform worse overall, this may not be such a viable option. A second option would be 
that foreign firms somehow have more productive relations with suppliers because they are 
more connected or embedded. This would suggest that international reputation and fame 
could be important factors in explaining the effectiveness of buyer-supplier relations. Chapter 
6 might shed more light on this view. Third, it could be that the local Dutch firms have 
become stuck in relationships with their existing suppliers that are no longer competitive. This 
would imply that foreign firms have a kind of newcomer advantage: they do not yet possess 
the history that local firms have, for the better and for the worse. Not being embedded gives 
them more room to operate flexibly in choosing and managing suppliers. Yet a fourth option, 
which complements this second option, would be that foreign firms are better able to exploit 
international sourcing to obtain competitive advantage. Their international sourcing network 
might enable them to pick the best sources all over the world, something domestic firms 
might not be able to do. This option will be explored further in chapter 7. For now it is 
difficult to provide a final answer to this question. 
 
 
Chapter summary 
Chapter 5 deals with the performance effects of outsourcing. It does so by using multiple 
regression analysis to test the hypotheses. The chapter draws upon two sources of data, the 
database and the survey. On the basis of the database it was established that external sourcing 
has increased significantly over the course of the 1990s in the Netherlands. The database 
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analyses further showed that there is a strongly negative relation between the extent of 
external sourcing and a firm’s return on sales figure. It seems outsourcing is not the 
profitability enhancing mechanism that some academics and many consultants portray it to be. 
Furthermore a moderately positive relation was found between external sourcing and market 
share. This effect, however, is not so stable across time and relatively small in size implying 
that outsourcing to increase market share is not a very efficient strategy. Other than these 
effects, there were several moderating and control variables that showed statistically significant 
effects as expected by the hypotheses. 
 
The analyses of the survey did not reveal such clear relations, as the problem with the 
independent (external sourcing) variable identified in chapter 4 caused contradictory and 
insignificant findings. Moreover the lack of variance in the dependent variable also implied 
that findings were not very strong. One important finding in the survey data, which confirmed 
the database analysis, was the positive relation between product innovation and firm 
performance. In the discussion section the findings were analysed. 
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Chapter 6: A behavioural view of supplier 
relations 
 
 
This chapter is concerned with supplier relations and how these can be employed by firms to 
obtain competitive advantage. It attempts to provide insights into how supplier relations 
influence competitive advantage of the firm by drawing mostly upon survey data. In the first 
section the focus will be on the analysis of economic performance of suppliers. In the second 
section, the focus will shift to strategic performance of suppliers. Section three summarises 
the findings of these first two sections. The fourth and final section of this chapter discusses 
the results from the earlier sections. Various elements of supplier relations will be discussed 
and linked to supplier performance empirically. In doing so this chapter draws on the 
theoretical model presented in figure 3 in chapter 3. Figure 1 briefly repeats the theoretical 
model that lies behind this chapter. 
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Figure 6.1: Overview of the voice relation model and its moderators. 
 
 
6.1 Economic performance 
Table 1 presents some descriptives of the variables from the survey. In chapter 4 some of 
these variables were already discussed as a part of establishing the scales. The key  var iab l e s  
in  th i s  s e c t i on  a r e  e c onomi c  p e r f o rmanc e  (ECONPERF) ,  s t ra t e g i c  p e r f o rmanc e  
(STRATPERF) ,  vo i c e  r e l a t i on s  (VOICE),  supp l i e r  power  (POWER),  buy e r  
d ep enden c e (BUYERDEP) ,  supp l i e r  d ep enden c e  (SUPPDEP) ,  t ru s t  (TRUST) and  
l o ya l t y  (LOYALTY).  The table shows several interesting outcomes. It appears that on the 
performance variables the appropriate variance has been attained. This means that 
performance outcomes vary among firms unlike the performance variables used in chapter 5. 
This should improve the effectiveness of later analyses in the sense that if there is more 
variance to explain, the analyses will reveal more effects. Also note that economic 
performance measures, with an average of 5.13 (25.64 over 5 measures) are substantially 
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higher than strategic performance measures at an average of 4.48 (13.44 over 3 measures). 
Given that these questions contain 7-point scales the ‘normal’ score would be 4. Obtaining 
economic supplier performance appears to be less problematic than strategic supplier 
performance.  
Furthermore it is interesting to note that in this sample sourcing firms admit to being 
more dependent on their suppliers for their purchasing volume than suppliers are dependent 
on the buyers for their sales volume. This does not counter the notion of sourcing firms 
always being larger than their suppliers, because the survey asked for the largest supplier but 
the buyer that completed the survey obviously need not be the largest buyer of that supplier. 
When further analysis was undertaken to look at the frequencies it appeared that a very 
substantial group of firms believed that suppliers were only around 0 to 20% dependent on 
them as a buyer. At the same time a substantial group of firms admitted to being over 30% 
dependent on their suppliers. The fact that 28 firms were unable to answer the question: ‘how 
dependent is your supplier on you’ is something that might introduce bias and could distort 
the analyses, which will be a point of further discussion. Something else that this table shows 
is that two firms actually have a relationship with their key supplier for around 100 years now, 
thus surviving several generations of management and several waves of integration and 
outsourcing. Obviously for this to occur special conditions are required like very high 
switching costs in the form of high transportation costs or specialised knowledge. 
 
Variable Measure for N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
DEFENDER No innovation strategy 200 1.00 .00 1.00 .045 .2078 
TOPMAN Top management 200 1.00 .00 1.00 .085 .2796 
REACTOR Low innovation strategy 200 1.00 .00 1.00 .140 .3479 
OTHERJOB Other job 200 1.00 .00 1.00 .175 .3809 
ANALYZER Medium innovation strategy 200 1.00 .00 1.00 .320 .4676 
PROSPECT High innovation strategy 200 1.00 .00 1.00 .495 .5012 
PURCHSPE Purchasing specialist 200 1.00 .00 1.00 .740 .4397 
RELGROWT Growth of relation 199 8.00 2.00 10.00 7.171 1.525 
LOYALTY Loyalty towards supplier 199 11.00 4.00 15.00 11.70 2.240 
VOICEREL Voice relation with supplier 200 11.00 4.00 15.00 11.71 2.275 
POWER Supplier power 198 17.00 3.00 20.00 12.40 3.583 
STRATPERF Strategic performance 191 15.00 5.00 20.00 13.44 3.079 
TRUST Trust in supplier 199 15.00 5.00 20.00 14.51 2.935 
BUYERDEP Dependence on buyer 172 94.99 .01 95.00 15.41 18.34 
RELLENGTH Lenth of relation 200 99.50 .50 100.00 15.87 13.84 
ECONPERF Economic performance 200 22.00 13.00 35.00 25.64 4.819 
SUPPLDEP Dependence on supplier 199 99.50 .50 100.00 32.06 25.13 
Table 6.1: Descriptives of the variables used in the analysis (key variables in bold)68. Table 4.37 
contains an overview of all variables. The listwise valid N = 165. 
 
                                                           
68 As discussed in chapter 4 there are sometimes multiple possibilities for the scales to be summated. For 
all the variables for which there were multiple possible scales the widest viable and theoretically most 
inclusive solution has now been chosen meaning the econperf measure shown here contains 5 items and 
not 4. This also concerns the measures for power, stratperf, loyalty and trust. When later analyses deviate 
from these wide measures, a remark will be made. 
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The next analysis that was performed concerned the bivariate correlations between variables. 
As before these correlations have been added to appendix C, table 5. Various strong 
correlations exist. Both  l ong - t e rm and  shor t - t e rm supp l i e r  p e r f o rmanc e  r e la t e  s t r ong l y  
po s i t i v e l y  t o  vo i c e ,  t ru s t ,  l o ya l t y ,  and  r e la t i ona l  g r owth . This provides a first indication 
that in order to have high supplier satisfaction voice, trust and loyalty must be present in some 
form. As expected there are also positive correlations among voice, trust and loyalty. These 
seem to be mechanisms that reinforce each other. Power relates negatively to both 
performance measures, which also seems to confirm the hypotheses in chapter 3. Relational 
growth is another measure that is positively connected to these measures indicating that 
relations that are improved over time perform better. Power is related negatively to these 
other measures, confirming it is a countervailing mechanism. Its working is opposite to that of 
the relation building mechanisms. Buyer and supplier dependence appear to be linked weakly 
to some other measures. Buyer dependence is related negatively to economic performance and 
positively to loyalty and relational growth. Supplier dependence is only related positively to 
relational growth, which appears at odds with some predictions. Finally it is interesting to note 
that the length of the relation appears to almost completely unconnected to all other 
measures, which would suggest that it does not matter much how long a buyer and supplier 
have been working together. All of these effects will be explored further in the regression 
analyses. 
 
Economic performance at the level of a supplier as it was defined in chapters 3 and 4, includes 
five elements. These five elements are measures of satisfaction with quality, costs, speed, 
responsiveness and reliability of deliveries. In this section the relation between the use of 
voice in a relation and these five economic supplier performance measures will be 
investigated. Again, as in chapter 5, mathematical representations of the model will precede 
the statistical analyses, which are based on the measures described in table 4.37. 
The basic model used for the analysis of economic performance includes firm size, 
industry level explanations, respondent characteristics, length of the relation, development of 
the relation over time and trust. Since the previous chapter showed that the best size measure 
available in the survey seems to be total purchasing, this variable is used. Given its exponential 
distribution a log purchasing was created. The basic model can be specified by the following 
equation: 
 
(1) ECONPERF = β0 + β1 * log purchasing + β2 * respexp + β3 * respjob + 
β4 * industry + β5 * rellength + β6 * reldevel + β7 * trust + ε 
 
Given that the problem with the large number of industries that was described in the previous 
chapter obviously resurfaced, the same threefold distinction between traditional, process and 
product based industries was again applied69. The basic model was tested in two separate 
                                                           
69 There is a difference with the previous chapter though. In the previous chapter the performance 
measures were related to industry competitors and therefore industry level effects on performance were 
quite minimal. In this chapter there is no predefined relation between industry and performance. 
Therefore larger effects of industry on performance may be expected and indeed are found throughout 
the chapter. Using all industry dummies would statistically be a preferable solution to using the three 
measures described above. However, since the number of variables needs to be limited, this is simply not 
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steps. The first model in table 2 tests whether respondent, firm and industry characteristics 
combine for a stronger model than nothing at all. The answer to this question is that this is 
marginally so. In particular the experience of the respondent and whether the respondent is a 
purchasing specialist influence economic performance positively. It is also noteworthy that 
firms in the ‘product’ industry report lower performance. However, overall this is not such a 
strong model. As the model is extended to include relationship level variables, this picture 
changes completely. In particular, the addition of trust strongly increases the explanatory value 
of the model. Trust is positively related to economic performance. The effects of being a 
purchasing specialist and the product industry are strengthened while the effect of respondent 
experience is weakened. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  6.134 .000  3.285 .001 
TOPMAN .060 .731 .466 .078 1.151 .251 
PURCHSPE .148 1.769 .079 .147 2.115 .036 
RESPEXP .098 1.364 .174 .049 .821 .413 
PRODINDU -.121 -.990 .323 -.126 -1.254 .211 
PROCINDU .054 .439 .661 .035 .353 .725 
LOGPUR -.053 -.758 .450 -.044 -.752 .453 
TRUST    .541 8.276 .000 
RELGROWT    .064 .968 .334 
RELLENGTH    -.045 -.769 .443 
 F-test: 2.183 .046 F-test: 13.217 .000 
 R2: .064 R2: .389 
 Adj. R2: .035 Adj. R2: .359 
Table 6.2: basic model for explaining economic  
performance of supplier relations. N = 199 / 197. 
 
This model is then extended to include the key independent variable, voice relations. The 
following model is applied: 
 
(2) ECONPERF = β0 + β1 * log purchasing + β2 * respexp + β3 * respjob + 
β4 * industry + β5 * rellength + β6 * reldevel + β7 * trust + β8 * voicerel + ε 
 
Table 3 contains the results of this model. It shows that voice relations are strongly positively 
related to economic performance. The model improves with the inclusion of voice relations as 
an explanatory variable. Furthermore all previous relations hold and become stronger. As in 
the previous chapter an effort was undertaken to improve the model. This resulted in the 
second model in table 3. After this point it was no longer possible to improve the model 
further. As expected some variables are removed from the model. Voice and trust are the 
most important predictors of economic performance. Furthermore it is interesting to note 
that being in the product industry quite strongly negatively influences the economic supplier 
                                                                                                                                                    
possible. Including all industry dummies alone implies more than 20 variables to start with. Furthermore 
adding more industry variables contributes less to explanatory value than adding other variables that are 
related directly to the buyer-supplier relation.  
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satisfaction. Finally, top managers and especially purchasing specialists are far more positive 
about economic supplier performance. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  2.847 .005  3.020 .003 
TOPMAN .105 1.628 .105 .107 1.687 .093 
PURCHSPE .152 2.302 .022 .157 2.451 .015 
RESPEXP .014 .251 .802    
PRODINDU -.125 -1.314 .190 -.172 -3.053 .003 
PROCINDU .059 .617 .538    
LOGPUR -.053 -.956 .340 -.049 -.909 .365 
TRUST .364 4.980 .000 .332 4.827 .000 
RELGROWT .016 .256 .798    
RELLENGTH -.060 -1.069 .286 -.059 -1.067 .287 
VOICEREL .329 4.601 .000 .332 4.827 .000 
 F-test: 15.295 .000 F-test: 22.245 .000 
 R2: .451 R2: .450 
 Adj. R2: .422 Adj. R2: .430 
Table 6.3: basic model for explaining economic performance  
of supplier relations including voice relations. N = 197 / 198. 
 
Given that the main theoretical effect has now been investigated, it is interesting to look at the 
hypothesised interaction effects. Like in chapter 5 the model is expanded to include 
moderating variables. It then takes on the following general shape: 
 
(3) ECONPERF = β0 + β1 * log purchasing + β2 * respexp + β3 * respjob + 
β4 * industry + β5 * rellength + β6 * reldevel + β7 * trust + β8 * voicerel + β9 * 
moderator + β10 * voicerel * moderator + ε 
 
The interaction effects that were calculated once again confirmed what was seen in the 
previous chapter: correlations between the moderating variable and the interaction effect are 
quite high. Table 6 in appendix C provides the correlations between various variables. Thus 
mul t i c o l l in ear i t y  p rob l ems  are again to be expected and indeed appeared when the 
moderating variables, voice relations and interactions were tested in the same model70. Thus, 
as in chapter 5 the analyses of moderators and interactions were separated and will be shown 
in two different tables. 
 Table 4 shows the model incorporating moderating variables but no interactions. In 
this model loyalty is positively related to economic performance, while power and dependence 
of the supplier on the buyer are negatively related. Also note that the product industry does 
not have a negative significant impact anymore. Instead the process industry dummy has taken 
on a positive significant impact. The earlier positive relation between trust, voice and being a 
purchasing specialist and economic performance still holds. The second model in this table is 
an optimised form of the first model that is in fact little different from this first model. 
 
                                                           
70 In these analyses tolerance values dropped to as low as 0.04. 
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 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  1.562 .120  2.773 .006 
TOPMAN .083 1.233 .219 .083 1.245 .215 
PURCHSPE .171 2.457 .015 .154 2.310 .022 
RESPEXP .001 .009 .993    
PRODINDU -.005 -.047 .963    
PROCINDU .186 1.824 .070 .184 3.176 .002 
LOGPUR .007 .114 .909    
TRUST .300 3.937 .000 .278 3.730 .000 
RELGROWT .080 1.219 .225 .083 1.280 .202 
RELLENGTH -.076 -1.293 .198 -.071 -1.242 .216 
VOICEREL .243 3.119 .002 .265 3.530 .001 
LOYALTY .182 2.728 .007 .172 2.699 .008 
POWER -.145 -2.419 .017 -.141 -2.442 .016 
BUYERDEP -.176 -2.819 .005 -.172 -2.928 .004 
SUPPLDEP -.062 -1.007 .315    
 F-test: 11.824 .000 F-test: 16.536 .000 
 R2: .516 R2: .508 
 Adj. R2: .473 Adj. R2: .478 
Table 6.4: extended model for explaining economic performance of supplier  
relations including voice relations and moderating variables. N = 170 / 17171. 
 
 St. β  t-value Sig. St. β  t-value Sig. St. β  t-value Sig. St. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  2.452 .015  2.897 .004  1.382 .169  2.873 .005 
TOPMAN .108 1.694 .092 .108 1.705 .090 .085 1.221 .224 .105 1.622 .107 
PURCHSPE .165 2.500 .013 .151 2.324 .021 .147 2.065 .041 .152 2.285 .023 
RESPEXP .008 .142 .887 .031 .540 .590 -.031 -.516 .606 .021 .374 .709 
PRODINDU -.099 -1.038 .300 -.108 -1.147 .253 -.042 -.395 .693 -.142 -1.485 .139 
PROCINDU .076 .806 .421 .060 .647 .518 .151 1.442 .151 .071 .740 .460 
LOGPUR -.030 -.547 .585 -.054 -.980 .329 -.002 -.033 .974 -.056 -.998 .320 
TRUST .346 4.745 .000 .335 4.629 .000 .353 4.604 .000 .357 4.782 .000 
RELGROWT .037 .572 .568 .028 .459 .647 .057 .857 .393 .028 .439 .661 
RELLENGTH -.053 -.942 .347 -.053 -.956 .341 -.070 -1.163 .246 -.072 -1.261 .209 
VOICEREL .408 5.215 .000 .178 1.677 .095 .356 4.741 .000 .347 4.774 .000 
VOICEREL X 
POWER 
-.150 -2.319 .022          
VOICEREL X 
LOYALTY 
   .205 1.936 .054       
VOICEREL X 
BUYERDEP 
      -.150 -2.362 .019    
VOICEREL X 
SUPPDEP 
         -.068 -1.107 .270 
 F-test: 14.602 .000 F-test: 15.216 .000 F-test: 13.043 .000 F-test: 13.789 .000 
 R2: .466 R2: .476 R2: .476 R2: .452 
 Adj. R2: .434 Adj. R2: .445 Adj. R2: .439 Adj. R2: .419 
                                                           
71 With the inclusion of the buyer dependence variable just over 25 cases are lost. Analyses revealed that 
this does not change the model, although it does lower the level of significance of several relations. This 
confirms that missing values are not a serious problem in later analyses. 
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Table 6.5: hierarchical regression models for explaining economic performance of supplier 
relations including voice relations and various interaction effects. N = 196 / 196 / 170 / 196. 
 
In table 5, various i n t e ra c t i on  e f f e c t s  of voice relations and moderating variables are 
described. As expected, the interaction with power shows a negative pattern. Also, the 
interaction effect with loyalty is positive, as hypothesised, although this effect is only 
marginally significant. Since the significance of voice relations also decreases quite a bit there 
is reason to believe these variables have some overlap with each other. However, this overlap 
is not so big as to create problems of multicollinearity. As expected the interaction with buyer 
dependence, the dependence of suppliers on a buyer, also contributes negatively to 
performance. Finally, the supplier dependence interaction was negative but was not found to 
be significant. 
 
 
6.2 Strategic performance 
The  pr e v i ous  s e c t i on  p rov id ed  ampl e  e v id en c e  tha t  vo i c e  r e l a t i on s  mat t e r  i f  f i rms  w i sh  
t o  e s tab l i sh  h i gh  e c onomi c  supp l i e r  sa t i s f a c t i on  in  t e rms  o f  qua l i t y ,  c o s t s ,  r e l i ab i l i t y ,  
sp e ed  and  r e spons i v en e s s . The correlations table demonstrated that strategic performance 
and economic performance are positively related, which might lead one to conclude that 
similar results will be found in this section. But strategic performance measures scored lower 
average values, meaning firms are more satisfied with short term, economic supplier 
performance than with long term, strategic supplier performance. This could indicate other 
results may be be found in this section. The same models were used to assess that question. 
Thus first a model is assessed similar to equation 1. Results are provided in table 6. 
These results are again split into a model excluding supplier relation variables and a model 
including them. The basic model without supplier relations variables is not a very useful 
explanation for strategic supplier performance. All variables are insignificant, as is the model. 
However, once we include trust, relational growth, and length of the relation a better model 
emerges. As with economic performance, trust is a necessary condition to obtain strong 
performance. But unlike economic performance for obtaining strategic performance the 
relation must be improved over time. Again, relation length as such does not seem to matter. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  5.078 .000  1.974 .050 
TOPMAN .017 .193 .847 .039 .546 .586 
PURCHSPE .078 .886 .377 .079 1.074 .284 
RESPEXP .070 .935 .351 .007 .114 .909 
PRODINDU -.042 -.325 .745 -.069 -.650 .517 
PROCINDU -.080 -.620 .536 -.110 -1.039 .300 
LOGPUR -.056 -.745 .457 -.054 -.877 .381 
TRUST    .450 6.589 .000 
RELGROWT    .216 3.132 .002 
RELLENGTH    -.007 -.106 .916 
 F-test: .520 .793 F-test: 10.639 .000 
 R2: .017 R2: .348 
 Adj. R2: -.015 Adj. R2: .316 
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Table 6.6: basic model for explaining strategic  
performance of supplier relations. N = 190 / 18972. 
 
Table 7 displays the results of the analysis after including voice relations. This analysis runs 
parallel to equation 2. As with economic performance, voice relations are positively related, 
implying that having a voice-based relation, rather than an exit-based relation is beneficial for 
strategic supplier performance. Furthermore the results from previous analyses hold in this 
model. Attempts were undertaken to improve the model, resulting in the second model in 
table 7. This model is almost similar to the model on the left-hand side in terms of the effects 
of remaining variables, implying that other firm level and industry level characteristics barely 
play a role in explaining strategic supplier performance. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  1.384 .168  1.330 .185 
TOPMAN .051 .741 .460    
PURCHSPE .083 1.163 .247 .057 .984 .326 
RESPEXP -.022 -.362 .718    
PRODINDU -.074 -.724 .470    
PROCINDU -.105 -1.023 .308 -.051 -.855 .394 
LOGPUR -.054 -.898 .370 -.050 -.848 .398 
TRUST .300 3.851 .000 .301 3.909 .000 
RELGROWT .184 2.731 .007 .182 2.738 .007 
RELLENGTH -.012 -.202 .840    
VOICEREL .273 3.626 .000 .266 3.589 .000 
 F-test: 11.540 .000 F-test: 19.320 .000 
 R2: .393 R2: .389 
 Adj. R2: .359 Adj. R2: .369 
Table 6.7: basic model for explaining strategic performance  
of supplier relations including voice relations. N = 189 / 189. 
 
As before the model is now extended to include moderating variables and interaction effects. 
Including both of these categories of variables simultaneously will once again introduce 
problems of multicollinearity and thus they are estimated separately. The model including all 
moderating variables is shown in table 8. Loyalty has a strongly positive relation with strategic 
supplier performance. Interestingly, the inclusion of the loyalty variable tends to ‘eat away’ the 
effects of voice relations, implying that loyalty may be a very strong indicator of strategic 
performance that overshadows voice relations. In the optimised model, which is the second 
model presented in table 8, voice relations actually become insignificant, although this is partly 
related to the decreased sample size. The positive effects of trust, loyalty and relational growth 
                                                           
72 The number of firms in the strategic performance regressions is slightly lower than in the economic 
performance regressions. Several firms were unable to answer the question relating to network 
management by suppliers. However, these missing values do not seem to influence the outcomes. Also, 
as industry is again simplified into three categories, a check was performed whether this influences the 
outcomes significantly. While the R2 of the models including all industries rose to .12, adjusted R2 
remained at 0. Thus including these 20 dummies is in effect not better than using the simplified form. 
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are maintained in this second model. Also note that industry effects do not seem to play a 
large role here. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  1.363 .175  1.373 .172 
TOPMAN .054 .688 .492    
PURCHSPE .129 1.601 .112 -.054 -.812 .418 
RESPEXP -.032 -.466 .642    
PRODINDU -.046 -.377 .707    
PROCINDU -.034 -.287 .775    
LOGPUR -.060 -.863 .390 .098 1.478 .141 
TRUST .250 2.823 .005 .250 2.879 .005 
RELGROWT .179 2.361 .020 .179 2.410 .017 
RELLENGTH .004 .065 .949    
VOICEREL .154 1.729 .086 .142 1.650 .101 
LOYALTY .222 2.908 .004 .232 3.158 .002 
POWER -.082 -1.195 .234 -.085 -1.264 .208 
BUYERDEP -.049 -.678 .499 -.060 -.882 .379 
SUPPLDEP -.094 -1.311 .192 -.091 -1.362 .175 
 F-test: 6.533 .000 F-test: 10.350 .000 
 R2: .380 R2: .377 
 Adj. R2: .322 Adj. R2: .340 
Table 6.8: extended model for explaining strategic performance of supplier  
relations including voice relations and moderating variables. N = 164 / 16473. 
 
What are the effects of the interactions between voice relations and the moderating variables? 
In table 9 each of these effects is presented in four different models. The interactions with 
power, buyer dependence and supplier dependence do not yield significant outcomes. In each 
of these models the variables that were found to be important in previous analyses still hold. 
The interaction with loyalty is strongly positively significant, as hypothesised. In fact, this 
interaction completely erases the direct effects of voice relations, implying that with loyalty 
included the effects of voice are negligible. In this model there was no problem of 
multicollinearity so the interaction effect simply prevails over the direct effect. 
 
                                                           
73 Please note that the number of firms in these models drops significantly because both the buyer 
dependence and strategic performance variables have missing values. An analysis that was performed 
excluding buyer dependence generated a similar model though. The main difference was that voice 
relations would once again become significant at the 1.5% level. 
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 St. β  t-value Sig. St. β  t-value Sig. St. β  t-value Sig. St. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  1.320 .189  2.258 .025  1.615 .108  1.407 .161 
TOPMAN .055 .791 .430 .057 .842 .401 .052 .647 .518 .052 .739 .461 
PURCHSPE .096 1.355 .177 .094 1.353 .178 .101 1.237 .218 .083 1.152 .251 
RESPEXP -.034 -.566 .572 .008 .142 .888 -.072 -1.043 .299 -.016 -.254 .800 
PRODINDU -.058 -.566 .572 -.040 -.399 .691 -.083 -.671 .504 -.091 -.880 .380 
PROCINDU -.081 -.788 .432 -.086 -.859 .391 -.069 -.569 .570 -.096 -.935 .351 
LOGPUR -.051 -.851 .396 -.073 -1.255 .211 -.057 -.821 .413 -.057 -.946 .346 
TRUST .302 3.867 .000 .248 3.206 .002 .286 3.240 .001 .294 3.693 .000 
RELGROWT .196 2.891 .004 .166 2.513 .013 .156 2.024 .045 .196 2.871 .005 
RELLENGTH -.012 -.202 .840 -.012 -.197 .844 .010 .139 .890 -.023 -.367 .714 
VOICEREL .312 3.774 .000 -.002 -.015 .988 .250 2.937 .004 .288 3.757 .000 
VOICEREL X 
POWER 
-.088 -1.277 .203          
VOICEREL X 
LOYALTY 
   .367 3.321 .001       
VOICEREL X 
BUYERDEP 
      .016 .218 .828    
VOICEREL X 
SUPPDEP 
         -.060 -.915 .361 
 F-test: 10.883 .000 F-test: 12.084 .000 F-test: 7.026 .000 F-test: 10.354 .000 
 R2: .405 R2: .429 R2: .337 R2: .393 
 Adj. R2: .368 Adj. R2: .393 Adj. R2: .289 Adj. R2: .355 
Table 6.9: hierarchical regression models for explaining strategic performance of supplier 
relations including voice relations and various interaction effects. N = 189 / 188 / 164 / 188. 
 
 
6.3 Findings from the survey 
A wide range of models was attempted to look at the effect of voice relations and several 
moderators on supplier performance. The analyses of the survey seem to provide support for 
several hypotheses. Furthermore the quality of the data and the analyses appears to be 
appropriate. 
 
Few measurement or econometric problems 
There do not appear to be major measurement problems with variables in this part of the 
survey. A normal distribution of the dependent variables with substantial variance was 
achieved. This implies that it is possible to find effects of the independent variables on the 
dependent variables. Also, as noted in chapter 4, the Cronbach’s Alpha obtained on these 
performance measures is good to very good. The measurement of the key independent 
variable, voice was also satisfactory in terms of reliability and validity as well as the variance 
obtained on this variable. 
With regards to the other variables no evidence was found that excluding items 
would improve the variables. In fact a whole series of models were run to test different 
measures, for example trust including 3 and trust including 4 items. All of these analyses 
pointed out that the directions of relations did not change and that including the largest 
possible number of items led to improvements in the strength of the relations. Thus the 
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dilemma posed in chapter 4 between optimising Cronbach’s Alpha and having a theoretically 
most appropriate variable was invariably solved by choosing the theoretically most appropriate 
variable. Since this is in most cases a matter of choosing between rather marginal Alpha 
improvements of around 0.01 and dropping a substantial part of the theoretical foundation of 
the study this amounts to a rather simple choice in the end. Achieving minor statistical 
improvements is somewhat useful. Having to lower one’s theoretical impact is quite dramatic. 
Perhaps the best illustration is in the economic supplier performance variable. Here there are 
two alternatives. There is a scale including cost of the product with an Alpha of .8314 and 
there is a scale excluding cost of the product where the Alpha value is .8450. Obviously 
reaching a 0.85 value on a scale is quite nice. However, the increase of the value will be only 
0.0136 and the Alpha value without this item is 0.83, which is a very decent value by all 
means. Looking at the theoretical change that occurs as a result of this operation we see a 
quite fundamental shift. What practitioner or scholar of management would be willing to 
suggest that the cost price of products plays no role in determining how well a supplier 
performs? Thus making the choice between excluding or including this item in the scale is 
really rather obvious in the end. 
 
Some additional evidence was gathered to conclude that there do not appear to be 
econometric problems with any of the regressions used: 
 
• The dependent variables are more or less normally distributed 
• Inspection of residuals from the analysis did not reveal major departures from 
normality. 
• Visual inspection of partial plots of the dependent variable and the key 
independent variables did not reveal heteroskedasticity. 
• Durbin-Watson tests produced figures close to 2, meaning no serial correlation 
(autocorrelation) is found among the residuals. 
• None of the independent variables in the models presented here have tolerances 
that approach 0; implying multicollinearity is not a problem in the models 
presented. 
 
Support for several hypotheses 
There was strong support for hypothesis 3b as well as hypothesis 4: voice relations positively 
influence both economic (3b) and strategic (4) supplier performance. Hypothesis 3a was 
rejected. Apparently firms need to co-operate closely with their key supplier not only to 
achieve long term goals but also to achieve desired quality, cost, speed, reliability and 
responsiveness levels. Furthermore there was support for several moderating hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 11 of a moderating effect of loyalty was supported for both economic and 
strategic performance. In the case of strategic performance the loyalty effect was even larger 
than the voice effect. Hypothesis 12 of buyer dependence being a negative moderator was 
accepted for economic performance. For hypothesis 13, supplier dependence being a positive 
moderator, no significant evidence was found. Finally, for hypothesis 14, firm power being a 
negative moderator, evidence was found for economic performance but not for strategic 
performance. 
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 Economic performance Strategic performance 
Independent 
variable 
• Strongly positive relation • Strongly positive relation 
Moderators • Power: strongly negative interaction effect 
• Loyalty: moderately positive effect 
• Buyer dependence: moderately negative 
interaction effect 
• Loyalty: strongly positive 
interaction effect that negates the 
effects of voice 
Other effects • Trust is strongly positively related 
• Loyalty is positively related 
• Power is negatively related 
• Buyer dependence is negatively related 
• Product industry is negatively related and 
process industry is positively related 
• Purchasing specialist is positively related 
• Trust is strongly positively 
related 
• Improvement of the relation 
over time is strongly positively 
related 
• Loyalty is strongly positively 
related 
Table 6.10: Summary of significant findings on supplier performance from the survey. 
 
 
6.4 Discussion 
Voice relations positively influence supplier performance. In itself this is not a particularly new 
finding. What makes it interesting is that both short-term and long-term effects of voice were 
tested along with several moderating effects. These moderators will be discussed later. First 
the main finding will be discussed. Voice relations essentially imply that a buyer and supplier 
engage in communication to solve problems. The fact that this is more effective at achieving 
joint innovation, learning and network effects than exit relations, where there is a constant 
threat of disengagement, appears obvious. Under conditions of low commitment and lack of 
co-operation, it will be very hard to achieve these goals. Certain preconditions are necessary 
for relations to be effective in the long run. If there is no ongoing communication within the 
relation it will be impossible to exchange the information needed to achieve joint innovation. 
Furthermore such innovation or creation of capabilities between firms will be difficult under 
conditions of adversity. If there is a constant threat of exit, where one or both parties might 
leave the relationship this will discourage joint work at all levels. Voic e  i s  n e ed ed  f o r  l ong  
t e rm supp l i e r  p e r f o rmanc e . This finding confirms mostly everything what has been written 
on inter-organisational relations in general and buyer-supplier relations in particular.  
However, what is perhaps somewhat surprising is that vo i c e  r e l a t i on s  a r e  a l s o  
n e ed ed  t o  ob ta in  d e s i r ed  e c onomi c  p e r f o rmanc e  l e v e l s . Adherents of the market model 
might tend to believe that more or less objective qualities like price, quality, speed, reliability 
and responsiveness could best be generated by arm’s length relations that allow buying firms 
to simply negotiate terms. Firms that desire voice relations will need to make investments up 
front that might be difficult to recoup in the case of uncertainty. Therefore setting up such 
relations with an eye towards achieving short-term goals does not appear to be lucrative. 
Apparently such is not the case for manufacturing firms in this sample in the Netherlands. 
This research finding seems to confirm another view, which suggests that co-ordination 
among partners is crucial to obtain any sort of superior performance from supplier relations. 
It conforms to statements by Richardson (1972) and Simon (1991). They both argue that mos t  
marke t s  a r e  b e s t  s e en  a s  s e t s  o f  in t e rd ep enden t  a c t o r s . An atomistic view of markets, 
where each actor is a completely independent actor, is not warranted in practice (Simon, 
1991). This amounts to the same as arguing that in most situations a mix of authority and 
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price mechanisms is used (Hennart, 1993). Since this study focused on the largest suppliers in 
business-to-business markets it does not seem unreasonable to suspect voice or at least a 
minimum amount of voice to be necessary to achieve economic supplier performance. Exit 
may not be appropriate in such cases. In fact, under these conditions of few buyers and few 
suppliers that are convicted to work with each other opportunism seems an extremely limited 
strategy. Hence opportunism is less likely to occur under such circumstances. In the face of 
large reputation losses, in the market, loss of credibility and so forth both buyers and suppliers 
that want to end relations may be very willing to settle for a quiet ending to their relationship 
and not blow it up. Furthermore, there is a large literature in supply chain management (Van 
Weele, 2000), which suggests that in order to optimise supply chains in terms of measures of 
economic supplier performance it is necessary to co-operate across firm boundaries. This 
finding seems to confirm that view. 
 
The strongest moderating factor in the analyses was loyalty to the supplier. A positive direct 
effect and a positive moderating effect were found in analyses of both economic and strategic 
performance. Both effects were much stronger for strategic performance than for economic 
performance. The direct effect can be explained by looking at the effects of loyalty on the 
partner. If the supplier perceives the buyer to be loyal to the supplier, meaning the buyer’s 
willingness to stay with the supplier is high and the buyer will not tend to switch unless drastic 
changes occur in the relation, this will generate more commitment from the supplier as well. 
Both parties extend their time horizon from perhaps weeks or months to years to come. 
Given this extended time horizon the other party’s investments will be seen in a more positive 
and long-term light as well. 
 The predicted moderating effect of loyalty on the relation between voice and 
performance occurred as well. Thus if there is loyalty the voice mechanism becomes more 
effective, in line with what Hirschman (1970) predicted. If both parties know there is a 
commitment to sustain the relation, this makes the voice mechanism work better. A buyer and 
supplier might engage in a joint effort to improve the quality of a component. Because of the 
fact that a joint effort is undertaken (voice) the result of this quality improvement initiative is 
more likely to be positive. However, it the parties undertake a joint effort knowing that their 
current co-operation relation is robust (loyalty) the outcome is likely to be even more positive. 
This mechanism was witnessed for both economic and strategic performance with the 
difference being the magnitude of the effect. In the case of strategic performance the 
interaction effect between voice and loyalty is much stronger. It is in fact so strong that it 
overshadows the direct effect of voice. This needs some explaining. Without including the 
interaction with loyalty, voice is an important explanatory variable but when including this 
interaction it becomes insignificant. Apparently when trying to obtain strategic performance 
effects loyalty is so important that voice can not be effective without loyalty. In the case of 
strategic performance committing to a long-term relation is so important that it makes co-
operation a given. This seems to make sense since a long-term perspective is needed to 
develop these benefits and particularly to exploit these benefits. 
 
The moderating role of power in obtaining performance through voice is interesting. First a 
direct effect was found. The more power the supplier has over the buyer, the less satisfied a 
buyer is with that supplier’s economic performance. However, this relation was not confirmed 
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when analysing strategic performance. Thus it seems power  i s  a  u s e fu l  me chan i sm f o r  a  
supp l i e r  t o  r ed i s t r ibu t e  s ome  e c onomi c  r en t s  t owards  i t s e l f . When a supplier has power, it 
can simply negotiate better contract terms or alternatively when the supplier has limited power 
the buyer can do so. This again is a finding that confirms existing theory, as well as managerial 
and ordinary intuition. The fact that the moderating influence of power is not replicated for 
strategic performance is something more of a puzzle. Several possible explanations appear. It 
could be that th e  ab i l i t y  t o  appropr ia t e  th e s e  ‘ s t ra t e g i c  r en t s ’  i s  no t  a  fun c t i on  o f  
power  bu t  a  fun c t i on  o f  f i rm capab i l i t i e s  o r  abso rp t i v e  capa c i t y  (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). Often these rents appear in a very tacit form and are inseparable so it will be impossible 
to simply negotiate with the other partner and split the pie. So only the firms that are willing 
and capable to absorb learning, innovation, and network effects are able to capture these 
effects. Also th e  va lu e  o f  s t ra t e g i c  r en t s  i s  o f t en  no t  th e  same  t o  th e  par tn e r s  since they 
have very different interests. Unlike economic effects like price that have similar value for 
both partners, the strategic effects may consist of an innovation that is useful not only in this 
product to this buyer but to all the products the supplier makes or vice versa. Therefore there 
is an asymmetric value attached to the co-operation. This is related to the extent to which 
spillover can occur from one product to the other. 
Then there is also the expected negative interaction effect between voice and power 
for economic performance in accordance with hypothesis 14 but not for strategic 
performance. This implies the effectiveness of using a voice strategy decreases with the 
existence of power differentials in the relation. When a supplier is less powerful it will use 
voice to create added value. When it is more powerful there is no need for the supplier to 
engage in voice since it can appropriate enough rents from this relation through its power 
base. Consistent with the predictions the stronger party will feel less need to engage in co-
operative efforts since these are extra investments that are unnecessary to obtain the desired 
goals. For obtaining strategic performance this is again different. If power differences are used 
as the basis of appropriating strategic performance, it is unlikely to be obtained at all. 
Obtaining strategic performance requires a long-term commitment regardless of power 
differentials. 
 
Buyer dependence, the extent to which suppliers are dependent upon buyers, was the first of 
two dependence effects tested. Buyer dependence was seen as an incentive to commit 
resources to the relation thereby improving its performance. The effects of buyer dependence 
were only present in the case of economic performance both directly and through the 
interaction effect. With much buyer dependence the economic performance of the relation 
decreases, implying that i f  t h e  supp l i e r  i s  l a r g e l y  d ep enden t  on  th i s  s ing l e  buy e r  i t  do e s  
no t  p e r f o rm so  we l l .  Several causes for this effect are possible. The most plausible 
explanation is that there is a lack of incentives for the supplier to perform well, particularly in 
terms of objective, ‘hard’ measures such as price. If the supplier has been a major supplier to 
this firm for a long time, it may lack the necessary price incentives from the market that 
stimulate economic performance. Having a wider range of buyers also gives access to more 
performance improvement techniques. Furthermore the buyer may find it difficult to 
disengage from the relationship given the large dependence of the supplier on the buyer. If 
the buyer decides to stop buying from the supplier, it is quite likely that the supplier will be 
forced to cut part of its labour force or it might even go out of business entirely. Therefore 
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the buyer will be willing to accept a lower performance by the supplier without parting from 
it. The exit mechanism is not viable under these circumstances. This is why certain firms in 
some industries, such as the electronics industry, usually limit dependence on one buyer to 
around 30% as a rule of thumb (this was also one of the outcomes of the interviews, see 
Tecson, 1998). 
 As opposed to the hypothesis, the interaction effect between voice and buyer 
dependence was also negative for economic performance. For strategic performance no 
significant effect was found. This implies that under conditions of high buyer dependence the 
voice strategy will be less effective. As noted if there is high buyer dependence the exit 
mechanism is less likely to be used. Given a lack of exit possibilities, voice is not as effective 
as it could be. This is in fact one of the statements that Hirschman (1970) himself made 
concerning the effectiveness of voice. Again, it is most likely to involve economic 
performance because the market (through the exit option) will assert the most influence on 
directly and unambiguously measurable items like price, quality and speed. 
 
The fourth interaction effect concerns supplier dependence for which neither direct effects 
nor indirect effects were found. There does not appear to be any measurement error of this 
variable. Neither is it the case that the power of the supplier, which could be though of as a 
similar variable, captures all the effects of supplier dependence. Ther e  s imp l y  a r e  no  e f f e c t s  
r e l a t ed  t o  supp l i e r  d ep enden c e . What are possible reasons for this? First, suppliers might not 
know how important they are to their buyers74. If they do not know their importance, they 
can not effectuate it in their bargaining strategies. Second, supplier dependence as it was 
measured may contain two opposite effects. On the one hand high supplier dependence may 
give more bargaining power to suppliers, leading them to appropriate economic rents, which 
again leads to lower economic performance for the buyer. On the other hand high supplier 
dependence may also increase the buyer’s investments, leading to higher economic 
performance for the buyer. This would suggest that in future research two separate measures 
should be created, one looking at appropriation by the supplier and the other looking at 
investments by the buyer. Of course it could simply be the case that the hypothesis is refuted 
because it is wrong and there is no effect connected to supplier dependence. On the basis of 
the results presented here this is not an improbable scenario, though one that needs further 
exploring. 
 
Like voice, trust has a large role in explaining both economic and strategic performance. The 
more trust in the supplier, the likelier it is high supplier satisfaction is obtained. This confirms 
existing research, which shows that trust in the partner is a necessary precondition for high 
relationship performance. Without trust the partner’s actions will be viewed conspicuously 
and a negative atmosphere emerges that makes it hard to perform well. Trust was measured 
here by confidence in the partner’s actions in terms of fulfilling obligations, taking appropriate 
decisions and providing good deals as well as by harmony in the relationship. The measure of 
trust used here is best seen as a measure for relational trust as opposed to institutional or 
                                                           
74 To support this statement keep in mind that a substantial number of buyers in the survey did not 
know how important their purchases were to their suppliers. This may be the same with the suppliers. 
Conversations with people at NEVAT, the Dutch suppliers association, also lend support to this view, 
as NEVAT members are often unaware of their importance to buyers. 
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calculative trust (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). This is coherent with an understanding 
that relational trust is the most effective means of increasing performance of relations. 
Institutional trust can hardly be moulded by firms. Calculative trust is very important in the 
context of single transactions but loses much of its significance in the context of an ongoing 
relation. Both institutional trust and calculative trust are likely to exist in similar quantities 
among all of the relations investigated here. The degree of relational trust, however, obviously 
varies among relations. Trust is also an outcome of the number of previous co-operative 
efforts (Gulati, 1995). As relational trust increases, so do the possibilities for using the relation 
to obtain performance. Furthermore the effects of trust and voice are more or less 
independent statistically in the analyses, meaning they explain different parts of the variance in 
performance. While trust is best seen as a necessary precondition for an effective relation, 
voice is a mechanism created by the parties to improve the relation. 
Whether a relation has grown over time in terms of the nature of the relation and 
purchased volumes matters not to economic performance, but does matter to strategic 
performance. This provides more evidence that in order to obtain strategic performance firms 
must address a different set of things than when they wish to obtain economic performance. 
For obtaining economic performance it is necessary to have a solid base of trust and loyalty as 
well as a voice strategy. But apparently it is not necessary to constantly improve the 
relationship. If a firm is looking for long term benefits it needs to not only be committed for a 
longer period of time, but also to express that commitment over time by purchasing more and 
improving the relationship. In fact, an improved relationship may be a necessary consequence 
of the choice to engage in joint innovation or learning. Only by taking a relationship to the 
next level are parties able to achieve more abstract and more complicated goals. 
 The  l eng th  o f  th e  r e l a t i on  do e s  no t  mat t e r  t o  a s s e s s  p e r f o rmanc e . Perhaps this 
comes as something of a surprise, given that one would expect a buyer-supplier relation to last 
longer if its performance is higher. However, there are several plausible explanations for this 
finding. First, the fact that two parties have been together for a very long time may often 
reflect something other than satisfaction, namely lock-in. The two parties may be committed 
to one another because of a lack of plausible alternatives, high investments, corporate 
standards or a range of other reasons. In such cases, they may not be very satisfied with 
performance, yet unable to switch to another partner. Second, in a long relationship the 
incentives to renew and innovate may no longer exist. This is a common difficulty in 
relationship management: in the beginning both partners have a range of new ideas and 
initiatives but as the relationship lasts longer, this flow of ideas decreases. This can undermine 
performance as well. Third, the length of the relationship might matter, but not beyond a 
certain threshold level. For instance there may not be a difference in performance once a 
relationship is 2 years or older. This idea was explored in some analyses and graphical tests 
and what seems to be the case is that the top quartile performance scores are not obtained 
until after a 3 year period. After that period different performance scores appear quite 
unrelated to length of the relation. However, since only 13 firms admitted to a relationship of 
2 years or less, this is anecdotal evidence. At this point it is safest to say that this option can 
not be ruled out and may be a point of further research. 
Being in what is defined as the product industry, all firms assembling complex 
products like vehicles, machines, computer and electronics was found to be negatively related 
to economic performance while in the process industry, featuring food and beverages, 
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chemicals and others, there was a positive relation. This could be seen as a coincidence but 
there is also a plausible explanation for these effects. The process industries have seen much 
more standardisation of products. As a consequence supply chains tend to take on much more 
sharply defined conditions. In the chemicals industry, for example, the quality of deliveries is 
hardly an issue of concern anymore since suppliers work by pre-defined standards. Similarly it 
is easier in process industries to come up with a constant supply of the product, making it 
easier to create reliable supply chains. If specifications change regularly and new components 
need to be engineered, as is for instance common in the machinery industry, creating a reliable 
supply chain may be more challenging. For strategic performance there was no significant 
industry effect but here there are no clear reasons to believe that industries differ. Why would 
some industries not seek innovation or learning effects? 
Another finding was that being a purchasing specialist was positively related to rating 
economic supplier performance. This appears to be a case of perception bias. Sourcing 
specialists of course like to think of their key supplier as performing well. Thus by responding 
positively they are defending their own actions and ground. Interestingly enough, they are not 
defending their turf vertically, towards top management, but horizontally towards other 
functional areas of management. This can be concluded from the fact that top management 
was also connected to above average performance ratings, though not always significantly. 
Apparently those that are most closely responsible for supplier relations, also tend to judge 
these relations as doing well. This is a finding consistent with other survey research and 
proves that including the respondent’s job as a variable was useful. 
 
 
Chapter summary 
Chapter 6 deals with the influence of the design of buyer-supplier relations on the 
performance of these relations. It draws upon regression analyses of survey data and a case 
study. The exit – voice model is applied. Both expected and unexpected results emerged. As 
expected voice (partnership) strategies produce higher strategic supplier satisfaction rates. If 
firms co-operate with their suppliers more joint innovation and competence building and 
network effects emerge. However, for economic performance measures, which include the 
delivery attributes of costs, reliability, speed, quality, and service levels, voice emerged as the 
superior strategy as well. This implies firms also need to co-operate intensely to obtain 
effective, low cost supply chains. The market mode of sourcing is not a sufficient means to 
obtain such benefits. 
 
Four moderating effects on the relation between voice and performance were investigated. 
Being loyal to the supplier had a direct and interaction effect for both economic and strategic 
performance. For economic performance these effects were moderate, suggesting loyalty is 
helpful but perhaps not strictly necessary. For strategic performance the effect was very 
strong, in fact it even overshadowed the effect of voice. Hence loyalty is a crucial 
characteristic of buyer-supplier relations that are successful in the long run. Power of suppliers 
had a negative direct and interaction effect on economic performance, implying that the more 
powerful suppliers are vis-à-vis buyers, the more they are able to extract economic rents from 
the relation. For strategic supplier performance this effect does not exist, which means that 
asymmetric value and the diffuse nature of these rents prevent a bargaining game from 
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occurring. The extent to which the supplier is dependent on the buyer had an economic 
performance effect similar to power, suggesting that supplier that are overly dependent on 
buyers also lose out in such bargaining games. For dependence of the buyer on the supplier 
no effects were found75. 
 
                                                           
75 At this point the reader is referred to Append ix  D  for an excursion into the role of the Internet in 
sourcing. While this section was originally a part of this chapter, it is best seen as a separate element of 
this study, since it deviates from the leading research question. Paul Matthyssens and Masaaki Kotabe are 
recognised for pointing this out in comments on a previous version. 
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Chapter 7: Glob,region,locall sourcing 
 
 
This chapter deals with the process of internationalisation in sourcing76. Global outsourcing of 
entire components or subunits is a relatively new phenomenon. In order to illustrate the 
benefits of global sourcing as well as its challenges, it is useful to look at a practical example of 
global sourcing. In the first section a case study of Ford’s world car project is presented as a 
practical illustration of global sourcing and its performance consequences. The second section 
deals with the consequences of internationalisation of the supply base on firm performance 
based on survey data. The third section focuses more narrowly on the performance 
consequences of having a largest supplier that is located abroad, based on the survey as well. 
The fourth and final section will discuss the findings. Figure 1 below recaptures the model 
that was first presented in figure 4.3. 
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Figure 7.1: overview of the international sourcing model and its moderators 
 
 
7.1 Global sourcing in practice: Ford Mondeo77 
Given the general lack of knowledge of international sourcing activities described in chapters 
1 through 3, it is useful to supplement quantitative methods by a more qualitative analysis. A 
case study of Ford Motor Company serves this purpose well. This case study is based entirely 
on secondary materials. 
 
Background  
This case deals with the Ford Mondeo78, a car introduced by Ford in 1993 as a ‘world car’. Ford 
Motor Company barely needs any introduction. It is of course known as one of the world’s 
                                                           
76 Please note that the focus of this chapter is on global external sourcing, that is global sourcing from 
external suppliers and not internal production across borders. 
77 A full version of this case study has recently been published elsewhere (Mol, in print). 
78 The Mondeo was the European version of the car. The North American names are Mystique and 
Contour. Because the Mondeo was built in the largest quantities, produced and sold earlier, it is generally 
referred to as ‘the world car’ by the business press but also by Ford itself. In the remainder of the text 
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premier manufacturers of automobiles. Its cars have been sold all over the world for many 
decades now. A world car is a single car that is sold in different parts of the world, although 
slight variations may be made to the model. Three key issues will be illustrated. 
The first issue deals with the advan tag e s  o f  g o ing  g l oba l  with its Mondeo for Ford and 
the barriers it faced by doing so. Obviously Ford must have thought there were important 
advantages attached to producing the first ever world car. These globalisation advantages will 
be discussed in the case in order to get an idea of the strategic motives behind this decision. 
On the other hand the automobile industry has always faced local constraints, for example in 
terms of traffic rules, that needed to be overcome. Therefore a delicate balance needs to be 
found and maintained between going global and operating locally. What kind of managerial 
challenge did Ford face here? 
The second issue is whether new IT  was the key enabler in establishing this global 
production and supply structure. A world car poses new and possibly very different demands 
upon the organisation and technology in use by Ford. Even if the parts going into a world car 
and the production technology are essentially the same with an ordinary car, a new logistics 
and communication structure is required to produce the car. From an IT perspective it is 
especially interesting whether it was the new technology that helped Ford to produce globally 
or other factors. It has often been suggested that IT is one of the key drivers of the process of 
globalisation. Does the Mondeo case confirm this?  
Finally there is a question about the su c c e s s  o f  th e  ca r  in  t e rms  o f  f i rm pe r f o rmanc e . 
Some hailed it as the new ‘model T’ but is it that successful? Ford attained much of its fame 
and present status from the highly successful model T, a car produced at a very large scale at 
the beginning of the previous century. The model T helped Ford to become by far the largest 
automobile assembler of the world at the time until its demise in the late 1920s caused a 
severe disruption to the Ford Motor Company. The world car concept inherent to the 
Mondeo presented a new mass scale production innovation. Was the performance of the 
Mondeo good enough to call it Ford’s new model T? 
 
Ford has always been one of the world’s largest and most international manufacturers of cars. 
It was founded in 1903 and first produced abroad in 1904 in Canada and started 
intercontinental expansion in 1911 in Manchester, England. Chandler (1964) gives a very 
detailed description of its early history. Ford differentiated itself from its competitors in 1908 
through the unique manufacturing strategy implemented by its legendary founder, Henry 
Ford. Ford decided that economies of scale and a low cost product would be the key to 
competitive advantage. Therefore Ford built only one model, the model T, from 1908 
onwards and attempted to do this in mass scale, low cost production. The reason Henry Ford 
chose the model T from his range of designs was that it was most suitable for mass 
production. The product was fully standardised. One of the innovations Ford introduced was 
the moving conveyor belt. Demand for the T-Ford grew rapidly, sparked by the low prices 
and economic growth in the United States. Ford expanded its number of assembly sites across 
the United States. In 1921 Ford’s model T sold 845,000 units for a U.S. market share of 55%. 
Ford became a huge industrial corporation over the period, in part because it also integrated 
                                                                                                                                                    
the name Mondeo will be used to designate the entire world car project (including the North American 
models). 
Glob,region,locall sourcing 
 157
backward by acquiring coal mines, railways and steel mills. However, the model T’s success in 
the end also proved to be its demise. Demand fell steeply after 1921 and in particular during 
1926 en 1927 due to the lesser economic situation and increasing substitution by second hand 
cars. Ironically the second hand market was flooded by Ford’s own T model. Those 
consumers that bought new cars were no longer interested in the simple T-Ford model. With 
these lower volumes Ford was no longer able to maintain its low costs. This initiated a long 
rebuilding period for the Ford company, which saw its eternal rival General Motors evolve 
into the world’s largest car manufacturer, which it would remain until the present day. GM’s 
Alfred Sloan introduced a number of managerial innovations like the divisional M-form 
(Chandler, 1964) that provided GM with the ability to produce multiple models and to 
reconfigure its organisation more effectively. 
 
A wor ld  ca r  
In more recent history Ford initiated a new model, which was also seen to be a breakthrough 
model. Some observers, though not Ford itself, have likened it to the T-Ford. When Ford 
Motor Company in 1992 publicly launched its plans to produce a world car this was already its 
third attempt to do so. The idea behind a world car, sometimes also referred to as a global car, 
is that one design fits all. More particularly, the efforts by Ford have been aimed at building a 
car that can at least be mass-sold in both Europe and the United States, by far the largest 
markets for Ford. The very first attempt by the company to build one single platform that 
could be sold in different markets all over the globe without major modifications even dates 
back to 1960 (Kitchen, 1993). This was of course a time when the word globalisation had not 
entered management vocabulary and most car producers were still mainly oriented towards 
their domestic markets. The project proved not very successful: some 60 days before 
production was to be started, the U.S. version was cancelled. The reason was that although the 
car was innovative, being a front wheel drive economy car, it would also be more expensive to 
produce than existing larger models. A second try came in 1981 when Ford tried to sell the 
same Escort model all over the world (Kitchen, 1993). This time a much larger effort was 
undertaken to design a single model for both markets. Although the Escort in itself proved to 
be a marketing success, it had little to do with a world car in the end: only two minor parts 
were identical in the European and North American versions. These two parts were the water 
pump seal and the Ford oval badge, by the way. This time the main reason was that two 
distinct development teams had operated simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic. Each 
group posed its own idiosyncratic demands. The Ford organisation was still not ready at the 
time, so it seemed. 
 
Under what circumstances did the Ford Mondeo come onto the market? Ford was still a fairly 
large firm, which was present in all key markets. Especially in Europe and North America, it 
had established a broad presence and attained a lot of market share. Ford even was the 
European market leader in 1984, but slipped back into fifth place around 1992, just before the 
introduction of Mondeo. More recently, after the introduction of the Mondeo, Ford has 
grown through acquisitions. In Europe, the purchase of Volvo in the late 1990s is the most 
obvious example. Over the last two decades Ford also started to invest on a larger scale in 
Asia. It did so mainly through agreements with Mazda of Japan and Kia of South Korea. In 
April 1996 Ford even obtained effective control over Mazda. One problem related to both 
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Mazda and Kia though, was that they were both relatively weak players within their national 
systems. Kia came close to a bankruptcy in October 1997, after which the Korean 
government decided to nationalise the company. Mazda has widely been cited as a firm that 
lacks both scale and bargaining power to be an effective producer on its own. It stands only in 
fifth place in the ranking of automobile producers in Japan and came close to bankruptcy 
around 1980. Ford’s key financial data are contained in table 1. They show that Ford Motor 
Company has grown substantially over the last 25 years, which is in large part due to the 
external acquisitions and the addition of rental and financial services like Hertz. 
 
 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
Sales  North America 
(thousands of units)  
3,072 2,457 3,237 3,284 3,993 4,787 
Sales rest of world 
(thousands of units) 
1,618 1,969 2,397 2,588 2,613 2,433 
Total sales 
(millions of US $) 
24,009 37,086 52,774 97,650 110,496 162,558 
Net income 
(millions of US $) 
323 - 1,543 2,515 99 4,139 7,237 
Total employees 
(numbers) 
416,120 426,735 369,300 370,400 346,990 364,550 
U.S. Employees 
(numbers) 
203,691 189,917 172,200 180,900 185,960 173,064 
Table 7.1: key data for Ford Motor Company, 1975-1999. Source: Ford Motor Company, 
annual reports 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 1999. Please note that accounting changes 
may have occurred over this period. Later years include more revenues and income from 
services. A net loss is signified by - (1980 only). Ford is currently divided in two sectors: 
automotive and (financial) services. In services key brand names are Hertz and Kwikfit. In 
automotive Ford not only owns the Ford brand, but also Volvo, Mazda, Lincoln, Land Rover, 
Jaguar, Aston Martin and Mercury. 
 
Case  d e s c r ip t i on  
After the 1960 and 1981 failures Ford started its third attempt to build a world car in 1986. 
Using the experience of what went wrong in 1981, European and American engineers started 
designing a new car, under the code name CDW27. Outside suppliers were involved in the 
project from 1989 onwards to develop specific components and modules of the car in a joint 
engineering effort. Three different brand names finally emerged, the Ford  Mondeo  for the 
European market and the Ford  Contour  and Mercury  Mys t ique  for the North American 
market. Of these cars, 90% of the elements were identical, although this is hard to see from 
the outside where the cars appear to be different. 
However, certain differences remained. Seat belts and air bags had to be adapted to 
the local markets. Since U.S. drivers do not always wear seat belts, their cars were provided 
with larger air bags. European drivers had a smaller, 30-liter air bag. Ford admitted that it had 
to cope with different supplier processes, which made it tough to achieve the desired 
component commonality. Furthermore local conditions and mandates forced a number of 
changes. Most of the problems arose when Ford had to re-engineer the Mondeo for the 
North American market and encountered U.S. federal standards and market conditions.  
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The stakes were high enough for Ford to make the success of this new car crucial. 
Some $ 6 billion were invested before it ever came into production, which is far more money 
than most competitors spend on a new model (the comparable Chrysler Neon cost only $ 1.3 
billion to develop, for example). Because of the radically new concept, it is sometimes referred 
to as a ‘new model T’, the car that brought Ford its original fame in the 1920s. In Europe, 
sales of the Mondeo started in 1993, the United States followed some 14 months later. The 
car was sold in some 76 countries all over the world, although most sales are obviously 
realised in the United States and Europe. 
 
Motives 
Why did Ford decide to try its luck a third time, despite the fact that nobody else in the car 
industry was building a world car? The answer provided by the company was a reference to its 
high degree of internationalisation, not just in terms of sales, but also in the spread of 
production sites and R&D knowledge. This led Ford to the conviction that it would be 
beneficial to consider a global approach instead of a multi-regional or multi-domestic 
approach. Mr. Philip Benton, Ford’s President until December 1992, suggested that “A global 
company can concentrate its resources where they will be used most effectively”. 
 So what advantages did this global structure provide the company with?  Economi e s  
o f  s ca l e  were believed to be the first and most important reason behind the world car project. 
These economies were not only to be obtained in the production of the different brands, but 
also in their design and the sourcing of components and parts from third parties. Being able to 
purchase double the quantities that a normal car model requires obviously gave Ford room for 
bargaining about prices. A second reason stems from the increased f l ex ib i l i t y  that Ford 
obtained. Both flexibility in purchasing and flexibility in production are thought to have 
grown. Ford can switch between locations (Europe and the U.S.) both for its own production 
as well as for sourcing components from suppliers. It would be easier to cover for delivery 
deficiencies on either side of the ocean too. Other reasons that were cited less often, include 
ach i e v ing  a  g l oba l  image  vis-à-vis customers, c r ea t ing  n ew knowl edg e  through a world-
wide network and a r ea c t i v e  approa ch  to the loss of market share in some markets. This last 
point raises an interesting question: Did Ford decide to build a world car out of a position of 
weakness, or one of strength? Although Ford was still clearly the number two manufacturer of 
cars in the world (after its eternal rival General Motors), Toyota was starting to catch up, as 
were others. Furthermore, Ford had experienced some pretty bad losses, especially in 1991 
when it lost almost $2.3 Billion. So the reactive strategy argument seems to have some ground 
as well, as Ford’s position was gradually slipping. Ford felt that it needed to do something new 
that could again give it a competitive edge over key rivals. Since Ford still had plenty of 
financial and technical resources available when it embarked on the world car project, it could 
afford to invest in such a large project. And Ford had the advantages of a strong presence in 
both the North American and European markets. Ford was strong but getting weaker. 
 
Internal organisation 
The Mondeo/Contour/Mystique was built on a project basis, where both the European and 
North American organisations contributed to the final product. From the earlier adventures 
with the Escort model, Ford had learned that real integration would be important. When the 
Escort was designed, two different design teams from Europe and the U.S. were working on it 
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simultaneously. As Mr. Benton put it “When there were opportunities to deviate from the 
shared engineering plan, both teams made the most of them, protecting their own turf and 
defending their own ideas about what constituted the ‘right’ product”. 
Ford’s factories in Europe are concentrated mainly in Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Belgium. The Ford world car was assembled in three different plants, in Genk (Belgium), 
Kansas City (Missouri, United States) and Cuatitlan (Mexico). The European plant initially 
produced some 400,000 units annually and the two North American plants some 300,000 in 
all. So it may well be concluded that there was an even spread between the two continents.
 Some key components in the car were sourced internally. At the beginning of the 
1990s some 50% of components in the automobile industry were sourced internally, but this 
percentage decreased rapidly. One example of intra-firm sourcing for the world car was the 
transmission. The manual transmissions were produced in Halewood in the United Kingdom, 
and Cologne in Germany. The automatic transmissions came from a Ford plant in Batavia, 
Ohio. This points to a form of regional specialisation in the sourcing network, since automatic 
transmissions are far more popular in the U.S. than in Europe with any new car model. Some 
9% of the European Mondeo cars were equipped with automatic transmissions, a figure that 
was still 3% above Ford’s expectations. 
 
Role of outside suppliers 
Outside suppliers fulfilled a key role in the project, since some $ 2.5 billion were spent 
annually by Ford on components and parts for the world car. Important issues arise on the 
nature of the sourcing network. First of all Ford tried to integrate the European and North 
American supply bases as much as possible. Mr. Albert Caspers, Ford of Europe’s chairman 
before the Ford 2000 program started in 1995, suggests: “The philosophy was to develop a 
part only once from one supplier in the world. This is the first project where we have done 
this”. One of the key strategies was to reduce the total number of suppliers severely. The 
Tempo and Topaz models that preceded the American version of the world car had over 700 
different suppliers. Ford was able to reduce this number to 227, using a world-wide supply 
office and early sourcing. The suppliers that participated were chosen through a global search. 
Ford itself used the term global-capable suppliers to illustrate its requirements. The suppliers 
were either chosen on their past performance or on a surrogate part. Mr. Dick Fite, who was 
the CDW27 supply director at the time, says: “The basic management challenge was to bring 
the two regional supply bases in North America and Europe together to find the best of all 
worlds in terms of technology, quality, cost, and logistic efficiency, so we could rationalize 
down to the fewest number of suppliers of best-of-class components on a worldwide scale”. 
One way of achieving this reduction that Ford used was the tiering of suppliers. At Ford in 
Basildon (U.K.), Alan Draper, exterior purchasing agent, said (back in 1993): “We have used 
tiering in areas like instrument panels for several years and are looking to extend the concept 
to other areas”. The suppliers were approached long in advance of actual production. Most of 
the contracts were agreed upon for a longer period of time. Many suppliers committed 
themselves to the project around 1989-1990. This allowed Ford enough time to discuss the 
car and its components extensively with the suppliers.  
 Just-In-Time is a central element of the production of the world car, although the 
intercontinental suppliers could, of course, not deliver JIT. For the other supplies, there was a 
great perseverance in pressing suppliers to set up plants in the proximity of Genk, in the case 
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of the European Mondeo. Ford itself did not hold any stock of components and parts in the 
plant as part of the JIT system. This is why many new sites were established within 30 km of 
Genk, delivering within the hour. They included Kautexwerke (gas tanks) and Lin Pac Ekco 
(interior front door trim panels), who both started production in Belgium, in the towns of 
Tessenderlo and Overpelt. A second group started production a little further away, such as 
Ryobi Aluminium Casting. The Japanese parent of this company was asked by Ford to 
produce transmission and clutch cases for the Mondeo. A new and successful plant was 
established in Carrickfergus, County Antrim, Northern Ireland. In 1994 it was heralded as the 
‘best factory in Northern Ireland’. A third track followed, was by suppliers that were already 
located near Genk. Rehau, from Rehau in Germany entered into a co-operative agreement 
with Arrow Molded Plastics of Circleville, Ohio. Together they developed interior scuff plates, 
which Rehau then produced for the Genk factory and Arrow for North American production. 
Finally, some European producers moved to North America to establish joint ventures there, 
as well as Americans coming over to Europe. 
 The ever-present cost issue played an important role in the sourcing network of 
Ford. Economies of scale were an important reason to develop a world car. Ford estimated 
that through the higher volumes, it was able to reduce the cost of supplies by $150 a car. Since 
some 700,000 cars were made annually, this saved the company up to $100 million a year. The 
following statement by Mr. Draper neatly illustrates the cost pressure that Ford puts on its 
suppliers: “we are asking our suppliers to absorb all future cost increases resulting from more 
expensive labour, materials, and overhead”. Thus these buyer-supplier relationships were not 
just co-operative, but contained elements of conflict too. 
 To what extent was this sourcing network international? It involved mainly suppliers 
that produce in North America and Europe, although some of these suppliers originated from 
Japan. Of the aforementioned $2.5 Billion, $140 Million involved exports from Europe to 
North America and $260 Million exports from North America to Europe. The North 
American share in the components of the European Mondeo was somewhere around 15%. 
This figure used to be in the range of 1-2% for older models, so this was a really remarkable 
change. This project also revealed some clear differences between supplier processes in Ford 
Europe and Ford North America, which created serious problems in the project: achieving 
maximum component commonality and quality were made much harder. On the other hand it 
also allowed Ford to gain insight in the peculiarities of the two parts of its organisation. These 
two different practices provided the firm with a possibility for learning. 
 
Information Technology 
The Mondeo project posed two different kinds of demands on Ford’s information systems. 
First there was a need for IT to support or replace existing manual labour in the design and 
engineering area. This is simply a requirement in all modern production, particularly 
production of automobiles. Because of the increased complexity of cars, the ever-increasing 
technical demands and cost pressures all carmakers have introduced IT in these processes. 
Second, Ford was looking at ways to rapidly exchange data between different parts of the 
world and to support long-distance communication between its employees and with its 
suppliers. This was specific to the world car project because it put demands on international 
information exchange that were not there in a regular European or North American project. 
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The global scale of production allowed Ford to reduce the number of times certain 
operations had to be performed. Two prime examples of IT of the first kind of IT application 
mentioned above are structure calculations and design improvements. Ford invested in 
networked computers for problem solving in the body structure design. To calculate the 
optimal body structure the finite element method is used nowadays. Basically the finite 
element method calculates what happens when pressure is put on small squares. Up to 70,000 
small squares combine to form the body structure of the car. In order to make such 
calculations Ford had to use a large and powerful computer. Therefore it bought a new Cray 
4MP super-computer during the Mondeo project, which was located at Ford’s headquarters in 
Dearborn, Michigan. This computer served both the European and U.S. versions and ran for 
almost a year to complete all calculations. Obviously, this kind of application completely relies 
on computers like the Cray 4MP. The design of the car poses other problems. Fritz Mayhew, 
chief of North American design of Ford suggested: “An internationalism has taken over in 
designs and products, making it much more possible to do a global car”. In order to do that, 
Ford’s engineering people had to rely on standardised programs like Computer Aided Design 
and Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM). In 1991 an international engineering team 
was installed in the Genk plant to prepare for the production launch of the Mondeo. This 
team exchanged data and pictures with other Ford engineering centres globally. CAD/CAM 
was the key tool used to reduce development times. 
 The second kind of IT application mentioned above does not deal with the technical 
capabilities of computers, but with the ability of IT to support communication processes over 
longer distances and to integrate geographically remote parts of the Ford organisation and its 
suppliers. During the Mondeo project Ford installed real-time multi-site simultaneous 
engineering and information transfer as well as a global e-mail system. Many up front 
investments in facilities were made by Ford to allow for supplier involvement in product 
development, supply and manufacturing. This included telecommunications and computer 
equipment. From the earlier adventures with the Escort model, Ford had learned that real 
integration would be important. To achieve such integration Ford relied more heavily than in 
the past on information technology, like a complex video conferencing system. Prior to the 
launch of Mondeo production video conferencing was already used in communications 
between Ford’s technical centres in Dunton, U.K. and Metternich, Germany. Later a 
transatlantic link was established. The video conferencing rooms Dunton are booked up to 16 
hours a day. John Oldfield, head of the world car program said about the transatlantic video 
link: “Without video conferencing, the amount of travelling involved and the time differences 
would make a project like CDW27 near impossible”. To make the global engineering project 
viable a world-wide communication infrastructure was needed particularly one that would 
allow for sufficient communication with external suppliers. However, not everything could be 
solved by long-distance communication. It was necessary for the project to physically move 
people. John Oldfield, the project leader, travelled back and forth across the ocean about once 
a month for six years. Throughout the project there were a minimum of 35 Americans 
working in the European organisation, mostly engineers, purchasing people and finance 
people. At one point the engineering team consisted of some 800 people. Ford flew hundreds 
of technicians back and forth across the ocean. Just before production started in Genk, Ford 
temporarily airlifted some 150 engineers from England and Germany to big, trailer-like mobile 
offices outside the Genk plant (at an estimated cost of $4 million to $6 million). Their goal 
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was troubleshooting and solving production problems. However, Ford believed it was getting 
more for its money than the three new models. This includes an improved global 
communications network. Alex Trotman suggested in 1994 that: “But our investment is in 
much more than hardware. We’ve been learning a new way of doing business for the long 
term. I have envisaged Ford with a global organisation since the late 1960s. It’s a natural 
evolution. Now is the right time for such a change. The tools are there – computers and 
communications – and we have a strong balance sheet. If you make big changes when times 
are difficult, expediency often takes precedence.” 
 
Analy s i s  
The advantages of going global were demonstrably there. Ford saved money by ordering 
larger supply quantities. Furthermore it could use the same internally produced parts, such as 
submissions, for the three cars on both sides of the Atlantic.  The case also shows that Ford  
has  s t rug g l ed  t o  f ind  th e  ba lan c e  b e twe en  g l oba l  in t e g ra t i on  and  l o ca l  a c t i v i t i e s .  While 
the benefits of going global appeared obvious to the firm’s managers, Ford was unable to 
avoid duplicating structures and adapting its cars to local demand. Local regulation was one 
reason for adapting the cars: North America and Europe obviously differ in some respects. 
Different consumer tastes also contributed to the adaptations. Europeans and North 
Americans sometimes tend to use their cars in different ways. For example parking space is 
limited in most of the (older) European cities and streets can be rather narrow. North 
Americans often drive longer distances, thus preferring cruise control. Many Europeans prefer 
manual transmissions because it fits their driving style better than an automatic transmission. 
Thus some of the barriers to going global could not be overcome by Ford. 
Was new IT the key enabler in establishing this global production and supply 
structure? From the case description two arguments stand out. One is that Ford could not 
have made the transition required for the world car without new means of information 
technology and communication technology. Second, these new technologies helped to 
overcome some of Ford’s problems, but failed to remove all of its concerns. It was still 
necessary to move around large numbers of people in order to deal with local production 
problems for example. Ford seems to have done a good job in integrating some of the 
technical functions involved in the project, particularly engineering and design. It is also 
obvious that most, if not all, of the sales efforts were localised. In fact, most consumers may 
not have noticed that they were buying a world car! As far as external suppliers are concerned, 
there is not much information on the use of IT. In historical perspective it seems that what 
occurred at Ford during the Mondeo project was a change of two kinds when compared with 
earlier experiences. First, there was information technology to allow for communication 
across borders, or perhaps we should say across oceans. Second, there was a conscious effort 
to have employees on both continents communicate with one another about the main design 
but also about all the details involved in getting the car produced. 
Was the performance of the world car project good enough to call this car a new 
model T? Ford itself reported to be quite satisfied with the results of the world car project. 
Sales of the Mondeo model in Europe were quite good from the beginning, 470,000 units 
over the first 15 months, and it was also chosen as the European car of the year in 1994 right 
after it was launched. It must be admitted that the first remake of the model came rather quick 
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though, in 1996. Table 2 provides the units sales of the Mondeo in Europe and its market 
share. 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
317,765 380,083 353,769 323,727 331,003 317,843 231,943 
10.1% 13.3% 13.0% 11.3% 10.8% 9.7% 7.4% 
Table 7.2: number of units sold by the original Mondeo model  
and its European market share in the medium-sized car segment. 
 
In the North American market the sales were reasonable too, although the model targeted a 
smaller segment from the beginning. In North America there were questions surrounding the 
high pricing, which caused some problems in marketing the product. Ford itself cited the 
learning effects, both internally and towards suppliers, as a very positive outcome. According 
to Mr. Parry-Jones, the vice-president who was in charge of the only Europe-based vehicle 
centre in the new Ford 2000 structure: Ford “is now a lot more comfortable with the idea of 
working across the major regional borders between Ford and its supply bases and between the 
various organisational elements within Ford”. This implies that Ford has increased its ability 
to conduct such global projects. As such, the company appeared to be quite satisfied with the 
outcomes of the projects. Although it may not have constructed a new model T, it did set out 
in a new strategic direction by becoming a more global firm. 
External critics of the project have centred on two issues. The first is whether it is 
really possible to build a global car and use global suppliers. The problem is that while cost 
savings drive the need for a global car, there is a danger of the result being too compromised 
to appeal to any specific market. In other words, consumers in different countries do want 
special features. Ford encountered this problem for example with the cup holder, that is a 
standard item in the U.S., but not so in Europe. As has been mentioned before, because of 
local tastes and regulations, the two versions only have 90% of the elements in common. 
Some industry watchers have also doubted whether consumers really want a global car. They 
suggested that an excellent car is what consumers want. Both the Honda Accord and Toyota 
Camry models have been sold across continents in roughly the same versions as well. But this 
was not because they had been made with the idea of a global car in mind, but rather because 
they were built to be excellent cars. These critics suggested that an excellent car can sell 
globally, but a global car cannot sell without some form of excellence. On a more basic level 
one can also wonder whether a car that is produced in only two regions is really global and 
whether sourcing almost 100% from the same two regions is really global sourcing. 
 The second issue of criticism concerned the development time of the car. The 
standard that was set by most Japanese producers is 2 to 3 years. It took Ford some 7 to 8 
years to develop the car, and even 4 years after outside suppliers were first involved. The $150 
savings per car that were reported earlier by sourcing in larger quantities, were more than 
offset by a $200 extra investment per car that Ford had to make in the car, following an 
improved standard that Nissan introduced in the European market in 1991 (including 
improvements in the suspension and the engine mounts). So the long development time cost 
Ford dearly. 
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Ford  b eyond  th e  Mondeo  in t r oduc t i on  
After the introduction of the first world car, Ford decided to take the integration of regional 
organisations further. As part of the Ford 2000 program, it announced in 1994 that the 
European and North American car businesses would be merged into the division Ford 
Automotive Operations. The Asian and South American/Rest of World organisations were 
being left out for the time being. Since January 1, 1995, Ford was organised along product 
lines, in so-called vehicle program centres. Of these centres, four were based in the United 
States, whereas one was based in Europe. Each centre was responsible for the world-wide 
design, operations and sales of a single product category. Ford was truly trying to introduce 
this method of global sourcing in all of its operations. A key statement of the Ford 2000 
program was that Ford has ‘a preference for suppliers with world-wide presence and resources 
to support global product development and manufacturing strategies’. The Ford 2000 
program also included centralising key managerial talent. Finally, it was unclear whether the 
organisation along products in the program vehicle centres according to Ford 2000 would be 
beneficial. It was reported in the Financial Times in 1996 that many motor industry bosses 
said ”Ford has failed to take account of the risks involved in convulsive change and will suffer 
as a result. Others, however, argue that hesitation today will only make the inevitable task of 
restructuring more difficult tomorrow”. Four years later, in late 2000, reports emerged that the 
Ford 2000 vehicle program had resulted in a strong centralisation of activities in North 
America. As a result, Ford was thought to have lost touch with its European consumer base, 
which caused a loss of market share. It was suggested (Muller, Welch, Green, Woellert and St. 
Pierre, 2000) that the Ford 2000 program led to an overly centralised organisation and leaving 
Ford without leadership in Europe, South America and Asia. As a remedy the new Ford 
CEO, Jacques Nasser reinstalled executives for various regions in 1999. The strong point of 
the whole Ford 2000 operation and Nasser’s subsequent moves appears to be that 
development times have come down dramatically, towards the level of Ford’s main 
competitors. 
 
The  In t e rn e t  
As far as using information technology is concerned Ford also took major steps in introducing 
new tools. The explosive growth of the Internet after the introduction of the Mondeo, 
triggered new opportunities to improve information exchange between Ford and its suppliers. 
Ford says that its top priorities are currently customer satisfaction and E-business. A much-
publicised example is Covisint, a co-operation started by GM, Ford and DaimlerChrysler 
which aims to be a marketplace for the automobile industry. Much of the data infrastructure 
of Covisint and other initiatives is taken care of by ANX, the Auto Network Exchange. Ford 
participates in ANX since 1998. ANX is a private, virtual network that connects major 
carmakers in North America and over 280 of their suppliers. It is used amongst others for 
design drawings, secure routing of product specifications and EDI transmissions. The 
advantage of ANX is that it removes existing proprietary connections between buyers and 
suppliers and thereby improves interchangeability. ANX is much faster than existing 
communication lines, reducing turnover times by 50 to 75%. This can generate large cost 
savings, while maintaining or improving the security of data exchange. ANX is able to cope 
with a large variety of data sources. While exclusive Intranets or Extranets induce only more 
connections and a larger burden of work, an open Extranet like ANX decreases the number 
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of electronic links. As the number of network members rises, so do the benefits of ANX. 
Ford’s usage of ANX includes CAD / CAM applications, client server applications, 
interactive mainframe applications and TCP/IP file transfer79. ANX and its members have 
been pursuing expansion outside of North America. As Joe Boyd, telecommunications analyst 
of Ford in Dearborn said: “There’s the issue of international suppliers needing to get access to 
applications on servers back here in North America, where we need the flexibility to support 
ones on other continents. An international ANX would be very desirable to us”. 
 
Conc lu s i ons  
To what extent is Ford’s experience in trying to achieve global integration by using 
information technology applicable for other firms and industries? It appears that all firms that 
internationalise their operations at one time or the other are confronted with conflicting 
demands. When McDonalds, the icon of global capitalism, internationalised its operations it 
soon found out that it was usually necessary to adapt its menu to local demand. Furthermore 
some countries had regulation that prohibited some of the practices the firm developed in the 
United States. The benefits of global integration are often taken for granted by 
internationalising firms or industry observers. However, there is no such thing as a uniform 
process of globalisation. One may suggest that only 10% of the European Ford Mondeo was 
different from the North American Ford Contour and Mercury Mystique. However, precisely 
this 10% raised the cost level of the car to $6 billion and delayed its introduction in North 
America (Smith, 1994). Even in  th e  In t e rn e t  a g e  th e r e  i s  a  f r i c t i on  b e twe en  g l oba l  
in t e g ra t i on  and  l o ca l  r e spons i v en e s s . 
As for Ford itself it may well be concluded that the Mondeo / Mystique / Contour 
was a turning point in its history. The world car has fundamentally altered Ford’s approach to 
building cars, which used to be two different approaches, depending on where the car was 
built. The world car induced an organisational change, in the Ford 2000 program, aimed at 
globalisation. Whi l e  i t  i s  no t  sa id  tha t  th e  ou t c omes  o f  th i s  p ro g ram ar e  po s i t i v e ,  i t  i s  
an  impor tan t  s t ep  in  r ed e f in ing  th e  ca r  indus t r y . Mondeo may not be a new model T. 
Then again: will there ever again be a car that bears the significance for mankind that this one 
model did, with its 15 million units of sales? Perhaps we should forget about the capital T and 
simply refer to Mondeo as Ford’s ‘new model t’. 
 
Year Event Outcome 
1960 First attempt to build a world car American version is never produced 
1981 Second attempt, Ford Escort Two versions differ completely  
1986 Third attempt is started One U.S.-European engineering team 
1989 Supplier involvement starts Many components developed together 
1993 Production and sales in Europe  
1994 Production and sales in U.S.  
1995 Ford 2000 program European and U.S. operations integrated 
1999 Ford 2000 program fails Regional executives re-appointed 
2000 New Mondeo launched  
Table 7.3: short summary of events and their outcome. 
 
                                                           
79 For details see: http://www.anx.com/downloads/ford.pdf 
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7.2 Internationalisation of the supply base 
Similar to Ford, manufacturing firms in the Netherlands have been internationalising their 
supply chains. The term global sourcing, which has never been translated into a Dutch 
equivalent, is widely used by Dutch sourcing managers80. However, little research has been 
undertaken to either assess the extent of internationalisation of the supply base of 
manufacturing firms in the Netherlands or to investigate the impact of this internationalisation 
on firm performance. In this section an overview will be given of the extent of 
internationalisation of the supply base of manufacturing firms in the Netherlands as well as 
how this is related to their performance. The survey will be the basis of this analysis. 
 
The survey asked firms where their external suppliers were located in terms of volumes 
sourced from a particular country or region81. An overview of the average geographical spread 
of the supply bases of all firms is given in table 4. On the basis of this table one would tend to 
conclude that internationalisation of the supply base is mainly limited to other EU countries, 
with the exception of a few firms or industries82. More than half of all sourcing is from within 
the Netherlands. In fact 19 firms sourced exclusively from the Netherlands, although another 
13 did not source anything from the Netherlands. Among foreign countries the Germanic 
countries are most popular. This is unsurprising given the larger annual trade volume between 
Germany and the Netherlands. Germany has been the most important trade partner of 
Netherlands since what seems like forever. Among the other EU countries there is more or 
less an even spread, although Belgium as the only other directly neighbouring country also 
accounts for a significant volume of sourcing. Beyond  th e  EU the r e  i s  no t  much  s our c ing  
a c t i v i t y  g o ing  on . Most of that activity is concentrated in Anglo-Saxon countries and to some 
extent in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia. 
 
                                                           
80 For instance Stork’s corporate purchasing department installed a global sourcing manager in the late 
1990s to promote international sourcing among its business units. This manager initiated various trips to 
countries like the Czech republic and Portugal. The department has now undergone organisational 
changes, a consequence of which is that the global sourcing function is no longer supported at the 
corporate level. 
81 When combining the sourcing volumes of all countries, the total that should emerge is 100%. For 
around 10 firms this total did not add to 100%. Most of the firms were close to 100%, suggesting that 
rounding off in one direction or the other led to these differences. A few firms were further off the 
mark. In order to be able to compare the firms, it was necessary to standardise all values such that the 
total was indeed 100%. All the values that are reported and used here are standardised values. 
82 Both Norway and Switzerland are seen as part of the European Union although they are not EU 
members. Both countries are members of the European Economic Area (EEA) implying they are 
actually a part of the same market. Furthermore the physical distance of these countries to EU countries 
is limited, with Switzerland actually being very close to the geographical centre of the EU. And in terms 
of country cultures Norway is usually seen as quite similar to other Scandinavian countries while 
Switzerland draws many comparisons to other Germanic countries. This is especially true for Swiss 
manufacturing firms that are mostly located in the German-speaking area of the country. 
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 Netherlands Belgium 
Luxem-
bourg 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Germany 
Austria 
Switzerland 
France 
Spain 
Portugal 
Italy 
U.K. 
Ireland 
Greece EU total 
Mean 55.4% 5.7% 3.9% 17.4% 4.3% 2.6% 0.02% 89.3% 
St. dev. 31.5 12.7 12.1 21.1 10.8 8.58 0.28 20.0 
Minimum 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 
Maximum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 75% 4% 100% 
         
 Central & 
Eastern 
Europe 
U.S. 
Canada 
Australia 
Japan Rest of Asia Other 
countries 
  Grand 
total 
Mean 2.5% 3.6% 1.6% 1.9% 1.1%   100% 
St. dev. 8.36 12.0 6.42 8.06 5.65   0 
Minimum .00 .00 .00 .00 .00   100% 
Maximum 60% 98% 50% 80% 60%   100% 
Table 7.4: average spread of supply base among countries and regions of the world. Valid 
listwise N = 199. 
 
The results above are not weighted according to size of the firm. However, one can argue that 
size of the firm is a key factor in determining the extent of internationalisation of sourcing. 
Larger firms are less likely to find suppliers of the appropriate size in the Netherlands. Larger 
firms are more international because a larger part of their size is formed by exports. So they 
are more likely to be exposed to international competition and international suppliers. And 
given their size they may be more eligible to receive price reductions when sourcing from one 
supplier world-wide. Smaller firms source internationally when they are highly specialised 
players requiring goods that are not produced everywhere. But it is likely that this is only a 
small group of smaller firms. To investigate these size effects, a weighed average was 
calculated that incorporated the total sourcing volume of the firm. The results of this can be 
found in table 5. 
 These results indicate that incorporating the sourced volume induces a number of 
significant changes. The main findings are still that most sourcing, 84%, occurs within the 
European Union and that a substantial part of sourcing, 37%, is from within the Netherlands. 
However, also notice that several foreign sources are used more heavily than the previous 
table predicted. More than one fourth of all sourcing is from the Germanic countries. The 
European Union is by far the largest supply source for manufacturing firms in the 
Netherlands. This also confirms what is generally accepted by now: for firms like these the 
EU should be thought of as the local market. Looking only at the Netherlands as the local 
market is incorrect in several ways. First the EU is officially a single market. Then the 
regulatory and institutional frameworks apply equally across Europe and most of the trading 
occurs within the EU. But there is sourcing from outside the EU as well. Some 6% of all 
sourcing is from Anglo-Saxon countries outside Europe while 4% is from Japan and 3% from 
the rest of Asia. These are not very high numbers but they do indicate that th e r e  i s  s ome  
g l oba l  s our c ing  a c t i v i t y  going on by manufacturing firms in the Netherlands. In general the 
findings confirm the literature discussed in previous chapters: much sourcing occurs locally 
and only a limited amount of sourcing, 16% in this case, occurs outside of the home region.  
Glob,region,locall sourcing 
 169
 
 Netherlands Belgium 
Luxem-
bourg 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Germany 
Austria 
Switzerland 
France 
Spain 
Portugal 
Italy 
U.K. 
Ireland 
Greece EU total 
Mean 37.3% 4.4% 5.0% 26.6% 6.0% 4.6% 0.02% 84.0% 
Minimum 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 
Maximum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 75% 4% 100% 
         
 Central & 
Eastern 
Europe 
U.S. 
Canada 
Australia 
Japan Rest of Asia Other 
countries 
  Grand 
total 
Mean 1.9% 6.0% 4.1% 2.7% 1.2%   100% 
Minimum .00 .00 .00 .00 .00   100% 
Maximum 60% 98% 50% 80% 60%   100% 
Table 7.5: weighed average spread of external supply base among countries and regions of the 
world incorporating sourced volumes83. Valid listwise N = 199. 
 
Another finding from the literature is that those firms most likely to source non-locally are in 
fact host (foreign) firms. Some additional analyses were performed to look at the effect of 
foreignness on the sourcing pattern, see table 6. Obviously statistical significance of these 
findings is severely hampered by the small number of foreign firms and the even smaller 
number of non-EU firms. Keeping this restriction in mind the general pattern seems to 
confirm the expectations raised in chapters 1 and 2, in particular tables 1.2 and 1.5.  
 
 Netherlands Belgium 
Luxem-
bourg 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Germany 
Austria 
Switzer-
land 
France 
Spain 
Portugal 
Italy 
U.K. 
Ireland 
Greece EU 
total 
Belgium 80% 10% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Finland 57.5% 5% 27.5% 10% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
France 87.5% 0% 5% 7.5% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Germany 49.7% 1.9% 3.2% 20.2% 3.3% 1.9% 0% 80.1% 
Ireland 55% 5% 0% 35% 5% 0% 0% 100% 
Israel 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 2% 
Japan 55% 2.5% 2.5% 10% 10% 10% 0% 90% 
Luxembourg 90% 0% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 95% 
Netherlands 57.7% 6.3% 4.0% 16.6% 3.7% 2.2% 0% 90.5% 
Sweden 54% 7% 3.4% 21.6% 9% .6% 0% 95.6% 
Switzerland 43.3% 0% 0% 26.7% 5% 16.7% 0% 76.7% 
U.K. 35.3% 6% 7.5% 20.3% 7.5% 21.3 10% 98.8% 
U.S. 29% 3.5% .1% 26.7% 12% 4.4% 0% 75.7% 
Cont inued  on  next  pag e
                                                           
83 Obviously a standard deviation can now not be calculated because the averages presented here emerge 
by dividing sourced volumes in one country or region by total sourced volumes. Minimum and 
maximum values are simply retained from the previous table. 
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 Central & 
Eastern 
Europe 
U.S. 
Canada 
Australia 
Japan Rest of 
Asia 
Other 
countries 
  Grand 
total 
Belgium 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%   100% 
Finland 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%   100% 
France 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%   100% 
Germany 6.4% 10.4% 1.3% 1.6% .2%   100% 
Ireland 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%   100% 
Israel 0% 98% 0% 0% 0%   100% 
Japan 0% 5% 5% 0% 0%   100% 
Luxembourg 0% 0% 0% 0% 5%   100% 
Netherlands 2.6% 2.5% 1.8% 1.6% .9%   100% 
Sweden 0% 0% 0% 4% .4%   100% 
Switzerland 1.7% 0% 6.7% 0% 15%   100% 
U.K. 0% 0% 1.3% 0% 0%   100% 
U.S. 2.7% 11.3% 0% 9% 1.3%   100% 
Table 7.6: average spread of external supply base among countries and regions of the world by 
country of origin. Valid listwise N = 199. 
 
Dutch firms obtain an above average percentage of sourcing from the Netherlands while 
foreign firms are more likely to use foreign sources, although they use Dutch sources 
substantially. Furthermore EU firms (excluding Dutch firms) use more EU sourcing while 
non-EU firms, which are mostly U.S. firms in this sample, use more non-EU sourcing, in 
particular sourcing from the United States. Among the EU firms only German firms are 
represented by a somewhat larger group of firms (9). They again use Germany more often as a 
supply source. This provides some evidence for both the effects of foreignness and home 
country effects. 
 
Having established the extent of international sourcing, the next question relates to 
hypotheses 5 and 6 from chapter 3. Does international sourcing improve firm performance? 
To answer this question regression analyses were performed again. The var iab l e s  tha t  a r e  
emp loy ed  in  th i s  s e c t i on  a r e  th e  same  var iab l e s  app l i ed  in  chap t e r  5 .3  w i th  th e  
add i t i on  o f  f o r e i gn  s our c ing  (FOREISOU) and  f o r e i gn  expe r i en c e  (FOREXPER).  
An overview of all variables can be found in table 4.37. First, correlations between variables 
were assessed. These can be found in table 7 in appendix C. Direct correlations between 
internationalisation and performance are virtually non-existent. There is a positive link 
between total EU sourcing and sourcing from the Netherlands. This was expected since total 
EU sourcing is to a large extent sourcing from the Netherlands. Foreign firms source more 
from outside the Netherlands and outside the EU, which confirms the results of the 
descriptive analysis above. And there is a negative relation between domestic / EU sourcing 
and extent of external sourcing as measured by the total production cost measure (totproco). 
This implies that firms that have a high percentage of their production costs supplied 
externally are more likely to source internationally. This relation does not show up for the 
other measure of external sourcing (purratsu). 
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Economic performance 
Like in chapters 5 and 6 mathematical models will be formulated that represent the theoretical 
model in chapter 3. Then statistical analysis will take place based on the measures that are 
categorised in table 4.37. The regression analyses are based on the models used in chapter 5. 
The model applied to sourcing strategy before will now be extended to include effects of 
international sourcing and foreignness. The following equation describes the model: 
 
(1) ECONPERF = β0 + β1 * logpursu + β2 * respjob + β3 * respexp + β4 * 
industry + β5 * purinteg + β6 * percstan + β7 * firmstra + β8 * external 
sourcing + β9 * foreign sourcing + ε 
 
The model that emerges in table 7 is very similar to the model presented in chapter 5, table 13. 
This implies that inclusion of internationalisation of the supply base does not add to the 
explanatory value of the model. Foreign sourcing (all sourcing from outside the Netherlands) 
is among the weakest variables in the model, which suggests that it is not really related to 
economic performance at the firm level. It is not useful to re-run the model in an effort to 
improve it, since the same model will emerge that was shown in table 13 of chapter 5. A 
similar model was tested where foreign sourcing was replaced by EU level sourcing84. This 
model did not come up with anything close to a significant link either. Similarly a country-by-
country explanation was not a useful explanation. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  6.348 .000 
LOGPUR -.187 -2.264 .025 
TOPMAN -.135 -1.531 .128 
PURCHSPE -.016 -.176 .861 
ANALYZER .400 2.094 .038 
PROSPECT .378 1.882 .062 
REACTOR .120 .808 .420 
PROCINDU .026 .204 .839 
PRODINDU -.140 -1.041 .299 
RESPEXP .038 .499 .618 
PURINTEG .024 .319 .750 
PERCSTAN -.126 -1.625 .106 
TOTPROCO .156 1.995 .048 
PURRATSU -.075 -.973 .332 
FOREISOU .010 .126 .900 
 F-test: 1.629 .076 
 R2: .120 
 Adj. R2: .046 
Table 7.7: extended model for explaining economic performance  
with survey data including foreign sourcing. N = 182 / 182. 
 
                                                           
84 This is of course equivalent to running a model on non-EU sourcing except that the sign of the 
variable will be opposite. 
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Although there is no direct effect of international sourcing on performance, it is still possible 
that there are interaction effects. Hypotheses 15 and 16 in chapter 3 predicted positive 
interaction effects due to foreign experience and foreignness. Table 8 in appendix C provides 
the correlations between the interaction variables, the moderating variables, and the 
independent variable. These effects were tested using the following expression: 
 
(2) ECONPERF = β0 + β1 * logpursu + β2 * respjob + β3 * respexp + β4 * 
industry + β5 * purinteg + β6 * percstan + β7 * firmstra + β8 * external 
sourcing + β9 * foreign sourcing + β10 * moderator + β11 * foreign sourcing * 
moderator + ε 
 
As before separate estimations were made for the moderating variables and the interactions. 
The results of including both moderating variables, foreignness and foreign experience, are 
shown in the first table, table 8. Interestingly foreign experience, in the sense of the firm being 
a multinational, has a marginally significant positive effect on performance. This effect is 
maintained in the improved model on the right hand side. Thus, although being a foreign firm 
or sourcing abroad are not of significant influence on economic performance, being a 
multinational is of importance. Otherwise, the analysis confirms the results of chapter 5. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  5.995 .000  7.960 .000 
LOGPUR -.215 -2.499 .013 -.225 -2.959 .004 
TOPMAN -.121 -1.363 .175 -.121 -1.627 .105 
PURCHSPE -.010 -.111 .912    
ANALYZER .348 1.816 .071 .261 2.576 .011 
PROSPECT .317 1.563 .120 .234 2.354 .020 
REACTOR .091 .609 .544    
PROCINDU -.005 -.037 .971    
PRODINDU -.159 -1.187 .237 -.145 -1.883 .061 
RESPEXP .033 .431 .667    
PURINTEG .044 .576 .565    
PERCSTAN -.126 -1.639 .103 -.118 -1.590 .114 
TOTPROCO .163 2.075 .040 .144 1.954 .052 
PURRATSU -.037 -.468 .641    
FOREIGN -.011 -.135 .893    
FOREISOU -.033 -.398 .691    
FOREXPER .161 1.947 .053 .142 1.915 .057 
 F-test: 1.680 .055 F-test: 3.087 .003 
 R2: .140 R2: .124 
 Adj. R2: .057 Adj. R2: .084 
Table 7.8: extended model for explaining economic performance with survey  
data including foreign sourcing and moderating variables. N = 182 / 182. 
 
In table 9 the interactions between foreignness and foreign sourcing and between foreign 
experience and foreign sourcing are tested. Unlike in previous chapters the correlations among 
the moderators and interaction variables are not very high. Tolerance values are 0.13 and 
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upward. Therefore it is possible to include both the moderating variables and the interaction 
effects. The analyses show that the interaction between foreignness and international sourcing 
does not come into play when explaining performance. It is positive as expected but not 
significant. Similarly the interaction between foreign experience and foreign sourcing does not 
perform as expected in hypothesis 16. It is negative and very insignificant. The direct effect of 
foreign experience (being a multinational) still holds. Thus there is evidence to conclude that 
hav ing  p r e v i ous  f o r e i gn  expe r i en c e  i s  b ene f i c i a l  f o r  f i rms  tha t  s our c e  in t e rna t i ona l l y  
bu t  do e s  no t  a f f e c t  th e i r  ab i l i t y  t o  l e v e rag e  in t e rna t i ona l  s our c ing  f o r  e c onomi c  
p e r f o rmanc e . 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  6.238 .000  6.305 .000 
LOGPUR -.183 -2.151 .033 -.212 -2.518 .013 
TOPMAN -.140 -1.571 .118 -.114 -1.282 .201 
PURCHSPE -.028 -.303 .762 -.010 -.116 .908 
ANALYZER .401 2.093 .038 .347 1.812 .072 
PROSPECT .386 1.906 .058 .317 1.566 .119 
REACTOR .126 .842 .401 .092 .622 .535 
PROCINDU .027 .209 .834 .000 -.002 .998 
PRODINDU -.133 -.984 .326 -.159 -1.184 .238 
RESPEXP .038 .490 .625 .030 .402 .688 
PURINTEG .024 .310 .757 .045 .591 .556 
PERCSTAN -.119 -1.524 .129 -.132 -1.699 .091 
TOTPROCO .166 2.088 .038 .159 2.035 .043 
PURRATSU -.083 -1.057 .292 -.033 -.408 .684 
FOREISOU -.026 -.283 .777 .038 .249 .804 
FOREIGN -.117 -.824 .411    
FOREIGN X 
FOREISOU 
.132 .871 .385    
FOREXPER    .217 1.681 .095 
FOREXPER 
X FOREISOU 
   -.113 -.562 .575 
 F-test: 1.465 .118 F-test: 1.702 .051 
 R2: .124 R2: .142 
 Adj. R2: .039 Adj. R2: .058 
Table 7.9: extended model for explaining economic performance with survey  
data including foreign sourcing, moderators and interaction effects. N = 182 / 182. 
 
Strategic performance 
The same analyses were also performed on strategic performance on the basis of this 
equation: 
 
(3) STRATPERF = β0 + β1 * logpursu + β2 * respjob + β3 * respexp + β4 * 
industry + β5 * purinteg + β6 * percstan + β7 * firmstra + β8 * external 
sourcing + β9 * foreign sourcing + ε 
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The results can be found in table 10. Similar to the findings on economic performance, 
international sourcing does not appear to be a strong explanation for strategic performance. 
There is no significant direct relation and the model does not improve as a consequence of 
including the variables on international sourcing. Again, using EU level sourcing or single 
countries as alternative explanations does not change these findings. There is no evidence here 
for a connection between international sourcing and strategic performance. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  4.291 .000 
LOGPUR -.007 -.091 .927 
TOPMAN -.015 -.172 .863 
PURCHSPE .149 1.678 .095 
ANALYZER -.070 -.420 .675 
PROSPECT -.036 -.206 .837 
REACTOR -.164 -1.250 .213 
PROCINDU .016 .124 .901 
PRODINDU -.116 -.874 .383 
RESPEXP -.024 -.318 .751 
PURINTEG -.038 -.501 .617 
PERCSTAN .094 1.243 .216 
TOTPROCO .080 1.042 .299 
PURRATSU .016 .220 .826 
FOREISOU .069 .882 .379 
 F-test: 1.526 .106 
 R2: .109 
 Adj. R2: .038 
Table 7.10: extended model for explaining strategic performance  
with survey data including foreign sourcing. N = 190. 
 
The model is extended to include moderating variables and interaction effects, giving: 
 
(4) STRATPERF = β0 + β1 * logpursu + β2 * respjob + β3 * respexp + β4 * 
industry + β5 * purinteg + β6 * percstan + β7 * firmstra + β8 * external 
sourcing + β9 * foreign sourcing + β10 * moderator + β11 * foreign sourcing * 
moderator + ε 
 
The results of the analysis including the moderating variables are described in table 11. Both 
being a foreign firm and having foreign experience are very minimally related to strategic 
performance. As in the previous model foreign sourcing has some positive impact but it is far 
from significant. If the model is optimised all three variables are dropped from the model and 
the model originally presented in chapter 5 re-emerges. Thus no  e v id en c e  f o r  a  r e la t i on  
b e twe en  hav ing  an  in t e rna t i ona l  supp l y  bas e  and  s t ra t e g i c  p e r f o rmanc e  a t  th e  f i rm 
l e v e l  c ou ld  b e  e s tab l i sh ed .  
 
Table 7.11: extended model for explaining strategic performance with survey data including 
foreign sourcing and moderating variables. N = 190. 
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 Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  4.162 .000 
LOGPUR -.003 -.041 .967 
TOPMAN -.016 -.185 .853 
PURCHSPE .148 1.664 .098 
ANALYZER -.070 -.412 .681 
PROSPECT -.037 -.209 .835 
REACTOR -.164 -1.239 .217 
PROCINDU .016 .126 .900 
PRODINDU -.117 -.872 .384 
RESPEXP -.020 -.262 .794 
PURINTEG -.039 -.510 .611 
PERCSTAN .094 1.235 .219 
TOTPROCO .081 1.050 .295 
PURRATSU .014 .185 .854 
FOREIGN .070 .857 .393 
FOREISOU -.016 -.201 .841 
FOREXPER -.002 -.021 .983 
 F-test: 1.323 .188 
 R2: .109 
 Adj. R2: .027 
 
In table 12 the interactions are included.  
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  4.178 .000  4.189 .000 
LOGPUR -.004 -.046 .964 -.008 -.097 .923 
TOPMAN -.015 -.170 .865 -.016 -.185 .853 
PURCHSPE .152 1.689 .093 .148 1.662 .098 
ANALYZER -.072 -.428 .669 -.070 -.412 .681 
PROSPECT -.041 -.233 .816 -.035 -.199 .842 
REACTOR -.166 -1.260 .209 -.164 -1.241 .216 
PROCINDU .015 .121 .904 .015 .114 .909 
PRODINDU -.120 -.891 .374 -.117 -.867 .387 
RESPEXP -.020 -.256 .799 -.024 -.312 .755 
PURINTEG -.038 -.508 .612 -.038 -.494 .622 
PERCSTAN .092 1.205 .230 .095 1.241 .216 
TOTPROCO .079 1.009 .314 .081 1.042 .299 
PURRATSU .017 .218 .827 .015 .197 .844 
FOREISOU .080 .908 .365 .054 .352 .725 
FOREIGN .015 .110 .913    
FOREIGN X 
FOREISOU 
-.040 -.265 .791    
FOREXPER    -.013 -.104 .917 
FOREXPER 
X FOREISOU 
   .025 .124 .901 
 F-test: 1.328 .185 F-test: 1.321 .189 
 R2: .109 R2: .109 
 Adj. R2: .027 Adj. R2: .026 
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Table 7.12: extended model for explaining strategic performance with survey  
data including foreign sourcing, moderators and interaction effects. N = 190 / 190. 
 
The story is similar to previous analyses: no interaction effects can be detected. Neither being 
a foreign firm nor having previous foreign experience lead to an increased ability to leverage 
international sourcing to obtain strategic performance. The effects of the independent 
variable, international sourcing, remain minimal as before. 
 
 
7.3 Dealing with international suppliers 
The data at the firm level are now complemented by data at the relationship level. The survey 
also investigated the location of the largest supplier. This location will now be related to how 
well a supplier performs according to the buyer. The key question in this section is whether 
having a largest supplier from abroad matters in explaining satisfaction about this supplier.  
First an overview of the countries in which the largest supplier is located is given in 
table 13. As expected most firms (121) indicated that their largest supplier is located in the 
Netherlands, but there are also 79 firms with largest suppliers abroad. Of these firms, many 
indicated Germany was home to their largest supplier. The number of largest suppliers located 
in non-OECD countries is quite limited at 7 out of 200. If the largest supplier was located in 
the Netherlands, firms were also asked to provide the physical distance between themselves 
and their supplier. This was done to make an estimate of the importance to the respondents 
of just-in-time deliveries and local clustering. Perhaps surprisingly there was not so much local 
clustering occurring. Only 17 out of 121 firms had their main supplier within less than 20 
kilometres. Most suppliers (73) were located anywhere in between 20 and 100 kilometres from 
the buying firm. 
 
Country # of firms Country # of firms 
Netherlands 121 Argentina 1 
Germany 33 Denmark 1 
Belgium 8 Norway 1 
France 5 Italy 1 
United States 5 Poland 1 
Japan 4 Hungary 1 
Sweden 4 Spain 1 
Canada 2 Czech Republic 1 
Switzerland 2 Ireland 1 
Finland 2 South Korea 1 
United Kingdom 2 Slovakia 1 
Indonesia 1   
Table 7.13: location of the largest suppliers of the firms in the sample (N = 200). 
 
Does it matter for its performance whether a supplier is located abroad? This is the next point 
of analysis. One would tend to think that firms that go abroad for finding their largest supplier 
do so for a reason. To test whether this is true, the models from chapter 6 were applied again. 
The var iab l e s  tha t  a r e  emp loy ed  in  th i s  s e c t i on  a r e  th e  same  var iab l e s  app l i ed  in  
chap t e r  6 .1  w i th  th e  add i t i on  o f  f o r e i gn  supp l i e r  (FOREISUP) ,  b e ing  a  f o r e i gn  f i rm 
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(FOREIGN) and  f o r e i gn  expe r i en c e  (FOREXPER).  An overview of all variables can 
be found in table 4.37. First the correlations involving these variables were calculated, see 
table 8 in appendix C. There is only one strong correlation: between having a Dutch supplier 
and the other variables. Sourcing managers perceive that having a Dutch supplier means that 
the supplier has less power: foreign suppliers are more powerful. Perhaps an explanation is 
that Dutch suppliers are more expandable or replaceable than foreign suppliers, because if 
there is a Dutch supplier for a good there will probably be a much wider range of potential 
suppliers for that good globally. If firms have to go abroad to find a supplier, there are 
probably fewer suppliers available globally. There are no significant linkages between being a 
foreign firm and any of the other variables. 
 
Economic performance 
Next the economic performance impact was assessed using the basic model including voice 
relations from chapter 6. This model was then supplemented by a dummy variable for having 
a foreign supplier. It is represented by the following equation: 
 
(5) ECONPERF = β0 + β1 * log purchasing + β2 * respexp + β3 * respjob + 
β4 * industry + β5 * rellength + β6 * reldevel + β7 * trust + β8 * voicerel + β9 * 
foreisup + ε 
 
Table 14 demonstrates the outcomes of the analysis. Adding the foreignness of a supplier to 
the model hardly increases the explanatory power of the model. The relation between having a 
foreign supplier and performance is slightly positive but not significant. If the model is 
improved by excluding the least significant variables, the resulting model is the same model 
presented in chapter 6, table 4, which implies foreignness of the supplier is not among the 
important variables. Thus there is no  e v id en c e  f o r  any  impac t  o f  hav ing  an  in t e rna t i ona l  
supp l i e r  on  e c onomi c  supp l i e r  sa t i s f a c t i on . 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  2.792 .006 
TOPMAN .109 1.677 .095 
PURCHSPE .152 2.297 .023 
RESPEXP .017 .297 .766 
PRODINDU -.128 -1.345 .180 
PROCINDU .064 .666 .506 
LOGPUR -.047 -.827 .409 
TRUST .366 5.000 .000 
RELGROWT .017 .259 .796 
RELLENGTH -.065 -1.149 .252 
VOICEREL .324 4.504 .000 
FOREISUP -.040 -.697 .487 
 F-test: 13.911 .000 
 R2: .453 
 Adj. R2: .420 
Table 7.14: basic model for explaining economic performance of supplier  
relations including voice relations and having a foreign supplier. N = 197. 
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Now the interactions are tested according to the following equation: 
 
(6) ECONPERF = β0 + β1 * log purchasing + β2 * respexp + β3 * respjob + 
β4 * industry + β5 * rellength + β6 * reldevel + β7 * trust + β8 * voicerel + β9 * 
foreisup + β10 * moderator + β11 * foreisup * moderator + ε 
 
The correlations among the independent variable and the interaction variables are displayed in 
table 8 in appendix C. The tolerance values on analyses (0.17 and upward) do not reach such 
low levels as in some of the analyses in chapters 5 and 6. Therefore it is possible to include 
both the interaction variables and the moderators in the analysis. Table 15 presents the results 
of these models. There are no significant effects either directly or through the interaction. 
This implies that being a foreign firm or having previous foreign experience do not really 
make a firm better at managing an international supplier in the sense that no higher supplier 
performance is obtained this way. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  2.736 .007  2.963 .003 
TOPMAN .106 1.632 .104 .114 1.726 .086 
PURCHSPE .152 2.280 .024 .158 2.380 .018 
RESPEXP .014 .238 .812 .013 .233 .816 
PRODINDU -.130 -1.350 .179 -.134 -1.400 .163 
PROCINDU .060 .623 .534 .052 .537 .592 
LOGPUR -.048 -.813 .417 -.062 -1.082 .281 
TRUST .372 4.999 .000 .369 5.031 .000 
RELGROWT .015 .231 .818 .014 .215 .830 
RELLENGTH -.068 -1.185 .237 -.064 -1.102 .272 
VOICEREL .326 4.482 .000 .325 4.515 .000 
FOREISUP -.057 -.900 .369 -.150 -1.247 .214 
FOREIGN -.031 -.406 .686    
FOREIGN X 
FOREISUP 
.051 .634 .527    
FOREXP    .029 .423 .673 
FOREXP X 
FOREISUP 
   .119 .888 .376 
 F-test: 11.700 .000 F-test: 11.897 .000 
 R2: .454 R2: .458 
 Adj. R2: .415 Adj. R2: .420 
Table 7.15: hierarchical regression models for explaining economic performance  
of supplier relations including voice relations, having a foreign supplier,  
being foreign, having foreign experience and interactions. N = 197 / 197. 
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Strategic performance 
This analysis was repeated for strategic supplier performance yielding the following equation: 
 
(7) STRATPERF = β0 + β1 * log purchasing + β2 * respexp + β3 * respjob + 
β4 * industry + β5 * rellength + β6 * reldevel + β7 * trust + β8 * voicerel +β9 * 
foreisup + ε 
 
The results of this analysis are provided in the following table, table 16. Similar to the previous 
analyses, there is not a strong relation between having a foreign supplier and strategic 
performance. Thus there is no  e v id en c e  f o r  any  e f f e c t s  o f  hav ing  an  in t e rna t i ona l  
supp l i e r  on  s t ra t e g i c  supp l i e r  sa t i s f a c t i on . 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  1.424 .156 
TOPMAN .048 .685 .494 
PURCHSPE .084 1.177 .241 
RESPEXP -.024 -.393 .695 
PRODINDU -.071 -.690 .491 
PROCINDU -.109 -1.057 .292 
LOGPUR -.060 -.988 .324 
TRUST .298 3.802 .000 
RELGROWT .184 2.724 .007 
RELLENGTH -.008 -.123 .902 
VOICEREL .278 3.659 .000 
FOREISUP .035 .565 .573 
 F-test: 10.479 .000 
 R2: .394 
 Adj. R2: .357 
Table 7.16: basic model for explaining strategic performance of supplier  
relations including voice relations and having a foreign supplier. N = 189. 
 
For the relation between international sourcing and strategic performance the interactions 
were tested as well:  
(8) STRATPERF = β0 + β1 * log purchasing + β2 * respexp + β3 * respjob + 
β4 * industry + β5 * rellength + β6 * reldevel + β7 * trust + β8 * voicerel + β9 * 
foreisup + β10 * moderator + β11 * foreisup * moderator + ε 
 
Table 17 gives the results of the models. There are no significant interaction effects nor are 
there any direct effects of the moderators. This implies that strategic supplier performance is 
not impacted by being a multinational firm or being a foreign firm. And it also means that 
being a foreign firm or being a multinational firm does not help a firm to leverage its relations 
with an international supplier for strategic performance purposes. 
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 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  1.399 .164  1.691 .093 
TOPMAN .048 .688 .493 .060 .855 .393 
PURCHSPE .084 1.168 .245 .093 1.302 .195 
RESPEXP -.025 -.394 .694 -.029 -.470 .639 
PRODINDU -.070 -.678 .499 -.084 -.811 .418 
PROCINDU -.108 -1.043 .298 -.128 -1.244 .215 
LOGPUR -.062 -.970 .334 -.087 -1.387 .167 
TRUST .296 3.715 .000 .299 3.829 .000 
RELGROWT .185 2.711 .007 .182 2.704 .008 
RELLENGTH -.007 -.114 .909 -.011 -.180 .857 
VOICEREL .279 3.628 .000 .281 3.703 .000 
FOREISUP .038 .555 .580 -.065 -.508 .612 
FOREIGN .012 .149 .882    
FOREIGN X 
FOREISUP 
-.009 -.100 .921    
FOREXP    .078 1.041 .300 
FOREXP X 
FOREISUP 
   .095 .666 .506 
 F-test: 8.770 .000 F-test: 9.146 .000 
 R2: .394 R2: .405 
 Adj. R2: .349 Adj. R2: .360 
Table 7.18: hierarchical regression models for explaining economic performance of supplier 
relations including voice relations, having a foreign supplier, and interactions. N = 189 / 189. 
 
Few econometric problems 
Since these analyses are extensions of the models used in previous chapters, any problems 
with the analyses presented here are directly linked to problems discussed in either chapter 5 
or chapter 6. The inclusion of the foreignness variable and the domestic versus foreign 
supplier variable does not lead to any new problems of multicollinearity as the analysis of the 
tolerance values showed. Given the very low correlations between these variables and all other 
variables this is as expected. 
 
Little support for hypotheses 
Neither hypotheses 5 nor hypothesis 6 were supported. There is no  e v id en c e  f o r  a  d i r e c t  
p e r f o rmanc e  e f f e c t  o f  in t e rna t i ona l  s our c ing . Sometimes there was a positive effect 
associated with international sourcing and sometimes there was a negative effect but all the 
effects were negligible in size. This finding holds across both the firm level and the 
relationship level. Firms are unable to increase performance through building a portfolio of 
international supply relations. And firms are unable to obtain superior supplier satisfaction by 
choosing an international supplier as their largest supplier. 
 There was very limited support for hypothesis 15 that foreign experience is a positive 
moderator on the relation between international sourcing and performance. The expected 
interaction effect was not found but there was a direct effect of the moderating variable. 
Multinational firms obtain higher economic performance at the firm level as expected. 
Hypothesis 16 was not supported. Foreignness does not affect performance nor does it matter 
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whether the firm is foreign in terms of the international sourcing – performance relation. 
Table 19 provides an overview of the findings. 
 
 Economic performance Strategic performance 
Independent variable • No relation (either level) • No relation (either level) 
Moderators • None found (either level) • None found (either level) 
Other effects • Foreign experience positively related (firm) • None found (either level) 
Table 7.19: Summary of findings on internationalisation from the survey. 
 
 
7.4 Discussion 
This chapter described international sourcing by manufacturing firms located in the 
Netherlands and tested the hypotheses that international sourcing improves economic and 
strategic performance. Several interesting findings emerged from both the classification of 
international sourcing strategies and the tests of the impact of international sourcing strategies 
on performance. 
 
The data on international sourcing strategy largely confirmed patterns that were found in 
earlier studies on international sourcing, which were described in chapter 1. In table 1.2 a 
model was developed to describe and categorise the various international sourcing strategies 
that firms have available. In terms of this model, many firms appear to be located in the upper 
cells (with much domestic and intra-EU sourcing) and on the left hand (meaning there are no 
integrated international sourcing networks in operation in most firms). Most sourcing comes 
from within the economic region in which the firm is located, in this case the European 
Union. In fact only 16% of sourcing stems from others areas of the world. Of all EU 
sourcing, domestic sourcing from within the Netherlands is the largest contributor at around 
37% of all sourcing. Germanic countries also contribute significantly at 27%. This is in line 
with longstanding and intensive trade relations between the nations as well as the relative 
strength of Germanic countries in manufacturing. Furthermore some 61% of the firms in the 
sample have their largest supplier located in the Netherlands and about 17% in Germany. The 
fact that largest suppliers are even more concentrated in the Netherlands than the supply base 
is on average, implies that firms are particularly unwilling to source their key products from 
foreign suppliers. The largest supplier was defined as the supplier with the largest supply 
volume to the firm. The Ford case also showed a limited extent of cross-continental sourcing, 
although there was substantial cross-continental sourcing compared to earlier efforts. 
Apparently there are core products these manufacturing firms source, which the firms 
themselves believe are best sourced from nearby places (JIT issues obviously play an 
important part here). For peripheral products this may be different as they contribute less to 
the total costs of the final product and can therefore perhaps be sourced at a higher risk. The 
barriers to international sourcing that were described in table 1.5 still very much remain alive. 
These findings c on t rad i c t  p r ed i c t i on s  and  s ta t emen t s  by  s ome  au thor s  tha t  
g e o g raph i ca l  bo rd e r s  and  l o ca t i on  no  l ong e r  mat t e r  (Cairncross, 1998; Ohmae, 1990). 
They provide support for an alternative view, which suggests that there is no across the board 
globalisation and that mos t  o f  th e  p ro c e s s e s  o f  in t e rna t i ona l i sa t i on  cur r en t l y  o c cu r r ing  
a r e  r e g i ona l  in  na tur e  (Rugman, 2000; Ruigrok & Van Tulder, 1995; Van Tulder et al, 
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2001). As an ever-increasing range of studies show, competition is a process occurring mainly 
within regions of the world. Although large multinational companies also invest in other 
regions of the world, their overall dependence on their home regions is often still large. 
Furthermore most trade takes place within economic regions and not between them. While 
there is some global sourcing by manufacturing firms in the Netherlands, its size is relatively 
small in comparison to domestic and regional sourcing. Of course there are always some 
exceptions and some firms do indeed source much from abroad. The f i rms  tha t  s our c e  mor e  
f r om ou t s id e  o f  th e  EU ar e  e sp e c ia l l y  th e  l a r g e r  f i rms  and  f o r e i gn  f i rms . Foreign firms 
have a tendency to source more from their respective home countries since they already have 
a strong supply base there. Furthermore they may have problems to adapt to local 
circumstances and constructing a local supply base may be costly in terms of both the costs 
involved to find local suppliers as well as the costs involved in building up relationships with 
these suppliers. Larger firms will require larger volumes from suppliers, making the range of 
possible suppliers smaller. Furthermore it may be more beneficial to source larger volumes 
from abroad due to scale economies in transportation and distribution.  
 
In the analyses that were undertaken to assess the impact of internationalisation of sourcing 
on performance no effects were found. Thus one may be tempted to conclude that 
internationalisation of sourcing does not lead to the expected performance increase, nor does 
it lead to any performance decrease. However, it could also be the case that there are errors in 
measurement of variables. Is there any reason to believe these measurement errors exist? To 
some extent the dependent variables of performance at the firm level, which were used in 
chapter 5 and used again in this chapter are not entirely reliable. The Cronbach Alpha values 
on these variables were rather low and it was noted that there was not so much variance in 
these variables. This could also affect the relation between internationalisation and 
performance. However, in chapter 5 some other expected relations were either found to be 
significant or to be almost significant and at a minimum to show the right sign. In this chapter 
there is almost no relation between the independent variable, internationalisation, and the 
dependent variable, performance. This confirms what some earlier empirical studies have 
shown. For example Kotabe and Omura (1989) and Kotabe (1992: 47) also concluded that the 
sourcing location may not matter very much. They suggest that it matters far more to assess 
whether certain key items are sourced internally or externally than to look at where these items 
are sourced from. To the extent that there was a relation between internationalisation and 
performance at the firm level this relation was negative. Although several firms did not 
complete the internationalisation variable as intended upon construction of the survey, these 
differences were standardised out of the data. The measurement of internationalisation of 
suppliers and of supplier performance did not produce any suspicions as was already 
concluded in chapter 6. For the largest supplier there was no positive relation between having 
an international supplier and supplier satisfaction measures. For economic performance there 
was a small positive effect while there was a small negative effect for strategic performance. 
Thus there is sufficient reason to believe that while there may be some kind of relation 
between having an international supply base or an international supplier and performance this 
relation is at best very weak. Internationalisation of the supply base does not seem to lead to 
enhanced firm performance for this cross-section of firms. 
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What could be the reasons for these findings? The most radical explanation would 
be that although firms may gain from internationalisation of sales, assets and manufacturing, 
as most of the literature on internationalisation suggests, they do not gain from 
internationalisation of sourcing. Perhaps internationalisation of sourcing is not a strategic 
choice but an imperative dictated by industry competitors. If this is the case a firm that 
sources internationally may not outperform competitors because they mimic each other’s 
behaviour. The decision to source from a particular location is relatively easy to imitate. In 
fact, some industries like clothing or automobiles are known to shift sourcing to certain 
countries in industry-wide waves. This is also a function of scale effects due to clustering. If a 
certain number of suppliers of an industry are located in a country, the conditions are 
favourable for buyers to select one from a multitude of suppliers. Competition among 
suppliers in a location will increase efficiency across the industry. A more moderate version of 
the ‘lack of strategic choice’ argument would be that in many instances firms that choose to 
internationalise their sourcing do so because no adequate domestic sources are available. Thus 
these firms are forced to source internationally, even though they know international sourcing 
may not bring any advantages.  
It could also be that there are advantages to be gained from international sourcing by 
lower production costs but that increased transaction and logistics costs connected to 
international sourcing offset these advantages. Firms may find it difficult to govern 
international supply relations effectively because of language, cultural and institutional 
differences or simply because of large distances. The Ford case also showed that substantial 
efforts may be needed to duplicate supply sources elsewhere in the world. This may be 
necessary to lower the risks associated with international sourcing. This finding would make 
the extent to which firms can leverage international supply relations highly dependent on their 
ability to manage far away partners. Firms are then balancing transaction costs and production 
costs across borders. While there are lower production costs associated with international 
sourcing, there are also higher transaction costs because of the difficulty of governing 
relations across borders. 
Another possibility is that it takes time for international supply relations to deliver. 
Perhaps there are positive performance effects but they only occur after a certain time period. 
Because the survey was cross-sectional this possibility can not be ruled out entirely. However, 
the fact that there was no effect on supplier satisfaction measures provides some evidence this 
was not the case. As was discussed in chapter 6 most firms have a relation with their largest 
supplier for over 2 years. In fact many have a relation for over 5 years. Still no performance 
effects could be found for these long relations. This suggests that internationalisation of the 
supply base may not matter much in terms of obtaining superior results. Obviously this is not 
the same as saying that internationalisation does not matter in terms of a firm’s overall 
structure and strategy.  
 
Two interaction effects were investigated. The interaction between foreignness and 
international sourcing did not yield any significant outcomes. Foreign firms are not 
significantly better at managing international supply relations. Perhaps they, like Dutch firms, 
are faced with similar kinds of difficulties in managing the logistics and communication of 
international supply relations. They could also have difficulty integrating foreign supplies into 
local production activities. And because international sourcing hardly has an impact on a 
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firm’s performance it is plausible that even foreign firms can not manage international 
sourcing to their advantage. Furthermore foreign firms in the survey do not obtain superior 
performance, either economically or strategically. This contradicts the earlier finding in 
chapter 5. However, since only a limited number of foreign firms (39) responded to the survey 
and measurement of performance in the survey could not be as detailed as measurement in 
the database was, it appears that statistical limitations could cause this lack of a finding. 
 
The interaction between foreign experience and international sourcing did not generate any 
findings. This implies that being a multinational does not make a firm better at using 
international sourcing as a tool for performance improvement. Again this seems mostly 
related to the fact that in the context of this study international sourcing is simply not a 
contributor to a firm’s performance. Perhaps foreign firms are superior in international 
sourcing but this does not translate into significant overall performance improvements. Three 
out of four regressions that were tested did show this positive pattern but nowhere was it 
significant.  
However, there was one direct effect of foreign experience. Fore i gn  expe r i en c e  i s  
po s i t i v e l y  r e l a t ed  t o  e c onomi c  p e r f o rmanc e  a t  th e  f i rm l e v e l . This implies that 
multinational firms are better than completely domestic firms are in terms of their financial 
performance (ROS / ROI). The data confirm that multinational firms can leverage differences 
between operations in various countries, thereby obtaining financial benefits (Dunning, 1993). 
If production costs rise in one country they can shift production activities to another country. 
Furthermore, multinational companies may also be able to charge a premium for their 
products given a more widely known brand name and the ability to deliver goods to multiple 
countries. Both of these effects help explain the superior performance of MNCs. 
 
 
Chapter summary 
Chapter 7 looks at the internationalisation of the supply base using the survey and a case. This 
case, of Ford Motor Company, revealed that major manufacturing firms that are in the 
process of internationalising their supply bases meet conflicting demands. On the one hand 
they intend to globalise activities to obtain scale benefits. On the other hand they need to take 
into account various local demands. The survey showed that this leads to a situation in which 
there is some international sourcing but its extent is limited. Most of the sourcing by firms in 
the sample occurs in the economic home region, the EU, and particularly the Netherlands. 
Those firms that diverge most from the pattern of local sourcing are large firms and foreign 
firms. The largest suppliers of the firms in the sample are mostly concentrated in the 
Netherlands and Germany. 
 
The performance effects of international sourcing were tested and appeared to be extremely 
limited. Neither at the firm level nor at the supplier level were any direct effects of 
internationalisation on performance detected. It appears that international sourcing is not a 
means to increase firm performance or at least that firms are not yet able to fully realise the 
potential of international sourcing. While firms can often lower production costs by sourcing 
internationally, transaction costs arise in similar quantities. Two moderating effects were 
tested. For being foreign there was no performance effect. For foreign experience (being a 
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multinational) there was a positive economic performance effect at the firm level. This implies 
multinational firms can achieve a higher profitability by cross-fertilisation of activities in 
multiple countries. 
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Chapter 8: Solving the Chinese puzzle? 
 
 
The focus of chapters 5 through 7 was on solving pieces of the puzzle. In each chapter one of 
three dimensions was investigated. However, the entire puzzle not only consists of three 
separate dimensions but also of the relations and interactions between them. In this chapter 
the three dimensions of sourcing discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7 will be re-examined as three 
parts of the same puzzle. The key question of this chapter is how the three dimensions relate 
to each other in terms of the performance impact of combining various sourcing strategies. In 
reality managerial decision-makers are unlikely to have in mind only one dimension of 
sourcing strategy at a time, in fact they will usually be concerned with all dimensions 
simultaneously. 
So in this chapter the attention is once again on the whole conceptual model as 
discussed in chapter 3 and not on its pieces. Therefore the graphical presentation of this 
chapter follows figure 3.1, which is shown below in figure 8.1. The first section focuses on the 
extent to which the three dimensions can be translated into the same concept, firm level 
performance. This section contains quantitative analyses based on combined survey and 
database data. The second section features a conceptual discussion of the interactions between 
the three dimensions of sourcing. The third section discusses the findings of this chapter.  
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Figure 8.1: basic research model. 
 
 
8.1 Comparing dimensions of sourcing 
The previous chapters all focused on one element of international sourcing strategy. In 
chapter 5 outsourcing was linked to firm performance based on both survey and CBS data. In 
chapter 6 the impact of voice relations on supplier satisfaction measures was assessed using 
the survey. Similarly the impact of international sourcing was discussed in chapter 7 based on 
survey data. These chapters generated interesting findings, sometimes because surprising 
significant effects were found, sometimes because the expected effects were not present. 
But what was not taken into consideration in chapter 6 is whether supplier 
satisfaction measures translate into performance at the firm level. Perhaps satisfaction about 
suppliers is simply an artefact of the manager’s thinking. It could also be that supplier 
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satisfaction does lead to improved performance. In chapter 7 the dependent variable was a 
perception measure with relatively low Alphas, which may have caused problems similar to 
those in chapter 5. To further improve the value of both of these chapters an analysis is 
needed, in which hard performance measures at the firm level are used, like the data from 
CBS used in chapter 5. Furthermore the basic research model presented in chapter 3 suggests 
that th e  th r e e  d imens i ons  o f  s our c ing  a r e  a l t e rna t i v e  means  t o  th e  same  end : achieving 
firm performance. If this is true, then they should also be tested as alternatives, implying that 
all three dimensions should be used in one and the same analysis. Thus there is both a 
pressing methodological and a pressing theoretical reason to conduct an integrated analysis. In 
this section this is precisely what is attempted. This section will us e  th e  CBS pe r f o rmanc e  
da ta  a s  d ep enden t  var iab l e s  wh i l e  in t r oduc ing  s ome  surv e y  da ta  a s  independen t  
var iab l e s  in an attempt to look at the effects of buyer-supplier relations and international 
sourcing as strategies to increase performance85. This implies that both sources of data will be 
used. The performance data that are used in chapter 5.1 as well as the survey data that are 
used throughout chapters 5, 6 and 7. In this chapter the models used in chapter 5.1 will be 
replicated and extended by parts of the models in chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
 
Methodological weaknesses of this analysis 
Any analysis that combines multiple sources of data has to be confronted with scepticism. Are 
the two measurements focused on the same unit? Are data compatible? Is there a time lag 
between the data sources? An attempt will now be made to answer these questions. Because 
surveys were sent to firms for which there was an exact match between CBS data and NEVI 
members, there are 180 out of 200 firms for which some kind of CBS data are available. For 
the other 20 firms there is a match but no CBS data are available for a variety of reasons. 
Since only firms with an exact match were chosen there is little concern over whether the 
units measured are the same units. Some further evidence for this was found by correlating 
the 1998 CBS data and the 2000 survey data on the amount of industrial purchasing (external 
sourcing), expressed in Dutch guilders. This generated a very high .961 correlation for 179 
firms. Concerning compatibility of data there is no reason to assume that the two sources can 
not be merged since th e  un i t s  a r e  th e  same . Also, there is nothing per se against merging 
perception data and hard data. In fact the survey used in this study like most other surveys 
combines hard data and perception data. 
The  key  p rob l em i s  in  th e  t ime  la g  b e twe en  th e  two  da ta  s our c e s . The CBS data 
were collected over the year 1998 while the survey data were collected over the year 2000. 
This makes establishing a relation more difficult and less reliable. A firm may have changed 
course over the 2-year time period. The problem can not be avoided though, since the survey 
could not be conducted retrospectively at a sufficient level of detail and the CBS data are not 
yet available for the year 200086. However, there is some indirect evidence to conclude that 
overall the firms have not changed much over this time period. In chapter 5 reference was 
                                                           
85 Note that this is technically feasible given the filtering procedure that was described in chapter 4: CBS 
data were matched with NEVI data.  
86 Conducting a survey with questions on trust, power of a supplier and other kinds of perception 
measures retrospectively can not be advised (Fowler, 1993). This will create recollection problems and 
introduce a great deal of bias in the answers. It would be somewhat similar to asking a person: ‘how did 
you feel about going to work three years ago from this very day?’ 
Solving the Chinese puzzle? 
 189
made to the high correlations between the degree of external sourcing in various years, see 
table 10 in appendix C. Year-to-year correlations for the larger sample were close to .9. This 
implies that the sourcing strategy of most firms does not change radically over the years. 
Furthermore it was noted that most firms had a relation with their major supplier of three 
years or more, providing yet another indication that sourcing strategy does not change rapidly 
over the years. 
Table 2 below provides correlations for the most recent years of CBS-based ROS 
measures of the respondent firms. This shows that there is a strongly positive relation 
between ROS figures from one year to another. This correlation is particularly high in view of 
the fact that these are percentages, not absolute values. This provides evidence to believe that 
the 1998 ROS figure provides at least an approximation of ROS in 2000, which would be the 
desired variable.  
However, it is obvious that no  causa l  r e l a t i on  can  b e  e s tab l i sh ed  using 
performance data that lie back in time. This is a problem in the sense that causality is a desired 
attribute. It is also a  prob l em in  t e rms  o f  th e  s t r eng th  o f  s ta t i s t i ca l  r e l a t i on s . Because of 
the time difference, statistical relations will tend to get weaker or much weaker. However, in 
light of the fact that all of the previous analyses showed that sourcing relations largely hold 
over time the sign of the relation would still be expected to keep its predicted direction. In this 
sense th i s  s e c t i on  p robab l y  p rov id e s  a  c ons e r va t i v e  t e s t : if a statistical relation is found it is 
likely that this relation will be stronger when properly aligned data are used. So it is obvious 
that ideally dependent data for the year 2000 or perhaps even 2001 would be used. However, 
the 2000 data will not become available until late 2002 at the earliest. Therefore the 
methodological solution that is chosen is the best solution currently available. 
 
 ROS96 ROS97 ROS98 
ROS96 1.000 
. 
174 
.747 
.000 
174 
.658 
.000 
174 
ROS97 .747 
.000 
174 
1.000 
. 
179 
.802 
.000 
179 
ROS98 .658 
.000 
174 
.802 
.000 
179 
1.000 
. 
180 
Table 8.2: Correlations between ROS figures of firms in the sample for 1996, 1997 and 1998. 
 
For the market shares of firms this data lag is less of a problem. As suggested in earlier 
chapters, a firm’s strategic performance (market position) usually holds much more steady 
over time than its profitability. Firms ’  marke t  shar e s  do  f lu c tua t e  bu t  on l y  o v e r  a  l ong e r  
p e r i od  o f  t ime .  Evidence to support this statement was sought and found. As table 3 shows 
correlations between various years are very high, implying that market shares do not change 
much between the years. This again means that 1998 market share is a strong predictor of 
2000 market share. As in chapter 5 the logarithm of the market shares of the firms was 
calculated because the market shares are exponentially distributed. In order for OLS 
regressions to work properly a logarithm has to be calculated to normalise the distribution of 
the dependent variable. Again, these are the best currently available data. 
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 LOGMARSHA96 LOGMARSHA97 LOGMARSHA98 
LOGMARSHA96 1.000 
. 
174 
.981 
.000 
174 
.970 
.000 
174 
LOGMARSHA97 .981 
.000 
174 
1.000 
. 
179 
.987 
.000 
179 
LOGMARSHA98 .970 
.000 
174 
.987 
.000 
179 
1.000 
. 
180 
Table 8.3: Correlations between logarithms of market  
shares of firms in the sample for 1996, 1997 and 1998. 
 
Thus the assumption can now be made that relations that are found in this chapter between 
sourcing and performance partly hold over time although it is not known how well they hold 
and how the causal relations run. In particular profitability is a variable that changes. A further 
assumption that needs to be made is that the type of relation with the largest supplier is 
characteristic of its relations with suppliers in general or at least has an impact on firm 
performance. Suppor t  f o r  th i s  a s sumpt i on  i s  f ound  bo th  th eo r e t i ca l l y  and  empi r i ca l l y . 
We can think of the relation with the largest supplier as a reflection of a firm’s ability to 
manage external relations. If a firm is unable to manage its relation with a supplier so 
important to its overall product it is unlikely to be able to manage relations with other parties 
any better. Similarly firms that manage relations with the largest supplier well, can probably 
manage relations with other parties decently. Therefore the relation with the largest supplier is 
an approximation of all relations with external suppliers. Empirically it was shown at the start 
of chapter 6 that relations with the largest supplier take up a substantial part of all sourcing for 
most firms in the sample. This implies that in this sample relations with the largest supplier are 
indeed often indicative of all supplier relations a firm maintains. Under these assumptions it is 
possible to regress several dimensions of sourcing strategy on the 1998 ROS variable 
(economic performance) and the logarithm of 1998 market share (strategic performance). 
 
Economic performance 
First, the correlations among the dependent and independent variables were calculated. They 
can be found in table 11 of appendix C. These correlations provide a range of interesting first 
takes on the outcomes. As chapter 5 revealed there is a negative relation between external 
sourcing and ROS. Furthermore there is the expected positive relation between voice and 
ROS. However, this relation is significant only at the 10% level, which is not a very good 
significance level for correlations. The positive effect is found but it is not very strong. Then 
there is also a positive relation between international sourcing and ROS. This relation, 
however, is completely insignificant. Furthermore three performance measures from the 
survey were included in the correlations table. As expected economic performance at the firm 
level, measuring ROS and ROI, is significantly positively related to 1998 ROS. However, this 
relation is not as strong as one would expect. This is probably again due to the lack of 
variance in the firm level economic performance measure. Furthermore both measures of 
supplier level performance are positively related to 1998 ROS. This means that being highly 
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satisfied with suppliers to some extent translates into firm profitability. Interestingly this 
relation is stronger for strategic performance at the supplier level than for economic 
performance.  
Once more mathematical formulations will be presented of the theoretical relations 
described in chapter 3. Then the statistical results will be presented. As before an overview of 
all variables can be found in table 4.37. The key  var iab l e s  o f  th e  ana l y s e s  in  th i s  s e c t i on  
a r e  e c onomi c  p e r f o rmanc e  (ROS98) ,  s t ra t e g i c  p e r f o rmanc e  (LOGMARSHA98) ,  
ex t e rna l  s our c ing  (PURRAT98) ,  vo i c e  r e l a t i on s  (VOICEREL) and  in t e rna t i ona l  
s our c ing  (FOREISOU) . 
 
The regression model for this analysis follows the basic research model for this study, as 
described in figure 1 in chapter 3. This basic model is an extended version of models applied 
in chapter 5 and is described by the following equation87: 
 
(1) ROS98 = β0 + β1 * log sales98 + β2 * log labint98 + β3 * export ratio + β4 
* industry + β5 * purinteg + β6 * percstan + β7 * firmstra + β8 * trust + β9 * 
rellength + β10 * reldevel + β11 * purrat98 + β12 * voicerel + β13 * foreisou + ε 
 
Obviously this again raises the problem faced in chapters 5, 6, and 7. Because of the limited 
sample size the number of variables has to be limited. Since the sample size is around 180 for 
this analysis, the maximum number of variables in the model should be around 20, but 
preferably less for the final model. Therefore industry was once again split into three dummy 
variables instead of tens of variables88. Then it is important to check whether the model 
presented in chapter 5, table 3, holds for this sample. This sample is obviously much smaller 
than the one presented in chapter 5 with close to 5,000 firms. A replication of the earlier 
regressions for the limited sample of 180 firms confirmed the two strongest effects of a 
negative relation between external sourcing and ROS and a positive relation between 
productivity (log labint) and ROS89. Then the full equation was run, which generated the 
results in table 4. 
 In the first model, with the whole gamut of variables, only external sourcing, with a 
strongly negative relation, and productivity, with a moderately positive relation, hold as 
significant variables. However, this is partly due to the fact that with so many variables, the 
variables tend to ‘cannibalise’ each other’s effects. Thus the model was improved along the 
same criteria as in previous chapters. The table displays two more models. The second model 
is an intermediate model in which several insignificant variables have already been removed. 
The third model is the final model, with the largest adjusted variance explained. In the second 
model foreign sourcing has been dropped since it was one of the least important explanations 
                                                           
87 Characteristics of the respondent are now dropped from the model as control variables because they 
were used to correct against bias in the dependent variable in the survey. Since the dependent variable is 
now an exact value from the database there is no reason to assume respondent characteristics of the 
survey matter much. 
88 Please note that this will decrease overall model fit as well as R2 values of the model. In fact, industry 
accounted for around 8% of the variance in ROS, which is roughly one fourth of all explained variance 
in the analyses in section 6.1. Now the industry dummies account for only a small part of all variance. 
89 Results are available upon request. 
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of profitability, which confirms the analyses in chapter 7. In the third model voice relations 
have also been dropped because although the positive relation was confirmed, there was not a 
significant relation. The third model confirms what was already shown before. External 
sourcing is negatively related to performance, and labour productivity is positively related. 
Furthermore an innovative strategy (being a prospector) pays off and being in the product 
industry is negatively related to ROS. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  -.566 .572  -.920 .359  -.859 .391 
LOGSAL98 -.084 -.881 .379 -.059 -.690 .491    
LOGLABIN .211 2.169 .032 .225 2.486 .014 .197 2.739 .007 
EXPRAT98 .040 .489 .626       
PROCINDU -.022 -.166 .868       
PRODINDU -.211 -1.557 .121 -.186 -2.573 .011 -.182 -2.563 .011 
PURINTEG .034 .456 .649       
PERCSTAN -.004 -.053 .958       
ANALYZER .067 .399 .691 .134 1.455 .148 .136 1.482 .140 
PROSPECT .137 .783 .435 .207 2.257 .025 .207 2.284 .024 
REACTOR -.039 -.284 .777       
TRUST -.045 -.481 .631 -.046 -.535 .593    
RELLENGTH .045 .602 .548       
RELGROWT .043 .522 .602       
PURRAT98 -.318 -4.282 .000 -.315 -4.386 .000 -.320 -4.591 .000 
VOICEREL .075 .822 .412 .102 1.185 .238    
FOREISOU .016 .209 .835       
 F-test: 2.949 .000 F-test: 6.192 .000 F-test: 9.635 .000 
 R2: .230 R2: .226 R2: .217 
 Adj. R2: .152 Adj. R2: .189 Adj. R2: .194 
Table 8.4: regression models for explaining ROS98 incorporating external  
sourcing, voice relations and international sourcing. N = 175 / 179 / 180. 
 
Thus no direct statistical evidence can be found that voice relations are positively related to 
financial performance. On the other hand it is well possible that the relation exists given the 
two-year time gap in the data. The correlations provided evidence for a positive relation. 
Additional indirect evidence can be gathered by looking at the impact of supplier performance 
on profitability. In chapter 6 it was established that voice is a crucial mechanism to improve 
supplier performance. If supplier performance is positively related to ROS then this implies 
that improving supplier performance is a way of increasing profitability and voice is an 
important mechanism to improve supplier performance.  
This is what is attempted in the next analysis, in table 5, where supplier performance 
is tested as a possible explanation of firm performance. Thus the question is asked whether 
being satisfied with suppliers is positively related to profitability. For this analysis the basic 
model of table 3 in chapter 5 was extended with both types of supplier satisfaction measures. 
The analysis shows that while economic performance does not matter much, strategic 
performance of suppliers is marginally positively related to profitability. Again given the time 
lag it is likely that the real relation between supplier performance and firm performance is 
different, most probably stronger. This provides preliminary evidence that managing suppliers 
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well can indeed lead to increased profitability of firms. This effect, however, appears to be 
small in comparison to the performance effects of outsourcing and innovation inside the firm. 
 
 Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  -.516 .607 
LOGSAL98 -.032 -.343 .732 
LOGLABIN .186 1.907 .058 
EXPRAT98 .029 .367 .714 
PURRAT98 -.315 -4.331 .000 
ECONPERF -.048 -.561 .576 
STRATPERF .147 1.703 .090 
PRODINDU -.190 -1.470 .144 
PROCINDU .019 .146 .884 
 F-test: 5.301 .000 
 R2: .206 
 Adj. R2: .168 
Table 8.5: extended model for explaining ROS98  
including supplier satisfaction measures. N = 172. 
 
Strategic performance 
Turning now to strategic performance the relation between supplier relations, 
internationalisation and ‘real’ market share will be investigated. The correlations among the 
independent variables, survey performance measures and market share can be found in table 
10 in appendix C. The only significant correlation between the independent variables and the 
logarithm of 1998 market share is with international sourcing. Later regression analyses will 
have to show whether this is an independent effect or a consequence of the fact that larger 
firms source more from abroad, which was apparent in chapter 7. There is a limited positive 
correlation between economic and strategic supplier performance and market share.  
Finally there is also a positive, but very small correlation between strategic 
performance at the firm level and the 1998 market share. Since these are similar measures, this 
raises questions. There are four possible explanations for the lack of correlation. First, the 
time lag between 1998 and 2000 was mentioned before but that does not seem to play a big 
part. Second, the lack of variance in scale measures can also cause a lack of correlation with 
other variables as witnessed in previous chapters. The third reason could be that strategic 
performance at the firm level is measured as both market share and sales growth in the survey. 
The inclusion of sales growth is likely to cause the relation to become weaker because it is 
clearly imperfectly correlated with market share. Fourth, and most importantly, while 1998 
market share in the database is measured in terms of a 3-digit industry, strategic performance 
in the survey is measured compared against direct competitors. The 3-digit industry in which a 
firm operates obviously not only contains direct competitors. Consider a business unit in the 
chemicals industry. When asked to compare its performance against its three largest 
competitors (as in the survey) it will compare itself to three other producers of the same 
product, say polypropylene. It is in fact quite unlikely that these competitors are located in the 
Netherlands. However, in the database a comparison is made against firms that are all located 
in the Netherlands and may be operating in a slightly different segment of the market or 
produce a different product. In fact, competition between business units is perhaps more 
Chapter 8 
 194
likely to occur at the 4 or 5-digit level. For practical reasons, especially because the number of 
firms in each 4 and 5-digit level industry is limited, data are not available. The latter two 
reasons appear to be the major reasons for the apparent lack of a correlation. 
 
The regression model applied to assess the impact on market share is similar to equation 1 
presented above, but also accounts for the different needs of regressions on market share 
provided in chapter 5. The dependent variable has of course been altered: 
 
(2) LOGMARSH98 = β0 + β1 * log labint98 + β2 * log indcon + β3 * export 
ratio + β4 * industry + β5 * purinteg + β6 * percstan + β7 * firmstra + β8 * 
trust + β9 * rellength + β10 * reldevel + β11 * purrat98 + β12 * voicerel + β13 * 
foreisou + ε 
 
First it was assessed whether the basic model found in chapter 5 (table 7) is more or less valid 
for the firms in the sample as well. It is a valid model, although it is not as strong a model as 
in chapter 5. The effects of exports become less significant in this model. The model can be 
used as a good basis for expanding the model by incorporating other variables. Table 6 shows 
the results for this model, the right hand model being an improved version of the left-hand 
model. There are quite surprising results here. As noted in chapter 5 the relation between 
external sourcing and market share is quite weak. However, the relation between voice 
relations and market share is weak as well, which is somewhat unexpected. Both variables are 
quite insignificant, meaning that even without the 2-year time lag there probably would not be 
any relation. Even more unexpected is the strongly positive relation between foreign sourcing 
and market share, which does not seem in line with earlier findings. Additional analyses 
showed that the effects could be explained as ‘size effects’. One of the findings from chapter 7 
was that larger firms source more from abroad. Since market share is of course a combination 
of size and industry, this explains partially what is going on here90. Some additional effects 
were found. As expected industry plays an important role in explaining market share. 
Interestingly having an integrated purchasing department corresponds with lower market 
shares. And the length of the relation with suppliers as well as whether this relation has 
improved over time are additional positive factors of influence here. 
 
                                                           
90 The correlation between foreign sourcing and logged sales is just as strong as the correlation between 
foreign sourcing and logged market share. This suggests that the effect that was found in this regression 
has little to do with market share per se but is an artefact of sales (firm size). If it were an effect really 
related to market share, the correlation with market share should have been stronger than with sales 
because market share is a mix of industry and sales. Apparently adding the industry to the mix (market 
share) does not alter the strength of the correlation with foreign sourcing. 
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 Stand. β  t-value Sig. Stand. β  t-value Sig. 
(Constant)  -3.630 .000  -3.627 .000 
LOGLABIN .298 4.272 .000 .298 4.424 .000 
LOGINCON .318 4.710 .000 .320 4.815 .000 
EXPRAT .086 1.241 .216 .088 1.267 .207 
PROCINDU -.399 -3.588 .000 -.402 -3.635 .000 
PRODINDU -.189 -1.616 .108 -.192 -1.661 .099 
PURINTEG -.228 -3.474 .001 -.229 -3.502 .001 
PERCSTAN -.087 -1.373 .172 -.091 -1.445 .150 
ANALYZER -.167 -1.158 .249 -.166 -1.159 .248 
PROSPECT -.158 -1.043 .299 -.159 -1.059 .291 
REACTOR -.199 -1.693 .092 -.199 -1.702 .091 
TRUST -.091 -1.133 .259 -.067 -.979 .329 
RELLENGTH .160 2.519 .013 .163 2.578 .011 
RELGROWT .150 2.093 .038 .160 2.297 .023 
PURRAT -.003 -.041 .967    
VOICEREL .045 .571 .569    
FOREISOU .172 2.642 .009 .171 2.646 .009 
 F-test: 7.460 .000 F-test: 8.591 .000 
 R2: .430 R2: .429 
 Adj. R2: .373 Adj. R2: .379 
Table 8.6: regression models for explaining logged 1998 market share incorporating  
external sourcing, voice relations and international sourcing. N = 175 / 175. 
 
Findings 
The findings put forward in this chapter have to be looked upon very critically. Lack of fitting 
data implied that all effects that were found may be surrogate effects or may indeed turn out 
to be opposite to what they were found to be here. Given those severe limitations table 9 
summarises the findings. 
 Evidence was again found for hypothesis 1b, of a negative relation between 
outsourcing and economic performance. This implies hypothesis 1a is rejected. No evidence 
was found in this chapter for a relation between outsourcing and strategic performance 
(hypothesis 2). There was some weak evidence for hypothesis 3b, a positive relation between 
voice relations and economic performance, meaning hypothesis 3a of a negative relation was 
rejected. No evidence was found for hypothesis 4, a positive relation between voice relations 
and strategic performance. Similarly there was no evidence for hypothesis 5, a positive relation 
between international sourcing and economic performance. There was evidence of hypothesis 
6, a positive relation between international sourcing and strategic performance. Furthermore 
the positive relation between innovation and economic performance was replicated, this time 
with measures on firm strategy. And long relations with suppliers as well as relations that 
improve over time are associated with higher strategic performance. 
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 Economic performance (ROS) Strategic performance (marsha)  
Independent 
variables 
• Outsourcing is strongly 
negatively related 
• Voice relations are weakly 
positively related 
• Foreign sourcing is positively related 
Other effects • Innovative strategies are 
positively related 
• Industry effects 
• Long relations with suppliers are positively related 
• Improved relations with suppliers are positively 
related 
• Industry effects 
Table 8.9: Summary of significant findings from the combined database and survey. 
 
 
8.2 Linking dimensions of sourcing 
Although outsourcing, supplier relations and internationalisation may have been separated in 
much of the academic literature these three dimensions of sourcing do not exist independently 
in managerial thinking. In fact sourcing managers are constantly weighing various dimensions 
of sourcing strategy: “If I outsource more, will I still be able to devote enough attention to all 
of my suppliers? How do I set up effective co-operation with an international supplier?” 
Thus it may well be worthwhile to look into interaction effects between various 
dimensions of sourcing. Is there an interaction between various dimensions of sourcing? If so, 
what are the directions of such interaction effects? For future research purposes this section 
presents a conceptual model to think about interactions between dimensions of sourcing. First 
the three separate interactions are discussed and then the model is shown graphically. 
 
Outsourcing – voice relations 
Firms that source externally transfer a part of their rent-generating potential to outside parties. 
If an item is sourced internally firms can improve the item themselves. Once it is sourced 
externally, it is an outside supplier that carries primary responsibility for the quality, price, 
innovation, marketability and so forth of the item. Thus the competitiveness of the firm is co-
determined by outside suppliers. 
 
(1 )  F i rms  tha t  ou t s our c e  mor e  w i l l  b e  mor e  d ep enden t  on  ou t s id e  supp l i e r s  f o r  su c c e s s .  
 
The performance effects of voice relations were investigated conceptually in chapter 3 and 
empirically in chapter 5. The analyses revealed that voice relations have a positive effect on 
relational performance. Firms that set up voice relations with suppliers report higher supplier 
satisfaction. In section 8.1 this analysis was extended to show that voice relations can also 
have a positive effect on a firm’s profitability, meaning not its perceived performance but its 
real performance. 
 
(2 )  Voi c e  r e l a t i on s  l ead  t o  in c r ea s ed  r e la t i on  p e r f o rmanc e  and  can  l ead  t o  in c r ea s ed  
f i rm pe r f o rmanc e .  
 
Demands posed upon management change over time. Previously, managers had to be able to 
steer internal production activities (operations management), now they increasingly have to 
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deal with the management of their suppliers (relationship management). As a firm increases its 
dependence on outside relations, it will become more experienced in dealing with these 
outside suppliers. Thus, the ability to manage these suppliers increases over time. On the 
other hand the number of external suppliers, or at least their importance, increases as well. 
Thus managers are required to increase their ex t e rna l  span  o f  c on t r o l . They need to manage 
more suppliers within the same time frame. 
 
(3 )  Cont rad i c t i on :  f i rms  tha t  ou t s our c e  mor e ,  w i l l  hav e  mor e  expe r i en c e  in  d ea l ing  
w i th  ou t s id e  supp l i e r s .  Howev e r ,  th e y  w i l l  a l s o  n e ed  t o  manag e  a  w id e r  rang e  o f  
supp l i e r s .  
 
Given this wider range of external suppliers to be managed under conditions of heavy 
outsourcing the question becomes what qualities are needed to manage outsourcing in such a 
way as to increase performance. This is where voice relations again come in. Only those firms 
that are able to manage outside suppliers well, are able to use outsourcing as a performance 
enhancing mechanism. Firms that are good at setting up voice relations can create advantage 
from external sourcing. This coincides with what was discussed in chapter 5: choosing to 
outsource as a response to not being well organised internally, is usually a wrong choice. 
 
(4 )  F i rms  tha t  a r e  b e t t e r  in  c r ea t ing  vo i c e  r e l a t i on s ,  and  th e r eby  improv ing  
p e r f o rmanc e ,  can  ou t s our c e  mor e  a c t i v i t i e s .  
 
Outsourcing – international sourcing 
As noted above, firms that outsource many activities are in need of more suppliers or larger 
suppliers. The volumes they source increase, implying they need suppliers with a large 
production capacity. Furthermore they will also need all kinds of different and specialised 
suppliers. 
 
(1 )  As  f i rms  ou t s our c e  mor e  th e y  a r e  in  n e ed  o f  mor e  supp l i e r s  t o  d e l i v e r  th e i r  w id e r  
rang e  o f  n e ed s  and  la r g e r  s our c ed  vo lumes .  
 
To find these additional suppliers, firms have to increase their pool of potential suppliers. 
They often have to look beyond their established base of suppliers. That is, they need to 
search beyond the confines of existing social networks. Such open searches are more likely to 
lead to international suppliers. These international suppliers often possess one of two 
advantages. Either they are highly specialised in terms of knowledge, offering products that 
can not be found locally or they are highly specialised in terms of production capacities and 
the ability to produce large quantities at low prices. 
 
(2 )  Addi t i ona l  supp l i e r s ,  par t i cu la r l y  supp l i e r s  o f  sp e c ia l i s ed  goods  and  la r g e  
vo lumes ,  a r e  o f t en  f ound  abroad .  
 
When firms do internationalise their searches, this implies that they can increase their range of 
potential suppliers. This increased potential has obvious advantages. It also carries a 
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disadvantage in that the costs of evaluating such foreign suppliers will be higher than the 
evaluation costs for well-known domestic suppliers. 
 
(3 )  In c lud ing  in t e rna t i ona l  supp l i e r s  in  a  s ea r ch  in c r ea s e s  th e  rang e  o f  po t en t ia l  
supp l i e r s  bu t  a l s o  induc e s  h i gh e r  e va lua t i on  c o s t s .  
 
Voice relations – international sourcing 
Again drawing on the evidence in chapters 6 and 8.1, voice relations are a successful means to 
lower the total costs of producing and transacting. They form an effective means of 
governance in situations where long-term commitments and the ability to co-operate are 
important properties. 
 
(1 )  Voi c e  r e l a t i on s  w i th  ex t e rna l  supp l i e r s ,  when  su c c e s s fu l ,  l owe r  th e  t o ta l  c o s t s  o f  
p roduc ing  and  t ransa c t ing .  
 
Chapter 3 mostly introduced the advantages of international sourcing when hypotheses 5 and 
6 were discussed. While there are these advantages, there are also important drawbacks, which 
were revealed in chapter 7. International sourcing may be an effective way of finding low-cost 
or high quality producers. But it is also more difficult to maintain relations with an 
international supplier. Thus, there is a production cost advantage associated with international 
sourcing but also a transaction cost disadvantage. 
 
(2 )  In t e rna t i ona l  s our c ing  r e la t i on s  su f f e r  f r om par t i cu la r l y  h i gh  t ransa c t i on  c o s t s .  
 
These high transaction costs are caused by geographic separation, unfamiliarity between the 
partners and differences in institutional environments. These conditions also make it more 
difficult to construct voice relations. While value may be created for both partners through 
voice relations, establishing the necessary trust is hard. 
 
(3 )  Se t t in g  up  vo i c e  r e l a t i on s  w i th  in t e rna t i ona l  supp l i e r s  i s  d i f f i cu l t  due  t o  d i f f e r en t  
g e o g raph i c ,  r e l a t i ona l  and  in s t i tu t i ona l  chara c t e r i s t i c s  o f  th e  buy e r  and  supp l i e r .  
 
However, given the possibility of voice relations to lower these transaction costs associated 
with international sourcing, voice relations can be effective in the international context. With 
much more changing relationships, of the exit type, international sourcing is often not 
productive given the many investments in logistics and other activities needed up front. 
Creating a voice relation with an international partner may be a very useful route to 
sustainable competitive advantage. 
 
(4 )  Voi c e  r e l a t i on s  w i th  in t e rna t i ona l  supp l i e r s  can  b e  a  par t i cu la r l y  e f f e c t i v e  means  
t o  l owe r  th e  t ransa c t i on  c o s t s  a s s o c ia t ed  w i th  in t e rna t i ona l  s our c ing .  
 
Combining these notions leads to an understanding of how the three dimensions of sourcing 
interact: a new model is obtained. A graphical version of this model is summarised in figure 1 
below. 
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Figure 8.1: An integral picture of sourcing strategy. 
 
 
8.3 Discussion 
In this chapter an attempt was made to draw comparisons between three dimensions of 
sourcing in terms of their performance impact. Furthermore some interactions between these 
three dimensions were posited. Several interesting effects were found. First the direct effects 
will be discussed and then the interaction model. 
 
External sourcing relates negatively to economic performance and is hardly related to strategic 
performance. This effect was discussed at length in chapter 5 and this discussion will not be 
repeated here. The strength of the effect is confirmed by the fact that the highest possible 
significance levels are maintained for the much smaller sample of 180 firms used in this 
chapter. When a positive effect between external sourcing and strategic performance was 
found in chapter 5, it was already suggested this was a marginal effect. This is confirmed by 
the fact that this effect disappears for the smaller sample in this chapter. 
Effects were also found when performance of the largest supplier was related to firm 
performance. Having a well performing supplier in terms of innovation, competence 
development and networking is positively related to ROS. Since these are long term 
objectives, it is reasonable to suggest that this effect holds over time. Economic supplier 
performance is different in this respect in the sense that it may fluctuate more over time. 
Satisfaction with reliability and quality may even differ per batch of products. This could help 
explain the lack of a finding, since there is a two-year time gap in between the measurements. 
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As demonstrated at length in chapter 5 innovation matters when explaining a firm’s financial 
performance. Chapter 8 found additional evidence for this point of view because innovative 
firm strategies (prospectors) outperformed non-innovative strategies. It appears that the 
positive relation between long term supplier goals and financial performance of the firm 
shows that innovation and competence effects coming from a relation with suppliers may also 
help the firm. This is consistent with the relational rent argument (Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
Then there is a positive link between voice relations and economic performance. 
This relation was found in the survey data in chapter 6 and confirmed in this chapter, 
although quite marginally. If a firm is able to construct co-operative relations with suppliers, it 
obtains higher economic performance. Co-operative relations with suppliers are an expression 
of a firm’s ability to manage external relations. Firms that are good at managing suppliers may 
also be good at managing relations with customers, governments or other stakeholders. Again, 
as this relation was discussed at length in chapter 6, no further discussion is necessary now. 
The relation between voice relations and strategic performance could not be replicated in this 
chapter. This relation does have the appropriate sign though. This suggests the smaller sample 
size may be the cause for the lack of a finding. 
Furthermore there is a positive link between foreign sourcing and market share in 
the tests conducted in this chapter. This link, however, appears to be a size effect more than 
anything else, as additional analyses showed. Larger firms source more from abroad for a 
variety of reasons, which were mentioned in chapter 7. Thus the question of causality is raised. 
It seems that reversed causality is the key explanation of this finding and not the fact that 
there is a large difference between the perception and hard data in this respect. No effect was 
found for the relation between foreign sourcing and economic performance, like in chapter 7. 
The probable causes were established in the discussion in chapter 7. This provides additional 
evidence that the shift from perception to hard data probably does not lie at the heart of the 
different finding between foreign sourcing and strategic performance. If this were the case the 
foreign sourcing – economic performance relation would probably change too. 
 
In section 8.2 attention was shifted to the interactions between the three dimensions. No 
formal theoretical model was developed yet but the section sketched the outlines of such a 
model. The data currently used do not allow for any formal tests of these interactions, nor 
were hypotheses formed on the basis of which this could be done. However, the conceptual 
discussion confirmed two important points. The first point is that in reality and in the 
manager’s mind sourcing decisions contain multiple dimensions, which should not be seen as 
isolated issues. Again, as noted in chapters 1 and 2, most of the sourcing literature focuses 
exclusively on one dimension or the other, although there have been exceptions fairly recently. 
For example Takeishi (2001) explicitly links the importance of creating valuable supplier 
relations to the phenomenon of outsourcing because it is a current consideration among 
firms. An important step forward for the sourcing literature would be to think more 
holistically and to explicitly consider comparisons and links between dimensions of sourcing. 
The second point is that there do exist important interactions between the three dimensions. 
As firms outsource more, the importance of supplier management to their success in the 
marketplace increases (Takeishi, 2001). Firms that are better at supplier management are able 
to outsource more before damaging core functions. Voice relations are hard to form with 
foreign suppliers. On the other hand, if a voice relation with a foreign supplier can be 
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established this can lead to a competitive edge. Outsourcing firms may have to turn to foreign 
sources to obtain specialised goods or benefit from large-scale operations. On the other hand 
including such foreign suppliers in a supplier search increases the range of suppliers and 
promotes further competition among suppliers. 
 
 
Chapter summary 
Chapter 8 attempted to integrate the three dimensions of sourcing. It featured regressions that 
built upon a combination of survey and database data as well as a conceptual discussion of the 
interactions between dimensions. The empirical analysis in this chapter was fraught with 
methodological difficulties, which were discussed. The combined analysis upheld the negative 
effect of external sourcing on profitability as it was discussed in chapter 5 despite the smaller 
numbers in this analysis. However, the positive relation between external sourcing and market 
share disappeared. Furthermore there was an indication of a positive relation between voice 
relations and ‘hard’ performance of the firm in the form of return on sales, although there was 
no significant evidence, which appears connected to the methodological difficulties described. 
Supplier satisfaction rates were shown to be a significant positive contributor to profitability. 
A final effect was the positive relation between international sourcing and market share. 
However, it was established that this was likely a surrogate of larger firms sourcing more 
internationally. 
 
The discussion of interactions between the three dimensions of sourcing strategy generated 
some insights for further research. The interaction between external sourcing and voice is the 
most important one. Firms that are good at developing voice relations with external suppliers 
benefit more from outsourcing. That is, they can outsource more without facing negative 
consequences. Those firms that outsource more will also become fairly dependent on their 
ability to manage outside suppliers. A similar argument applies between internationalisation 
and voice relations. Constructing voice relations with international suppliers will be far more 
difficult than with local suppliers. But if a firm is able to construct such relations, the 
transaction costs attached to sourcing internationally can decrease substantially. Finally, firms 
that outsource much will be searching for suppliers internationally. They have a need for a 
larger pool of potential suppliers. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 
The previous 8 chapters have dealt with the status of the literature on sourcing strategy, a 
conceptual model to look at some additional issues in sourcing, a description of methods and, 
over the last four chapters, an overview of empircal results. In this chapter the findings from 
these last four chapters will be placed in the perspective of the literature. The conclusions will 
particularly focus on what comes out of this study in terms of recommendations for the 
sourcing literature. 
The conclusions contain only two separate sections. First, the limitations of the study 
are mentioned in section 9.1. Then in section 9.2 the academic implications of this study will 
be sketched along the three dimensions of sourcing and for sourcing strategy as a whole. 
Several future research extensions are also suggested in section 9.2.  
 
 
9.1 Limitations 
In the empirical chapters the methodological limitations of the study were already described. 
What follows now is an overview of these limitations as well as some general limitations of 
this research. 
 
Methods 
There are several methodological imperfections in this study. Most importantly the part of the 
survey dealing with internal versus external sourcing was not useful because of a measurement 
problem. This problem was identified and explained but could not be repaired. The 
conclusion drawn in chapter 5 was that the survey results on internal and external sourcing 
were not reliable. That is, they can not be used to draw entirely reliable conclusions with 
regards to performance. A smaller problem identified in the survey was the relatively low 
reliability values on some of the measures. These low reliabilities sometimes led to a lack of 
findings and at other points cast findings in doubt. 
 Besides these measurement problems, there are the usual limitations associated with 
the use of a certain data source. Case studies tend to be very thick in description but often 
lack the appropriate data to test a proposition. This is certainly true for the case studies 
presented in this study. Survey data have a solid level of detail but it is often not possible to go 
beyond perception measures for many variables, which is again true for the survey presented 
here. Perception measures have the disadvantage that the answers contain the respondent’s 
bias, something which this study could only partially control for. Then there was a database 
that was used to study the results of a large set of firms. While such databases are often rich in 
terms of the number of observations they often lack detailed measures. The problems 
associated with the measure for asset specificity in this database are an illustration. 
 Further methodological problems were found in the execution of the regression 
analyses in chapters 5 through 8. These problems were especially related to issues of 
multicollinearity, perfect correlations and the normal distribution of the dependent variable. 
Solutions for these problems were searched and found within the chapters. In general there 
do not appear to be major limitations stemming from the resulting regression models. 
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General 
An obvious limitation of this study is its geographical delineation. Because the Netherlands 
was chosen as the empirical testing ground, not all results may be transferable to other places 
in the world. The best way to find out what findings are location specific is of course to 
replicate the research elsewhere. Since this study is already a replication of other studies, the 
main findings on voice relations do seem to hold across locations. This study further confirms 
some results of other studies on external sourcing, suggesting there may be some validity 
across boundaries there as well. The dimension of foreign sourcing and performance has not 
been researched much and here a replication elsewhere would definitely be desirable. Practical 
and time considerations prohibited sending out the survey to multiple countries. Such a cross-
European survey would in itself be a desirable project and may be a future research activity. 
 Despite these limitations to this study, it seems fair to say that several theoretical and 
methodological shortcomings of other studies that were described in the literature review, 
have been overcome. In that sense this study presents a step forward in the domain of 
sourcing research. Several dimensions of sourcing were connected and Europe, in particular 
the Netherlands, proved to be a fruitful testing ground for ideas developed and researched 
elsewhere. 
 
 
9.2 Implications and possible extensions 
Several implications for research and interesting avenues for future extensions emerge from 
this study. 
 
Internal versus external sourcing 
Many academics and consultants have suggested outsourcing as a route to increasing firm 
performance pointing to arguments like increased focus on core competencies, more 
‘strategic’ flexibility, lower fixed costs, the strength of the price mechanism, benefiting from 
best-in-world suppliers, the virtues of virtual organisations and more. Examples and best 
practice cases were found to support this point of view. However, most of these studies 
downplayed the advantages of being vertically integrated that were more prominent in the 
literature until the 1980s. These are arguments like internal synergies and interfaces, 
controlling opportunism through the authority mechanism, easier learning and innovation and 
others. Therefore th e r e  i s  a  l a ck  o f  ba lan c e  in  th e  ou t s our c ing  l i t e ra tur e  in  r e c en t  
y ea r s . 
Furthermore i n  th e  d e s i gn  o f  s tud i e s  on  ou t s our c ing  two  impor tan t  ing r ed i en t s  
we r e  mi s s ing . The first missing ingredient is non-perception data that can be analysed 
statistically. Most studies rely on cases. If generalisation is attempted through statistical studies 
these studies used perception data as the dependent variable. Obviously both of these 
methods are useful in the overall research process but they should be complemented by 
statistical studies of hard data. The second ingredient concerns measurement over time. Most 
studies look at outsourcing results at one point in time only. This does not always lead to 
reliable results. It is well possible a firm is satisfied with an outsourcing operation in the short 
term to then encounter problems in the longer term. 
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In this study these problems were overcome. This study indeed shows that the balance 
between outsourcing and internalisation may also have gone missing in practice. Firms  in  th e  
sampl e  hav e  ou t s our c ed  t oo  much  and  th e r e f o r e  expe r i en c e  a  l owe r  p e r f o rmanc e . Being 
as lean as possible is not necessarily good for a firm’s competitiveness in the marketplace. For 
the outsourcing literature this has several implications. First it seems that th e  ba lan c e  
b e twe en  ar gumen t s  f o r  and  aga in s t  ou t s our c ing  shou ld  b e  r e s t o r ed . While there is a case 
to be made for outsourcing under certain conditions, this does not mean outsourcing is a 
good option under almost any condition. Often-heard riddles like ‘outsource everything that is 
non-core’ are probably not a good piece of advice. There is not so much of a need for new 
theoretical arguments. Instead what the literature needs is a less lopsided focus. Second, th e r e  
i s  a  n e ed  f o r  mor e  s tud i e s  w i th  mul t ip l e  y ea r s  o f  da ta  to examine whether relations hold 
over time. The studies examined in the literature rely on cross-sectional data and this poses 
limitations on their findings. In this study it could be established that the main patterns were 
consistent over the 1993-1998 time period. Third, it is useful to distinguish between different 
types of performance because ou t s our c ing  i s  mos t  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t ed  t o  f inanc ia l  measur e s . 
Outsourcing does not seem to alter a firm’s position in the market so much but seems to lead 
to decreased financial performance because firms have outsourced too much. Therefore it 
appears future studies, including those in other research settings, ought to concentrate in 
particular on this outsourcing-profitability relation. Fourth, r e s ea r ch  tha t  in c lude s  
mode ra to r s  on  th e  ou t s our c ing -p e r f o rmanc e  r e la t i on  r emains  th e  mos t  in t e r e s t in g  work . 
Outsourcing decisions are heavily influenced by a set of firm, industry and nation specific 
factors and excluding those from the analysis limits the usefulness of any findings. While asset 
specificity and uncertainty have long been seen as key indicators of the outsourcing decision, 
the time has now come to also look into industries of different technology levels. Such studies 
comparing high-tech and low-tech industries, which would be possible on the basis of the data 
presented here, would increase the understanding of when an outsourcing strategy is 
beneficial. Obviously, it would also be interesting to look into the sourcing behaviour of so-
called dot.com firms and assess whether their very disintegrated firm structures are in fact an 
effective means to improve performance or a reflection of a lack of internal capabilities. 
 
Exit versus voice relations 
Much has been written about the potential benefits of partnership or voice relations with 
suppliers. More recently some authors have pointed at the potential costs of such relations 
and the accompanying networks. Most authors writing on partnership relations do not 
distinguish between short term and long term goals of the firm. This study explicitly set out to 
look at both kinds of effects and search for variations in how relations contribute to these 
goals of firms. Furthermore it engaged in the discussion whether effective supplier relations 
translate into overall firm performance. This led to several interesting observations and some 
additions to the literature. 
 
First, and unsurprisingly, vo i c e  i s  a  n e c e s sa r y  c ond i t i on  f o r  h i gh  supp l i e r  p e r f o rmanc e  
bo th  in  th e  sho r t  t e rm and  th e  l ong  t e rm . A co-operative relation between the buyer and 
supplier is needed to increase relational rents. This confirms that assertions made by the 
literature on this topic are correct. If a firm wants to be satisfied with its main supplier, it 
needs to design relations in such a way as to maximise benefits. Second, and this does not 
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really come as a surprise either, t ru s t  and  vo i c e  a r e  s t r ong l y  in t e r r e la t ed  phenomena . This 
is another confirmation of previous literature on trust, partnership relations and performance. 
Parties are more likely to engage in co-operative behaviour if they trust each other. If there is 
mutual value creation through a relation besides the presence of trust, these parties will engage 
in voice relations. Third, as with the outsourcing issue, i t  i s  u s e fu l  t o  d i s t in gu i sh  b e twe en  
sho r t - t e rm and  l ong - t e rm goa l s  o f  a  r e la t i on .  The characteristics necessary to obtain both 
types of goals differ. This is something the literature on this topic has not really addressed yet. 
In order to optimise short-term goals, related to efficient supply chain management, it is 
sufficient to have a voice relation and trust in the partner. And being relatively more powerful 
than suppliers helps a sourcing firm, because power is a mechanism to extract short-term 
performance from suppliers. In the long term a different picture emerges. First, power is not a 
useful moderator to extract rents, mostly because of asymmetric value to the partners. Second, 
voice is still a necessary but no longer a sufficient condition to obtain performance in the long 
run. Another necessary characteristic is a real commitment to a supplier. Without such loyalty, 
joint innovation, capability building and network formation are hard to achieve. The literature 
on supplier relations should take this distinction between short term and long term 
performance into account in forthcoming studies. The fourth observation is that supp l i e r  
p e r f o rmanc e  and  t o  s ome  ex t en t  a l s o  vo i c e  r e l a t i on s  t rans la t e  in t o  hard  f inanc ia l  
r e tu rns .  The literature on this topic is mostly limited to an analysis of perception or 
intermediary performance measures. Rarely has it been proven that handling supplier relations 
well leads to financial gains. This study provided indications that satisfaction with joint 
innovation, capabilities and network building pays off in terms of profitability. Although 
methodological issues warrant some concern over these findings, this is an addition to the 
supplier relations literature that helps strengthen the voice argument. Furthermore it proves 
that attempts to improve supplier performance are certainly not in vein. Designing supplier 
relations in an appropriate manner helps a firm to achieve its goals. A next step is to remove 
those methodological concerns or to replicate these results elsewhere. 
 
Domestic versus international sourcing 
The rise of international sourcing as a research theme and a trend among practitioners is often 
associated with the cost saving and performance improving nature of international sourcing. 
Much has been written about the possibilities of electronics firms to source from South East 
Asia or the production potential of the car industry in Central and Eastern Europe. So far the 
literature has had difficulties quantifying these results or even making them tangible. Direct 
tests of the performance effects of internationalising sourcing are missing. This study has 
attempted to fill this void and several points of interest emerged. 
 
The earlier working title of this study was ”Global sourcing: fad or fact”. This leads to the first 
observation: mos t  s our c ing  i s  no t  g l oba l  in  na tur e . Important patterns of intra-regional 
sourcing exist, for example from Germany to the Netherlands in this study. And foreign firms 
source more from their respective home countries. Larger firms are more likely to source 
internationally as well. But generally speaking the most common pattern of sourcing is from 
within a Triad or other economic region. For the literature on this topic this implies that 
global sourcing should be seen as the exception and not as the rule. Currently, global sourcing 
can not be established as a general fact. Second, th i s  s tudy  d id  no t  f ind  any  causa l  
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pe r f o rmanc e  l ink be twe en  in t e rna t i ona l  s our c ing  and  supp l i e r  p e r f o rmanc e  o r  f i rm 
pe r f o rmanc e . Although there was one positive finding in chapter 8 to do with market share, 
this is best explained as an artefact of large firms sourcing more internationally. Otherwise no 
direct effects could be proven. International sourcing is perhaps best seen as a phenomenon 
that occurs within industries. As an industry discovers a new and improved source, all firms in 
that industry flock to that source, implying that this source is not a key to competitive 
advantage. Third, th e  t r end  t owards  in t e rna t i ona l  s our c ing  in s id e  th e  EU de s c r ib ed  in  
th i s  s tudy  c on f i rms  Europe  has  b e c ome  one  marke tp la c e  f o r  manu fa c tu r ing  goods . 
There do not appear to be any major barriers limiting sourcing from within the European 
Union. In fact, almost all manufacturing firms in the Netherlands operate in the European 
market and not the Dutch market. This is obviously a change from earlier times, induced by 
both market and institutional developments. 
 
Global sourcing strategy as a Chinese puzzle 
To recapitulate from previous chapters one final point: g l oba l  s our c ing  s t ra t e g y  i s  a  
mu l t id imens i ona l  p rob l em tha t  i s  b e s t  approa ched  by  c ompar ing  and  l ink ing  var i ous  
d imens i ons . In this study, outsourcing, supplier relations and supplier internationalisation 
were presented as three dimensions of global sourcing strategy. By recognising that a variety 
of managerial sourcing decisions exists, which are taken interdependently, the sourcing 
literature can take one step further in understanding this Chinese puzzle and moves a step 
closer to a realistic view of the puzzle. 
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Appendix A: Scales 
 
 
This appendix describes the development of the measures in the survey. The original 
measures by other authors as they were used in English91 are provided here as well as 
translations of the items that were designed during the course of survey development. 
 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
SOURCING 
A translation was made of the sourcing strategy measure of Murray, Kotabe and Wildt 
(1995a): 
• The percent of the total value of non-standardized components in the product (in your 
purchase price) currently supplied by internal members of the parent system 
In the light of this study it appeared better to reverse the question and ask for the percentage 
supplied by external suppliers. This was more consistent with the remainder of the survey. 
 
INTERNATIONAL SOURCING 
No directly applicable measures were available. Thus a question was developed to assess the 
extent of international sourcing. Respondents were asked: 
 
• What percentage of the total purchasing value for the product is purchased in ….. 
 
Respondents were then given a total of 12 different possibilities. The cumulative value of 
these 12 possibilities had to be 100%. The 12 possibilities were Netherlands, Belgium / 
Luxembourg, Denmark / Finland / Sweden / Norway, Germany / Switzerland / Austria, 
France / Spain / Italy / Portugal, Great Britain / Ireland, Greece, Central and Eastern 
Europe, United States / Canada / Australia, Japan, rest of Asia, rest of world. 
 
These 12 categories were chosen based on expected theoretical differences between a) the 
Netherlands and the rest of the world as domestic and foreign sources, b) different cultural 
blocs determining the extent of homogeneity ([Hofstede, 1980 #568]; Kogut & Singh, 1988) 
and c) different institutional environments in the form of the European and other trading and 
economic blocs.  
 
ELECTRONIC SOURCING 
No directly applicable measures for electronic web-based applications in sourcing relations 
were available in the literature. Thus a question was developed to assess the usage and extent 
of usage of four web-based applications. 
                                                           
91 Many authors do not explicitly provide measures. John (1984) for instance only provides examples of 
measures while Helper’s (1991) measures can only be derived indirectly. Others provide questions that 
are out of context like Dyer, Cho and Chu’s (1998) questions for suppliers.  
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• Do you use the following application …… 
• If you use this application, then for what percentage of total purchasing for the product? 
These questions were then applied to web-based catalogues, electronic auctions,  (internet) 
EDI and electronic procurement solutions. 
 
VOICE (VOICE) 
A direct translation was made of the ‘covariate for strategic partnership’ measures of Mohr 
and Spekman (1994). 
• In this relationship, the parties work together to solve problems (1 = strongly disagree, 5 
= strongly agree) 
• The manufacturer is flexible in response to questions we make (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree) 
• The manufacturer makes an effort to help us during emergencies (1 = strongly disagree, 5 
= strongly agree) 
• When an agreement is made, we can always rely on the manufacturer to fulfill all the 
requirements (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
 
 
OTHER VARIABLES 
 
EXPERIENCE 
The following question was constructed to control for the experience of the respondent: 
• When did you start in your current job? 
 
JOB LEVEL 
The following question was constructed to control for the job level of the respondent: 
• How would you describe your job? 
The possible answers were ‘CEO’, ‘purchasing executive’, ‘purchasing manager’, ‘purchaser’, 
‘purchasing advisor’, and ‘other, ….’. 
 
PURCHASING BUDGET 
The following question was constructed to control for the purchasing volume: 
• What yearly purchasing budget in Dutch guilders are you responsible for? 
 
PURCHASING INTEGRATION 
The following question was constructed to control for purchasing integration:  
• To what degree is the purchasing function integrated with other functions like marketing, 
production and research? 
The possible answers were ‘not at all’, ‘not really’, ‘average’, ‘strongly’, and ‘very strongly’. 
 
FIRM SIZE 
The following question was constructed to control for firm size: 
• What is the total turnover of your firm including all its parts in Dutch guilders?  
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BEING MULTINATIONAL 
The following question was constructed to control for being multinational: 
• Does your firm have foreign offices? 
 
INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 
The following question was constructed to control for international integration: 
• If your firm has any foreign offices then how often are you in touch with fellow 
purchasers abroad? 
The possible answers were ‘daily’, ‘weekly’, ‘monthly’, ‘hardly ever’, and ‘never’. 
 
GENERAL FIRM STRATEGY (GENSTRAT) 
A translation was made of the ‘strategic orientation self-typing’ measures of Shortell and Zajac 
(1990)92: 
• Hospital A maintains a niche within the health care system by offering a relatively stable 
set of services / facilities. General Hospital A is not at the forefront of new services or 
market developments in healthcare. It tends to ignore changes that have no direct impact 
on current areas of operation and concentrates instead on doing the best job possible in 
its existing arena. 
• Hospital B maintains a relatively stable base of services while at the same time moving to 
meet selected, promising new service / market developments. The hospital is seldom 
‘first in’ with new services or facilities. However, by carefully monitoring the actions of 
institutions like Hospital C (below), Hospital B attempts to follow with a more cost-
efficient or well-conceived service. 
• Hospital C makes relatively frequent changes in (especially additions to) its set of services 
/ facilities. It consistently attempts to pioneer by being ‘first in’ in new areas of service or 
market activity, even if not all of these activities ultimately prove to be highly successful. 
Hospital C responds rapidly to early signals of market needs or opportunities. 
• Hospital D cannot be clearly characterized in terms of its approach to changing its 
markets or services. It doesn’t have a consistent pattern on this dimension. Sometimes 
the hospital will be an early entrant into new fields of opportunity, sometimes it will 
move into new fields only after considerable evidence of potential success, sometimes it 
will not make service / market changes unless forced to by external changes. 
There are 6 possible answers to this question in the survey, namely 1 (A), 2 (A-B), 3 (B), 4 (B-
C), 5 (C), and 6 (D)  
 
 
UNCERTAINTY  
The uncertainty a firm faces consists of two elements here, volume uncertainty and 
technological uncertainty. Together they determine the extent to which the environment of 
the firm is uncertain. 
                                                           
92 Please note that these measures were used in the United States. Contrary to mainland Europe, the U.S. 
has a system of competition between hospitals, making these measures fit for testing competitive 
strategies in the hospital industry. Obviously translations were made such that references to hospitals 
were removed entirely. 
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A direct translation was made of the ‘volume uncertainty’ measures of Walker and Weber 
(1984). 
• Expected volume fluctuations: the extent to which significant fluctuations are expected in 
the daily or monthly volume requirement for the component (Likert-type scale of 1 to 5) 
• Uncertain volume estimates: the extent to which volume estimates for the component are 
expected to be uncertain (Likert-type scale of 1 to 5) 
 
A direct translation was made of the ‘technological uncertainty’ measures of Walker and 
Weber (1984). 
• Changes in specifications: the frequency of expected changes in specifications for the 
component (Likert-type scale of 1 to 5) 
• Technological improvements: the probability of future technological improvements of 
the component (Likert-type scale of 1 to 5) 
 
ASSET SPECIFICITY (ASSPEC) 
 
Asset specificity (Murray et al, 1995a): 
• In manufacturing the non-standardized components in product, the level of specific 
assets or resources (i.e., unique assets or resources, such as configurations of work 
stations, use of special raw materials and specially trained labor, invested in the product 
that have little or no use for other purposes) is (0 = zero, 5 = very high) 
 
A direct translation was made of the ‘asset specificity’ measures of Walker and Poppo (1991). 
However, their measures featured the words ‘relatively unique to the supplier’, while the 
purpose of this survey was to measure the asset specificity of the entire product, product X. 
Therefore the supplier part was omitted from the measures. 
• The extent to which the production of the part requires technical labor skills that are 
relatively unique (measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale) 
• The extent to which the production of the part requires manufacturing equipment that is 
relatively unique (measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale) 
However, the work on asset specificity by Williamson (1985) not only describes the 
importance of specific labour skills and manufacturing equipment but also discusses the 
importance of specific production locations. The shipbuilding industry is one example of site 
specific production: ships are always built next to a river, sea or connected lake, as it would be 
difficult to transport entire ships over land before letting them sail out. Williamson refers to 
this third component as site specificity. Particularly in the light of international sourcing 
strategy site specificity is an important dimension to add to the asset specificity measure. 
• The extent to which the production of the part requires production locations that are 
relatively unique (measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale) 
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PROCESS INNOVATIONS (PROCINN) 
A direct translation was made of the ‘process innovations’ measures of Murray et al (1995a). 
• To your firm, the level of process innovation in the product (i.e., the set of innovative 
ideas involved in the manufacturing process) is (0 = zero, 5 = very high) 
• Relative to your competitors, the level of process innovations in your product is (1 = very 
low, 5 = very high) 
• The number of potential applications (or uses) of the process innovations in the product 
is (0 = zero, 5 = very high) 
 
PRODUCT INNOVATIONS (PRODINN) 
A direct translation was made of the ‘product innovations’ measures of Murray et al (1995a). 
• To your firm, the level of product innovation in the product (i.e., the set of innovative 
ideas involved in the product) is (0 = zero, 5 = very high) 
• Relative to your competitors, the level of product innovations in your product is (1 = 
very low, 5 = very high) 
• The number of potential applications (or uses) of the product innovations in the product 
is (0 = zero, 5 = very high) 
 
LONGEVITY 
The following question was constructed to control for longevity of the buyer-supplier relation: 
• For how long have you had a relationship with this supplier? 
 
STABILITY 
A direct translation was made of the measures of Nooteboom, Berger and Noorderhaven 
(1997): 
• The relation between our firm and this customer has continually improved in the course 
of time (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
• Our supply to this customer has increased strongly in the course of time (1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
 
TRUST (TRUST) 
A direct translation was made of the ‘trust’ measures of Mohr and Spekman (1994). 
• We trust that the manufacturer’s decisions will be beneficial to our business (1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
• We feel that we do not get a fair deal from this manufacturer (1 = strongly agree, 5 = 
strongly disagree) 
• This relationship is marked by a high degree of harmony (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree) 
 
POWER (POWER) 
A direct translation was made of the measure for bargaining power of suppliers of Murray et 
al (1995a): 
• On average, the number of external suppliers capable of providing the non-standardized 
components in the product is (0 = zero, 5 = very many) 
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• If your firm were to change suppliers for the non-standardized components in the 
product, the one-time cost involved in switching from one supplier to another would be 
(0 = zero, 5 = very high, reverse coded) 
• The number of substitutes for the non-standardized components in the product is (0 = 
zero, 5 = very many) 
 
However, power is often a multi-dimensional construct (Cool & Henderson, 1998). In the 
case of a buyer-supplier relation one may think of power that is determined by variables 
exogenous to the relation like the number of potential suppliers or substitutes. Alternatively 
there are power aspects endogenous to the relation like the relative size of the two parties or 
the importance of the product the supplier supplies to the focal product. Thus it appeared 
necessary to add more items to measure power. A translation was made of the supplier power 
measures of Cool & Henderson (1998): 
• Supplier bargaining power: the bargaining power of your principal suppliers, that is, their 
capacity to impose their pricing conditions, is (low, quite low, medium, quite high, high) 
• Number of potential suppliers: the number of potential suppliers to your firm is (less 
than 10, less than 50, less than 100, more than 100) 
• Supplier concentration: of your total purchasing, what percentage does your largest 
supplier represent (0-10-20-30-40-50-60-70-80-90-100) 
• Impact on seller’s differentiation: the impact of the products purchased from your 
suppliers on your product differentiation is (weak, quite weak, medium, quite important, 
important) 
• Impact on seller’s costs: the impact of the products purchased from your suppliers on 
your cost structure is (weak, quite weak, medium, quite important, important) 
• Supplier’s switching cost: for your principal suppliers, the loss of one supplier would have 
a ……. negative effect (low, quite low, medium, quite high, high) 
• Forward integration: over the last 3 years, forward integration into your industry from 
your suppliers has been (rare, quite rare, a few, quite numerous, numerous) 
• Cost to switch suppliers: the costs to switch suppliers are (low, quite low, medium, quite 
high, high) 
These measures were adapted to the survey that focused only on the most important supplier 
and not the whole gamut of suppliers. Also the ‘supplier switching cost’ and ‘supplier 
concentration’ measures were measured by applying a precise percentage. Finally it can be 
noted that ‘number of potential suppliers’ and ‘cost to switch suppliers’ exist in both series of 
power measures and were as a consequence only used once. Thus a total of 9 possible power 
measures were used. 
 
SUPPLIER LOCATION 
The following questions were constructed to control for the location of the supplier: 
• In what country is the largest supplier located? 
• If the largest supplier is located in the Netherlands then how far from your firm? 
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BENCHMARKING 
The following questions were constructed to control for benchmarking: 
• How often does your firm measure the performance of the largest supplier? 
• How often does your firm compare the performance of the largest supplier with that of 
its competitors? 
The possible answers were ‘never’, ‘on a yearly basis’, ‘every three months’, ‘monthly’, and 
‘continuously’. 
 
LOYALTY (LOYALTY) 
A direct translation was made of the ‘commitment’ measures of Mohr and Spekman (1994). 
• We’d like to discontinue carrying this manufacturer’s product (1 = strongly agree, 5 = 
strongly disagree) 
• We are very committed to carrying this manufacturer’s products (1 = strongly disagree, 5 
= strongly agree) 
• We have a minimal commitment to this manufacturer (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly 
disagree) 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (ECONPERF) 
For the general measure of economic performance of sourcing a direct translation was made 
of the ‘financial performance’ measures of Murray et al (1995a). 
• Relative to the product’s largest three competitors, the return on sales is (1 = much 
lower, 5 = much higher) 
• Relative to the product’s largest three competitors, the return on investment is (1 = much 
lower, 5 = much higher) 
 
For the measure of economic performance of the largest supplier a direct translation was 
made of the ‘exchange performance’ measures of Poppo and Zenger (1998). These measures 
were applied to the deliveries by the largest supplier of product X. 
• The level of satisfaction with the overall cost (1 = dissatisfied, 7 = satisfied) 
• The level of satisfaction with the quality of the output or service (1 = dissatisfied, 7 = 
satisfied) 
• The level of satisfaction with the responsiveness to problems or inquiries (1 = 
dissatisfied, 7 = satisfied) 
However, it appeared that these measures did not cover all elements of supplier satisfaction 
within the context of manufacturing. Interviews with people in the field as well as discussions 
with academic experts revealed two other important dimensions of supplier satisfaction, 
namely the reliability of deliveries and the speed of deliveries. The reliability of deliveries is 
important because without a certain level of reliability the supply chain tends to become 
unstable and costs rises exponentially. The speed of deliveries increasingly matters in industrial 
exchanges because of Just-In-Time concerns as well as shorter product life cycles. Thus two 
more measures were added. 
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• The level of satisfaction with the reliability of deliveries (1 = dissatisfied, 7 = satisfied) 
• The level of satisfaction with the speed of deliveries (1 = dissatisfied, 7 = satisfied) 
 
STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE (STRATPER) 
For the general measure of strategic performance of sourcing a direct translation was made of 
the ‘strategic performance’ measures of Murray et al (1995a). 
• Relative to the product’s largest three competitors, the market share is (1 = much lower, 
5 = much higher) 
• Relative to the product’s largest three competitors, the sales growth rate is (1 = much 
lower, 5 = much higher) 
 
For the measure of strategic performance of the largest supplier there was no measure readily 
available. However, exchange satisfaction measures had been used for economic performance. 
Their structure could easily be maintained. So the ‘exchange performance’ measures of Poppo 
and Zenger (1998) were employed and three measures were developed. These measures were 
built on recent literature on inter-firm relations that stresses the importance of relations with 
external partners, in this case suppliers, as a means of increasing the capabilities of a firm 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998), its innovative potential (Nooteboom 1999) and its ability to set up 
linkages (Burt, 1992). Interviews with people in the field as well as discussions with academic 
experts confirmed the importance of these three elements. 
• The level of satisfaction with learning new capabilities from the supplier (1 = dissatisfied, 
7 = satisfied) 
• The level of satisfaction with joint innovation with the supplier (1 = dissatisfied, 7 = 
satisfied) 
• The level of satisfaction with the supplier’s ability to manage its network of 
subcontractors (1 = dissatisfied, 7 = satisfied) 
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Appendix B: Survey (in Dutch)93 
 
 
Bedankt voor uw interesse in ons onderzoek. De vragenlijst bestaat uit meerdere onderdelen. 
Bij elk onderdeel staat een korte toelichting. Het invullen van de vragenlijst duurt ongeveer 20 
minuten. Het is van belang dat u alle vragen invult, omdat we alleen dan uw antwoord 
kunnen gebruiken in het onderzoek. We verzoeken u telkens het juiste antwoord te 
omcirkelen of aan te kruisen. 
 
Ook als u niet in staat bent deze vragenlijst in te vullen, horen we dit graag van u 
(liefst met korte vermelding van reden). Als u graag een kopie van de resultaten 
(inclusief industrievergelijkingen) wilt ontvangen, vult u dan alstublieft het bijgesloten 
antwoordformulier in. U kunt de vragenlijst en het antwoordformulier opsturen door 
middel van de bijgevoegde retourenvelop. Een postzegel is niet nodig. 
 
Bij vragen kunt u contact opnemen met Michael Mol (mmol@fbk.eur.nl of telefonisch 010 - 
408 11 68 / 06 - 166 08 373). Onze hartelijke dank voor uw medewerking. 
 
Prof. dr. Rob van Tulder 
Dr. Paul Beije 
Drs. Michael J. Mol 
 
 
Deel 1: Over u en uw onderneming 
Hieronder staan enkele vragen over u en het bedrijf waar u voor werkt. Wilt u bij meerdere 
mogelijkheden telkens de be s t  k l oppende  mogelijkheid omcirkelen of aankruisen? 
 
1. In welk jaar bent u in uw huidige functie begonnen? ………………….. 
 
2. Hoe is uw functie het beste te omschrijven? 
  Algemeen Directeur   Directeur inkoop 
  Inkoopmanager   Inkoopfunctionaris 
  Inkoopadviseur   Anders, nl. …………………. 
 
3. Hoe hoog is het jaarlijkse inkoopbudget waar u verantwoordelijk voor bent in guldens? ... . .  
 
4. In hoeverre is de inkoopfunctie in uw bedrijf geïntegreerd met andere functies zoals 
marketing, productie en onderzoek? 
niet vrijwel niet gemiddeld sterk zeer sterk 
 
5. Wat is de totale omzet van uw onderneming, inclusief alle onderdelen, in guldens? ………. 
 
                                                           
93 Paper size and lay-out have been reformatted to fit the appendix. The original survey is a 16-page A5 
booklet. 
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6. Heeft uw onderneming buitenlandse vestigingen?       
ja nee 
 
7. Zo ja: hoe vaak heeft u contazct met collega-inkopers in buitenlandse vestigingen? 
dagelijks wekelijks maandelijks zelden nooit 
 
8. Deze vraag gaat over de algemene strategie van uw bedrijf. U kunt rechts de mogelijkheid 
omcirkelen die het mees t  l i jk t  op uw bedrijf: 
 
A: De organisatie bevindt zich in een niche in de sector. Ze biedt een relatief vaste 
verzameling producten/diensten aan. In het algemeen is ze geen voorloper in nieuwe 
technologische of markt-ontwikkelingen in de sector. Ze heeft de neiging om veranderingen 
niet op te pakken wanneer deze geen directe invloed hebben op de huidige gang van zaken. In 
plaats daarvan concentreert ze zich op het zo goed mogelijk uitvoeren van haar taken in de 
bestaande omgeving. 
 
B: De organisatie heeft een relatief stabiele basis van producten/diensten, terwijl ze 
tegelijkertijd bezig is om selectief bepaalde veelbelovende nieuwe ontwikkelingen in te passen. 
De organisatie is zelden de eerste met adoptie van nieuwe producten, diensten of 
technologieen. Echter, door zorgvuldig de acties van organisatie type C (zie hieronder) in de 
gaten te houden, probeert ze te volgen met een beter ontworpen of kosten-efficiëntere 
product/dienst. 
 
C: De organisatie maakt relatief vaak aanpassingen op (en met name toevoegingen aan) haar 
verzameling van producten/diensten. Ze probeert consequent een pioniersrol te vervullen 
door als eerste nieuwe technologieën of markten te ontwikkelen, zelfs als uiteindelijk niet al 
deze activiteiten leiden tot succes. De organisatie reageert snel op vroege signalen over 
behoeften en kansen in de markt. 
 
D: De organisatie kan niet eenduidig gekenschetst worden in termen van haar aanpak ten 
aanzien van nieuwe producten, diensten of markten. De organisatie vertoont geen consequent 
patroon op deze schaal. Soms is de organisatie een pionier in nieuwe gebieden, soms stapt ze 
pas in nieuwe gebieden na duidelijk bewijs van het mogelijk succes, soms negeert ze deze 
ontwikkelingen tenzij ze gedwongen wordt door externe veranderingen. 
 
A 
Zit tussen A en B 
B 
Zit tussen B en C 
C 
D 
 
 
Deel 2: De uitbestedingsstrategie van uw onderneming 
De vragen die nu volgen gaan over de uitbestedingsstrategie van uw bedrijf. Het gaat om het 
product waarmee u het meeste omzet. Bij de uitbesteding gaat het alleen om toeleveringen van 
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produc t en  die een de e l  uitmaken van het uiteindelijke product. Het gaat dus niet om facilitaire 
inkoop of inkoop van diensten. 
 
Product X 
1. Wat is het product waarmee u het mees t e  omze t? 
………..……………………………………………………………………….. 
Dit product zal vanaf hier produc t  X heten. 
 
Onzekerhe id  
De productie van product X kan onzeker zijn door vo lumewi jz i g ing en  of 
sp e c i f i c a t i ew i jz i g ing en . 
 
2. Wat is voor product X ……… Zeer laag            Zeer hoog 
… de gemiddelde maandelijkse volumeschommeling 1 2 3 4 5 
… de betrouwbaarheid van maandelijkse schattingen van het volume 1 2 3 4 5 
… de frequentie van specificatieveranderingen 1 2 3 4 5 
… de kans op toekomstige technologische veranderingen 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Over product X 
Product X bestaat uit n i e t - g e s tandaard i s e e rd e  componenten die speciaal voor product X 
gemaakt worden en g e s tandaard i s e e rd e  componenten (‘van de plank’). 
 
3. Welk percentage van de productiekosten van product X komt van g e s tandaard i s e e rd e  
componenten?    …………….…….% 
 
Bij de productie van niet-gestandaardiseerde componenten voor product X worden specifieke 
produc t i emidde l en  gebruikt. Bijvoorbeeld machines, speciale grondstoffen en getrainde 
werknemers. Sommige productiemiddelen hebben alleen waarde voor de productie van 
componenten voor product X.  
 
4. Wat is de hoeveelheid productiemiddelen die we in i g  of g e en  waarde hebben voor ande r e  
doelen dan de productie van componenten voor product X: 
nul zeer laag laag gemiddeld hoog zeer hoog 
 
 
5. In hoeverre vereist de productie van niet-
gestandaardiseerde componenten voor product X…… 
Niet                                      Zeer sterk 
… unieke technische vaardigheden bij werknemers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… productieapparatuur die uniek is voor deze componenten 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… speciale productielocaties  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Nu volgen enkele vragen over het resultaat van product X. Deze zijn bedoeld om te kijken 
hoe goed het met het product gaat in vergelijking met concurrerende producten. 
 
Marktresultaat product 
Hier gaat het om de positie van het product in de markt . 
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6. Ten opzichte van de grootste 3 concurrenten is ……… Veel lager             Veel hoger 
… het marktaandeel van product X 1 2 3 4 5 
… de omzetgroei van product X 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Financieel resultaat product 
We willen graag weten wat de wins tmarg e  van product X is vergeleken met de winstmarge 
van concurrerende producten. 
 
Het rendement op verkopen is winst of verlies gedeeld door verkopen. 
Het rendement op investeringen is winst of verlies gedeeld door alle investeringen samen. 
7. Ten opzichte van de grootste 3 concurrenten is ……… Veel lager             Veel hoger 
het rendement op verkopen van product X 1 2 3 4 5 
het rendement op investeringen van product X 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
De nu volgende vragen gaan over (internationale) uitbesteding. Bij de uitbesteding gaat het 
alleen om toeleveringen van produc t en  die een de e l  uitmaken van het uiteindelijke product. 
Het gaat dus niet om facilitaire inkoop of inkoop van diensten. 
 
Uitbesteden 
Van de totale productiekosten van product X wordt een deel extern ingekocht. 
 
8. Welk percentage van de totale productiekosten van product X wordt momenteel door 
externe leveranciers geleverd  …………….…….% 
 
Internationaal uitbesteden 
Deze vraag is bedoeld om inzicht te krijgen in waar uw leveranciers zitten. Hier gaat het om 
de inkoopwaarde (t o ta l e  ex t e rn e  inkoop ) voor product X. 
 
9. Het totaal voor deze vraag moet optellen tot 100% . Welk percentage van de totale 
inkoopwaarde van product X wordt ingekocht in: 
 
Nederland       .……% 
België en Luxemburg     .……% 
Denemarken, Finland, Zweden en Noorwegen  …… % 
Duitsland, Zwitserland en Oostenrijk   …… % 
Frankrijk, Spanje, Italië en Portugal    …… % 
Groot-Brittanië en Ierland     …… % 
Griekenland      …… % 
Centraal en Oost-Europa     …… % 
Verenigde Staten, Canada en Australië   …… % 
Japan       …… % 
Overig Azië      …… % 
Overige landen      …… % 
Totaal       100% 
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De volgende vragen betreffen innovatie. Daarbij staat centraal hoeveel vernieuwing er 
in het productieproces zit en in hoeverre product X zelf een vernieuwend product is. 
 
Procesinnovatie 
Met procesinnovatie bedoelen we het aanbrengen van verbeteringen in een bestaand 
productieproces of het introduceren van een beter productieproces. 
11. Voor product X is … Nul Zeer laag           Zeer hoog 
… het niveau van procesinnovatie vergeleken met andere 
producten in uw bedrijf 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
… het niveau van procesinnovatie in vergelijking met  
concurrerende producten  
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
… aantal mogelijke toepassingen van deze procesinnovaties 
in uw andere producten 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Productinnovatie 
Met productinnovatie bedoelen we het verbeteren van een bestaand product of het 
ontwikkelen van een nieuw product. 
12. Voor product X is … Nul Zeer laag           Zeer hoog 
… het niveau van productinnovatie vergeleken met andere 
producten in uw bedrijf 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
… het niveau van productinnovaties in vergelijking met  
concurrerende producten  
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
.. aantal mogelijke toepassingen van deze productinnovaties 
in uw andere producten 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
Gebruik van E-commerce 
Electronic commerce wordt steeds vaker toegepast in inkoop. Hieronder noemen we enkele 
belangrijke E-commer c e  t o epas s ing en  met daarbij de vraag of uw onderneming deze 
toepassingen gebruikt. 
 
13. Welke van de volgende toepassingen worden gebruikt bij produc t  X  en zo ja voor 
hoeveel pro c en t  van de inkoop van product X? 
 
Toelichting: 
• Internet EDI is Electronic Data Interchange via het internet (dus niet via een directe lijn). 
Dit is een manier om gegevens uit te wisselen met uw leveranciers. 
• Procurement solution is een electronische toepassing voor bestelling, logistiek en 
levering, gebaseerd op intranet of internet technologie. Dit is een manier om uw 
orderproces te stroomlijnen. 
• Webcatalogus is een catalogus van uw leveranciers op het internet. Dit is een 
electronische winkel van een leverancier. 
• Elektronische veiling is een internet site waar u meerdere leveranciers laat bieden op uw 
order. Dit is een manier om de leverancier met de laagste prijs te selecteren. 
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 Wordt gebruikt Zo ja: hoeveel procent van de inkoop van product X 
Internet EDI Nee Ja ……..………….% 
Procurement solution Nee Ja ……..………….% 
Webcatalogus Nee Ja ……..………….% 
Elektronische veiling Nee Ja ……..………….% 
 
 
Deel 3: De grootste leverancier 
Het laatste deel van de vragenlijst gaat over uw g roo t s t e  leverancier voor product X. Hiermee 
wordt bedoeld de externe leverancier die in gu ld ens  het meeste toelevert voor de productie 
van product X. 
 
Relatie met de grootste leverancier 
1. Hoe lang heeft u al een relatie met deze leverancier?      ……………… jaar 
 
2. Reageer op de volgende stellingen 
 Sterk oneens                       Sterk eens   
De relatie tussen ons bedrijf en de grootste leverancier is 
door de tijd heen voortdurend verbeterd 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Onze inkoop bij de grootste leveranciers is door de tijd heen 
voortdurend toegenomen 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
3. Welk percentage van de totale inkoop voor product X wordt door de g roo t s t e  leverancier 
geleverd?       ……………% 
 
Uw grootste leverancier heeft waarschijnlijk meerdere klanten. 
4. Welk percentage van de omzet van uw grootste leverancier komt van  u? ………………% 
          
 
Over  d e  g r oo t s t e  l e v e ran c i e r  
De vragen op deze pagina gaan over de relatie met de grootste leverancier. 
 
5. Reageer op de volgende stellingen. Het gaat het erom of de leverancier met u samenwerkt 
en meedenkt. 
 
 Sterk oneens      Sterk eens    
In deze relatie werken partijen samen om problemen op te lossen 1 2 3 4 5 
Deze leverancier is flexibel in het beantwoorden van onze vragen 1 2 3 4 5 
Deze leverancier helpt ons in noodsituaties 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. Reageer op de volgende stellingen. De vraag gaat in op het vertrouwen dat uw bedrijf in de 
leverancier heeft. 
 
 Sterk oneens      Sterk eens    
Als er een overeenkomst is, kunnen we er altijd op vertrouwen 
dat deze leverancier alle voorwaarden nakomt 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
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We vertrouwen er op dat de leverancier beslissingen neemt die 
goed zijn voor ons 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
We vertrouwen erop dat we een goede deal krijgen van deze 
leverancier 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Deze relatie wordt gekenmerkt door een hoge mate van harmonie 1 2 3 4 5 
 
De macht van de leverancier 
De nu volgende vragen gaan over de mate waarin uw onderneming ofwel uw grootste 
leverancier de mach t i g e r e  par t i j  is in de relatie. 
 
7. Over het door de grootste leverancier geleverde product 
 
 Nul Zeer weinig         Zeer veel 
Hoeveel andere leveranciers kunnen dit product leveren  
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Hoeveel vervangende producten zijn er voor dit product  
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
8. De onderhandelingsmacht van de grootste leverancier is 
laag vrij laag gemiddeld vrij hoog hoog 
 
9. Het door de grootste leverancier geleverde product heeft invloed op zowel de kostprijs van 
product X als ook op de eigenschappen. 
 
Welke invloed heeft het product van  de grootste leverancier op uw  Gering                 Groot 
… totale kosten  1 2 3 4 5 
… mogelijkheden om product X onderscheidend te maken van 
concurrenten  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
10. Gedurende de laatste 3 jaren is het aantal keren dat uw leveranciers met u zijn gaan 
concurreren, dus soortgelijke producten zijn gaan produceren, 
gering vrij gering Gemiddeld vrij groot groot 
 
De l o ca t i e  van  d e  l e v e ran c i e r  
Deze vragen gaan over de vestigingsplaats van de leverancier. 
 
11. In welk land is de grootste leverancier gevestigd?    
 ……………. 
 
12. Indien in Nederland, hoeveel kilometer van u verwijderd?   
 .…………… 
 
Prestatiemeting en vergelijking 
Om te kijken hoe goed een leverancier het doet, kunnen de leverprestaties van de leverancier 
gemeten en vergeleken worden. 
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13. Hoe regelmatig meet u de prestaties van de grootste leverancier? 
nooit jaarlijks elk kwartaal elke maand continu 
 
14. Hoe regelmatig vergelijkt u de prestaties van de grootste leverancier met die van zijn 
concurrenten (‘benchmarking’)? 
 
nooit jaarlijks elk kwartaal elke maand continu 
 
Wisselen van leverancier 
Het kan voorkomen dat u van leverancier wilt wisselen. Daarover gaan de volgende vragen. 
 
15. Als uw onderneming de grootste leverancier van product X zou vervangen, dan zouden de 
eenmalige kosten om naar een andere leverancier over te schakelen …… zijn  
nul zeer laag laag gemiddeld hoog zeer hoog 
 
16. De volgende stellingen gaan over loyaliteit richting de grootste leverancier. 
 Sterk eens      Sterk oneens 
We willen graag stoppen de producten van deze leverancier te kopen 1 2 3 4 5 
We zijn niet erg gecommitteerd aan het kopen van de producten van 
deze leverancier 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
We hebben een minimale betrokkenheid richting deze leverancier 1 2 3 4 5 
 
17. Hoe makkelijk zou het voor uw onderneming zijn om de producten van de grootste 
leverancier van product X zelf te gaan produceren (‘inbesteden’)? 
onmogelijk zeer makkelijk makkelijk gemiddeld moeilijk zeer moeilijk 
 
 
Deze pagina gaat over uw tevredenheid met de grootste leverancier. 
 
De korte termijn resultaten van de grootste leverancier 
Hier gaat het om de tevredenheid over de leveringen van uw grootste leverancier. 
18. Hoe t e v r ed en  b en t  u  b i j  uw g roo t s t e  l e v e ran c i e r  
me t  …  
Zeer ontevreden             Zeer tevreden 
… kwaliteit van de leveringen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… reactievermogen bij problemen of vragen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… kosten van de leveringen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… betrouwbaarheid van leveringen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… snelheid van leveringen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
De lange termijn resultaten van de grootste leverancier  
Hier gaat het om de tevredenheid over de totale bijdrage die uw grootste leverancier levert aan 
het resultaat van uw onderneming. 
19. Hoe t e v r ed en  b en t  u  b i j  uw g roo t s t e  
l e v e ran c i e r  me t  …  
Zeer ontevreden             Zeer tevreden 
… het leren van nieuwe vaardigheden van leverancier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… gezamenlijke innovatie met leverancier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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… zijn vermogen om zelf het netwerk van zijn sub-
leveranciers aan te sturen 
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 
 
 
Ten slotte: 
Controleert u alstublieft nogmaals of u alle vragen heeft ingevuld. 
 
We willen u hartelijk bedanken voor het invullen van deze vragenlijst. Uw bijdrage is voor het 
slagen van ons onderzoek van groot belang. Hieronder staat een vrije ruimte. Die kunt u 
gebruiken als u nog iets kwijt wilt over wat de inkoop van uw bedrijf afwijkend maakt van 
andere bedrijven. Ook kunt u hier eventueel ander commentaar kwijt. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix C: Correlation tables 
 
 
 LOGSA
L98 
LOGLA
BINT 
FIRMU
NCE 
PURRA
T98 
EXPRA
T98 
ASSPE
C98 
RNDINT
98 
MARINT
98 
NETRO
S98 
MARSH
A98 
FOREIG
N 
LOGSAL98 1.000 
. 
4640 
.710 
.000 
4640 
-.134 
.000 
4640 
.396 
.000 
4640 
.432 
.000 
4640 
.030 
.052 
4208 
.220 
.000 
3383 
.106 
.000 
3383 
.137 
.000 
4640 
.449 
.000 
4640 
.207 
.000 
1591 
LOGLABINT .710 
.000 
4640 
1.000 
. 
4640 
-.129 
.000 
4640 
.542 
.000 
4640 
.301 
.000 
4640 
-.046 
.003 
4208 
.115 
.000 
3383 
.034 
.045 
3383 
.152 
.000 
4640 
.230 
.000 
4640 
.085 
.001 
1591 
FIRMUNCE -.134 
.000 
4640 
-.129 
.000 
4640 
1.000 
. 
4787 
-.062 
.000 
4640 
.048 
.001 
4640 
-.020 
.194 
4342 
.046 
.007 
3486 
.015 
.377 
3486 
-.090 
.000 
4640 
-.046 
.002 
4640 
.019 
.449 
1650 
PURRAT98 .396 
.000 
4640 
.542 
.000 
4640 
-.062 
.000 
4640 
1.000 
. 
4640 
.192 
.000 
4640 
-.281 
.000 
4208 
.016 
.364 
3383 
-.018 
.302 
3383 
-.291 
.000 
4640 
.100 
.000 
4640 
-.070 
.005 
1591 
EXPRAT98 .432 
.000 
4640 
.301 
.000 
4640 
.048 
.001 
4640 
.192 
.000 
4640 
1.000 
. 
4640 
-.059 
.000 
4208 
.325 
.000 
3383 
.058 
.001 
3383 
.034 
.020 
4640 
.231 
.000 
4640 
.298 
.000 
1591 
ASSPEC98 .030 
.052 
4208 
-.046 
.003 
4208 
-.020 
.194 
4342 
-.281 
.000 
4208 
-.059 
.000 
4208 
1.000 
. 
4342 
-.049 
.006 
3218 
-.030 
.088 
3218 
.162 
.000 
4208 
-.040 
.010 
4208 
.042 
.107 
1505 
RNDINT98 .220 
.000 
3383 
.115 
.000 
3383 
.046 
.007 
3486 
.016 
.364 
3383 
.325 
.000 
3383 
-.049 
.006 
3218 
1.000 
. 
3486 
.194 
.000 
3486 
.072 
.000 
3383 
.053 
.002 
3383 
.207 
.000 
1139 
MARINT98 .106 
.033 
3383 
.034 
.045 
3383 
.015 
.377 
3486 
-.018 
.302 
3383 
.058 
.001 
3383 
-.030 
.088 
3218 
.194 
.000 
3486 
1.000 
. 
3486 
.053 
.002 
3383 
.069 
.000 
3383 
-.013 
.666 
1139 
NETROS98 .137 
.000 
4640 
.152 
.000 
4640 
-.090 
.000 
4640 
-.291 
.000 
4640 
.034 
.020 
4640 
.162 
.000 
4208 
.072 
.000 
3383 
.053 
.002 
3383 
1.000 
. 
4640 
.068 
.000 
4640 
.128 
.000 
1591 
MARSHA98 .449 
.000 
4640 
.230 
.000 
4640 
-.046 
.002 
4640 
.100 
.000 
4640 
.231 
.000 
4640 
-.040 
.010 
4208 
.053 
.002 
3383 
.069 
.000 
3383 
.068 
.000 
4640 
1.000 
. 
4640 
.119 
.000 
1591 
FOREIGN .207 
.000 
1591 
.085 
.001 
1591 
.019 
.449 
1650 
-.070 
.005 
1591 
.298 
.000 
1591 
.042 
.107 
1505 
.207 
.000 
1139 
-.013 
.666 
1139 
.128 
.000 
1591 
.119 
.000 
1591 
1.000 
. 
1650 
Table C1: correlations between key variables in the database. Presented are the correlations, 
significance levels of correlations (2-tailed) and number of firms that were correlated. 
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 PURRAT93 PURRAT94 PURRAT95 PURRAT96 PURRAT97 PURRAT98 
PURRAT93 1.000 
4491 
.852 
4438 
.827 
4448 
.795 
4483 
.764 
4481 
.750 
4344 
PURRAT94 .852 
4438 
1.000 
4734 
.867 
4690 
.816 
4726 
.784 
4724 
.776 
4587 
PURRAT95 .827 
4448 
.867 
4690 
1.000 
4743 
.860 
4735 
.825 
4733 
.805 
4596 
PURRAT96 .795 
4483 
.816 
4726 
.860 
4735 
1.000 
4779 
.858 
4769 
.821 
4632 
PURRAT97 .764 
4481 
.784 
4724 
.825 
4733 
.858 
4769 
1.000 
4777 
.862 
4630 
PURRAT98 .750 
4344 
.776 
4587 
.805 
4596 
.821 
4632 
.862 
4630 
1.000 
4640 
Table C2: correlations between purchasing rates in the database in various years. Presented are 
the correlations and number of firms that were correlated (all 2-tailed significance levels are 
.000). 
 
 PURXRND RNDINT PURXASSP ASSPE PURXUNC FIRMUNCE PURXFORE FOREIGN PURRAT 
PURXRND 1.000 
. 
3.378 
.904 
.000 
3.378 
.199 
.000 
3114 
-.076 
.000 
3.117 
.124 
.000 
3372 
.037 
.033 
3378 
.249 
.000 
1.091 
.193 
.000 
1091 
.275 
.000 
3372 
RNDINT .904 
.000 
3.378 
1.000 
. 
3.475 
.025 
.156 
3114 
-.049 
.005 
3.207 
.066 
.000 
3372 
.047 
.005 
3475 
.186 
.000 
1.116 
.211 
.000 
1132 
.017 
.332 
3372 
PURXASSP .199 
.000 
3.114 
.025 
.156 
3.114 
1.000 
. 
4193 
.611 
.000 
4.193 
.090 
.000 
4193 
-.050 
.001 
4193 
.167 
.000 
1.442 
.035 
.189 
1442 
.519 
.000 
4193 
ASSPEC -.076 
.000 
3.117 
-.049 
.005 
3.207 
.611 
.000 
4193 
1.000 
. 
4.327 
-.060 
.000 
4193 
-.017 
.260 
4327 
.009 
.717 
1.477 
.041 
.110 
1497 
-.280 
.000 
4193 
PURXUNC .124 
.000 
3.372 
.066 
.000 
3.372 
.090 
.000 
4193 
-.060 
.000 
4.193 
1.000 
. 
4625 
.872 
.000 
4625 
.040 
.109 
1.583 
-.004 
.865 
1583 
.179 
.000 
4625 
FIRMUNCE .037 
.033 
3.378 
.047 
.005 
3.475 
-.050 
.001 
4193 
-.017 
.260 
4.327 
.872 
.000 
4625 
1.000 
. 
4772 
-.004 
.883 
1.620 
.012 
.623 
1642 
-.064 
.000 
4625 
PURXFORE .249 
.000 
1.091 
.186 
.000 
1.116 
.167 
.000 
1442 
.009 
.717 
1.477 
.040 
.109 
1583 
-.004 
.883 
1620 
1.000 
. 
1.620 
.922 
.000 
1620 
.149 
.000 
1583 
FOREIGN .193 
.000 
1.091 
.211 
.000 
1.132 
.035 
.189 
1442 
.041 
.110 
1.497 
-.004 
.865 
1583 
.012 
.623 
1642 
.922 
.000 
1.620 
1.000 
. 
1642 
-.069 
.006 
1583 
PURRAT .275 
.000 
3.372 
.017 
.332 
3.372 
.519 
.000 
4193 
-.280 
.000 
4.193 
.179 
.000 
4625 
-.064 
.000 
4625 
.149 
.000 
1.583 
-.069 
.006 
1583 
1.000 
. 
4625 
Table C3: correlations between moderating variables, interaction variables and external 
sourcing from the database (with 1998 data). Presented are the correlations, significance levels 
of correlations (2-tailed) and number of firms that were correlated. 
 
 
Appendices 
 241
 MAR
KPER
F 
FINA
PERF 
FIRM
PERF 
PRO
CINN
O 
PRO
DINN
O 
PUR
RATS
U 
ASSE
TSPE 
UNC
ERTA
I 
RESP
JOB 
PERC
STAN 
RESP
EXP 
PURB
UDG
E 
FIRM
STRA 
MIXS
TRAT 
TOTP
ROC
O 
MARKPERF 1.000 
. 
197 
.386 
.000 
189 
.859 
.000 
189 
.178 
.015 
187 
.228 
.002 
190 
-.005 
.945 
194 
.027 
.710 
194 
-.008 
.909 
195 
.143 
.045 
197 
.140 
.051 
194 
.003 
.969 
197 
-.017 
.809 
196 
.063 
.415 
170 
-.167 
.019 
197 
.074 
.306 
195 
FINAPERF .386 
.000 
189 
1.000 
. 
189 
.804 
.000 
189 
.116 
.120 
181 
.147 
.047 
183 
-.100 
.175 
186 
.006 
.939 
187 
.007 
.924 
187 
-.002 
.974 
189 
-.052 
.477 
186 
-.023 
.749 
189 
-.076 
.302 
188 
.106 
.181 
162 
-.127 
.081 
189 
.088 
.229 
187 
FIRMPERF .859 
.000 
189 
.804 
.000 
189 
1.000 
. 
189 
.211 
.004 
181 
.277 
.000 
183 
-.071 
.336 
186 
.035 
.635 
187 
.017 
.812 
187 
.093 
.204 
189 
.059 
.427 
186 
-.020 
.780 
189 
.008 
.913 
188 
.130 
.098 
162 
-.180 
.013 
189 
.114 
.119 
187 
PROCINNO .178 
.015 
187 
.116 
.120 
181 
.211 
.004 
181 
1.000 
. 
190 
.762 
.000 
189 
.090 
.221 
187 
.186 
.010 
189 
.253 
.000 
189 
.007 
.925 
190 
-.011 
.876 
188 
.066 
.368 
190 
-.053 
.466 
189 
.149 
.058 
162 
-.197 
.006 
190 
.060 
.415 
189 
PRODINNO .228 
.002 
190 
.147 
.047 
183 
.277 
.000 
183 
.762 
.000 
189 
1.000 
. 
193 
.098 
.179 
190 
.134 
.063 
192 
.262 
.000 
192 
.000 
.997 
193 
.006 
.929 
192 
.115 
.110 
193 
.034 
.635 
192 
.156 
.046 
165 
-.164 
.023 
193 
.078 
.280 
192 
PURRATSU -.005 
.945 
194 
-.100 
.175 
186 
-.071 
.336 
186 
.090 
.221 
187 
.098 
.179 
190 
1.000 
. 
197 
-.061 
.402 
194 
.124 
.085 
195 
.059 
.412 
197 
-.039 
.586 
194 
-.058 
.416 
197 
-.039 
.588 
197 
.127 
.098 
171 
.065 
.364 
197 
.062 
.386 
195 
ASSETSPE .027 
.710 
194 
.006 
.939 
187 
.035 
.635 
187 
.186 
.010 
189 
.134 
.063 
192 
-.061 
.402 
194 
1.000 
. 
197 
.045 
.527 
196 
.092 
.201 
197 
-.188 
.008 
196 
-.120 
.092 
197 
-.076 
.290 
196 
-.028 
.720 
169 
-.135 
.059 
197 
.088 
.221 
196 
UNCERTAI -.008 
.909 
195 
.007 
.924 
187 
.017 
.812 
187 
.253 
.000 
189 
.262 
.000 
192 
.124 
.085 
195 
.045 
.527 
196 
1.000 
. 
198 
-.077 
.280 
198 
-.080 
.265 
196 
.043 
.544 
198 
.028 
.694 
197 
.272 
.000 
170 
.044 
.536 
198 
.029 
.691 
196 
RESPJOB .143 
.045 
197 
-.002 
.974 
189 
.093 
.204 
189 
.007 
.925 
190 
.000 
.997 
193 
.059 
.412 
197 
.092 
.201 
197 
-.077 
.280 
198 
1.000 
. 
200 
.020 
.777 
197 
-.237 
.001 
200 
-.021 
.772 
199 
.090 
.240 
172 
-.140 
.048 
200 
.086 
.227 
198 
PERCSTAN .140 
.051 
194 
-.052 
.477 
186 
.059 
.427 
186 
-.011 
.876 
188 
.006 
.929 
192 
-.039 
.586 
194 
-.188 
.008 
196 
-.080 
.265 
196 
.020 
.777 
197 
1.000 
. 
197 
.131 
.066 
197 
.075 
.294 
196 
-.051 
.506 
169 
-.057 
.423 
197 
.004 
.961 
196 
RESPEXP .003 
.969 
197 
-.023 
.749 
189 
-.020 
.780 
189 
.066 
.368 
190 
.115 
.110 
193 
-.058 
.416 
197 
-.120 
.092 
197 
.043 
.544 
198 
-.237 
.001 
200 
.131 
.066 
197 
1.000 
. 
200 
.061 
.392 
199 
-.057 
.458 
172 
-.004 
.955 
200 
.002 
.974 
198 
PURBUDGE -.017 
.809 
196 
-.076 
.302 
188 
.008 
.913 
188 
-.053 
.466 
189 
.034 
.635 
192 
-.039 
.588 
197 
-.076 
.290 
196 
.028 
.694 
197 
-.021 
.772 
199 
.075 
.294 
196 
.061 
.392 
199 
1.000 
. 
199 
.044 
.567 
172 
-.062 
.386 
199 
.121 
.089 
197 
FIRMSTRA .063 
.415 
170 
.106 
.181 
162 
.130 
.098 
162 
.149 
.058 
162 
.156 
.046 
165 
.127 
.098 
171 
-.028 
.720 
169 
.272 
.000 
170 
.090 
.240 
172 
-.051 
.506 
169 
-.057 
.458 
172 
.044 
.567 
172 
1.000 
. 
172 
.94 
. 
172 
.218 
.004 
171 
MIXSTRAT -.167 
.019 
197 
-.127 
.081 
189 
-.180 
.013 
189 
-.197 
.006 
190 
-.164 
.023 
193 
.065 
.364 
197 
-.135 
.059 
197 
.044 
.536 
198 
-.140 
.048 
200 
-.057 
.423 
197 
-.004 
.955 
200 
-.062 
.386 
199 
. 
. 
172 
1.000 
. 
200 
.024 
.733 
198 
TOTPROCO .074 
.306 
195 
.088 
.229 
187 
.114 
.119 
187 
.060 
.415 
189 
.078 
.280 
192 
.062 
.386 
195 
.088 
.221 
196 
.029 
.691 
196 
.086 
.227 
198 
.004 
.961 
196 
.002 
.974 
198 
.121 
.089 
197 
.218 
.004 
171 
.024 
.733 
198 
1.000 
. 
198 
                                                           
94 These variables can not be correlated since all firms that have value 1 for the mix strategy dummy, 
have no value for general firm strategy. 
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Table C4: correlations between key variables on external sourcing in the survey: Presented are 
the correlations, significance levels of correlations (2-tailed) and number of firms that were 
correlated. 
 
 
 
ECONPER
F 
STRATPE
RF 
VOICERE
L 
RELGR
OWT 
TRUST LOYALT
Y 
POWER BUYERDE
P 
SUPPLDE
P 
RELLENG
TH 
ECONPERF 1.000 
. 
200 
.562 
.000 
191 
.550 
.000 
200 
.300 
.000 
199 
.577 
.000 
199 
.417 
.000 
199 
-.230 
.001 
198 
-.158 
.038 
172 
.100 
.159 
199 
.004 
.959 
200 
STRATPERF .562 
.000 
191 
1.000 
. 
191 
.521 
.000 
191 
.420 
.000 
190 
.543 
.000 
191 
.466 
.000 
191 
-.175 
.016 
190 
.001 
.995 
165 
.041 
.570 
190 
-.008 
.910 
191 
VOICEREL .550 
.000 
200 
.521 
.000 
191 
1.000 
. 
200 
.399 
.000 
199 
.611 
.000 
199 
.439 
.000 
199 
-.157 
.028 
198 
-.038 
.621 
172 
.034 
.636 
199 
.066 
.351 
200 
RELGROWT .300 
.000 
199 
.420 
.000 
190 
.399 
.000 
199 
1.000 
. 
199 
.467 
.000 
198 
.297 
.000 
198 
.040 
.573 
197 
.182 
.017 
172 
.054 
.447 
198 
-.008 
.907 
199 
TRUST .577 
.000 
199 
.543 
.000 
191 
.611 
.000 
199 
.467 
.000 
198 
1.000 
. 
199 
.440 
.000 
198 
-.176 
.013 
198 
.016 
.836 
171 
.135 
.058 
198 
.062 
.382 
199 
LOYALTY .417 
.000 
199 
.466 
.000 
191 
.439 
.000 
199 
.297 
.000 
198 
.440 
.000 
198 
1.000 
. 
199 
-.036 
.614 
197 
.179 
.019 
172 
.181 
.011 
198 
.053 
.456 
199 
POWER -.230 
.001 
198 
-.175 
.016 
190 
-.157 
.028 
198 
.040 
.573 
197 
-.176 
.013 
198 
-.036 
.614 
197 
1.000 
. 
198 
.080 
.298 
171 
.049 
.490 
197 
.038 
.594 
198 
BUYERDEP -.158 
.038 
172 
.001 
.995 
165 
-.038 
.621 
172 
.182 
.017 
172 
.016 
.836 
171 
.179 
.019 
172 
.080 
.298 
171 
1.000 
. 
172 
.081 
.293 
172 
-.020 
.792 
172 
SUPPLDEP .100 
.159 
199 
.041 
.570 
190 
.034 
.636 
199 
.054 
.447 
198 
.135 
.058 
198 
.181 
.011 
198 
.049 
.490 
197 
.081 
.293 
172 
1.000 
. 
199 
-.062 
.386 
199 
RELLENGTH .004 
.959 
200 
-.008 
.910 
191 
.066 
.351 
200 
-.008 
.907 
199 
.062 
.382 
199 
.053 
.456 
199 
.038 
.594 
198 
-.020 
.792 
172 
-.062 
.386 
199 
1.000 
. 
200 
Table C5: correlations between key variables on supplier relations in the survey: Presented are 
the correlations, significance levels of correlations (2-tailed) and number of firms that were 
correlated. 
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 VOICE VOIXPOW VOIXLOY VOIXBUY VOIXSUPD BUYERDEP SUPPLDEP POWER LOYALTY 
VOICE 1.000 
. 
200 
.502 
.000 
198 
.842 
.000 
199 
.134 
.079 
172 
.276 
.000 
199 
-.038 
.621 
172 
.034 
.636 
199 
-.157 
.028 
198 
.439 
.000 
199 
VOIXPOW .502 
.000 
198 
1.000 
. 
198 
.442 
.000 
197 
.098 
.204 
171 
.205 
.004 
197 
.029 
.705 
171 
.077 
.283 
197 
.753 
.000 
198 
.253 
.000 
197 
VOIXLOY .842 
.000 
199 
.442 
.000 
197 
1.000 
. 
199 
.220 
.004 
172 
.336 
.000 
198 
.080 
.298 
172 
.141 
.048 
198 
-.113 
.115 
197 
.839 
.000 
199 
VOIXBUYD .134 
.079 
172 
.098 
.204 
171 
.220 
.004 
172 
1.000 
. 
172 
.111 
.147 
172 
.966 
.000 
172 
.076 
.324 
172 
.026 
.738 
171 
.234 
.002 
172 
VOIXSUPD .276 
.000 
199 
.205 
.004 
197 
.336 
.000 
198 
.111 
.147 
172 
1.000 
. 
199 
.069 
.366 
172 
.953 
.000 
199 
.021 
.771 
197 
.272 
.000 
198 
BUYERDEP -.038 
.621 
172 
.029 
.705 
171 
.080 
.298 
172 
.966 
.000 
172 
.069 
.366 
172 
1.000 
. 
172 
.081 
.293 
172 
.080 
.298 
171 
.179 
.019 
172 
SUPPLDEP .034 
.636 
199 
.077 
.283 
197 
.141 
.048 
198 
.076 
.324 
172 
.953 
.000 
199 
.081 
.293 
172 
1.000 
. 
199 
.049 
.490 
197 
.181 
.011 
198 
POWER -.157 
.028 
198 
.753 
.000 
198 
-.113 
.115 
197 
.026 
.738 
171 
.021 
.771 
197 
.080 
.298 
171 
.049 
.490 
197 
1.000 
. 
198 
-.036 
.614 
197 
LOYALTY .439 
.000 
199 
.253 
.000 
197 
.839 
.000 
199 
.234 
.002 
172 
.272 
.000 
198 
.179 
.019 
172 
.181 
.011 
198 
-.036 
.614 
197 
1.000 
. 
199 
Table C6: correlations between moderating variables, interaction variables and voice relations 
from the survey. Presented are the correlations, significance levels of correlations (2-tailed) 
and number of firms that were correlated. 
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 FOREISUP FOREIGN ECONPERF STRATPERF LOYALTY POWER TRUST VOICE RELLENGTH 
FOREISUP 1.000 
. 
200 
.035 
.619 
200 
-.027 
.707 
200 
-.007 
.924 
191 
.060 
.396 
199 
.178 
.012 
198 
-.018 
.806 
199 
-.089 
.211 
200 
-.081 
.256 
200 
FOREIGN .035 
.619 
200 
1.000 
. 
200 
.023 
.743 
200 
.004 
.956 
191 
.001 
.990 
199 
-.010 
.894 
198 
.027 
.703 
199 
-.014 
.843 
200 
.013 
.860 
200 
ECONPERF -.027 
.707 
200 
.023 
.743 
200 
1.000 
. 
200 
.562 
.000 
191 
.417 
.000 
199 
-.230 
.001 
198 
.577 
.000 
199 
.550 
.000 
200 
.004 
.959 
200 
STRATPERF -.007 
.924 
191 
.004 
.956 
191 
.562 
.000 
191 
1.000 
. 
191 
.466 
.000 
191 
-.175 
.016 
190 
.543 
.000 
191 
.521 
.000 
191 
-.008 
.910 
191 
LOYALTY .060 
.396 
199 
.001 
.990 
199 
.417 
.000 
199 
.466 
.000 
191 
1.000 
. 
199 
-.036 
.614 
197 
.440 
.000 
198 
.439 
.000 
199 
.053 
.456 
199 
POWER .178 
.012 
198 
-.010 
.894 
198 
-.230 
.001 
198 
-.175 
.016 
190 
-.036 
.614 
197 
1.000 
. 
198 
-.176 
.013 
198 
-.157 
.028 
198 
.038 
.594 
198 
TRUST -.018 
.806 
199 
.027 
.703 
199 
.577 
.000 
199 
.543 
.000 
191 
.440 
.000 
198 
-.176 
.013 
198 
1.000 
. 
199 
.611 
.000 
199 
.062 
.382 
199 
VOICEL -.089 
.211 
200 
-.014 
.843 
200 
.550 
.000 
200 
.521 
.000 
191 
.439 
.000 
199 
-.157 
.028 
198 
.611 
.000 
199 
1.000 
. 
200 
.066 
.351 
200 
RELLENGTH -.081 
.256 
200 
.013 
.860 
200 
.004 
.959 
200 
-.008 
.910 
191 
.053 
.456 
199 
.038 
.594 
198 
.062 
.382 
199 
.066 
.351 
200 
1.000 
. 
200 
Table C7: correlations between having a foreign supplier (foreisup), being foreign, supplier 
performance, loyalty, voice, power, trust and length of the relation. Presented are the 
correlations, significance levels of correlations (2-tailed) and number of firms that were 
correlated. 
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 FOREIGN X FOREISUP FOREXPE X FOREISUP FOREXPER FOREIGN FOREISUP 
FOREIGN X FOREISUP 1.000 
. 
200 
.406 
.000 
200 
.186 
.008 
200 
.610 
.000 
200 
.389 
.000 
200 
FOREXPE X FOREISUP .406 
.000 
200 
1.000 
. 
200 
.504 
.000 
200 
.076 
.283 
200 
.878 
.000 
200 
FOREXPER .186 
.008 
200 
.504 
.000 
200 
1.000 
. 
200 
.106 
.136 
200 
.313 
.000 
200 
FOREIGN .610 
.000 
200 
.076 
.283 
200 
.106 
.136 
200 
1.000 
. 
200 
.035 
.619 
200 
FOREISUP .389 
.000 
200 
.878 
.000 
200 
.313 
.000 
200 
.035 
.619 
200 
1.000 
. 
200 
Table C8: correlations between having a foreign supplier (foreisup), being foreign, foreign 
experience and interaction effects. Presented are the correlations, significance levels of 
correlations (2-tailed) and number of firms that were correlated. 
 
 PURRAT98 VOICEREL FOREISOU ROS98 ECONPERF 
(RELATION) 
STRATPERF 
(RELATION 
FINAPERF 
(FIRM) 
PURRAT98 1.000 
. 
180 
-.126 
.092 
180 
-.021 
.784 
179 
-.313 
.000 
180 
-.154 
.039 
180 
-.019 
.807 
172 
-.143 
.063 
170 
VOICEREL -.126 
.092 
180 
1.000 
. 
200 
.044 
.536 
199 
.135 
.071 
180 
.550 
.000 
200 
.521 
.000 
191 
.111 
.127 
189 
FOREISOU -.021 
.784 
179 
.044 
.536 
199 
1.000 
. 
199 
.100 
.181 
179 
-.021 
.766 
199 
-.002 
.975 
190 
-.035 
.637 
188 
ROS98 -.313 
.000 
180 
.135 
.071 
180 
.100 
.181 
179 
1.000 
. 
180 
.119 
.111 
180 
.155 
.043 
172 
.231 
.002 
170 
ECONPERF 
(RELATION) 
-.154 
.039 
180 
.550 
.000 
200 
-.021 
.766 
199 
.119 
.111 
180 
1.000 
. 
200 
.562 
.000 
191 
.080 
.273 
189 
STRATPERF 
(RELATION) 
-.019 
.807 
172 
.521 
.000 
191 
-.002 
.975 
190 
.155 
.043 
172 
.562 
.000 
191 
1.000 
. 
191 
.109 
.143 
183 
FINAPERF 
(FIRM) 
-.143 
.063 
170 
.111 
.127 
189 
-.035 
.637 
188 
.231 
.002 
170 
.080 
.273 
189 
.109 
.143 
183 
1.000 
. 
189 
Table C9: correlations between three independent variables, 1998 ROS and survey 
performance measures. Presented are the correlations, significance levels of correlations (2-
tailed) and number of firms that were correlated. 
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 PURRAT98 VOICE FOREISOU LOGMAR98 ECONPERF 
(SUPPLIER) 
STRATPERF 
(SUPPLIER) 
STRATPERF 
(FIRM) 
MARSHA98 
PURRAT98 1.000 
. 
180 
-.126 
.092 
180 
-.021 
.784 
179 
.044 
.561 
180 
-.154 
.039 
180 
-.019 
.807 
172 
-.024 
.752 
177 
-.078 
.299 
180 
VOICE -.126 
.092 
180 
1.000 
. 
200 
.044 
.536 
199 
.084 
.263 
180 
.550 
.000 
200 
.521 
.000 
191 
.139 
.052 
197 
.085 
.259 
180 
FOREISOU -.021 
.784 
179 
.044 
.536 
199 
1.000 
. 
199 
.240 
.001 
179 
-.021 
.766 
199 
-.002 
.975 
190 
.107 
.136 
196 
.131 
.080 
179 
LOGMAR98 .044 
.561 
180 
.084 
.263 
180 
.240 
.001 
179 
1.000 
. 
180 
-.024 
.747 
180 
.071 
.355 
172 
.032 
.669 
177 
.707 
.000 
180 
ECONPERF 
(SUPPLIER) 
-.154 
.039 
180 
.550 
.000 
200 
-.021 
.766 
199 
-.024 
.747 
180 
1.000 
. 
200 
.562 
.000 
191 
.214 
.002 
197 
.014 
.856 
180 
STRATPERF 
(SUPPLIER) 
-.019 
.807 
172 
.521 
.000 
191 
-.002 
.975 
190 
.071 
.355 
172 
.562 
.000 
191 
1.000 
. 
191 
.203 
.005 
190 
.087 
.259 
172 
STRATPERF 
(FIRM) 
-.024 
.752 
177 
.139 
.052 
197 
.107 
.136 
196 
.032 
.669 
177 
.214 
.002 
197 
.203 
.005 
190 
1.000 
. 
197 
.017 
.824 
177 
MARSHA98 -.078 
.299 
180 
.085 
.259 
180 
.131 
.080 
179 
.707 
.000 
180 
.014 
.856 
180 
.087 
.259 
172 
.017 
.824 
177 
1.000 
. 
180 
Table C10: correlations between three independent variables, 1998 market share, log of 
1998 market share and survey performance measures. Presented are the correlations, 
significance levels of correlations (2-tailed) and number of firms that were correlated. 
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Appendix D: The Internet in sourcing95  
 
 
As stated before, the Internet is an important driver of change in sourcing strategy. What is 
interesting is how this change process occurs. Does the Internet fundamentally alter the 
nature of existing relationships? Does it tend to favour particular kinds of relationships in the 
long run thus eliminating others? In order to look at buyer-supplier relations as they evolve it 
is necessary to obtain a basic understanding of this change process. In this appendix a model 
will be developed and illustrated that helps to deal with this question. 
 
Different tools, different purposes 
Companies now have available a wider range of tools to execute their sourcing strategies. 
Some of these tools are Internet catalogues, Intranet catalogues, Internet EDI, electronic (or 
Internet) auctions, search tools, procurement solutions on an Intranet, electronic (Extranet) 
networks and web portals (marketplaces). These tools serve different purposes.  
An Internet catalogue is an online shop where buyers can investigate a firm’s product 
offerings and purchase products. The most famous example of an Internet catalogue, 
Amazon, operates in business-to-consumer markets. A very wide range of firms in both 
business-to-business (B2B) markets and business-to-consumer (B2C) markets is now 
operating Internet catalogues. Intranet catalogues are normally limited to B2B markets and 
usually only applicable to larger firms. Firms gather information from a variety of suppliers 
and combine that information in an internal catalogue, which is subsequently published on the 
Intranet. Employees are provided with authority to order from the catalogue up till a 
maximum amount. Novartis is one organisation that has implemented an Intranet catalogue 
(Koppius et al, 1999). Internet EDI (Threlkel and Kavan, 1999) is based on regular EDI. The 
difference is that the Internet (or an Intranet or Extranet) is used as the medium to transport 
EDI messages. This allows for a greater degree of standardisation because TCP/IP based 
forms can be used. This is a major advantage in EDI messaging where a lack of 
standardisation has been a constant problem. Manufacturing and distribution firms have been 
implementing Internet EDI. Electronic auctions are auctions conducted over the Internet 
with the aim of having multiple bidders compete with each other for the best offer. While the 
auctioning technique has been around for much longer, using the Internet allows auctioneers 
to conduct real-time auctions across multiple places. Thus the possibility to conduct an 
auction is available at a much lower cost. Freemarkets is a firm that has pioneered the use of 
auctions in the B2B context (Koppius et al, 1999). Search tools include general search engines 
over the Internet, such as Google, but also more specific forms like the online version of the 
yellow pages. They are used in both B2B and B2C contexts to gather and then reduce 
information. By drawing upon the extremely wide range of information available and then 
filtering that information these tools allow users to search for specific needs. Procurement 
solutions, like those of Ariba, extend Intranet catalogues one step further by also integrating 
other functions such as inventory control and shipping and automating the entire process 
from the order to the actual delivery of a product. Electronic networks are means to connect a 
                                                           
95 Some of the concepts, though none of the content, in this section have been drawn from a paper on 
electronic sourcing (Koppius, Mol, Van Heck & Van Tulder, 1999). 
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large number of parties to each other electronically. In a sense they are ‘communities’ of firms. 
A well-known example in this category is the supplier network of Cisco that helps Cisco 
suppliers connect to Cisco but also to each other. Web portals or marketplaces really are 
communities of firms in the sense that they bring together a large number of buyers and 
suppliers. While most marketplaces started by merging a number of catalogues of suppliers 
and offering this combined catalogue to potential buyers, many are now also seeking 
extensions towards trading options through auctions or message boards (for example 
VerticalNet Exchange). In order to illustrate the role of these new tools in buyer-supplier 
relations a case study is now presented of an electronic auction that changed a buyer-supplier 
relation. 
 
Case study electronic auction 
Electronic auctions are one new and important tool for buying firms to manage relations with 
their suppliers. This case study attempts to illustrate the auctioning process and the 
consequences of electronic auctions on buyer-supplier relations. The case study is based on 
three interviews with both the buyer and supplier at locations in Eindhoven, Best and 
Hamburg, a public roundtable discussion and secondary materials. All these materials were 
gathered in late 2000. 
 
Background 
Philips Medical Systems (PMS) is a division of the Dutch electronics giant Philips NV. Philips 
is officially based in Amsterdam, but the core of its activities is found in Eindhoven, a city in 
the south of the Netherlands. The turnover of PMS in 1999 was 2.5 billion Euro. In that same 
year PMS employed some 11,800 employees. The 1999 earnings before taxes amounted to 225 
million Euro. PMS is a very research intensive firm. In 1999 it spent 7.9% of its sales on R & 
D expenditures. In 2000 PMS completed three major acquisitions in the U.S. by buying 
Medquist, Agilent Technologies and ADAC Laboratories. This further strengthened its 
position globally and particularly in North America. PMS has plants in four sites: Best (near 
Eindhoven) and Heerlen in the Netherlands, Seattle in the United States and Hamburg in 
Germany. PMS products include Ultrasound, MR, CT, IT and X-ray machines. PMS is the 
world’s number 3 player in medical systems behind General Electric of the U.S. and 
Germany’s Siemens. In Europe only Siemens has a larger market share than Philips. The total 
size of the markets PMS operates in globally is an estimated 17.5 billion Euro, of which 
modalities (the main PMS products) make up 10 billion Euro.  
The X-ray products, which will be the focus of attention here, are produced in both 
Best and Hamburg. The case being discussed deals with three types of X-ray machines 
produced in the Hamburg plant. The electronic X-ray equipment is stored in 19-inch cabinets. 
In itself 19 inch is a fairly standardised size for these cabinets, which will also be found in 
many offices. PMS uses a tailor-made variant of the 19-inch cabinet, which has fewer features 
than the standard, universal 19-inch cabinet and is therefore usually cheaper than the universal 
cabinet. Cabinets have not changed much in appearance or materials use over the last few 
decades. However, there have been changes of the production process, with the increased use 
of CAD/CAM machines, automated cutting and other new process technologies. The three 
major steps in the production process are cutting steel plates, painting and varnishing them 
and then final assembly. Specifications of the cabinets PMS buys change every year or so. 
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Furthermore the specifications are slightly different for each of the three types of X-ray 
machines. 
Since the early 1980s PMS had been buying the cabinets from the same supplier, 
Stork Industrial Modules (SIM), a business unit of Stork. Stork is a large Dutch industrial 
conglomerate with a range of business units that are engaged in a wide range of engineering 
activities and production activities, including machine building. The turnover of Stork in 1999 
was 2.4 billion Euro. The firm’s stock is traded on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. SIM is a 
part of the Aerospace group, which had a total turnover of 364 million Euro in 1999. SIM has 
the explicit goal of being a first-tier supplier and attempts to manage the supply chain for its 
customers. Its three main areas of production include electronic cabinets & covering, 
mechatronic modules & machines and outdoor products, including for example telephone 
boots. SIM has two sites in the Netherlands, in Eindhoven (SIM headquarters) and Helmond, 
as well as a production facility in Poland. Furthermore it often collaborates with another Stork 
business unit, Stork Electronics, to produce joint products. Throughout the almost twenty 
years that SIM produced this product the relationship between PMS and SIM can be 
characterised as positive and collaborative. This can partly be traced back to the fact that the 
two major Dutch industrial firms Philips and Stork meet regularly to discuss all kinds of topics 
and often have joint interests in public or government affairs. To some extent there is also a 
historical connection because parts of Philips had been sold to Stork. However, the relation 
between PMS and SIM was not very intensive because almost no product innovation 
appeared during the period. So there was little or no exchange of engineering capability or 
joint problem solving. 
 
Description 
PMS was first confronted with an electronic auction when it participated in a workshop 
organised by the Technical University of Munich together with a number of large German 
firms, including banks. Having seen the savings one bank made on its electricity bills, due to 
an auction, PMS got interested and decided to scan its product portfolio for possibilities to 
conduct its own electronic auction. Several items were seen as potential targets for an auction 
but some were not possible for practical reasons, like long-running contracts, and for others 
the purchasing value was simply too low to organise an auction. Outside of Bill-of-Materials 
purchasing Philips uses quite a lot of centralised, company-wide contracts and for those PMS 
could of course not hold its own auctions. PMS had decided that the minimum annual 
purchasing value would have to be around 0.5 Million DM. The 19-inch cabinets appeared to 
be one of the few items for which both the purchasing value (several million Euro) and 
buying conditions were fitting. PMS decided to give the electronic auction a try and obtained 
two auction slots from TU Munich, which acted as the auctioneer. One of these slots was 
never used due to technical problems. Mr. Ludwig Binder, purchasing manager of PMS 
Hamburg admitted the auction was something of an experiment but suggested that the 
outcomes proved PMS was right. 
As PMS was planning to source this type of cabinet for another 2 years, it decided to 
hold an auction for 3,700 units over a 2-year period. To this end 10 suppliers were selected. 
Nine of these were suppliers were known to PMS, through earlier purchases or RFQs by PMS 
Hamburg or Best. PMS people visited all of these 9 suppliers within 2 years prior to the 
auction. One was a Rumanian supplier that PMS met at a trade fair. PMS was not aware of its 
Appendices 
 250
capabilities but decided to include it to obtain a benchmark price. It never intended to actually 
choose that supplier. In retrospect it turned out that this firm was a supplier to other large 
multinational firms, including Siemens (although not to its medical division). The final list of 
10 participants was agreed upon by the purchasing department and the development 
department. None of these 10 suppliers had any previous experience with electronic auctions. 
The suppliers were fully informed two weeks prior to the auction. Suppliers were not allowed 
to communicate during the auction and bids were anonymous to PMS. All suppliers were 
under the obligation to make at least one bid in the auction, which would last for a minimum 
of one hour with a maximum one hour prolongation. 
At SIM there was no such things as a warm welcome for this initiative. To SIM the 
announcement came as a shock because it was not previously informed about PMS plans in 
this area. Hans Büthker, general manager of SIM responded in the following way: 
 
“Well, you can imagine that if you have been supplying a product for 20 years 
and feel that you have a certain kind of relation with your customer, this comes 
as a surprise. You’re somewhat shocked. When we received these materials two 
weeks in advance, our first response was: if it’s going to be like this, we best quit 
now.” 
 
However, SIM decided to participate nonetheless in order to “obtain some experience with 
this new tool” but also to show that it classifies the medical industry as a strategic industry for 
its business. SIM made some calculations and decided it could take another 7% off the price 
in order to remain profitable. SIM did not expect anyone to go much lower than 7% below 
the current price level, which was consistent with PMS expectations, which were a price 
reduction in the range from 10 to 12%. In fact, PMS set a 10% minimum price reduction 
before it would change its source. 
 
Outcomes 
Apart from Stork and the Rumanian firm described earlier the participants in the auction were 
a Danish firm, a Spanish firm, a Czech firm, a Slovakian firm, two German firms and another 
Dutch firm? The Slovakian firm had informed PMS in advance that it did not believe in the 
auction tool and could only reluctantly be convinced to participate. The Slovakian and 
Rumanian firm strongly influenced the auction pattern. The Slovakian firm had decided 
before the auction to what price level it was willing to bid and subsequently advanced to that 
level directly. Only the fact that there was a 5% threshold level for every 5 minutes slowed 
down the price drops. As described above SIM had decided in advance that it would go no 
further than 7% below its old price level. Some of the other firms also had their own reasons 
to limit their bids. In the end only the Slovakian firm, the Rumanian firm, a Danish firm, and a 
German firm competed for the lowest bid. Just when the price seemed to stabilise towards the 
end of the auction, the Rumanian firm made another price drop that made it win the auction. 
However, it could never have won the order in the first place, which was rewarded to the 
second highest bidder, a German firm. Given the general price level of the other Northern 
European bidders, this German firm appears to be somewhat out of range. Its bid can be 
explained by specific circumstances. This firm owns a plant in Hungary that was not utilised 
to its capacity before the auction. Since the firm had capacity to spare, it decided to make a 
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lower bid than it could normally have made given its cost levels. The firm was satisfied to 
regain only part of the fixed costs it was incurring. 
After the auction ended there was brief contact between PMS and SIM when Mr. 
Binder visited SIM in Eindhoven. SIM was provided with a final opportunity to cut its price 
level, but declined to do so. PMS maintains that if SIM would have gone down to 15% below 
the original price, there may have been a lot of discussion on whether or not to switch 
suppliers. Another disagreement between the two parties centres on the final order for 
cabinets that PMS placed with SIM. A rather large quantity of cabinets was ordered from SIM 
after the auction was finished and the decision to switch suppliers had been made. While PMS 
maintains that it had been offered the opportunity to order more cabinets by SIM, SIM said 
that PMS had demanded the extra load to build up inventory in case the new supplier would 
be unable to deliver the cabinets at the right time and quality. 
 
The relation between SIM and PMS was terminated after the auction. Although the two 
parties still meet regularly, if only for being located so close to one another, there is no 
ongoing co-operation anymore. SIM has phased out the product. 
 
Implications from the case study 
The relation between PMS and SIM was terminated because both parties did not foresee any 
future improvements to make it worthwhile to continue the commitment. This appears to be 
a major departure from the situation as it was. However, several interesting things emerge on 
both sides of the relation. PMS conducted a previous audit that signalled SIM’s product 
offering might not be competitive anymore. Furthermore the electronic auctioning process 
forced PMS to review its entire product portfolio in a structured manner with the explicit 
objective of identifying candidates for the auction in terms of potentially realisable savings. 
The cabinets came out as the prime candidate. Both of these seem to suggest that PMS, rather 
than introducing a major change now, was perhaps several years late in considering a change 
of suppliers. If PMS would have more closely monitored market developments in cabinets it 
might have been tempted to consider switching at an earlier point. Obviously achieving the 
lowest possible costs in purchasing these cabinets was not a high priority at PMS in previous 
years. 
 From the perspective of SIM this cabinet was a product at the low end of its 
technology range. Compared to relations with other buyers, including high tech firm ASML, 
this was a relatively static relation. In fact, nothing much had changed over the course of 20 
years. The fact that SIM has now decided to phase out the product entirely, instead of trying 
to improve its competitiveness with this product, is also telling in this respect. It is also 
interesting to note that moving production to the plant in Poland was never considered, not 
before the auction, not during the auction and not after the auction. This is indicative of the 
low management priority given to retaining the product and also of the unwillingness to move 
any production activities from the Netherlands to Poland. The latter would probably cause 
internal resistance. The conclusion is that the product was simply not considered a core 
product of SIM. 
 Both parties have witnessed changes in the outside world over the 20-year time 
period during which SIM delivered the cabinets to PMS. Sourcing became more international 
and many new technologies and products were introduced. After 1989 Central and Eastern 
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Europe increasingly became a part of the European economic space. Customer demands for 
medical products altered and the nature of competition in the market changed too. Buyer-
supplier relations were increasingly seen as a potential source of competitive advantage. Both 
buyers and suppliers increasingly pursued co-operative buyer-supplier relations. But this 
relation hardly changed. Perhaps the most intriguing question coming out of this case study is 
why nothing changed for so long. The changes that occurred as a consequence of the auction 
could have come at a much earlier time. Viewed this way, the primary function of the 
electronic auction is to speed up processes that were somehow inevitable. The electronic 
auction is more a carrier or catalyst of changes then an engine for change. This is not to say 
the role and impact of the auction is marginal, because this auction did have a significant 
impact on both firms. This impact is perhaps mostly related to the way these firms think 
about using electronic auctions in buyer-supplier relations. Their awareness of electronic 
commerce and electronic auctions in particular has increased dramatically. 
 
A model 
The  In t e rn e t  induc e s  chang e  in  buy e r - supp l i e r  r e l a t i on s . However, it appears that this is 
not a change of direction in these relations, but mostly a way of speeding up ongoing 
developments. The Internet is an enabler of what firms want to achieve in their inter-
organisational relations. In order to get a broader understanding of how to interpret various 
Internet-based solutions, a model is presented in figure 1. The model in figure 1 explicitly 
builds upon earlier work that included four other cases (Koppius et al, 1999). This model 
utilises two dimensions of buyer-supplier relations to categorise the variety of solutions 
available, a process dimension and an outcomes dimension. The model categorises the 
solutions in terms of the circumstances under which they are most useful. Sometimes they 
may also be useful under different circumstances, sometimes they may not be useful or even 
completely dysfunctional. 
 The first dimension, displayed in the vertical axis, is the length of the economic 
exchange varying between a single transaction and a long-term relation. This is the process 
dimension of the model. This amounts to something similar to exit and voice perspectives, 
which also require different time horizons. Both ends of this continuum present very different 
demands on Internet-based solutions. Given that two firms will engage in a single transaction 
with no clear commitment to further transactions, it is most useful to use an infrastructure 
that is efficient for a single transaction. Auctions or Internet catalogues are good models for 
such situations. They allow firms to obtain the appropriate information or the right bargaining 
model to solve their current needs. On the other hand setting up an infrastructure that allows 
ongoing interaction like an electronic network is probably a case of investing too much. These 
are unnecessary investments that might harm the effectiveness of the transaction, for example 
because the price mechanism can not be applied to the full extent. 
 The horizontal the second dimension, the performance criteria to be obtained, varies 
between very clear criteria and highly diffuse criteria. This is the outcomes dimension. A clear 
criterion is minimum price or a pre-defined quality level. Such criteria can be measured very 
well and can usually be quantified. A diffuse criterion could be joint learning or finding a 
range of potential suppliers for a new component. Such criteria are often defined ‘on the fly’ 
with contracts being incomplete by nature. As managers go along they decide what it is they 
want. These criteria are more often than not difficult or impossible to measure. For example a 
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buyer and several suppliers might decide to form an electronic discussion group to discuss a 
potential product innovation. This is best done in an electronic network setting. Using an 
auction seems a less appropriate and potentially very disturbing mechanism. In cases like this 
the auctioning mechanism may well cause mistrust and disrupt the innovation process. The 
‘clear’ versus ‘diffuse’ criteria fit in with the economic versus strategic performance distinction 
made earlier. Clear criteria are similar to economic supplier performance while diffuse criteria 
are similar to strategic supplier performance. 
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Figure 6.1: A model of various E-commerce applications and when they  
are most usefully applied. The X-axis portrays the nature of  
performance criteria. The Y-axis presents the length of the exchange. 
 
Evidence from the survey 
In the survey firms were asked to identify the extent to which they use four Internet-based 
solutions. These four solutions are Internet EDI, procurement solutions, web or Internet 
catalogues and electronic auctions. In table 11 correlations are presented between usage of 
each of these solutions and firm size, the relation with the largest supplier and supplier 
performance. This analysis has to be interpreted with the largest possible caution. First, usage 
of the solutions was measured at the firm level, as obviously is firm size, while only the 
relations with and performance of the largest supplier were measured. Thus a comparison is 
made between firm level variables and relation level variables. Obviously since this relation 
concerns the largest supplier, there is some reason to assume it is important to the firm and 
somewhat representative of its ability to manage supplier relations. Furthermore the number 
of firms responding positively to using an electronic solution is limited to 44 (Internet EDI), 
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31 (procurement solution), 46 (web catalogue) and 8 (electronic auction). This strongly limits 
the statistical reliability of the analyses, making it not advisable to use regressions here. 
Particularly in the case of auctions, no statements can be derived whatsoever. Inclusion of 
whether or not the firm uses a particular solution as a dummy variable is not very useful either 
with these numbers and given the high fluctuations among firms as to how intensive their use 
is. There are also questions surrounding the completion of the survey. It does not seem 
unlikely that some firms that use regular EDI have entered this as Internet EDI. And the term 
procurement solution may have been understood too broadly too. In any case, the use of 
Internet-based solutions by manufacturing firms in the Netherlands is still rather limited96. 
Nonetheless the correlations in the table may be a first piece of evidence for the 
model presented earlier. There is the expected positive correlation among different solutions, 
implying that firms that are active in EDI, are also more likely to be active in web catalogues 
or procurement solutions. This reflects a higher awareness of and interest in the role of the 
Internet in sourcing by these companies. Or more simply, it means some firms are 
frontrunners while others lag behind in the adoption of the Internet. Also larger firms are 
more active in using E-Commerce, except for using web catalogues. This also makes sense 
given the high initial investments needed to set up these systems as well as the fact that larger 
firms are probably more exposed to these developments. That web catalogues are an 
exception to the size effect is not surprising: investments in web catalogues are made by the 
supplier, not by the buyer. Using a web catalogue may in fact be an easy way for small firms to 
obtain some of the potential advantages of using the Internet. The only significant positive 
link to performance is that between procurement solutions and strategic performance. This is 
unexpected since procurement solutions were expected to be linked mostly to economic 
performance. It could be that procurement solutions have more of a strategic element in them 
than expected because investments in them require efforts by both buyers and suppliers and 
thus a long-term commitment. Or perhaps there is a measurement error given that only 31 
firms use a procurement solution. Finally there is some evidence that Internet EDI and 
particularly procurement solutions are positively related to voice relations and trust. This 
would be an indication that these solutions indeed require the long-term perspective ascribed 
to them in the model. But again this is at best seen as a piece of preliminary evidence for the 
model. At least there does not appear to be much evidence against the validity of the model. 
Obviously more extensive research efforts are needed in the future to look into this matter in 
more detail. 
 
                                                           
96 Further evidence for that statement is found in the extent of usage of these solutions: only Internet 
EDI and procurement solutions are used for substantial sourcing activity of 17% and 37% of total 
sourcing by firms that use them. Web catalogues are used for only 7% of sourcing and auctions for 5% 
of sourcing by firms that use them. 
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 Webedi Procsol Webcat Elauc Voice Trust Logpur Econper Stratper 
WEBEDI 1.000 
. 
199 
.272 
.000 
199 
.282 
.000 
199 
.014 
.842 
199 
.111 
.119 
199 
.098 
.172 
198 
.033 
.647 
198 
.089 
.212 
199 
.114 
.116 
190 
PROCSOL .272 
.000 
199 
1.000 
. 
199 
.159 
.025 
199 
.124 
.082 
199 
.146 
.039 
199 
.047 
.515 
198 
.113 
.112 
198 
.053 
.455 
199 
.219 
.002 
190 
WEBCAT .282 
.000 
199 
.159 
.025 
199 
1.000 
. 
199 
.131 
.066 
199 
.081 
.257 
199 
.062 
.387 
198 
-.016 
.825 
198 
.107 
.134 
199 
.029 
.696 
190 
ELAUC .014 
.842 
199 
.124 
.082 
199 
.131 
.066 
199 
1.000 
. 
199 
.071 
.317 
199 
-.136 
.056 
198 
.073 
.309 
198 
-.069 
.332 
199 
-.083 
.258 
190 
VOICE .111 
.119 
199 
.146 
.039 
199 
.081 
.257 
199 
.071 
.317 
199 
1.000 
. 
200 
.611 
.000 
199 
.026 
.714 
199 
.550 
.000 
200 
.521 
.000 
191 
TRUST .098 
.172 
198 
.047 
.515 
198 
.062 
.387 
198 
-.136 
.056 
198 
.611 
.000 
199 
1.000 
. 
199 
-.016 
.824 
198 
.577 
.000 
199 
.543 
.000 
191 
LOGPUR .033 
.647 
198 
.113 
.112 
198 
-.016 
.825 
198 
.073 
.309 
198 
.026 
.714 
199 
-.016 
.824 
198 
1.000 
. 
199 
-.023 
.751 
199 
-.054 
.455 
190 
ECONPER .089 
.212 
199 
.053 
.455 
199 
.107 
.134 
199 
-.069 
.332 
199 
.550 
.000 
200 
.577 
.000 
199 
-.023 
.751 
199 
1.000 
. 
200 
.562 
.000 
191 
STRATPER .114 
.116 
190 
.219 
.002 
190 
.029 
.696 
190 
-.083 
.258 
190 
.521 
.000 
191 
.543 
.000 
191 
-.054 
.455 
190 
.562 
.000 
191 
1.000 
. 
191 
Table 6.11: correlations between usage of (Internet) EDI, procurement solutions, web 
(Internet) catalogues, electronic auctions, voice relations, trust, firm size, economic and 
strategic performance in the survey. Presented are the correlations, significance levels of 
correlations (2-tailed) and number of firms that were correlated. 
 
 
Discussion 
The role of the Internet in buyer-supplier relations has been a topic of much debate among 
practitioners in recent years (Kaplan and Sawhney, 2000). While the original electronic 
markets literature (Malone et al, 1987), which was established prior to the rise of the Internet, 
suggested that sourcing would shift from hierarchies to markets as a consequence of 
increasing IT usage, the understanding that is now rising is tha t  th e  In t e rn e t  may  no t  b e  a s  
much  o f  a  tu rnaround  v eh i c l e  a s  s ome  pr ed i c t ed . In particular in business-to-business 
markets the Internet may just be another element of relations that will be incorporated over 
time. The case study and the very limited statistical study presented in this chapter lend some 
support to this view. There is a variety of Internet-based tools that firms use in their relations 
with suppliers. These tools have different properties and are best used under different 
circumstances. Some tools fit well with long-term relations while others help to support single 
transactions. Then there are tools that focus on measurable, economic benefits and yet others 
that are used for more diffuse performance criteria. A further step in this area of research is to 
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conduct studies that look at the effectiveness of such tools given the goals they are set out to 
achieve. This would probably require a longitudinal measurement among a larger set of firms. 
 
Summary 
The role of the Internet in buyer – supplier relations was discussed based on a case and some 
survey analysis. The Internet is best seen as a tool that is integrated into existing relations. 
There are various Internet-based solutions that have utility in various situations. Based on a 
performance dimension and a relation dimension a model was presented to depict which 
solutions fit what situations. A case study of an electronic auction was used to illustrate this 
model and the statistical analysis provided some limited initial evidence for this model. 
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Samenvatting (in Dutch) 
 
Ondernemingen hebben vele doelen. Een belangrijk doel van ondernemingen is om 
voortdurend het  bedrijfsresultaat te verbeteren. Het vakgebied strategisch management houdt 
zich bezig met de vraag welke methoden geschikt zijn om betere bedrijfsresultaten dan de 
concurrentie te behalen. Dit proefschrift is een voorbeeld van een strategisch management 
studie. In het bijzonder ligt in dit proefschrift de vraag op tafel hoe bedrijven hun resultaten 
proberen te verbeteren door hun inputs op een strategische manier te betrekken (dit wordt 
‘sourcing strategie’ genoemd). Hierbij gaat het om drie strategische keuzen: 
 
1. Welke activiteiten doen bedrijven zelf en welke activiteiten besteden ze uit aan externe 
leveranciers (wat bekend staat als ‘outsourcing’)? 
2. Wat voor relaties bouwen bedrijven op met hun externe leveranciers (ook wel ‘supplier 
relations’)? 
3. In hoeverre betrekken bedrijven hun inputs uit Nederland dan wel de Europese Unie of 
uit de rest van de wereld (het vraagstuk van ‘global sourcing’). 
In dit proefschrift wordt elk van deze drie onderwerpen behandeld. Telkens wordt de vraag 
gesteld of bedrijven hun resultaten kunnen verbeteren door een bepaalde strategie te kiezen. 
 
In de eerste twee hoofdstukken van het proefschrift wordt de bestaande literatuur over 
sourcing strategie besproken en geëvalueerd. Er is al veel over dit onderwerp geschreven in 
verschillende vakgebieden van de bedrijfskunde, zoals strategisch management, international 
business, industriële marketing, inkoopmanagement en organisatietheorie. Toch blijken er 
diverse hiaten te zijn in de kennis op dit gebied. De twee belangrijkste gebreken zijn (a) dat er 
nauwelijks overlap bestaat tussen de verschillende vakgebieden en de drie onderwerpen en (b) 
dat er vrij weinig onderzoek in Europa is gedaan naar dit onderwerp. Het eerste gebrek is 
problematisch, omdat hierdoor te weinig gebruik gemaakt wordt van de mogelijkheid 
bestaande kennis te integreren. Het tweede gebrek leidt er toe dat we veel weten over sourcing 
strategie in de Verenigde Staten, maar over Europa, een andere economische grootmacht, veel 
minder. 
 
In het derde hoofdstuk wordt een theorisch model opgesteld dat de formele relaties definieert 
tussen de strategische keuzen die een onderneming maakt en de resultaten van de 
onderneming. Dit gebeurt op grond van eerder onderzoek in de praktijk alsmede theorie. Het 
model wordt gevormd met behulp van diverse theorieën (transactiekosten, resource based, 
exit-voice, sociale systeemtheorie) die voornamelijk gebaseerd zijn op inzichten uit de 
economische en sociologische wetenschappen. Er wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen de 
bedrijfsresultaten op korte termijn (met name financieel van aard) en de bedrijfsresultaten op 
lange termijn (de marktpositie en vaardigheden van de onderneming). Het model gaat er van 
uit dat veel uitbesteden op lange termijn negatief is voor de resultaten. Op korte termijn zou 
het zowel positief als negatief kunnen zijn. Van internationaal uitbesteden (global sourcing) 
wordt verwacht dat de effecten zowel op korte termijn als op lange termijn positief zijn. 
Omgekeerd heeft binnen Nederland uitbesteden dan een negatief effect. Van intensieve 
samenwerkingsrelaties met leveranciers wordt verwacht dat die op korte termijn negatief 
Samenvatting (in Dutch) 
 258
uitwerken, maar op lange termijn juist positief. Voor relaties waarin uitbesteder en 
toeleverancier niet samenwerken wordt juist het omgekeerde verwacht.  
 
In hoofdstuk 4 worden de vier onderzoeksmethoden besproken die deze studie gebruikt om 
het model te testen. De eerste methode is losse interviews. Om een goede indruk te krijgen 
van wat er speelt in de praktijk zijn diverse interviews gehouden met managers. De tweede 
methode is die van gevalsstudies. Een project van Ford rond internationaal uitbesteden wordt 
besproken in hoofdstuk zeven. Bij hoofdstuk zes hoort een studie van een internetveiling 
uitgevoerd door Philips Medical Systems. De derde onderzoeksmethode is statistisch 
onderzoek op basis van een grote database met cijfers van het Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek over industriële uitbesteding door bedrijven in de Nederlandse industrie. De vierde 
onderzoeksmethode is de statistische analyse van de resultaten van een door 204 managers 
van industriële bedrijven in Nederland ingevulde vragenlijst over hun sourcing strategie. Deze 
vragenlijst werd speciaal voor dit onderzoek ontworpen en uitgevoerd. 
 
De hoofdstukken 5, 6, 7 en 8 houden zich allemaal bezig met de analyse van de verschillende 
onderzoeksmethoden. In hoofdstuk 5 ligt de nadruk op de eerste van de drie hoofdvragen: in 
hoeverre kunnen ondernemingen het uitbesteden van activiteiten gebruiken om hun 
concurrentiepositie te verbeteren? De bevindingen van deze studie zijn dat uitbesteden 
nauwelijks effecten op het lange termijn bedrijfsresultaat heeft. Op korte termijn, voor de 
winstgevendheid van ondernemingen blijkt er wel een effect te zijn en wel een negatief effect. 
Dit betekent dat bedrijven die veel uitbesteden minder winstgevend zijn. Dit staat haaks op de 
trend van de laatste 15 jaren om steeds meer uit te besteden. Er worden in dit proefschrift 
meerdere verklaringen gegeven voor dit opvallende resultaat. Een eerste deelverklaring is dat 
het juist de bedrijven zijn die het slechter doen, die veel uitbesteden. Toch is er meer aan de 
hand: het lijkt er ook op dat ondernemingen onderschatten hoe belangrijk de samenhang is 
tussen verschillende activiteiten en er daarom  te weinig het belang van zien om die activiteiten 
te bundelen binnen de onderneming. Verder onderschatten veel bedrijven de 
coördinatiekosten die gemoeid gaan met uitbesteding en de afhankelijkheid die ontstaat van 
toeleveranciers. Men zou ook kunnen stellen dat de macht van ‘de markt’ om effectief te 
produceren overschat wordt. Er spelen overigens diverse andere factoren mee, zo blijkt het in 
sectoren met veel innovatie nog minder gunstig te zijn om uit te besteden. 
 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt nader ingegaan op de tweede hoofdvraag, namelijk of intensieve 
samenwerkingsrelaties met leveranciers tot betere resultaten leiden. Het antwoord luidt 
bevestigend: zowel op korte termijn als op lange termijn leiden samenwerkingsrelaties en veel 
onderling vertrouwen tot betere resultaten. Dit druist in tegen de gedachte dat als partijen op 
afstand staan en er alleen op eindprestaties wordt gestuurd, de resultaten beter zijn. Hier 
wordt dus verder bewijs gevonden dat ‘de markt’ waar partijen op afstand staan, minder 
effectief is dan het aangaan van relaties tussen partijen. Het opzetten van een 
samenwerkingsrelatie vergt overigens veel tijd en investeringen. Ook in dit hoofdstuk zijn 
andere factoren van belang. Onder meer bleek dat als een leverancier veel macht heeft, dit tot 
slechtere resultaten bij de uitbesteder leidt op korte termijn, maar niet op lange termijn, omdat 
dan complementaire vaardigheden belangrijk zijn en niet macht. 
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In hoofdstuk 7 ligt de derde hoofdvraag op tafel: leidt internationaal uitbesteden tot betere 
resultaten? Eerst wordt geanalyseerd in hoeverre bedrijven daadwerkelijk internationaal 
uitbesteden. Nederlandse industriële bedrijven blijken vooral binnen Nederland en de rest van 
de Europese Unie uit te besteden. Uitbesteding buiten de EU (‘global sourcing’) is een beperkt 
fenomeen, wat vooral bij enkele grotere bedrijven voorkomt. Voor het veronderstelde 
positieve effect van uitbesteden buiten Nederland of buiten de EU wordt geen bewijs 
gevonden. Dit betekent dat bedrijven die meer internationaal uitbesteden het noch beter noch 
slechter doen dan hun concurrenten. Met andere woorden: global sourcing heeft geen 
significante invloed op de resultaten van bedrijven. 
 
In hoofdstuk 8 wordt door een combinatie van databronnen geprobeerd om de verschillende 
vragen naast elkaar te leggen. Hier wordt dus een vergelijking gemaakt tussen de effecten van 
uitbesteden, het opbouwen van samenwerkingsrelaties en internationaal uitbesteden. In 
hoofdstuk 8 worden de resultaten van de eerdere hoofdstukken in grote lijnen bevestigd. 
Daarna worden de drie vragen conceptueel met elkaar verbonden in een model. Het blijkt dat 
er belangrijke interacties zijn tussen de verschillende vragen, dat wil zeggen dat hoe een 
onderneming omgaat met één vraag, consequenties heeft voor de andere twee vragen. 
Bedrijven die veel uitbesteden zijn bijvoorbeeld sterk gebaat bij een groot vermogen om 
samenwerkingsrelaties aan te gaan. Bedrijven die veel uitbesteden zullen eerder internationale 
toeleveranciers moeten zoeken. En als bedrijven internationaal uitbesteden zal het aangaan 
van echte samenwerkingsrelaties moeilijker worden. 
 
Hoofdstuk 9 tenslotte, bevat de conclusies en beperkingen van deze studie. Diverse 
beperkingen worden besproken zoals onvolkomenheden in de gegevens en het feit dat de 
studie zich alleen op Nederland richt. Ondanks deze beperkingen vormt deze studie een 
belangrijke aanvulling op eerder werk, dat zelf weer allerlei andere beperkingen kende. 
Richting ondernemingen worden diverse conclusies benadrukt. Ten eerste moeten 
ondernemingen uitermate kritisch omgaan met het instrument uitbesteding. In het wilde weg 
veel uitbesteden, zoals in de jaren negentig in Nederland gebeurd is, leidt tot slechtere 
resultaten. Ten tweede loont het opzetten van samenwerkingsrelaties met leveranciers 
inderdaad, hoe moeilijk het ook mag zijn. Ten derde is global sourcing geen zinvol instrument 
om de prestaties van de onderneming sustantieel te verbeteren. Daarnaast worden diverse 
implicaties voor de strategisch management literatuur gegeven. De studie sluit af met een roep 
om meer multidisciplinair onderzoek naar sourcing strategie, waarin nadrukkelijk de 
samenhang van diverse dimensies van sourcing strategie in ogenschouw moet worden 
genomen. 
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Summary 
 
This PhD thesis on global sourcing strategy is concerned with how firms obtain competitive 
advantage through managing their input side. The issue of competitive advantage is core to 
the field of strategic management but this study also draws significantly from the fields of 
international business, organisation theory, industrial marketing and purchasing & supply 
chain management. 
 
In chapter 1 an overview is provided of the literature on sourcing strategy. The review results 
in the identification of 3 research areas, which are subdivided into 5 dimensions of decision-
making on sourcing. The three areas of interest are make-or-buy decisions, supplier 
management, and international sourcing. All three have been studied in the management 
literature and interest in them appears to be growing. The make-or-buy area consists of one 
dimension, labelled ownership. At least since the work of Williamson (1975), academics have 
been discussing the merits of outsourcing versus vertical integration. The supplier 
management area consists of two separate dimensions, supplier relations and network 
management. Supplier relations have been studied extensively throughout the late 1980s and 
1990s, for example by Helper (1987), who frames them in terms of exit versus voice, and 
Dyer and Singh (1998). Issues of network management and embeddedness have also gained 
attention in that period, see for instance the work of Granovetter (1985) and Ford (1998). The 
third area, international sourcing, is subdivided in supplier internationalisation and 
international supply decisions. Supplier internationalisation is concerned with the extent of 
internationalisation of the supply base, see Kotabe and Omura (1989), who suggest a 
distinction between domestic versus international sourcing, and Kotabe (1992). International 
supply decisions is a less developed area of study, but see Faes et al (2000) or Handfield 
(1994). 
 Chapter 1 then provides an extensive review of the international sourcing area, since 
this has not been reviewed thoroughly before. This leads to the conclusion that most sourcing 
is not very international in nature and that decision-making is seldom of an integrated, global 
nature. Thus in previous research global sourcing is the exception rather than the rule. 
 
In chapter 2 the literature is assessed further with the explicit goal of identifying holes in that 
literature. Several important findings emerge. First, the literature on sourcing strategy is quite 
fragmented, not only because of an apparent lack of communication between various fields of 
study, but also because the three areas of study identified above are by-and-large treated 
separately. Second, the geographical spread of empirical studies is uneven: there are many 
studies of firms in the United States and fairly few of other regions of the world, in particular 
Europe. As a third point of concern, it appears that there has not been a great deal of research 
that specified and found convincing evidence for the performance effects of various sourcing 
strategies. This is particularly true for the third area of study, international sourcing. 
 
Building upon these criticisms, a conceptual framework is constructed in chapter 3. This 
framework relates the dimensions of (1) internal versus external sourcing, (2) exit versus voice 
relations, and (3) domestic versus international sourcing to firm performance. Similar to 
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previous studies (e.g. Murray et al, 1995) firm performance is seen as a two-headed 
phenomenon. In the short run firms strive for economic performance, which is often 
expressed in terms of profitability or other efficiency measures. In the longer run a firm aims 
at obtaining strategic performance, which is a stock variable taking the form of market 
positions and firm capabilities. 
 Then, building upon existing literature, several hypotheses are formulated concerning 
the relation between these three dimensions of sourcing and the economic and strategic 
performance of a firm. These are complemented by hypotheses concerning the moderating 
(interaction) effect from other, related variables. Finally, a range of control variables is 
specified. This results in the construction of one general model, which consists of three 
submodels that are each constructed around one of the dimensions of sourcing. 
 
Chapter 4 is concerned with the methodological base of the study. Two methods employed 
sparingly in this study, interviews and case studies, are briefly discussed. Then a database 
consisting of around 5,000 manufacturing firms in the Netherlands is presented. This database 
is primarily applicable to the first dimension of internal versus external sourcing. The rest of 
chapter 4 is devoted to discussing a survey that was constructed and executed as a part of this 
study. Some 204 respondents from manufacturing firms in the Netherlands, an effective 
response rate of 30.4%, provided data on all three dimensions of their firms’ sourcing 
strategies. The chapter discusses the nature of the sample and the quality of the response. The 
final part of chapter 4 is devoted to constructing several multidimensional scales. 
 
In chapter 5 the first of three dimensions, internal versus external sourcing, is investigated 
empirically using multiple regression and interesting results emerge. The most important 
finding is that external sourcing is strongly negatively related to firm profitability (economic 
performance). This counters a trend among both academics and practitioners to promote 
outsourcing of items as a means of improving financial results. Several moderating effects are 
found as well. Under conditions of high asset specificity, high R & D intensity, and high 
uncertainty it is even worse to outsource. There is also a moderately positive relation between 
external sourcing and strategic performance (market share).  
 
In chapter 6 the second dimension, exit versus voice relations, is discussed. Again there are 
several interesting findings. This study finds confirmation for the positive effect of voice 
relations on supplier satisfaction both in the short run (economic performance) and in the 
long run (strategic performance). Alongside with trust, a co-operative relation (voice) is 
needed to improve the performance of suppliers. Furthermore interesting other effects are 
found. It appears power is a useful tool to extract economic rents, but does not increase 
strategic performance. Loyalty to the supplier on the other hand is only moderately useful for 
economic performance but a necessity in the long run. 
 
Chapter 7 deals with the third dimension of domestic versus international sourcing. Empirical 
evidence is provided to support the statement that global sourcing is the exception rather than 
the rule in this sample of firms, although larger and more international firms do source more 
from abroad. Then the performance implications of international sourcing are investigated. 
No direct relation between international sourcing and economic performance could be 
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established. There is a relation between international sourcing and strategic performance 
(market share) but this is later explained away as a ‘size of the firm effect’, implying reversed 
causality. Thus there really is no evidence for any performance effect of international sourcing, 
contrary to parts of the literature and a widespread belief among practitioners. 
 
In chapter 8 an attempt is made to look at all three dimensions of sourcing strategy 
simultaneously. Given limitations of the data there are severe caveats to the empirical 
investigation into this integrated view. However, a conceptual discussion is then offered, 
which shows that there is an important overlap between the three dimensions of sourcing. 
Chapter 9, the conclusions of this study, therefore presents as one of the recommendations 
for further study a more integrated view of different dimensions of sourcing strategy. Another 
general conclusion presented is that in the current climate managers appear to overestimate 
the force and efficiency of the market at the expense of organising. 
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